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
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
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THE
BRITISH AND FOREIGN
EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

EDITED BY THE
REV. H. SINCLAIR PATERSON, M.D.

VOL. XXXII.



LONDON & OXFORD.
JAMES NISBET & CO., BERNERS STREET.
EDINBURGH: OLIVER & BOYD.
MDCCCLXXXIII.

PRINTED BY THOMAS AND ARCHIBALD CONSTABLE, PRINTERS TO HER MAJESTY,
AT THE EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY PRESS.

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BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JANUARY 1883.

ART. I.—*The Riviera and Palestine.*

NATURE loves to recapitulate. In her ascent in time and space she leaves nothing altogether behind. The pictures of the past are brought into the present. What existed in former ages in one part of the world may now be found in another part. None of the geological periods can be said to have vanished for ever. All ages of the world may be said to be contemporaneous. The living plants and animals of the glacial epoch may still be found on Alpine heights and in ocean depths, where the frigid conditions that once prevailed extensively are now locally continued. The age of reptiles still exists in the Galapagos Archipelago, and the age of Marsupials in Australia, which reproduces the Oolitic period in our own country. If we wish to form some idea of the aspect which Great Britain presented at the close of the Miocene epoch, we have only to go to the north-eastern seaboard of America, whose animal and vegetable productions are still very much what they were in our own country in that remote age. The phenomena which Scotland exhibited at the close of the glacial period, Norway still displays; and in its primeval pinewoods, its alpine plants and animals, and its social customs and land laws, Norway is only a larger Scotland postdated some

ten or fifteen centuries. The prehistoric pottery of Europe is still made in the Hebrides; and the Swiss lake-dwellings and the Scotch and Irish crannogs have their modern representatives, in the villages built by the Malays and the natives of the Orinoco district in South America, in the midst of the waters; and Venice itself is, so to speak, but the perfect flower of the idea rudely sketched in these curious primitive habitations.

Of this group of resemblances between regions far separated in time and space, which might easily be greatly multiplied, one of the most remarkable examples is the likeness between the Riviera and Ancient Palestine. The Riviera is now a picture of what Palestine was in the time of our Saviour. In these days, the visitor to the Holy Land finds everything changed. The great outlines of the scenery are still very much what they ever were; but the subordinate features are almost entirely altered. The effacing fingers of time and decay have obliterated many characteristic details of the landscape; and comparatively few objects remain to continue the grand traditions of the past. The country is laid waste; its terraces broken down, and the soil washed away from them; its woods and forests have disappeared; thorns and thistles have covered its fields, long withdrawn from cultivation. The supply of water, which made Moses call it a land of brooks, has been greatly reduced; and only a solitary specimen here and there remains of the magnificent palms which once abounded from Dan to Beersheba. The first sight of Palestine to one who expects to find a land flowing with milk and honey, as beautiful in daylight reality as it lay pictured in his own mystic dreams, is disenchanting. He cannot recognise the sacred scenes of his imagination in that hoary wilderness, haggard and austere, which spreads before his eye. In order, therefore, to form some idea of what the Holy Land was in the time of our Saviour he must go to the West; and there, nearer the great centres of modern civilisation, along the shores of the most frequented sea in the world, he will find at the present day an almost exact recapitulation of the archaic scenes that have long vanished in their own home. The earth still retains a faithful picture which illustrates the scenes and objects amid which our Saviour lived; and a residence in Nice, or in almost any part of the Riviera, is to the student of sacred subjects an

admirable Biblical education. There he will realise more vividly than anywhere else the scenic background of the gospel history, and recall the objects which gave life and colour to the visions of prophets and the songs of the temple, and lent their charm to the greatest dramas that have ever been enacted on our earth; while a grand sanctification from Bible memories gives to every hour in this beautiful land a Sabbath significance. Let us glance then at some of the most striking points of resemblance between the Riviera and Palestine.

The geographical position of the two countries is not dissimilar. They are both situated on the Mediterranean Sea,—the Riviera on the northern coast; Palestine on the eastern. The shore-line of both is nearly of the same length—about two hundred miles. It runs from north to south in the case of Palestine; it runs from west to east in the case of the Riviera. Palestine looks westward to its destiny in Europe; the Riviera looks eastward towards its origin in Asia. Palestine is a narrow strip of mountainous land between the far-stretching eastern desert and the waters of the Levant; the Riviera is a narrow strip of elevated land extending along the shores of the Gulf of Lyons, at the foot of the snow-clad Maritime Alps and their rugged offshoots.

Viewed on a large scale, the geological structure of Palestine is remarkably simple. It consists of a series of calcareous plateaus, roughened here and there on the west, and more markedly on the east, side by side by rocks of volcanic origin. It was formed by aqueous and igneous agencies; by an alternate baptism of water and fire. The Lebanon range consists chiefly of hard crystalline limestone, abounding in fossil ammonites and gasteropod shells, belonging to what is called the Neocomian Period, being the equivalent of the English Greensand. It is overlaid by a formation of soft white chalk, which has given to the range its name of Lebanon, or milk-white. The same formations occur throughout Western Palestine, with the hard underlying limestone in some places appearing denuded on the surface; and in others, such as in the south of Hebron, with the lower bed quite hidden by the overlying chalk which covers the whole country. In the central region, and on the higher hills of Galilee, overlying the chalk, there are traces of a dark, hard limestone full of nummulites, which is referred to

the tertiary period. Everywhere there is evidence of vast denudation, cutting up the table-lands into hills and ravines of great depth—indicating a former climate when the streams were larger, and the rains more frequent and abundant than now. The cretaceous submarine formations have been disturbed by various volcanic outbursts, the principal foci or centres of which are to the east of the Jordan and in Galilee. These eruptions belong to the early tertiary period; to the time when the volcanoes of the Roman plain were in full activity. And though volcanic action has now ceased in the Holy Land itself, numerous hot springs still testify to its recentness; while along the shores of the Red Sea there are even at this day some still active craters. The Bible narrative, particularly in the Psalms and the prophetic books, frequently alludes to volcanic phenomena, to earthquakes, and flaming and smoking hills; and this testimony, like that of Livy in regard to the analogous phenomena of the Roman plain, would confirm the belief that volcanic action took place in Palestine far on into the historic period.

Closely resembling the geology of Palestine is that of the Riviera. It, too, is remarkably simple, consisting principally of calcareous deposits and the products of volcanic eruptions. At Nice, as well as in other parts of the coast, the Neocomian and Cretaceous systems are well developed. Along the east side of the peninsula of St. Hospice may be studied the green-sand formation, which is identical with that of Lebanon; and overlying it, about the village of St. Jean, and on the headland of St. Hospice itself, may be seen the upper cretaceous rocks with their characteristic chalk fossils, resembling the cretaceous deposits of Hebron and the desert south of Beersheba. At Beaulieu, Villefranche, Antibes, and in the valley of the Roya at Ventimiglia, as well as elsewhere, the igneous rocks are strikingly represented. There are numerous traces in other parts of the country of volcanic action, and of the cretaceous formations having been more or less affected by lava streams, and basaltic rocks; in some instances the beds of limestone being violently contorted and upheaved, as at various points along the Corniche Road, just as they are on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho. These volcanic outbursts belong to the same early tertiary period as those of Palestine, and took place,

probably simultaneously, when the volcanoes of Central Italy and of Western Scotland were flaming to heaven, and presented a magnificent and appalling spectacle. Numerous hot springs, like those on the eastern shores of the Dead Sea, occur in the Riviera, testifying to the comparative recentness of volcanic action; and from a curious cavern in the side of the Mantega valley, near Nice, gushes forth a warm pellucid stream, that reminds one of the spring of Callirhoe, to which Herod the Great resorted in his last illness for its healing virtues. In the Riviera, as in Palestine, it is clearly seen that volcanic action must have continued over a long period, from the fact that in some places the older basalt-capping on limestone plateaus has been cut down by torrent-beds, and in others, the valleys and ravines so formed have served as moulds into which later lava currents have been poured.

It is not in the Riviera proper, however, but in a region further to the west and north, that the volcanic phenomena of Palestine find their most remarkable counterparts. The wild and dreary region of the Hauran, to the east of the Jordan, with its dark lava streams, scattered scorïæ and cinder cones, with their enclosed craters, closely resembles the district of the Puys of Auvergne. In both cases the volcanic cones are singularly fresh—though they have been extinct within the whole period of human tradition; and the sequence of volcanic action in the Hauran is a repetition of the well-known structure of Auvergne, whose recent lava frequently occupies the bed of a torrent that has scooped its way through the older basalts. In Eastern Palestine, as in Central France, may be seen the remarkable appearances of the Phlegræan Fields in Southern Italy. Like Palestine, the Riviera has experienced on a great scale the erosive power of water. The extraordinary *vallons* in the neighbourhood of Nice, and the numerous deep ravines between Cannes and San Remo, could not have been scooped out by the torrents which at present flow through them, and which are dry for the most part of the year. They bear witness to a former climate, when rain and river-water were much more developed than they are now. There is nothing in the Riviera, however, analogous to the most interesting of all the geological features of Palestine, the valley of the Jordan—the greatest absolute depression on the

earth's surface, and to the series of four large inland lakes, which mark at intervals the course of this most wonderful longitudinal fault or crevasse, and have a strange, unnatural aspect like the lakes of Albano, Nemi, and Avernus in Italy, which have had a similar volcanic origin. Indeed, a singular absence of lakes characterises the whole Riviera. But the deep depression of the Jordan is to a certain extent paralleled by the trough of the Mediterranean Sea, which close along the shore from Cannes to Mentone, is exceedingly deep, and must have been produced by a somewhat similar cause. When the Jordan valley was filled with the waters of the Red Sea, it presented a phenomenon not unlike that of the Mediterranean along the shores of Nice; and the extraordinary saltness of the Dead Sea, the remains of this larger ancient sea, is only a few degrees greater than that of the Mediterranean, whose exceptional concentration and weight are caused by similar excessive evaporation.

The general contour of the two countries is also surprisingly similar. The great rocky backbone of Palestine, running from north to south, is repeated in the Riviera by the wild stony heights girding the coast from east to west, and forming the intermediate ground between the Maritime Alps and the sea; while the valleys and tributary glens of the Holy Land are repeated in the numerous ravines and gullies which separate the hills and ridges of Nice and Mentone, marked by torrents whose shingly channels are in most instances quite dried up. In the Riviera, as in Palestine, there is a comparatively level tract of land along the sea-shore, on which the larger towns and villages are situated. And the Jordan, running down in its deep defile between its lofty hills, spreading over a wide terraced channel, which it only fills in rainy weather, or after the melting of the snows of Lebanon, has its counterpart in the Var, which is also fed by the Alpine snows, pursues its course for the most part between lofty hills, and at its lower end has a strange-looking channel, above half a mile broad, whose bareness is broken only by the impetuous flow of a few distinct streams, which have scooped out for themselves deep trenches among the sand and gravel. The snowy chain of Lebanon, which forms the background of almost every landscape from any rising ground in Palestine, is

paralleled by the enthroned and diademed Alpine summits, which lift up their white brows to the sky on the edge of the vast amphitheatre of Nice, and make the crowning glory of the view. In both cases they suggest, not so much an alien unremembered winter far away, as the vision of the Great White Throne, and of that radiant heavenly city which has no need of the sun, neither of the moon, to shine in it, and carry the sublimity of the earthly landscape up into the region of the spiritual and eternal, filling the soul not only with awe and reverence, but lifting it into a peace and patience kindred to their own. And while the snow of the Arctic regions thus finds a place on the highest points of the two countries, the heat of the torrid zone may also be felt in them both; for at Jericho the climate and productions resemble those of Southern India, and a part of the Riviera, near Nice, has received the name of "*La Petite Afrique*," from the exceptional heat of its naked barrier-crag, with its spray-bedewed platform of rare semi-tropical flowers. From the heights of the Riviera, as from the heights of Palestine, the same wonderful combination of the changeless blue of the Mediterranean Sea, the eternal snow of the mountains, and the fadeless beauty of the palms of the desert, may be seen, in a single view, in one indescribable picture! In the Riviera, as in Palestine, we see spread out horizontally, what we see vertically on any lofty mountain rising above the snow-line in the tropics—a near conjunction of different types of vegetable life, ranging from the arctic plants of the snowy summit to the tropical botany of the base. In Palestine the *Oxyria reniformis* of our own Highland mountains and of the arctic flora grows on the top of Hermon; while the *Salvadora Persica* of India grows in the Jordan valley; just as on the Col di Tenda of the Maritime Alps is found the saxifrage of Northern Britain and Greenland, and on the hot rocks of Nice the Euphorbia of Central Africa. And in both countries we have these two extremes existing in a temperate climate. A tropical mountain which would exhibit vertically those contrasts of climate and productions, would have its general surface tropical, harmonious with the region in which it stood; and thus it would be altogether unadapted to the development of a hardy independent race, such as inhabited the plateaus of Palestine and the Riviera. But in

Palestine and the Riviera, while the general surface of the country is temperate, the contrasts of climate and productions are secured, by lifting one part to the arctic heights of the Lebanon and the Alps, and sinking the other part to the tropical depths of the Dead Sea, and the sheltered shores of the Mediterranean, leaving the middle portions of the two countries more favourably situated for the support of vigorous life, and the development of a strong individuality of national character.

One of the most remarkable features of Palestine and of the Riviera is the number of towns and villages perched upon isolated rocks and lofty precipitous hills. Beyond most countries the Riviera and Palestine abound in such natural fortresses and cities set upon a hill, great and walled up to heaven, approached only by the narrow path worn white on the grey or brown breast of the steep slope. The traveller through these regions sees with surprise hoary ruins or still inhabited hamlets picturesquely crowning many a wild crag and mountain top. They tell of times of lawless violence and oppression, when such places of defence and safety were sorely needed ; and also of primitive ages, when the valleys and low grounds were uninhabitable on account of swamps and the pestiferous breath of the deadly malaria, and the loose alluvial soil of the plain was apt to be swept away by the sudden rush of the winter-torrents from the neighbouring hills, affording but a treacherous foundation in comparison with the naked rock and the lofty height. Economical reasons also determined this choice of position. In countries where the ground is too valuable to be allowed to produce a useless tree, where every inch of soil is needed for the growth of the necessities of life, human habitations are naturally placed on rocky heights or in lonely desert places, too barren to be of any other use, so that the inhabitants might not waste any portion of ground which it was possible to irrigate and cultivate. Chorazin, Bethsaida, Samaria, Nazareth, have their counterparts in Vence, St. Jeannet, Falicon, Eza, Roccabruna, and those wonderful villages on the hills above Mentone, which were built centuries ago for protection from the Moorish pirates. The convent of Mar Saba, on the way to the Dead Sea, is not more remarkable and picturesque than the ruins of Tourette,

or the Deserted Village, on the top of a desolate hill nearly 3000 feet above Nice. And while there is a strange natural fascination in the sight of these villages and ruins on their arid peaks, which long years of rain and sunshine have made so like the rock upon which they are perched, that it is difficult to tell where Nature's workmanship ends and man's begins, they have at the same time a rich spiritual suggestiveness. We understand, when visiting such lofty eyries, what is meant by the frequent Scripture allusions to "dwelling on high," with the wide view, the pure air, the glories of dawn and sunset, the stars so close overhead, and the elevation above all the sordid strife and trouble of the lower world, and all those natural influences which in such places calm and purify the soul; and also the references to the "rock of our salvation," the imagination quickly discovering the analogy between the natural fortress and Him who is greater than a rock and high tower. We see how these inhabited rocks opened up to David and the prophets expressive symbols of the God in whom they trusted, especially of that aspect of His character from which they derived the greatest comfort in times of danger and despondency. And we see why such ideas should have been transferred to our own spiritual hymnology, and mingle with all our public and private devotions.

"Rock of Ages, cleft for me,
Let me hide myself in Thee."

Here are the scenes from which all those ideas have been derived.

The allusions made to the sea by the Scripture writers lose much of their force and point when interpreted by what we know of our Western seas. Many of the phenomena of the Mediterranean are unique. Unlike the other great seas of the world, it has almost no tide, and there is therefore a strange sameness in its appearance and voice. In calm, its lovely blue surface looks like that of a lake; a resemblance which is still further increased by the utter absence of that fresh briny odour of the veritable ocean, which makes the air of our own sea-coasts so invigorating. In storm it has little or no variety. Even when lashed by one of its famous winds into seething foam, its billows are entirely different from the magnificent

rollers of the Atlantic coming in with a strong breeze and a rising tide ; they are monotonous in their form and movement, and break in ceaseless crashes upon the same shingly ridges. I have watched for hours, beside the beautiful Bay of Angels at Nice, the waves, driven by a strong mistral, lashing the shore ; but notwithstanding their tremendous magnitude and force, the line of foam on the beach continued always the same. Not an inch of the pebbles was wetted beyond that line. They retreated and advanced to this point with the regularity and precision of a pendulum. Gazing seaward upon the mountainous mass of foam advancing with terrific speed and impetus, it seemed as if the whole shore would be overwhelmed with an overflowing flood ; but at my feet, at precisely the same point where it last expended its fury, it broke as gently as a ripple on the brim of a mountain tarn. I have seen a lady sitting on a camp-stool on the shore, within a few inches of the edge of the sea, calmly sketching the wonderful billows as they arched and curled over into foam, when to the spectator the situation seemed full of imminent peril ; but like the might of the lion beside the innocence of Una, the raging of the sea was tamed, and it only shook the drops from its hoary mane as it crouched at her feet. I had, with such a spectacle before my eyes, a more vivid idea than I ever realised before of the force and significance of the Scripture words, "He hath compassed the waters with bounds." "When he gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment." "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further ; and here shall thy proud waves be stayed." The Mediterranean Sea, more than any other sea, because of its want of tides, gives one the idea of a chained force. When you stand upon its shore, you feel as if you touched the very feet of Jehovah, and saw them indicating the limit of its power. No such impression is received from the Atlantic, or any other tidal sea, whose mighty waters roll onwards majestic and irresistible whether in ebb or flow.

So also no other sea could give the illustration which the prophet derived from the Mediterranean, as he watched its waters, alternately engulfing and casting up the sandy and chalky soil of the beach under the lash of the west wind : "The wicked are like the troubled sea when it cannot rest,

whose waters cast up mire and dirt." The same phenomenon may be observed in the Riviera as in Palestine. The waves, as they beat upon the shore, grind the rocks and stones, and stir up a great amount of white solid matter, which gives the water along the beach a milky appearance. The incessant pounding of the waters on the same part of the shore—for even when the sky is calm and serene, the waters of the sea are often agitated by the swell of some storm, that has spent its fury in some other region of its wide domain—the continual grinding of the wave-mill at the same point produces more débris from the surrounding calcareous rocks along the shores of the Mediterranean, than can be seen along the shores of any other sea. If the water of the Mediterranean is examined by means of a concentrated beam of light, it is found to be full of fine particles held in suspension, which reflect rays of all colours; and the water by its selective absorption allows only the blue rays to be reflected to the surface and to the eye. Near the shore the colour is lighter and greener than it is further out, owing to the greater quantity of white solid matter which the water holds in suspension; and the variety in the colouring of the sea, like the bickering hues upon a dove's neck, is due to the amount of the suspended particles at different places and at different times. No one looking at the clear transparent waters of the Mediterranean would ever imagine that they were full of impurity—more full, indeed, of impurity than the water of our seas and lochs, that look so dark and drumly in comparison. And yet it is so in reality; that very impurity is the cause of its lovely transparency and blueness, just as the small particles of dust suspended in the air give the sky its beautiful clear azure hue. In certain states of the sea, however, the brilliant blue disappears, and the waves are seen to be dim and foul with the mire and dirt which they contain. It was in such a state that the prophet saw it, when he compared the restless and foul condition of the wicked to the ceaseless tossing to and fro of its muddy waters, laden with the débris of the shore. Motion usually purifies water—at least to appearance. How clear and snow-white does the filthy fetid river look when it falls over a weir! But here along the Mediterranean shore the motion of the water only intensifies its pollution; as the actions of the wicked, instead of refining them,

only deepen their vileness. And just as the apparent purity and blueness of the Mediterranean waters is only a mask to conceal their inherent impurity, so the fair professions of the wicked are only the reflection of heaven upon the surface of their life—while the mud of the pit is in the underflow.

The flora of the Riviera differs so much from that of Britain and Northern Europe, that the aspect of the country is entirely changed. In no other part of France or Northern Italy do the plants present such a semi-tropical appearance. Nowhere else—till the latitude of Sicily and Malta is attained—do so many species occur which belong essentially to the flora of Asia and Africa. Various circumstances favour the development of such semi-tropical plants so far out of their proper botanical region. One of these is the modifying effect upon the temperature of its shores of the Mediterranean, which is much warmer than other seas. Another is the protection afforded against the northern winds by the encircling range of the Maritime Alps, which absorb the moisture of these winds, precipitating it in the form of snow upon their summits. The sky in consequence is no longer obscured by vapour, mists, and clouds, but appears of a brilliant blue, and the sun shines forth in undimmed splendour, and stimulates the powers of vegetable life to the utmost. The climate is exceedingly dry, thus favouring the growth of evergreens, and plants with thick and leathery leaves, containing an unusual quantity of fragrant oils. Then, too, the limestone rocks, which are the prevalent features of the country, not only form, by their disintegration, the most fertile soil, but rising high above the ground in many places, reflect the sun's heat and communicate it with concentrated force to the soil beneath, so that plants in such situations grow as in a natural conservatory. The spurs and offshoots of the Alps, composed of limestone, form an extended undercliff beneath the mighty rampart beyond; and this undercliff, running east and west along the whole length of the Riviera, holds the southerly winds back on the coast-line below it, and so retains their warmth. It absorbs so much sun-heat during the summer that it becomes a regular stove, abnormally raising the temperature of the air and soil throughout the whole year. This is very remarkably the case between Nice and Mentone, which is so warmed by the lofty cliffs rising behind, that this part of

the Riviera has quite the climate of Northern Africa. Similar conditions exist in Palestine; and therefore we need not be surprised that the flora of the two countries should exhibit a remarkable correspondence. A vast proportion of the plants of Palestine are absolutely identical with those of the Riviera; and even in the comparatively few cases where they differ, they belong mostly to the same genera, and present an appearance which, to one who has studied the flora of Nice, is quite familiar.

The object that first strikes the eye of the visitor to the Riviera is the palm-tree. It is like a vision of a new world. It belongs so essentially to the tropics that one is surprised to see it in Europe. The legends and histories of the cradle-lands of the oldest civilisation cluster around it; and it realises pictures of sacred and Oriental scenes, that from our earliest years have produced a deep impression upon the imagination. In the Riviera it is a foreigner acclimatised; the original trees having been planted by the Arabs. There is indeed a European palm, the *Chamærops humilis*, or dwarf palm—a very common ornament of our conservatories, which once grew in great abundance along the northern shores of the Mediterranean. It is one of the most interesting relics of the miocene flora; but having survived for untold ages, it is now extirpated in the Riviera, and is found only on the southern shores of Spain and in Sicily. But the date-palm, a much more imposing and useful member of the family, has been introduced in its place, and produces illusions which its sister species, which has only a geological history, could not have created. Everywhere from Marseilles to Genoa, the visitor will see this palm growing in the gardens, often attaining a great height and girth, and spreading forth its huge tuft of fronds in undisturbed peace, while the leaves of other trees around are fluttering in the breeze. At Nice, some of the streets have avenues of palms, which impart quite an Eastern appearance to the town; while in the grounds of the Villa Zuylen, at the entrance of the Mantega Valley, there is one of the grandest palm-trees in the Riviera, bearing annually immense clusters of fruit. So abundant are the palms in that charming tract of land, extending from Bordighera to San Remo, that it used to be called the “*giurisdizione delle palme*,” the “circuit of the palm-trees.” At Bordighera, the palms grow in thousands, forming groves of great extent; and the preparation

and forwarding of leaves for the use of the Jews at the Feast of Tabernacles, and of the Roman Catholics in the ceremonies at Easter, and specially on Palm Sunday, is a very remunerative occupation. But though the palm is so common in the Riviera as to form one of the most striking features in the landscape, it nevertheless seldom ripens its fruit. Clusters of dates indeed appear on the trees; but the berries are comparatively small in size and crude in flavour, giving only an indication of the blessings which the tree confers upon its native country. At Bordighera, Egyptian seeds have to be planted in order to keep up and increase the supply of trees; but in some well-sheltered places the dates become perfectly ripe and germinate freely. In the garden of Signor Moreno may be observed seedlings that have grown spontaneously from the ripe fruits of the older trees.

In regard to its abundance of palm-trees, the Riviera is now what Palestine was in the days of our Saviour. At the present day the palm-tree is comparatively rare, except in the Philistine plains, and in the old Phœnicia about Beyrout. The history of the tree is emblematical of the people whose home was once in the land; and the well-known coin of Vespasian, representing the palm-tree with the legend "*Judæa capta*," forms a sad picture of the desolation that has overtaken the once-favoured heritage. As in the Riviera, so in Palestine, the palm-tree does not ripen its fruit everywhere or in every season. It is only in certain localities, such as the coasts and inland valleys, that it produces or matures its fruit. In the hill-country of Judæa it puts forth flowers, but does not yield, or at least ripen, its dates unless in exceptional seasons. It is remarkable that the references to the palm-tree in Scripture are almost exclusively confined to its stately and ornamental appearance, and rarely, if ever, to its fruit; the vine and fig-tree being the favourite symbols of fruitfulness. The true country of the palm-tree is the East, where the mean temperature never falls below 68°, extending, with slight interruptions, from the shores of the Atlantic to the confines of Persia. In that region it grows abundantly, and matures its fruit every season; its verdant canopy, supported by naked upright stems like a graceful peristyle, forming a beautiful contrast to the red and arid sand of the desert. In most parts of this changeless region the only

objects that break the monotony of the landscape are the date-palm and the tent of the Arab.

Next to the palms, the olive-trees of the Riviera attract the attention of the visitor. It is the tree that above all others determines the general appearance of the country. It is the tree that more than all others is characteristic of the Holy Land. It once covered all the fields and slopes of Palestine, ascending like a great altar-smoke of vegetation on the heights to the skies. But the ruthless hand of the destroyer has laid many of those olive woods low; and now the tree affords but a scanty covering in comparison to the barren hills and the arid plains. The olive must now be studied in perfection in the Riviera, for the Holy Land, in these degenerate days, gives no adequate idea of the beauty and luxuriance of which the tree is capable. Nowhere, except in the extreme south of Italy and Sicily, does the olive attain the size and grandeur which it reaches between Nice and Mentone. Generation after generation, its mighty trunks, hoary with lichens, lift up their far-extending branches covered with dark evergreen foliage, which accords so well with the cloudless sky, the bare limestone rocks, and the blue-green sea. A little above the station of Beaulieu, near Nice, may still be seen the enormous stump of an olive-tree lately burned to the ground by a madman, who danced among the flames. When standing, it required twelve persons with arms extended to surround it, and was more than a thousand years old. Though the olive does not seem at first to unfamiliar eyes so beautiful as our own northern birch, which it somewhat superficially resembles, one learns after a while to love it more than any other tree. Sombre and monotonous as it looks at a distance, it exhibits near at hand a singular variety of hues and forms; now looking hoary and soft, when the wind blows its leaves one way, like a luminous haze or a veil of warm light; and now, when the leaves are still in the breathless air, dark and awful, like the shadow of a thunder-cloud. Nowhere does the sky look so blue as through the meshes of its foliage; and its trunk and roots are so gnarled and twisted, as if it produced its wealth of foliage and fruit through much sore struggle with circumstances. While in our own birch, with its silvery stem and airy foliage, we see, as it were, the laugh of nature at the completion of her adorning the hills

with the softest moss and the greenest verdure, we see in the olive, with its rugged, cavernous trunk and sombre foliage, the smoke, as it were, of the earth's torment in forming out of the driest air and the barest rock, with the hardest struggle, the annual miracle of the multiplication of its cruse of oil. It is a weird and solemn tree, with a kind of hard passion in its lurid leaves, and a divine fury torturing its limbs like a vegetable Laocoon. Beneath its shade we dream of Olivet and the Garden of Gethsemane, and its leaves seem ever to whisper of the awful agony through which the world was redeemed. There is no tree whose associations are so entirely scriptural. It is like sharing in the life of the companions of our Lord to see from November to April, on the olive-covered heights above Nice, the peasants shaking down from the trees the sloe-black berries into great sheets spread upon the ground, or to pass by a simple olive-mill in some sequestered dell, crushing out of the glistening fruit the finest and thinnest oil—the same oil which fed the flame of the golden candlestick in the Jewish temple, and anointed the head of King David, as well as entered as an element of relish and nourishment into the common food, of which our Lord Himself must have partaken.

Growing on the same artificial terraces with the olives are the fig-trees. They are everywhere to be met with in the Riviera, as in Palestine. There are several varieties, and some trees in the neighbourhood of Nice have attained a gigantic size. In winter the fig is plain and naked as an ash-tree; its grey, plump, fantastically-tangled branches, destitute of leaves, look as if covered with hoar-frost in the sunshine, and have a ghostly appearance in the moonlight. At the end of March, however, light, tender, green leaf-lobes begin to unfold themselves from the hoary branches; and the contrast between these and the dusky, unvarying foliage of the olive groves, among which they gleam, is so striking that we see a new force and significance in our Saviour's words when He says to us, in that charming language of natural signs which He so often employed: "Now learn a parable of the fig-tree; when her branch is yet tender, and putteth forth leaves, ye know that summer is nigh: so likewise ye, when ye shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the door." This selection of the fig-tree, as exhibiting the first signs of approaching

summer, shows what a close observer of nature our Lord was. Almost all the other trees of Palestine are evergreen, and maintain the same appearance in winter and summer unchanged, the fig-tree being the only common conspicuous tree that sheds its leaves in winter and remains naked for several months. And the soft young foliage of spring, sprouting from the bare, frosty-looking branches, as if directly from the cold, icy bosom of winter, has such a rich suggestiveness of a more genial influence and of brighter times about it. It reads the natural prophetic lesson to the passer-by that the season of hope and fulfilment, the promise of the blossoming year, is at hand; and the deeper spiritual lesson that the time is near for every one, in which the Master will come seeking the fruit of all His gracious dealings with us. We see an interesting correspondence between the peculiar nakedness of the tree in winter, coupled with its rich, bright clothing of foliage in summer, and the self-consciousness of nakedness through sin which our first parents had in the garden, combined with the aprons of fig-leaves which they made for themselves. There is a plausibility in the tradition that the fig-tree was the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and a suggestiveness in the thought that the leaves of the tree itself, on the great universal principle of "like curing like," were made the means of healing or relieving one of the evils which the eating of the forbidden fruit had produced.

Frequently associated with the olive and the fig may be found throughout the Riviera the carob, or St. John's Bread, another of the prominent trees of Palestine. It has received in the Riviera the former name of carouba, or carob-tree, from the Moors, to whom the country at one time belonged, and who introduced into it, after its subjugation, several valuable economic plants. The latter name was bestowed upon it in Palestine from the supposition that it supplied the locust-beans which formed the food of John the Baptist in the wilderness. Its technical name, *Ceratonia*, is derived from the Greek name applied to its curious pods, *keratia*, literally "little horns." These pods supplied the original carat weights of jewellers and goldsmiths; hence the origin of the name. Nowhere in the Holy Land are there such splendid specimens of this tree as at Villefranche and Beaulieu, in the neighbourhood of Nice,

sending up from wide-spreading, half-bared roots, and knotted, powerful trunks, their dense crown of glossy foliage in the midst of olive groves, or alone on the sunny shore. It is here far north of its proper latitude, being in other parts of Europe confined to the extreme south of Italy and Greece. Nothing can give a greater idea of vegetable vigour and endurance than its massive trunk and stout, leathery, evergreen leaves, and yet it is in reality less hardy than the olive. It can endure any amount of heat, for it flourishes in Central Africa, where the olive is unknown; but it is impatient of cold, and perishes where the olive would thrive. Its pods are given to horses and mules; but, though often eaten by human beings, they are leathery, and have a very disagreeable smell and taste. Hence the touching reference to them in the Parable of the Prodigal Son, when it is said that, having spent all his money, he had come to want in the far country, and was fain to fill his belly with the *keratia*, or husks which the swine did eat.

In the same situations in which it is found in Palestine, viz., on the banks of streams and on the shores of lakes, the oleander grows wild in many parts of the Riviera. And where there is more than usual moisture in the soil, it forms extremely handsome and stately bushes, covered with rose or purple or pure white flowers. The ornamental specimens we cultivate in our greenhouses, or which we see growing in pots in France and Switzerland, give no idea of the beauty and luxuriance of the plant when growing wild in favoured spots in the Riviera and along the Sea of Galilee; their fresh green leaves and lilac flowers meeting the limpid waters upon a strand covered with tiny spiral shells. It is in all likelihood the willow of Scripture, and aptly illustrates the prophetic blessing,—“Thine offspring shall spring up as willows by the water-courses.” Another of the vegetable links of connection between the Riviera and Palestine is the pomegranate, which is as common in the one country as in the other. Indeed, the pomegranate belongs more specially to the western part of the Mediterranean than to the eastern, having travelled from Carthage, its native country, where it is found wild, to the other botanical regions of Europe, where it is now found. In the Riviera, as in Palestine, in common with the few other deciduous trees which cast their leaves every year, it presents a miserable appearance in winter

among the mass of evergreen vegetation, with its slender brown shoots, and thin naked ramifications. But when covered in summer with its beautiful green leaves and clusters of fleshy, scarlet blossoms, richly fragrant, there are few trees more ornamental. Partaking of the antiquity of the vine, fig, and olive, connected with religious ceremonies, and associated with heathen mythologies as well as scriptural scenes and incidents, yielding a fruit which has furnished a theme for very beautiful images in sacred and profane poetry, and whose pleasant acid juice is most grateful to the palate in hot climates, assuaging thirst in a degree quite peculiar to itself,—it is for these varied reasons one of the most interesting of natural objects; and an orchard of pomegranates was not more prized in the original scenes of the Canticles, than it is at this day in the farms around Nice and Mentone.

Frequently associated with the pomegranate in the Riviera is the peculiar-looking thorny jujube-tree, whose lanky branches, cracked here and there, are bare for three or four months of the year. It is common also in Palestine. Of a closely-allied species, whose branches, being long, slender, and pliant, could easily be plaited, it is supposed that the crown of thorns was made. No plant can be more treacherous than this gentle-looking tree; for under every leaf it conceals a sharp thorn curved like a fish-hook, which grasps and tears everything that touches it; while its glossy, deep-green, ivy-shaped leaves give to a crown woven of it a close resemblance to the classic wreath with which kings and heroes were wont to be adorned, thus conveying a calumny as well as a double mockery in the infliction. The Zizyphus is much used, both in the Riviera and Palestine, as fuel, on account of its abundance and the dryness of its slender twigs. Flashing up at once in a fierce and brilliant flame, which is speedily over, so different from the steady and persistent glow of other kinds of wood, it gives one a vivid conception of the Bible images which compare the laughter of fools to the crackling of thorns under a pot, or the fury of the wicked to the rapid ignition of these thorns, and the little effect which it produces.

Another plant connected with the solemn incidents of the Crucifixion is also extremely abundant in Palestine and along the Riviera. This is the cane or reed—the *Arundo donax*,

which has given its name to Cannes, as well as to Cana of Galilee, and to various other places with similar vegetation in Italy and Palestine. The banks of the streams at Engedi are covered with dense thickets of this reed, as well as other parts of the western and southern shores of the Dead Sea, the banks of the Jordan, and along the strand of the Sea of Galilee. In shady glens and recesses among the hills, wherever there is marshy ground, this reed is found. So also in the Riviera it abounds wherever the conditions necessary for its existence occur; and in both countries it is indispensable to the vine-cultivator, as affording props along which to train the shoots. Many of the slender fences and palisades are also formed of it. When covered with its graceful leaves, and plumed with its magnificent white blossom, it gives a peculiarly Eastern appearance to the landscape; and it is always interesting to the Bible student, on account of the use to which it was put, as a pen with which to form the broad Hebrew letters in the prophet's roll, as a fictitious sceptre placed in the hands of our Saviour in mockery, and as a rod for lifting to His dying lips the sponge filled with vinegar to allay His intolerable thirst. No imaginative mind can hear the rustle of the wind through a brake of these canes in the solitudes of the Riviera, without having the saddest scene which the world has ever seen—albeit it is the source of all our hope—vividly recalled. The canes seem to whisper to each other of the dreadful secret which they keep to themselves.

Peculiarly indicative of a dry southern climate, and of a rocky arid region, is the *Pistachia lentiscus*, or mastic-tree, which indeed no longer merits the name of tree; for throughout the region of the Mediterranean the necessity for fuel has pressed with peculiar hardness upon this species. It has been suffered in this way to attain only the dimensions of a mere bush, forming the common underwood in the forests, and covering the driest rocks with its glossy evergreen leaves and clusters of small red berries. It is very abundant between Nice and Ventimiglia, and flowers during the winter. Perhaps the largest tree in existence is that which grows in the Villa Sinibaldi at Bordighera, forming a beautiful leafy bower of great extent, and, from the slow growth of the species, must have attained an age of several centuries. In the

common bush-form, the *Pistachia lentiscus* is found on the walls of Jerusalem and in the thickets near Hebron, as well as in various other parts of the dry limestone table-land of Palestine, where it gives the only tinge of green to vary the monotony of barrenness. It is specially interesting as being closely allied to the terebinth of sacred story, which is as distinctly the tree of Palestine as the palm is the tree of the desert.

On Mount Tabor, the only flowering plant, save a species of Cyclamen, is the celebrated *Styrax officinalis*, which in April is covered with innumerable lovely white flowers, in appearance and fragrance not unlike those of the orange. From the bark of this tree exudes a fragrant resin, from which was prepared one of the ingredients of the holy incense of the Tabernacle, and which is still used at Easter in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem—small pieces being sold to the pilgrims at enormous prices, not for burning, but to be worn on the person as a charm. The only part of the Riviera in which the tree is now found is in the mountainous woods on the east side of Toulon. Here it clothes the banks of the streams in profusion, and presents, when in blossom, the most beautiful appearance, well worth going a hundred miles to see. Being periodically cut for fuel in common with the other trees and bushes growing near, it can seldom attain its proper size; and it is a curious circumstance that, while its bark exudes its peculiar fragrant resin abundantly in the Levant, it is destitute of it in Southern France, and the bark does not possess the least odour of storax. I saw, however, in the beautiful garden of Mr. Hanbury, near Mentone, a tree which produced a few precious tears of this resin, to the intense joy of Mr. Hanbury's late brother, the celebrated pharmacologist, who had searched for years for this substance in vain. The precious tears were preserved in a small phial, and smelt as sweetly as when newly gathered six years ago—an interesting memorial of one whose great scientific achievements and personal virtues smelt sweet and blossomed from the dust!

Myrtles, junipers, and box-trees grow in the same situations in the Riviera which they affect in Palestine. Various species of oaks lend their shade to the valleys; while on the higher grounds, in both countries, the Aleppo pine cools the air with its light green outspreading tufts of leaves; and the maritime

pine sifts, with a peculiarly soothing sound, between its fragrant needles, at once the sigh of the south wind as it passes over the rocks, and the murmur of the waves as they beat upon the shore. As for wild-flowers there are no countries that possess such a variety and profusion as Palestine and the Riviera. Nazareth received its name from the extraordinary abundance of gay flowers which grew on its green hills; and many places about Nice look like the garden of Eden run wild from Christmas to June. Everywhere in the two countries the sweet Alyssum fringes the pathways with its drift of scented snow, and the rosemary clothes the naked slopes with a hoary beauty, and serves to offer a continued incense in lonely places sanctified ages ago by the presence of the Most High; while far and wide red anemones run like flames among the green grass of the olive woods, and speak of Him who bade us consider the lilies of the field arrayed in more than the glory of Solomon. Several species of cistus or rock-rose cover the more sterile spots with their thick bushes, whose pink and white blossoms recall the familiar dog-roses of our hedges; while in the more sheltered places there are thickets of broom-like shrubs, clothed with the most brilliant golden flowers, but guarded by fierce implacable thorns. Nowhere is there such a variety of liliaceous plants, such as tulips, fritillarias, squills, narcissuses, irises, crocuses, cyclamens, and asphodels, which almost carpet the ground during spring and early summer, and often cover the whole landscape by their extraordinary profusion. Euphorbias, in great variety, from the tall shrubby species with thick stems and woody branches, to the flaccid herbaceous kind, form a golden green covering for rocks so hot and dry that nothing else would grow upon them. On moist rocks, and even in dry shady places, the adiantum, or maiden-hair fern, —the loveliest of all the tribe—unfolds its delicate fronds in the utmost profusion. It is the only fern that is found in the Peninsula of Sinai, growing freely in a small rocky recess, overhanging a clear spring above the Convent of St. Catherine. It also grows abundantly at the Pools of Solomon, and in an old wall on the Mount of Olives, and also at Aceldama. In the Riviera it is exceedingly common, lining the walls of the deep and shady *vallons* with the most lovely draperies. Another fern, the common ceterach, is abundant on rocks and walls

near Bethlehem, and uniformly diffused over all the Riviera, occurring in the crevices of almost every old wall. The fragrant cheilanthes used to be found abundantly about Nice, but it is now confined to a few spots about Cannes and Cimiez. At Beit Pale, in the Valley of Hinnom, and near Enrogel, it however grows in profusion. The *Pteris Cretica*, or Cretan Brake, which is now confined to the side defiles opening out of the great valley of the Var, is not uncommon in Palestine; and the *Asplenium adiantum nigrum*, or black-stalked spleenwort, as well as the lovely little club moss, *Lycopodium denticulatum*—whose foliage assumes such bright hues, from deepest green to the palest yellow and the most brilliant red—grow out of the crevices of the shady rocks, and creep over all the moist banks in both countries.

Thus not only is there a general superficial resemblance between the flora of Palestine and that of the Riviera, but we can trace the mutual likeness down to the humblest species. Nearly all the trees and all the cryptogamic plants, and most of the herbaceous flowering plants, are precisely the same. The cultivation of the vine is carried on with greater success in the Riviera than in Palestine, and its vineyards and grapes, as well as the wine that is produced, are far superior in point of quantity and quality. The oranges of Jaffa, on the other hand, are far larger and finer in every respect than the oranges of Nice and Mentone, whose cultivation has received for many generations little or no attention. But the lemon-groves of Nice and Mentone make up for this inferiority of the orange, and present an appearance, when laden with fruit, to which there is no parallel in Palestine. Both the orange and the lemon are exotics in the two countries, having been originally introduced from China, but they have taken kindly to the alien soil and climate, and produce equal, if not superior fruits, to those which they yield in their native land. The same may be said regarding those singular plants, the cactus, opuntia, and agave, which grow naturally on the dry, rainless plains of Mexico, and had been introduced into the south of Europe and into Palestine soon after the discovery of America. They grow in their adopted soil with even greater vigour and luxuriance than at home, storing up what moisture they require in their thick fleshy leaves, where, owing to the

absence of pores, it is protected from evaporation. So magnificent is the growth of these grotesque plants, that they seem in Palestine and the Riviera the characteristic vegetation of these lands; and several curious anachronisms have in consequence been committed by painters, who have put into the backgrounds of their pictures, representing incidents in the life of our Lord, scenery in which the agave and the opuntia have formed a prominent feature.

Not less striking are the insects and land-shells of the two countries. The mollusca in Palestine and the Riviera are unusually abundant and varied. With little difficulty a hundred species, terrestrial and fluviatile, may be gathered by an ordinary collector in a very short time, while passing from place to place. Indeed, in such dry and arid regions the exuberance of snail-life fills one with amazement; the vegetation being everywhere attacked by hosts of *Helices*, and even the driest rocks being covered with them. On the hillsides of Judea, as on the terraced slopes of Nice, the *Helix Arabica* is common. *Bulimus decollatus*, a white shell, remarkable for its curiously tapering spire, with flat top, like a truncated cone, may be gathered abundantly about Nice among the scarlet poppies and the hyacinths on the banks, or picked out from the loose crumbling earth about some broken-down olive terrace. It is the commonest shell in the valley of the Nile, and throughout Palestine, decorating the ruined theatre of Ephesus, where St. Paul was brought by the outraged citizens. In the northern valleys of Palestine the rocks are covered with *Clausilia*, which affect the same situations in the Riviera; and one species, which clings to the rocks of Mont Boron and Mont Vinaigrier at Nice, hangs with its apices pointing downwards in a singular manner, in hundreds, from the remarkable inscribed tablets cut on the face of the rocks near Beyrout by Assyrian and Egyptian monarchs. In regard to insects, the familiar forms of the butterflies of the Riviera are represented by identical species, or closely allied congeners, on the plains of Sharon. They are as numerous and varied in both countries as might have been expected in such lands of flowers. The procession-caterpillar constructs its curious silky bag in the tufts of the maritime pine in Palestine, as in the Riviera; the same scorpions are found under the stones; similar spiders are common to both

countries, the remarkable trap-door spider digging its curious lidded tube in the soft shady banks of Northern Galilee, as about Cannes and Mentone. The late Mr. Moggridge, who did so much to investigate the flora and fauna of the Riviera, has conclusively shown that the common black ant of that region is the ant of Scripture, and that what is said by Solomon of its provident habits, which has been called in question by the writer in *Smith's Bible Dictionary*, is strictly true in every particular. I have myself frequently dug up the nests of ants about Nice, especially on the dry sunny ridge of the Col de Serena, and found the passages filled with the seeds of plants growing in the neighbourhood, whose embryos had been cunningly nibbled off, so as to prevent germination. The lesson to the sluggard could not have been conveyed in a more graphic and instructive manner.

Most of the cultivation of ancient Palestine was carried on by means of terraces, owing to the hilly and rocky nature of the country, and the scarcity of level ground and alluvial soil. The labour involved in the construction of these terraces must have been immense. Low ramparts of the loose stones lying about were constructed in a successive series, one above another, upon the sides of the hills, like a flight of greyish white stone stairs. To the patches of ground thus enclosed earth was carried up with great toil, and kept from sliding down the slopes by means of the boundary walls. In this costly artificial soil were planted fig and olive trees, vines and pomegranates; and underneath their shadow strips of wheat and other grain alternated with strips of vetches or beans, manured and irrigated by means of tanks and aqueducts. Every inch of ground up to the tops of the hills was thus carefully cultivated, and the result was an extraordinary productiveness, fully justifying the description given of the country as a land flowing with milk and honey. More than any other country, Palestine needed the incessant industry of man for producing and maintaining its fertility, and nowhere else could the proverb have been so emphatically exemplified—"The hand of the diligent maketh rich." In Egypt and most other countries, where there was an abundance of alluvial soil, comparatively little labour was required to produce the fruits of the field. An easy industry sufficed to produce luxuriant crops, and to

render a sensuous existence as pleasant as the lot of man allows. But on the steep terraced hills of Palestine, Nature could only pour her fruit into the lap of patient and incessant toil ; and with the sweat of a man's face alone could he eat his bread. Hence there was a more visible correspondence here than elsewhere between the blessings of Heaven and the moral habits of the people, educated into patience and self-denial and trust in God by the very necessities of their agriculture. The mountains, whose terraced slopes were thus carefully cultivated, brought peace to the people ; and the little hills, adorned with all manner of field and garden produce, intermingling the regularity of human industry with the free, careless luxuriance of Nature, brought abundance by righteousness. And nowhere else could the disregard of God's laws, disobedience to His holy will, have such ruinous consequences ; nowhere else could the curse upon the ground, because of man's moral lapse, have been so evident and complete. On these terraced slopes, if a man failed in his duty, or misunderstood his own welfare, the very soil disappeared beneath his feet. There are no ruins like those of the Holy Land ; not merely the ruins of towns and villages, but the ruins of Nature itself. The very fields are laid waste. When the olive and other trees were cut down by the invaders, the winter rains, which the rich foliage distributed in a gradual and beneficial manner, in the absence of all restrictions poured over the sides of the hills, and washed away the soil ; the terraces were demolished, and the stones of which they were built scattered in chaotic confusion, dry, utterly destitute of earth, and baked by the vertical sun. Nothing but heaps of barren stone now meet the eye where the hillsides, once laughing with verdure and fruitfulness, must have presented a most charming appearance, viewed from the valleys.

But the peculiar mode of cultivation, which got its death-blow from the endless wars and gross misgovernment of Palestine, is still in full operation in the Riviera. One sees in the neighbourhood of Nice and Mentone, the very same spectacle of agricultural wealth which the industrious hands of the Jews had produced in Palestine in the days of our Saviour. There, too, cultivation is carried up almost to the tops of the hills, and their slopes are everywhere built into terraces, faced with walls of rough stone, and planted with the vine, olive, and fig

tree. Of these terraces there are hundreds of thousands, and the toil involved in their construction is almost inconceivable. Not only are they formed at first with much labour and expense, but they must be kept in constant repair, otherwise the costly soil will be washed away by the wintry rains; and breaches are being continually made in their walls. The vine-clad terraces on the steep banks of the Rhine fill the spectator with astonishment at the amount of labour expended in their formation; but for extent and difficulty of construction, they bear no comparison to the *muricciuoli*, or olive-terraces of the Western Riviera. By means of these artificially-graded walls every bit of ground, no matter how bare and steep, is tilled, and the plants grown have the most favourable conditions for their development. Nothing can exceed the vividness of the patches of sprouting grain and luxurious vegetables which grow on these terraces under the shade of the olives and figs. One understands, when coming upon these velvety patches among the rocky heights, the force of the prophecy which must have derived its image from a similar scene in Palestine—"There shall be an handful of corn in the earth, upon the tops of the mountains; the fruit thereof shall shake like Lebanon." It speaks of a time of restitution, when a revived fertility, beginning in such tiny patches among the hills, will spread over all the mountains, and the whole land of promise will break out into the happy laughter of fruitfulness and abundance. No more graphic picture could be found anywhere of what Palestine has been, and may yet be, when the barren people shall be quickened and the barren land revived, than the richly-cultured terraced slopes of the Riviera.

In ancient Palestine there was a wonderful variety of conditions suitable for the cultivation of different plants. On the small property of a Hebrew farmer many different kinds of crops could be raised. On the low ground barley and wheat would flourish luxuriantly; on the terraced slopes of the hills orchards of pomegranates, fig, olive, almond, and vine would yield their fruit; while above this level, where the virgin soil had not been reclaimed, flocks and herds found pasture among a tangled growth of heath and arbutus, pines, roses, and myrtles, that nourished by their moisture and shade frequent tufts of grass. The small size of the Hebrew farms when the country

was first portioned out to the inhabitants, and the frequent subdivisions of these for many generations, at the death of the owners, led to a more complete development of all the resources of the soil. Places which a scantier population would have neglected were thus brought into careful culture, and every portion of soil, however unpromising at first sight, was turned to the best account. With such a method of cultivation, favoured by such a sun and climate, we are not surprised that the country should have supported the enormous population of which not only the Bible narrative, but the unprecedented mass of ruins covering the land to the very tops of the hills, testify. God's purposes in isolating the Israelites from the surrounding nations, and educating them to be the custodiers, and ultimately the missionaries, of the faith and of the civil and religious liberty of the world, were thus wonderfully helped by the productiveness of the country itself, able to support all its inhabitants without any extraneous help, without any need of commerce or intercourse with other nations. All plants necessary to life or conducive to health were either indigenous or flourished under cultivation in the open air; and even the native materia medica supplied types of all the leading groups of remedies used in the healing art. A similar variety of conditions of cultivation exists in the Riviera. While, like Palestine, the soil is principally composed of limestone, it is marvellous what combinations it is capable of, and how exposure or shade, drought or moisture, a higher or lower elevation, lend themselves to the growth of different vegetable productions. On the same farm may be found the plants of different climes; the homely bean associated with the fig, the wheat growing beneath the olive, and the pomegranate mingling its scarlet blossoms with the snowy flowers of the apple and the cherry tree; while the Ligurian bees may gather their rich honey from the wealth of wild flowers that fringe the pathways, and the sheep and goats may browse on the grassy spots that sprinkle the arid heights with verdure. The same social laws which restrict the size of properties, and their subdivision at the death of the father of the family, have in the Riviera, as in Palestine, so far from being an inconvenience, proved a positive benefit, inducing habits of industry and thrift, and causing every atom of soil that is not absolute rock to be made useful.

No part of Europe is so carefully cultivated as the Riviera, and no equal extent of country yields such a generous and varied return of the fruits of the earth. And thus in the Riviera at the present day, as in Palestine in the days of our Saviour, where a small population would have been exposed to constant famine, a very large population finds the means of a comfortable and, in some instances, even a luxurious subsistence.

One of the peculiar pleasures of a visit to the Riviera is that one is transported backwards, as it were, through many centuries of the world's history, to scenes and incidents that belong to the early ages of our race. The Riviera is the bridge between the Occident and the Orient; but it has deeper sympathies with the unchanging East. Although placed, like ancient Palestine, in the midst of the most concentrated masses of the old continent, in the very focus towards which the intercourse of the three parts of the world radiate, and though surrounded by the most flourishing and civilised nations, yet it has developed within itself a complete contrast to them, and retained a marked individuality of national character, and of manners and customs. Visitors from all parts of the world yearly flock in thousands to its health-resorts; large and fashionable towns, where every modern luxury may be obtained, have risen upon the sites of poor and wretched fishing-villages; a railway, constructed with infinite cost and difficulty through its formidable rocks, runs along its border, carrying an enormous goods and passenger traffic, and linking it with all the commercial centres. But, notwithstanding these amazing changes, that have occurred within the life of the present generation,—the visitor will find close to the most fashionable resorts numerous traces of the old ways of the people; and at every step he will get new light shed upon passages of Scripture with which he had been familiar from childhood, but which he had never thoroughly understood until now. Hundreds of texts that suggested little or no meaning, as we heard them on Sundays in our early years, amid circumstances with which they had no natural affinity,—here, in a land like that of their birth,—become suddenly beautiful and significant, when thus illustrated. One interprets the Bible narrative here by the help of commentaries altogether new; not by the dead letters of books, but by the

living pictures of nature and of human life, photographing themselves upon the mind with vivid force. The most trifling incident recalls some beautiful pastoral; the simplest feature in a landscape suggests some familiar though hitherto imperfect simile. We can understand the Bible images that refer to the preciousness of water, in this thirsty land, where the dry beds of the brooks are as white as the roads for half the year,—and where almost nothing can be grown without perpetual irrigation,—far better than in our own land, that is musical with the sound of many waters, and every green thing luxuriates under weeping skies. Nowhere does the spring come to the waiting earth with such lovely tenderness as in the sunny South,—realising the exquisite description of the Song of Solomon:—"The winter is past, the rain is over and gone; the flowers appear on the earth; the time of the singing of birds is come, and the voice of the turtle is heard in our land." No one who has not seen the gaunt and naked fig-tree, that, amid all the other evergreen trees, seems a living embodiment of winter, putting forth its delicate foliage at the approach of March, can enter into the joy of the time when the fig-tree putteth forth her green figs, and the vines with the tender grape give a goodly smell.

The Psalmist's comparison of children to olive-plants round about their parents' table, is unintelligible to him who has not seen what is a common sight in the Riviera as in Palestine, a number of young shoots springing up from the roots of an old olive-tree, that spread thickly round the trunk, and are partially exposed above the surface of the ground; each of which, if suffered to grow, will attain at length the size of secondary trees, and give to one olive-tree the appearance of possessing several trunks. When the parent bole decays, these secondary shoots are capable of taking its place; or, if detached, they have the power of separate development. Only he who has seen, what one often witnesses on the heights around Nice, a picturesque shepherd going before his sheep, and calling them to follow him—or sometimes carrying carefully on his shoulder, over the rugged path, a young lamb or wounded sheep, or leading gently along, with the same loving care, mingling with the sheep,—a shaggy flock of bell-bearing goats, whose soft musical tinkling is indescribably sweet in the clear upland air,

—only he who has seen this common picture of the primitive pastoral life of the East, can appreciate fully the Saviour's parables of the Good Shepherd and of the Sheep and Goats. Solomon's image descriptive of the hoary head of old age—"and the almond-tree shall flourish"—derives a new significance from that loveliest spectacle of the spring in the Riviera, when the bare and leafless almond-trees in every garden are so covered with blossoms that they look like masses of snow tinged with the crimson hues of sunset clouds. The long droughts of the Riviera, when for two or three months together there is no rain, and the parched land, baked by the intolerable sun, breaks up into hard solid plates, and a yellowish haze of heat overspreads the sky day after day—enable one to comprehend the full meaning of the Scripture curse—"Thy heaven that is over thy head shall be brass, and the earth that is under thee shall be iron." Palestine was not a land of brooks, but of wells; and this is strikingly true of the Riviera. The running streams are few and far between; but in every olive-yard there is the indispensable well for watering the cultivated plants which would otherwise perish. Many of the gardens have tanks or deep reservoirs filled from some distant source among the hills, and distributing their precious contents over the dry ground by means of rills and conduits. Others have open circular wells with a low wall round them, or a white dome of mason-work overhead, and are furnished either with a simple bent pole and stone-poised bucket, or with a huge clumsy erection of wheel-machinery with ropes and vessels for raising water. There is nothing more Oriental than this feature in the landscape; and it may be seen at every step. No property is complete without its well. It is the centre spot of life round which the human household and all beauty and luxuriance radiate—like the beams of a star that are quickened by its disk. The circular well gives to the olive-yard an appearance so Biblical, that the re-enactment of some old incident in the life of patriarch or prophet around it would hardly excite any surprise. Eliezer might, at one of the open wells by the wayside, with his string of camels behind him, wait patiently until Rebekah should come and draw water for them; or the deathless interview between our Lord and the Samaritan woman at the well of Jacob might take place beside

it. Then, too, the mattock with which the labourer digs the soil is the same crooked implement which the ancient Egyptians used, and is as different as possible from our spade; while the larger fields, instead of being turned over laboriously by hand-labour, are ploughed by means of a primitive wooden plough, like that which Elisha employed when invested with the prophet's mantle; drawn, too, by dull, patient oxen, plodding on, just as they were painted upon the tombs and temples of races that lived three thousand years ago. On the high grounds above Cimiez and on the Col de Serena, I have seen the women and children beating down the olive-berries, from the overhanging branches, into great sheets spread upon the ground, exactly in the way described in Deuteronomy, "When thou beatest thine olive-tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again; it shall be for the stranger, the fatherless, and for the widow;" and no argument will convince the Niçois peasant that this common practice of his forefathers is injurious both to the tree and the fruit, any more than it will convince the fellaheen of the Holy Land. The only practicable path by which of old the Jews travelled from north to south, was along the crest of the mountain range between the Jordan and the Mediterranean; and it resembled the grand Corniche Road, which was long the only way by which the traveller could go from Nice to Genoa, commanding some of the finest views in Europe, embracing on the one side the glorious Maritime Alps, and on the other the ever-varying beauties of the Mediterranean. In any one of the narrow paths between the two high walls of neighbouring vineyards or gardens around Nice, might occur the incident of Balaam encountering the angel of the Lord standing with a drawn sword in the way,—and the ass pressing close, in the limited space, against the wall, crushing the prophet's foot.

But it is manifestly impossible to refer to all the scenes and incidents which remind one in the Riviera of scriptural allusions and customs. We find ourselves, in this western part of the Mediterranean, surrounded and touched by a continued life, which brings the experiences of kings, prophets, and godly men of old into contact with the altogether different experiences of our modern civilisation. What we have idealised by our Biblical education into a kind of cloudland, we find has

here a real existence in the matter-of-fact world ; and among the fields and olive-woods of fashionable Nice and Cannes we see what brings before us the sacred imagery of the Holy of Holies of the covenant people. I know nothing more useful to any man than to be able to realise, by means of analogous scenes and circumstances, that Scripture words and facts embodied the most living life, and are a record of things as little out of the way of the ordinary habits of the people as the common incidents of our own everyday life. In this way the Bible becomes, not a mummy of the past, deadening the thought that deals with it, something apart by itself in a sacred niche to be superstitiously worshipped, but a living oracle of the present, quickening and ennobling the soul that intelligently understands it.

Wonderfully similar too are the histories of Palestine and the Riviera. There is no land that has undergone so many vicissitudes as the Holy Land. Representatives of nearly all the great races of the earth have possessed it in turn. Canaanites, Israelites, Romans, Saracens, English, French, Turks, have successively held sway over it. The different faiths of the earth have had their shrine in it. The nature-worship of Baal was first set up on its high places ; the sunny cultus of Pan laid its spell upon the romantic sources of the Jordan at Banias ; the severe and awe-inspiring religion of the Jews consecrated all its scenes, and made the whole mountain-land one great altar to Jehovah ; the Crescent of the Mohammedan faith gleamed in its sky ; the Christian Cross rose over all its sacred buildings ; and now the cry of the Muezzin summons the faithful to prayer from all its minarets. In like manner the Riviera has passed into the possession of widely different hands at successive periods of its history. It belonged at first to the Ligurians, a primitive people who worshipped the powers of nature on the mountain tops. Afterwards a Phocian colony came from Greece, and gave Nice its name, in memory of a victory gained by them over some neighbouring Ligurian tribes. Then it was conquered by the Romans, who have left enduring traces of their occupation in the grand aqueduct of Fréjus, the amphitheatre and baths of Cimiez, and the lonely mountain tower of Turbia. The Saracens next lorded it over the country ; and after the cruel

ravages of war taught the people many of the most useful arts of peace. Subsequently the Counts of Provence and the Angevin sovereigns of Naples in turn ruled it; giving up the sovereignty in the end to the House of Savoy, by whom it was ceded to the French Government. The races that have inhabited it have been compounded of all the virtues and vices of the prehistoric and the historic peoples. The nations who claim Homer and Virgil, Dante and Shakespeare, who honour Charlemagne, Columbus and Buonaparte, have made its shores resplendent with genius and action. Baal, Pan and Jupiter, Mohammed and Christ, have dominated the hearts and consciences of men in this fair region. And unlike Palestine, the Cross is triumphant where the Crescent has long waned and gone out in darkness.

But we cannot obviously push the resemblances between the two countries too far, else the analogy will be found to be fanciful. We must not lose sight of the many points of difference. For one thing Palestine never was, even when it most merited the divine description of it as "a land flowing with milk and honey," a beautiful country like the Riviera. With the exception of some parts of Galilee, much of the Holy Land is monotonous and uninviting. It has little variety of colouring, and still less of outline; its features rarely group themselves into picturesque or scenic combinations. But it is far otherwise with the Riviera. On this earth of ours there is no lovelier land or brighter sun; none more opulent and fruitful. Nowhere else do the sea and the mountains form such harmonious pictures; nowhere else are the varied charms of nature brought together into such a focus of perfect beauty; nowhere else is the play of transfiguring light upon translucent sea and opalescent mountain so exquisitely soft and varied; and He who called the light down upon these shores certainly saw that it was "very good." But while Palestine in this respect must yield the palm to the Riviera, it is the remarkable correspondence between the two countries which gives to the Riviera its principal charm and interest in the eyes of every lover of the Bible. More than any other Oriental region Palestine resembles the countries of the West; more than any other Western country the Riviera resembles the lands of the East. And we cannot be too thankful that almost at our doors,

within easy reach, we find a chamber of natural imagery, to illustrate in the most graphic manner, the word-pictures of that Book, which has so vividly reflected the scenes and objects of the Holy Land. That country, which stands on the shores of the Mediterranean, pushing its shoulder at Carmel out into the sea, as if advancing as far as possible to the great Western world, has transferred to that Western world not only the rich results of its long and wonderful history, but even its very physical aspects; and now in Europe we see not only what Palestine was when the smile of Jehovah shone upon it, but what it will be when that smile shall beam upon it again. The Riviera is at once a memory of its past and a prophecy of its future.

HUGH MACMILLAN.

ART. II.—*Human Nature a witness to the Divine Trinity.*

“And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. So God created man in his *own* image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul.”

THE doctrine of the Trinity has been through all the history of the Church the subject of keen and persistent controversy. In the early ages of Christianity the Church was distracted by fierce conflicts, in which even the powers of the world took part, conflicts raging specially around the Person of Christ, with leading ecclesiastics to be found on both sides of the great strife. And in modern times the records of the controversy form a most voluminous literature, a literature constantly receiving additions up to the present day. The resources of philology and criticism may be said to have been wellnigh exhausted in order to prove the Trinity to be a doctrine of Scripture, that is, that there are three Persons in the Godhead, the same in substance, equal in power and glory. This proof we regard as complete and conclusive. But while we thus regard its place in Scripture to be established on the soundest basis of interpretation, it may be inquired whether, as our

theologians generally hold, it is a doctrine exclusively of Revelation, or whether there be any prior source of evidence appropriate to its own nature, which would relieve it of much of its mystery, and conciliate the human understanding to its acceptance. If we consider how the fact of the Divine existence has its place in Scripture, we see that it is not there as an exclusive revelation, but as a fact familiarly known on evidence proper to itself, independently of the authority which it derives from its place in the written Word. It has secured the credence of the human understanding by a form of evidence patent to the natural perception of its own powers. And the Word always assumes the Divine existence, the Divine nature, and the Divine attributes to be known to man. Now, if the Trinity be a fact of the Divine nature, it is a reasonable presumption that the proof of it might be comprehended in the evidence which proves the Divine existence, and which manifests the Divine nature and attributes. It is self-evident that there must be a manifestation of God to man, true, trustworthy, and infallible, prior to the written Word, or the Word would be to him altogether unintelligible. The Scriptures do not begin with an array of definitions to prepare man for understanding the terms he shall meet with throughout their wondrous revelations. There is no definition of the principal term which casts its sacred and sublime light over all its pages—God. “In the beginning GOD made the heavens and the earth.” It is assumed that all men have before them the evidences of God’s existence, and that they know Him before they open the page of Revelation. They know that He is a Being possessed of intelligence, will, and power—in one word, a Spirit. He has manifested Himself, prior to the written Word, in a way that renders the knowledge of Him self-evident to the human mind. What is this manifestation? It is the human mind itself, created in His image, after His likeness. Man is thus at once the manifestation and the percipient of the manifestation, so that to the ancestor of our race the consciousness of self and the cognition of God were simultaneous mental acts, mutually guaranteeing the reality of each other. The knowledge of God was thus imparted with unerring certainty, being exempted from all peril of indirectness, and from all possibility of refraction. The manifestation and the per-

ception of it are necessary correlatives; the one cannot be without the other. It is essential to a manifestation that it be perceived, and in this case the manifestation secured its own certain perception. Human nature, then, is the original, the divinely authenticated, the only true source of our knowledge of God. And until man has derived it from this source, he cannot recognise the footprints of the Creator in the universe around him, neither could he interpret the further revelation of the written Word. We must therefore study the nature of God in our own nature, and whatever is essentially distinctive of the Divine nature which God would have man to know we cannot doubt must be discoverable in an image constructed by Himself for the very purpose of manifesting Himself to man. And in our analysis of human nature for our present purpose we must only make account of that which is original and constitutional. We therefore make no account of sin, nor of its effects, for it is neither original nor constitutional, only premising that we have need to be on our guard against its disturbing influence upon our judgment in prosecuting our analysis.

We must lay down a preliminary postulate respecting the use of terms, namely, that we employ the terms expressive of Divine attributes, and those expressive of the corresponding attributes in human nature, in the same signification; in other words, that any true definition of the one class would be equally true of the other. If they differ in kind, they do not come under the same definition, and the definition of one would afford no key to the meaning of the other. For aught that definition could determine, they might be opposites. If attributes in God bearing the same names with attributes in human nature are, as some declare, essentially different, how can we attach any meaning to them at all? Spirit has but one meaning for us. Person has but one meaning for us; knowledge, righteousness, goodness, truth—what ideas can be attached to these terms, if they are essentially different from the qualities which they indicate in man? This mode of interpreting, or rather obscuring, the Divine attributes has been criticised with just severity by Mr. Mill, in reviewing Dean Mansel's views in his *Limits of Religious Thought*. God is "the Father of spirits"—"we are His offspring." Fatherhood and offspring

express affinity. God "breathed into man's nostrils the breath of life." The breath of respiration does not exhaust this Divine and pregnant act. Elihu seems to have had before his mind the particular facts of the creation of man when he said, "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration (breath) of the Almighty hath given them understanding" (Job xxxii. 8). A like signification is to be attached to the words of Solomon : "The spirit (breath) of man is the lamp of the Lord," the Divine light, intellectual and moral, the true life of man, the Divine image, the likeness, not constructed mechanically from elements foreign to the nature of the Creator, like the bodily structure from the dust, but the likeness of affinity, likeness of nature, constituting man, in some profoundly true sense, "a partaker of the Divine nature." If the several attributes of human nature are unlike those in the Divine, the whole image must be unlike the Divine Original, and can impart no knowledge of God to man whatever. It is from the functions of intellectual and moral attributes in our own nature that we frame our definitions of them, and all our notions of spiritual beings, and our reasonings respecting them, proceed, of necessity, on the truth of those definitions. And if they are not true to the corresponding attributes in the Divine nature, attributes bearing the same verbal designations, then, indeed, is God to us unknown and unknowable. It is true the human attributes are finite, and the Divine infinite, but neither of these terms enter into the definition of an attribute. They are not qualitative terms; they express nothing whatever of the nature of anything of which they could properly be predicated. The expressions, "a finite object," "an infinite object," impart no meaning; they tell nothing of the nature of their respective objects, nothing by which they could be recognised or identified. To deny that the human and Divine attributes can be comprehended under common definitions is to invalidate the authority of the image, and, as ascribed to God, to exclude from the sphere of human knowledge their meaning and functions altogether. Without the image no verbal definition or description of the Divine nature or attributes could have conveyed any notion of God to the human mind. But when God constituted an image of Himself, feature answering to feature, and all indicated by a common terminology, He invested it with an authority, as a

revelation of Himself, in no degree inferior to that of the written Word. And that Word discovers to us no attribute of the Divine nature which has not its counterpart in the human. Only by a right interpretation of the image can we attain to a true knowledge of the nature and the eternal life of God. To this, then, we address ourselves, as far as seems necessary, in order to our present argument.

Personality is the grand distinction of spiritual being. Man is a spirit; and his personality distinguishes him from all other existences in this world, investing him with a pre-eminence over all. The consciousness of it is an original endowment of the human mind, reached by no reasoning, communicated by no form of foreign testimony. It is an ultimate fact in our nature, admitting of no explanation, incapable of logical definition, but known to every man with infallible certainty. It is the sovereign power within the man, unifying all the elements of his nature, and ruling the distribution of all their activities. A person is a self-conscious, self-determining being, and he expresses his personality with all its dignity and authority, and exclusiveness, by the smallest word in the English tongue—I. By the use of this little word in the intercourse of his daily life, he affirms his self-consciousness, and asserts the distinction of his personality from that of every other man. He requires no philosopher to establish the fact of his personal identity for him. He knows himself to be the same from day to day, from year to year, in spite of all the varieties of his experience; and he expects the continuous permanency of that identity in all the future. Personality constantly affirms the supreme proprietary right in every portion of that territory over which it has raised its standard, and it defies all invasion,—Life is mine, intelligence is mine, will is mine, conscience is mine, brain and bone and muscle are mine.

In interpreting the image of God, we cannot but regard this regal power of human nature as entitled authoritatively to testify to personality in the Divine nature. It is the essential and fundamental element in our own upon which all others depend; and if, founding on our own nature, we affirm spirituality of God, we cannot but at the same time affirm

personality of Him; and as we have no knowledge of any personality but the human, we can only attach one meaning to the term. We have no data from which to form any conception of a personality different in kind from the human. Yet theologians warn us that we are not to regard it as meaning in God what it means in man. It has even been said to be totally different. If so, we can affirm nothing of it whatever, for every degree of likeness would be excluded, and the same would necessarily be true of spirit, and of every element in the Divine nature which has been regarded as having its likeness in the human. But this is to divest human nature of its high place of honour as a true image, a real, the only real manifestation of God, and therefore the only true source of our knowledge of God. God cannot be known by mere negations; and our duty is to endeavour to interpret the image, and not to deny the life-likeness of its features one by one. To every man, his own personality, as an ultimate fact, is a mystery. That the Divine should be a mystery also is not to be wondered at; but to man it is, like his own, an ultimate fact. He cannot but believe in the reality of his own; and as it is given to him in consciousness, to be a witness to him of the reality of the Divine, he has a certainty, which no other form of evidence could enhance, that the Divine Personality is the original from which his own has been copied with Divine fidelity, feature for feature. The likeness between two human personalities, metaphysically regarded, is a mystery; and metaphysically regarded, the distinction between them is a mystery, but no scepticism can deny either fact. And with the very limited knowledge we possess of the abstract nature of personality, it does not seem to be within the competency of the human mind to affirm that personality cannot be predicable of the Divine in the same sense in which it is predicable of the human. We have the positive affirmation of likeness by the image, and we have abundant evidence, in God's conversibleness with man, that the Divine Personality performs like functional action with that of the human. A person is a being knowing himself, possessing the power of self-direction—these functions of personality cannot be denied to God; and we cannot refuse to recognise them in Him in the same signification in which

man has the consciousness of them. This is likeness perfectly well marked. And it is entirely on the ground of likeness that man can recognise God at all, or believe that such a Being exists. All religion is founded upon the reality of the likeness between God and the worshipper, for without this there could be no mutual knowledge, no fellowship, no reciprocal love. We recognise a distinction between the Divine and human personalities—a distinction in fact, but a distinction which is indefinable, just as the distinction between one human personality and another is indefinable; in both cases we recognise the distinction as ultimate, unexplained facts, original and inexplicable beliefs. But we deny that the distinction can be construed into a total difference, so that they cannot perform similar functions for similar ends. But also, there is the fact recognised by all that believe in the existence of God, that personality is as suitably applied to God as to man; and it has never been suggested that another term should or could be devised which could better mark the distinction between the human and the Divine, or be more appropriate to the one than to the other. This proves a universal conviction of likeness. But likeness implies distinction, or it would be identity. Two men are like each other; they are distinct from each other, but they are not different from each other in essential qualities. The perfection that belongs to God, and the incompleteness which attaches to man, mark themselves by a wide difference in personal action; but, that personal action and self-direction are truly predicable of both forbid the affirmation of total difference, and warrant the affirmation of likeness of nature and of essential attributes, and their comprehension under a common designation.

But we have still to notice a special fact respecting the constitution of human personality essential to a right understanding of it, and of significant importance in the present discussion. It is this: that no single personality has the conditions of its own action within itself; it is not an integer complete in itself. The complement of its existence is found in other personalities the counterparts of itself, and capable of responsive action. Dr. Reid says of our mental powers and their operations: "They suppose understanding and will, but they suppose something more, which is neither understanding

nor will,—that is, society with other intellectual beings.” We are essentially by our constitution social beings; and all our powers, intellectual and moral, bear the social impress. We have no consciousness of any power capable of absolutely self-action. A man’s individuality cannot assume its form in solitude; it is shaped and fashioned by the forces and frictions of social life. Even the solitary operations of our minds derive their chief materials from the contrasts and harmonies of social life. Dr. Caird says:—

“The abstract individual is not truly man, but only a fragment of humanity, a being as devoid of the moral and spiritual elements which are of the essence of man’s life, as the amputated limb of participation in the vital existence of the organism. The social relations are a necessary part of the being of the individual. He cannot realise himself within himself, but only in and through those who are other than himself. . . . The abstract individual, isolated from all other human spirits, would lack elements which enter essentially into the idea of humanity, would be nothing more than the undeveloped germ of human nature, the possibility of a spirit that has never become actual.”¹

Every individual man is incomplete in himself, an integral member of an organism composed of other personalities, and dependent upon his place in that organism for all his intellectual and moral activity. The personal *I* demands a *Thou* and a *He*. This is personality as man knows it, and it is the sole type of personality that comes within the range of his observation. The order of human nature brings the infant with his undeveloped personality under the influence of personalities in the vigour of their activity which earnestly set themselves to elicit its self-consciousness, and nurses every symptom of success until it knows itself a living soul, and “learns the use of ‘I and me,’” and henceforth recognises its dependence upon social relations for progress and happiness. And there is every reason to believe that self-consciousness would never be elicited in this state of being by relation to any other class of objects but that of personalities. God said of Adam,—“It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him an help-meet for him.” It is clear from this that God did not regard Adam as possessing completeness in his

¹ *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 241-2. But even the germ would be incomplete, and could not develop without a co-factor in another personality.

single personality, and, as the Hebrew testifies, he needed a help in his own likeness, otherwise he could not have fulfilled the great ends of his creation. The expression in the English Bible, "meet for him," and in the margin "as before him," is interpreted by the Centenary Bible "to match him," and in Dr. Davison's translation of Fuerst's Lexicon, still more happily, "his counterpart."¹ And it is evident that it is the necessity of the race that was thus being provided for. Adam had his own self-consciousness elicited by his relation with God. The constitutional action of the law of race or lineage, that like produces like, had not yet discovered itself. The organism was only complete when the first-born of the first pair attained to self-consciousness, and had felt, "I am not what I see, and other than the things I touch."

We are then restricted to our self-knowledge for our knowledge of personality, and we are wholly unable to form any *a priori* notion of what we ought to expect personality to be in the Divine nature. In Scripture we find the same personal terms invariably employed in relation to God and man, carrying out the original idea of man bearing the image of God; and we cannot but regard personality as the primal and prominent element of that image. Only as we know it can we warrantably ascribe it to God. Nor have we any data from which to reason, or on which to form an hypothesis of any other form or kind of personality, much less to form the conception of a kind, more worthy of God.² In our interpretation of the image, and in ascribing its features to God as their Divine original, nothing essential to human personality may be omitted, nor anything conjectural added. Now the relation of personalities to each other, in order to the self-consciousness

¹ Translated by the LXX. *βοηθὸς κατ' αὐτόν* and *βοηθὸς ὁμοιος*, and by the Vulgate "adjutorium simile, adjutor similis"—a help like himself.

² To those who regard Jesus Christ to be a Divine person, incarnate in human nature, we may well suppose the meaning to be attached to personality in the Divine nature to be practically and conclusively determined. His Divine personality manifested itself through human faculties, presenting habitually the familiar phenomena of human personal action. He used daily, in the intercourse of life, all current personal terms and forms of expression, and avowed personal experiences natural to mankind. But His personality manifested that of the Father, proving it to be like His own, as His own proved itself to be like the human, and so plainly conforming to the conditions of the human, that even His own brethren, familiar with His life for thirty years, did not believe Him to be other than human.

of each, is the essential condition of their existence as single personalities. An individual personality can have no existence except in relation with others. As Dr. Caird has said, "The social relations are a necessary part of the being of the individual." As a personal being he has his completeness only in relation with others. Unless, therefore, we repudiate the testimony of the image altogether, we must ascribe personality to God as bearing this characteristic distinction, and affirm that the Divine nature contains within it a plurality of persons in necessary organic relation with each other, enjoying ineffable fellowship from all eternity. It is impossible to recognise a unipersonal being, Divine or created, to be a rational belief to the human mind. It is an absolute contradiction to our nature. We reason from the image, and the image is God's own revelation of His own nature, and we have no other source of knowledge prior to this, and no correction of it in any other after, but only confirmations of it from every department of our nature, as we shall see. It is altogether a false inference from human nature to a unipersonal God; from a nature essentially plural to a nature essentially singular; from a being whose existence is impossible except in relation with like existences, to a being existing out of all relation with a like existence. Human nature is so essentially social that to deprive it of its social constitution is to annihilate it. It bears no likeness to a being having no relations and no fellowships within his own nature. A plurality of persons in unity is of the very essence of human nature, and from a single personality no inference can be drawn to the nature of man's Creator. Human nature testifies to a plurality in unity in the Divine Being, to such a God alone; and all other life bears the same testimony. Plurality of individuals in the unity of a common nature is the law of earthly life. Neither man nor anything that has in it the breath of life bears testimony to the existence of a solitary Deity—a Deity without relations and fellowships within His own nature. May we not reverently think that as life in all its degrees of worth is the chiefest of the works of God, and of most value in the eyes of Him who is the I AM, the living God, it was His purpose in creation to cast the shadow, and not the very image, of His own constitutional life upon the most obscure current in which life flows,

reserving for its very image in man its highest dignity and honour, feature answering to living feature? And thus it is given to man, from his vantage-ground of observation, to descry in the heavens above him the Divine source and Exemplar of his own social nature and relations, and to see in all beneath him, over the whole domain where blood circulates and instinct rules, stretching away into ever-increasing obscurity, until it is discerned in its *minimum visibile*, trembling in equivocal reality on the verge of his sensible horizon—even through all the stages of this vast and wonderful regression, to see the impress of the same typical form which has its most honourable illustration in himself.

The human mind furnishes no data, the visible universe furnishes no data, on which to found, or by which to illustrate the conception of a solitary insulated being. If, then we seek the Original after which human nature is copied, we might state the case thus :—Here, by one hypothesis, is a personal being, possessing, therefore, intelligence, will, sensibility, eternal, unrelated, without a fellow ; and, by another hypothesis, a plurality of Persons existing eternally in the unity of a common nature, enjoying all the conditions of perfect fellowship and happiness. Which of these beings is that of which human nature bears the likeness? The answer cannot be doubtful. Plurality in unity is the very mould in which human thought is cast, from which it has taken its form in its successive generations ; it is the order of nature to which the human mind spontaneously accommodates itself, and it possesses no data from which to form a conception of an order of life which does not conform to this universal law.

From personality we pass on to Knowledge, and, from its relation to personality, we may confidently expect a concurrent conclusion. From its own nature also, and the conditions of its action, it involves plurality in unity. Knowledge is an original endowment of human nature. "The beginning of knowledge is knowledge." It has no natural antecedent ; it is not evolved from something more elementary. A cognition is the primary act of consciousness. It is intuitive, unreasoned, deduced from no prior fact, but original, self-evident, infallible. Mr. J. S. Mill says : "The truths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others

are inferred. Our assent to the conclusion being grounded on the truth of the premises, we never could arrive at any knowledge by reasoning unless something could be known antecedently to all reasoning." And later, in his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, he says,—“We do know some things immediately and intuitively.” Now these intuitions, the original principles of human nature, we regard as the essential features of man's likeness to God, copied immediately from Himself by Himself, and by His Divine law of heredity made to be constitutional through all generations. They are marked by the characteristics which distinguish the Divine knowledge. They are original, immediate, self-evident, and infallible. They bring the human knowledge under a common definition with the Divine, proving them to be like in kind and in function. And it is the reality of this likeness which is the essential condition of our knowledge of God, for only intelligence can apprehend intelligence. Our own intuitions are the source and spring of all knowledge to us, of self-knowledge, knowledge of God, knowledge of the universe. The definition of knowledge is in no way modified by the predicates finite and infinite, applied to the human and the Divine respectively, neither being a qualitative term. It may be affirmed with the utmost confidence that the mind which designed the universe and the mind which can perceive and understand the principles of its structure—the mind which could conceive the vast system of infallible geometrical truth, and the mind which can discover and infallibly recognise the truth of its axioms, and pursue with infallible certainty the most intricate paths of the great system, and formulate its principles into the most certain of all sciences, detecting principles before they have been indicated by facts, must be like in kind. And minds which can know each other must be like in kind, although the range of the one is finite and that of the other infinite. And this likeness we regard as necessarily comprising the condition without which human knowledge is impossible, namely, the relation of the mind to an object. Our intuitions are not self-active; they only act when brought into relation with appropriate objects. This relation between subject and object is necessary to self-consciousness, to perception, to thought. In truth this is less a matter of speculation than of fact. It is a fact of intuition,

and the order of nature illustrates it. For that order renders it impossible for the human mind to have the experience of a single act of self-consciousness before it comes into relation with an objective. Unavoidable certainties of sensation await the entrance of the infant into the light of life. He can have no single independent act of self-consciousness, no knowledge of self alone before subject becomes wedded to object in bonds never to be sundered. God has joined them together; they cannot be put asunder. The subject can never know the briefest interval of isolated independence so as to have an experience of an act of self-consciousness which owes nothing to objective relation. Even when the reflective period of life has arrived, and the mind is able to observe and analyse its own states, by no effort of abstraction can it so isolate the thought of self from the thought of objective existence, or, what is the same in effect, from the experience derived from the relation to objective existence, as to have a purely independent act of self-perception. For the objective has possessed itself of the memory, and there can be no reflection of the mind upon itself without comparison with former states, necessitating recourse to the stores of memory. In the most resolute effort to inspect the present experience apart from all relation to objectivity, the inexorable law of association will compel the objective of the past to confront the self-consciousness of the present. Besides, if we regard mind to be a perfectly homogeneous substance like the perfect fluid of physics, it were contrary to reason to suppose it self-acting, originating the "vortices" of thought independently within itself.

Philosophers of opposite schools are agreed as to this necessary condition of all knowledge—the relation between subject and object. Knowledge is therefore well defined as "the perception of relations," a definition which rightly implies plurality of the objective. Sir William Hamilton says, "Knowledge is a relation, and every relation supposes two terms . . . and knowledge is the relation between these two terms."—*Metaphysics*, Lect. xi. Mr. Spencer says, "Knowledge implies something known and something which knows; whence it follows that a theory of knowledge is a theory of the relation between the two." And again: "Language has, in fact, been, throughout its development, moulded to express all things under the fundamental relation of subject and object,

just as much as the hand has been moulded into fitness for manipulating things presented under the same fundamental relation; and if detached from this fundamental relation, language becomes as absolutely impotent as an amputated limb in empty space."—*Psych.* vol. ii. pp. 307, 335. President Porter, Yale College, says: "In knowing we apprehend not only that objects exist, but also that they exist in certain relations to other objects, one or more. Hence it is essential to the definition of knowledge, not only that we know objects as existing, but that we know them as related. . . . When it is said that in every act of knowledge we not only apprehend that objects exist, but that they exist in some relation, it is not intended that the objects are first known to be, and afterwards known in their relations, but rather that when they are known to be, they are also known as related. Least of all is it true, that objects are first known apart, and then are brought together in order that they may be discerned as related. Nothing can be further from the truth. The object given is always complex."¹ Dr. Bain says: "The primary attributes of intellect are (1) Consciousness of *Difference*, (2) Consciousness of *Agreement*, (3) *Retentiveness*. Every properly intellectual function involves one or more of these attributes, and nothing else." "The beginning of knowledge or ideas is the discrimination of one thing from another." "The fundamental property of Discrimination is also expressed as the law of Relativity." "As regards knowledge, everything known is known in contrast to something else." "There cannot be a singular or absolute cognition." "All knowledge finally resolves itself into differences and Agreements."² Mr. Mill, in his *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, had said in his first and second editions of that work,—“But without the notion of not-self we cannot have that of self, which is contrasted with it.” But in his third edition he omits this statement from the text, and in a note he says,—“In saying this I overlooked the fact that my own sensations and other feelings, as distinguished from what I call myself, are a sufficient not-self to make the self apprehensible. The contrast necessary to all cognition is sufficiently provided for by the antithesis of the Ego and particular modi-

¹ *The Human Intellect*, pp. 65, 66.

² *Mental and Moral Science*, pp. 82, 83.

fications of the Ego." Mr. Mill does not tell us how the Ego comes to have sensations, feelings, and particular modifications apart from relations to a distinct not-self. He must have overlooked an important element of his philosophy, in which he regards matter to be "a permanent possibility of sensations." Then he seemed to have regarded that "possibility" as objective, but he must have come to believe it to be comprehended within the Ego itself, thereby constituting the Ego a self-sufficient and absolutely independent being, and therefore entitled to claim the attribute of self-existence. But we have his acknowledgment of the fundamental truth that contrast is necessary to all cognition; and we shall retain the belief that the contrast to which the Ego was indebted for its sensations, feelings, and particular modifications, was an objective distinct from itself.

The element of relation, then, enters into the very notion and definition of knowledge, and belongs to every function of intelligence. "We think in relations," says Mr. Spencer. Man is bound to objectivity by the law of his being. This intuition of co-existences is the fundamental condition of his social life. Relation to his kind, recognition of his kind, fellowship with his kind, are necessary to sustain as to direct the action of every man's intelligence, and the intuition of self and not-self is the constitutional provision which makes this action possible. Mind alone is the satisfying objective to mind; it is the highest object of the cognitive power; and it is the only object that can meet its action with responsive action. The highest mental exercise is the discrimination of mind and its thoughts human and Divine; the highest mental enjoyment is the intelligent reciprocation of thought. The conditions of this reciprocation are based upon the very nature of knowledge as being the perception of relations. And it is knowledge thus regarded that is the constitutional qualification for the place and work assigned to man in the universe, a universe whose law is relation, a universe in which all existence is co-existence. This is knowledge of the only kind and in the only form in which man knows it; it is in this form alone he is conscious of it—a form which he can in no-wise change. But this is the testimony of human nature to knowledge as an attribute of the Divine nature. It is God's

own testimony to knowledge as it is in Himself, that is that He has been eternally cognisant of relation, eternally living in the relations of subject and object. This fundamental element is inseparable from human knowledge and from human thought, and man's whole experience of intellectual action reclaims against the attribution of intelligence to any being existing out of all relation. Eliminate the element of relation, and intelligence with all its functions disappears. This is the plain testimony of human nature, the living image of the living God.

We have further evidence of the intimate likeness between the Divine and human knowledge in the construction of the universe around us. This revelation of God entirely harmonises with that of human nature, presenting knowledge and thought uniformly characterised by relation. Having within ourselves the consciousness of intelligence and of its various functions, we intuitively recognise and interpret its signs and marks in external nature. Everywhere around us the universe is vocal with eloquent thought. It is one vast system of symbols of thought, addressing every sense, and pressing their significance upon every power of the mind. Thought is everywhere; it is universal as existence. "Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world." Relation, order, likeness, difference, unity, identity, proportion, law, causation, are thoughts, ideas, principles, which have clearly determined the construction of the universe, and whose continued action maintains it in existence. Man's fancy does not import these thoughts into nature: he finds them under the form of material symbols, intelligible to him as articulate speech. These thoughts are not a secretion of brain, any more than a secretion of rock. They cannot be traced to any terrestrial life, nor to organisation, nor to any antecedent in nature. These thoughts have clearly preceded their symbols, and framed them. No theory of evolution will account for geometrical thought. This whole system of thought, the interpretation of which employs the best energies of the men of science, is absolutely without error, every mind approaching its study, not as a critic or a judge, but as a

learner, and accepting its conclusions as infallibly true and certain. This whole system of thought has come directly from the Divine mind, passing through no medium that could colour or refract it. And man finds Divine thought thus expressed in nature to be apprehensible by his own mind. All its classes adjust themselves quite naturally to his powers, and his mind adapts itself quite naturally to their entertainment. They are not felt to be a foreign or incongruous element. They flow as naturally along the channel of the human consciousness, as naturally occupy the memory, as naturally conform to the law of association, as naturally obey the call of recollection, and as naturally find expression through human organs of speech, as though they were the spontaneous product of the mind itself. The man of science, when investigating matter, discovers truths of mind, principles. And although he were a materialist, he can express his discoveries only in terms of thought. He can discover no natural antecedent to account for their existence; they are absolutely original, yet his mind responds to them with intelligent apprehension. He analyses, classifies, constructs theories, frames hypotheses, reasons from them, and appropriates them, to the conscious increase of his own intellectual wealth and power. "We must never forget," says Sir John Herschel, "that it is principles, not phenomena, the interpretation, not the mere knowledge of facts, which are the objects of inquiry to the natural philosopher." And Dr. Tyndal says, "Facts alone cannot satisfy the mind, and where the law is established the question 'Why' is inevitable." It is thus clearly a necessity of thought that mind is ultimate, and that it is everywhere present, and that it is mind alone that can answer the "Why," and the answer, the explanation, is expected to be in terms of mind. Explanation or interpretation of phenomena is the prerogative of mind alone.

In the realm of nature thought is everywhere, relation is co-extensive with thought, thought-relations are everywhere. Relation discovers itself with the same uniformity in nature with which it dominates the human intelligence. The human mind and the mind which manifests itself in nature disclose the same essential characteristics, and the kinship of the human to the Divine is established by two witnesses. . And

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both witnesses consent in testifying that the knowledge of God is the perception of relations, the eternal cognition of co-existence. This is the revelation of an essential attribute of God, testifying what it is in Himself and to Himself, without reference to relation with the universe. It testifies that he has been eternally cognisant of relation, living in actual relations—that therefore there are relations within His own nature, the necessary conditions of His perfection and happiness—a plurality of Persons in the unity of the Godhead. This conclusion cannot be assailed otherwise than by discrediting the testimony of the image of God, and the concurring testimony of the material and sentient universe; and as against these Divine witnesses, no hypothesis can claim even a momentary or provisional preference. On no ground of reason can this position be denied, for it occupies, apart from revelation, the whole ground of information upon the subject under review. And no data exist from which the human mind can reason that knowledge is possible under other conditions than those supplied by the reciprocal antithesis of self and not-self. Much less is there any basis for the conception of a form of knowledge more perfect than that to which man and nature bear witness. It is the guarantee of the social life of man; it is the witness to the social life of God.

Even Unitarians demand an objective for God, so impossible is it to believe in the absolute solitariness of an intelligent being. That distinguished Unitarian, Dr. Martineau, writes thus:—

“Our age professes itself weary of the old mechanical Deism, and cries out for an Immanent and Living God. It is well: but even for Immanency itself, there must be something wherein to dwell; and for Life, something whereon to act. Mind, to think out its problems,—unless those problems are a dream,—cannot be monistic,—a mere subjective infinitude,—its tides and eddies all within. What resource, then, have we, when we seek for something objective to God? The first and simplest, in which, accordingly, philosophy has never failed to take refuge, is *Space*. Inconceivable by us, except as co-extensive and co-eternal with Him, yet independent of Him, it lies ready, with all its contents of geometrical property, for the intuition of His Reason. And to Thought, which thus comes out of its eternity, and engages itself upon determinate relation, we cannot help ascribing the cognition of *Time*, with its attendant *Number*. Thus the circle of quantitative data is complete, and the ground of all mensurative and deductive intellect is there. Will this, then, suffice? Can we follow out the Kosmical problem

upon this track? The experiment has been too tempting for philosophers to resist; and again and again they have worked in this vein, and tried to exhibit the universe as a *deduction*, thought, wrought out 'more geometrico' from axioms of Eternal Reason; to dispense altogether with creative *volition*, as the source of order; and to connect even physical qualities and phenomena by a conceivable chain of logical necessity with the self-evidence at fountain-head."

Dr. Martineau shows the insufficiency of this attempt to "dispense with creative volition," and affirms that, "in the Ethics of Spinoza, and the Dialectic of Hegel, the pretension has, in modern times, twice culminated and twice fallen." And "the principle of their failure is this, that they did not,—for in truth they could not,—keep their promise of borrowing nothing from experience and observation, of working everything from ontological self-evidence." This resource, therefore, he dismisses as unsatisfactory:—

"Nature cannot be treated as a geometrical or logical necessity; that were God alone with the inner Laws of Thought and the outer data of Quantity, no universe need ever have been; and that to evolve the result intelligibly we must go beyond the assumptions of the mathematics and metaphysics. In other words, there must be something else than Space objective to God."

Dr. Martineau does not pause to inquire "whether it is conceivable that God should,—so to speak,—*supply Himself* with objectivity, by a "creation out of nothing,"—or whether, as Sir W. Hamilton contends, the conception is "absurd and self-destructive." This conception is sufficiently unreasonable, first, because it would imply that God had lived throughout a previous eternity without an objective, and had not felt it to be a necessity; and, secondly, because no created objective would have been sufficient, as it could not have been the measure of His infinity. Dr. Martineau then says:—

"There is only one resource left for completing the needful objectivity for God, namely, to admit, in some form, the coeval existence of matter, as the condition or medium of the Divine agency and manifestation. . . . Failing the proof" (of the absolute origination of matter) "we are left with the Divine Cause, and the material condition of all nature in eternal co-presence and relation, as supreme subject and rudimentary object."

It will thus be seen that the pure monism of Dr. Martineau's Theism surrenders to the necessities of his philosophy. A solitary mind, "a mere subjective infinitude," will not satisfy the conditions of "Divine agency and manifestation." In

other words, a solitary being cannot be an agent; he cannot, therefore, be possessed of intelligence and will. He cannot be God. He must have an objective coeval with Himself, external to Himself. This objective is matter, a "rudimentary object," that is, matter without particular forms,— "the simplest skeleton of the constitution of matter." Apart from this objective, God is non-existent. Matter with its primary qualities "belong eternally to the material datum objective to God; and his mode of activity with regard to them must be similar to that which alone we can think of his directing upon the relations of Space, viz., not Volitional, to cause them, but Intellectual, to think them out." "The Secondary qualities, on the other hand, having no logical tie to the Primary, but being appended to them as contingent facts, cannot be referred to any deductive thought, but remain over as products of pure Inventive Reason and Determining Will." "And this is precisely the realm of Divine originality." The eternal agency of the Divine Being is thus limited to the sphere of the secondary qualities of matter. They are the qualities which determine the plasticity of matter, its power of being moulded into particular forms, and they are the product of the Divine "Inventive Reason and Determining Will." This is the nearest approach to creation allowed to God. He could create no new entity; He could only impart new qualities to eternal matter, by the use of which He could make it assume new forms. And this was the sole agency of an infinite intelligence from all eternity,—a mere inventive worker, contriving and executing ever new forms of matter. Dr. Martineau's Theism leads him to regard the Divine Being as one, in the strictest monistic sense; but his sounder philosophy teaches him rightly that "mind cannot be monistic, its tides and eddies all within." His philosophy reclaims against his Theism. He shrinks from the idea of a "lonely God." But the co-presence of a chaos of rudimentary matter, this sole objective to God, until He began to act upon its plasticity, could not relieve the loneliness of an intelligent, not to speak of a moral being. This would imply imperfect satisfaction from eternity, and also a gradual increase of satisfaction, with the advancing variety and order of the universe, through untold æons, until perfect and peopled worlds gave back responsive thought to Divine formative intelligence and

power. Infinity cannot be predicated of such a being. He is limited in his own nature, without the power of action, except by relation to an objective of a nature utterly incongruous to his own. He is dependent upon this objective for the conditions of his activity, and matter being finite, it does not afford a sphere for infinite activity. The possibility of exhausting the capabilities of change in finite matter through the illimitable eternity rises up before the mind as a rational suggestion. This hypothetical unipersonal being is thus twice limited,—limited in his own nature, and limited by the limitations of his sole sphere of possible action. Such a being is not infinite, nor independent, nor self-existent. If we predicate infinite intelligence of him, and give him the fellowship of intelligent finite beings, he is still a “lonely God.” An intelligent being, who has no equal, is a lonely being. Fellowship is a necessity of every intelligent being, and fellowship, on equal terms, is necessary to its perfection. An infinite being must be independent, having all the resources and conditions of its activity within itself, and, as being intelligent, must have its objectivity within its own nature, that there may be equality between the subjective and the objective, and that they may be interchangeably subject and object. An intelligent objective is the only congruous and suitable objective to an intelligent subject. Matter can be no necessity to an infinite mind. Even a peopled universe, though peopled by the most perfect possible of created intelligences, supplies no sufficient objective to a being whose intelligence is infinite. Only relations, with an equal intelligence, can supply the conditions necessary to absolutely perfect intellectual activity and fellowship. Dr. Martineau says, “Life must have something whereon to act.” This is true; but the something must be such as shall satisfy the whole of the life’s energies. The life-power must only be controlled by the will of the agent, and in no degree by the limitations of the sphere. Now, Dr. Martineau’s objective for God imposes a perpetual limitation upon the action of a supposed infinite Life. All the necessary conditions of Divine action must be Divine; the Object Divine, as the Subject is Divine. The personal Subject must have a personal Object,—a not-self, its Divine equal. There is then reciprocal comprehension with perfect reciprocal appreciation, and fellowship is perfect.

The necessary condition of all this is—a Plurality of Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature.

A like necessity for an objective to God is a prominent element in Principal Caird's Theism, as appears in his very able work, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*. With a juster sense of the dignity of the problem than that entertained by Dr. Martineau, Dr. Caird finds in finite spirits intelligent beings, a more congruous object than "coeval matter." But it seems strange that Dr. Caird, who believes the doctrine of the Trinity to be "the central truth not only of Christian faith but of Christian philosophy," should feel it necessary to seek for an objective to God outside the Divine nature, or that it should be supposed possible to find a sufficient objective outside the Divine nature. Affirming the doctrine of the Trinity, he yet reasons on the hypothesis of the unipersonality of the Divine nature, the only hypothesis which can suggest the necessity of an objective for God, as the antithesis necessary to His self-realisation. And this end is served only by an organic relation with finite beings; and God and these finite beings—the Infinite and the finite—are reciprocally necessary to each other; "each is necessary to and realises itself in and through the other." Having, he says, "attempted to show that Finite Spirit or Mind, considered by itself, and apart from Infinite Spirit or Mind, is a mere abstraction, that the former presupposes and is intelligible only in the light of the latter," he turns "to the other side of the opposition," and finds that an abstract, self-referent Infinite must, equally with an abstract, self-referent Finite, yield to another and higher idea. The Infinite of religion cannot be a mere self-identical Being, but one which contains in its very nature organic relation to the Finite. Or rather, it is that organic whole which is the unity of the Infinite and Finite." And again: "A necessary relation cannot be one in which there is necessity only on the one side and mere arbitrary will on the other;" the necessity therefore is equally on the side of the Infinite as of the Finite. And accordingly it is added that "the existence of a finite world or of finite spiritual beings cannot be ascribed to a mere arbitrary creative will, but springs out of something in the very nature of God, or that the idea of God contains in itself, as a necessary element of it, the

existence of finite spirits. Now that the true idea of the Infinite does contain in it the idea of the Finite, or, in less formal terms, that the nature of God would be imperfect if it did not contain in it relation to a finite world, may be shown in various ways." And the way this is shown is that if God were conceived as a mere abstract self-identical Infinite, He "would lack that which is one of the most essential elements of a spiritual nature—the element of love."¹ We cannot follow this line of thought further than is necessary to our own argument, which is to show that the Divine nature contains in its own personalities all the necessary conditions of its infinite activity, and owes nothing whatever to finite beings. It seems impossible to reconcile the positions of Dr. Caird, either with the infinity of God or the finitude of his hypothetical world of spirits. If God be dependent upon relation to such a world for self-realisation and self-consciousness, He cannot be called infinite. And if the relation be necessary, as it is affirmed to be, He cannot be absolute. Without this relation, as we have just seen, according to Dr. Caird, the nature of God would be imperfect. He has not His perfection in Himself, therefore He is not self-sufficient, He is not independent. According to this philosophy of religion, God is not to be conceived of as "self-identical infinite, complete, self-contained in His own Being," because such a being would be "without life in the life of others," and "without reciprocated knowledge and affection." Such a being is not self-existent. Can we recognise in such a being the living and true God? And those beings who are necessary to the perfection of God and are in organic relation to Him, why are they called finite? They are spiritual beings, eternal as God, being in eternal organic relation with Him, necessary beings, in whatever sense He is, uncreated. These are predicates of God—where are the marks of their finitude? They "spring out of something in the very nature of God"—are they not therefore Divine? Their relation to God is one of reciprocal dependence, and, for aught that appears, equal, as it is eternal. No ground of superiority on the one part or the other discovers itself; and no reason appears why the same predicates may not be affirmed or denied of the one as of the other, or why the one should be

¹ *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 280, 252.

designate Infinite or the other Finite. A dependent being is not Infinite—a necessary being is not Finite.

That the Divine Being should be without relation to an objective is contrary to the philosophy of both these accomplished men, Dr. Martineau and Dr. Caird, for both assert relation to an object to be necessary to the self-consciousness of an intelligent being. That objective to the Divine Being cannot be a creation, for that would make the prior eternity to be without consciousness. The necessary objective must be eternal as the Supreme Subject Himself. Both recognise this ; and Dr. Martineau arbitrarily postulates the eternity of matter, and Dr. Caird, with equal arbitrariness but with a nicer appreciation of the necessities of a spirit, postulates the eternity of finite spirits capable of responsive thought. This is an apprehension of the true principle of an objective for God, namely, the necessity of fellowship to an intelligent being, whether Infinite or Finite. But he has overlooked the indisputable truth that fellowship, to be perfect and satisfying, must be equal. An Infinite nature and a Finite nature do not meet on terms of equality. The reciprocal communicativeness and receptivity are utterly disproportioned to each other. The Finite cannot impart so as to satisfy the receptivity of the Infinite. The receptivity of the Finite is not of capacity to receive all which is in the power of the Infinite to communicate. Identity of nature is absolutely necessary to equality of giving and receiving in intellectual fellowship. The fellowship of finite spirits is altogether insufficient for the Divine Spirit. If His fellowship were restricted to that of the Finite there would be a necessary limitation of His intellectual activity, because the finite being, finite in his capacity of comprehension, could not understand the deep things of God. A lower rank of mind may have the conditions of its utmost activity satisfied in the fellowship of a higher, because there is no limitation imposed upon its natural capacity ; it has scope for all the free and spontaneous action of which it is capable. But the higher rank of mind cannot have its greater capacity for action satisfied in the fellowship of the lower. Every mind desires competent appreciation of its exercises and judgments, but this requires competent comprehension. The capacity of the finite being is incompetent to the comprehension of the

Divine nature, or of the profundity of its thoughts. An intelligent being who has no equal, who is above all others in capacity, must be absolutely without fellowship, absolutely without the conditions upon which perfect fellowship depends. Such fellowship demands mutual comprehension, the equal appreciation of each other's nature and thoughts. Men have experience of such fellowship within the limitations of their common nature in their intimate relations with each other. But man has the conscious capability of a higher fellowship, and the consciousness that his merely human fellowships are not perfectly satisfying. Every man feels that he does not know any other man perfectly, and he is equally convinced that he himself is not perfectly known by any other. Here are mutual restrictions upon their fellowship. Suppose God to be a solitary being, where are the conditions of equal fellowship for Him? By entering into communication with man He shows Himself capable of fellowship and desirous of it. He manifests His desire to be known, to be appreciated and honoured for His infinite perfections. But imperfect honour, imperfect appreciation, imperfect comprehension cannot satisfy the claims of Him who knows Himself to be worthy of infinite regard. No honour can be satisfying which is not adequate, which is not exactly proportioned to the excellency of the perfections of the infinite God. It cannot rise above, it must not fall below. The honour rendered by the creature, while it is a homage due from him, cannot rise to the sublime altitude of the Divine perfections. Such a Being can never know fellowship if He be dependent upon His relation to the creature for its enjoyment. And satisfaction or happiness, in any signification which man can attach to these terms, cannot possibly be ascribed to Him.

Thus, correlatively, we have to consider upon what the infinite power of cognition, of comprehension, of appreciation, is to be exercised. Where is the sphere for its action? The sphere must be proportioned in every respect to the capability of action. The problem is, *to find a perfect objective, congruous and fitting, for a perfect intelligence*; and the answer is, *a perfect intelligence*. A plurality of persons in the unity of the Divine nature is the sole rational solution of the problem. A Divine Person alone can adequately know and honour a

Divine Person. And reciprocally, a Divine Person can only be adequately known and honoured by a Divine Person. Intellectual fellowship is then complete, equal, infinitely satisfying, from eternity to eternity.

If we further consider that function of Intelligence which we denominate Wisdom, it is evident that relation is the essential condition of all its action. In all plans and contrivances, in all constructive operations, Wisdom is the ruling power. In speculative thought, in the formation of theories, in the construction of scientific hypotheses, the diversified possibilities of combination and order demand the action of Wisdom in the processes of selection and arrangement. But the highest sphere for its action among men is found in the relations of social life. There, where will, and the spontaneous energies of many minds, are in vigorous activity, where fixed purposes and free preferences are flung in indiscriminate mixture into the multitudinous arena of human life and impulse and action, there is the occasion for the highest efforts and best achievements of Wisdom. In the right ordering of a family, in determining and guiding the policy of a state, in the government of the Church, and of all forms of human association, the regulative power of human wisdom is taxed to the utmost. Now this is the manifestation of Divine Wisdom, showing its proper function, its proper sphere, and the condition of its action. It is impossible to assign any function to such an attribute in a solitary being. It is manifested to us in its real character and action as the necessary regulative principle of social order—this is its proper nature, and in no other character can we rationally ascribe it to God. If there be no intellectual relations, no social life in the Divine nature, there is no place for Wisdom, nor are there the conditions of any function of Intelligence.

Our argument has all along proceeded upon the assumption that the attributes of the Divine image are copies of those in the Divine nature, that they are comprehended under the same definitions, and that, therefore, they are properly called by the same names. And as we have indicated before, we desire it to be understood that we regard the attributes as *given* in the human constitution, in its creation—its primitive intuitions. It is thus we have spoken of knowledge, primitive cognition, the perception of relations, as being predicable of the Divine

knowledge as certainly as of the human ; and it is not possible to show any basis whatever for a conception of knowledge different in kind or more excellent in quality or form of action. No evidence can be adduced of the existence, no presumption of the probability or possibility of any other kind of knowledge, than that which is the glory of man. The whole visible universe, and the instincts of animated nature, no less than the intuitions of man, reclaim against the conception of an intelligent being existing in eternal solitude—"a lonely God."

The same conclusion follows of strict necessity from an analysis of the moral nature of man, as the moral image of God. As moral attributes are so related to the intellectual as not to be able to act apart from them, their action is necessarily subject to the same psychological laws. The same fundamental law, the relation between subject and object, rules with the same potency in the moral sphere of human life as in the intellectual. For this reason a very brief analysis of our moral nature will serve the purpose of our argument. Righteousness, benevolence, truth, are attributes native to the human constitution, and their action determines and directs the moral life. They are severally relative terms, implying the relation between subject and object.

Righteousness is the principle which determines rights, and which defines and guards them. Now, rights can only arise in society. Social relations are the only sphere of the action of righteousness ; it is the ruling principle of social order, securing respect for all personal rights. The highest and most sacred of all rights is the honour due to personal perfection. Its existence is the assertion of its claim ; the perception of it elicits spontaneously the obligation to respect it. The claim is righteous—the response is righteous. But the claim and the response must be exactly proportioned, that the action of righteousness may be perfect. God's personal perfection is the ground of His claim to man's homage. That homage is God's right. To yield it is a righteous act on the part of man. But however pure it may be, it "falls short of the glory of God," because man cannot estimate fully the Divine perfection. Man's righteous homage in his best estate is not proportioned to the righteousness of the Divine claim. The conditions of the perfect action of Divine justice cannot be found in relations

with the finite creature. They can only lie within the Divine nature itself, where alone, subjectively and objectively, they are perfect. Out of the relations of moral beings we know of no function which righteousness could perform. We have experience of its action, and understand its function in all the diversity of human association; and we believe this to be the manifestation of the Divine righteousness, disclosing to us its proper nature, such as it has been to God from all eternity, without respect to any relation to created existences. His righteousness must have been eternally active because eternally perfect; but this can only be regarded as possible within actual moral relations, and those relations Divine. Nor is it possible to believe in the happiness of a being conscious of rights which never can be perfectly enjoyed. A Divine Person alone can appreciate Divine rights at their Divine value, and honour them with perfect honour. A plurality of persons in the unity of the Godhead alone accounts for the perfect action of righteousness from everlasting to everlasting.

The same conclusion follows from the very nature of the principle of Benevolence. It is an exclusively social virtue. Its proper nature is to impart. It is the disposition to bestow good upon a susceptible object. In our own nature it bears within it the obligation to impart the good which it is in our power to bestow. And, as Bishop Butler says, the love of our neighbour is as much "a part of our nature" as self-love. The relation between self and not-self is the essential condition of the action of Benevolence under all its modifications. In that form of it which we denominate Love, we know that the consciousness of it is impossible if it has no suitable object. In no other sense can we rationally ascribe Love to God than that in which we have the experience of it in our own nature, as that principle which is the purest and sweetest bond of social life. "God is Love"—that is, it is His nature to love. He loves as certainly as He lives. He must have lived eternally, according to His nature: He must, therefore, have loved eternally, and must have lived within the moral relations which constitute its necessary conditions. The assumption of an infinite unipersonal being, for it is a mere assumption, excludes the possibility of eternal love as a real experience—a "lonely God" must have a loveless life. Even the finite beings

in eternal organic relation with God, according to Dr. Caird, could not have the perfection of excellency and beauty which would satisfy the infinite power of loving in an infinite being. And, conversely, they would be incapable of loving God with that perfect love which is the full measure of the claim of infinite loveliness. Such a being could neither love nor be loved according to the perfection of his nature. His very perfection, if confined to association with finite beings, would bar the possibility of the joy and happiness of love. The finite beings would be happier than He, because the conditions of their happiness bear a constant proportion to their susceptibility. Love must be for ever an impossible experience to a solitary being. This is too obvious to require further argument.

Truth also, as a moral attribute, can have no action and no meaning except in the social relations of moral beings. Only in those relations can veracity, truthfulness, trustworthiness, fidelity, with their necessary correlatives, belief, trust, confidence, have place or action.

Having proved, as we believe, the existence of a Plurality of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead, the question now arises, Does human nature furnish data for determining definitely the number of which the plurality consists? In order to the discussion of this critical point, it is necessary to determine the true seat of the Divine image in man. In one aspect of this question it has already been determined that the image is seated in the original mental and moral elements of human nature. But we have also seen that those elements have not the conditions of their action in any single personality. No single personality is an integer complete in itself; it is but a constituent member of an integer which contains in its necessary unity the subjective conditions of all mental and moral action. This integer is the unit of the race, and is the true seat of the Divine image. It contains within it the completeness of human nature, so as that all reasoning founded upon the data supplied by the unit would be valid and conclusive, as if derived from the whole race. The unit would be human nature complete in itself if all its other generations were non-existent. This would not be true of the individual; the individual cannot be the unit of the race; he cannot fulfil all the functions of the race, nor be the complete image of God.

The unit corresponds to the family, an organism of natural and necessary relations. The family consists of parents and offspring, and it is complete in its minimum number of three, the parents and one child.¹ The relations supplied by a duality are insufficient for the action of the laws of thought. But in the relations of three the whole dialectic apparatus of the human mind is provided with the essential conditions of action. There is the perception of likeness and difference. There is identity, contradiction (non-contradiction), excluded middle, comparison, thought, judgment, abstraction, generalisation. Within the same relations the moral powers, justice, goodness, and truth are elicited, and the sensibilities in their most intense degree. No additional members elicit any new powers. With the family, therefore, in its minimum number of three, we have our argument complete for determining the unit of the race, and for identifying it with the image of God. Now, this unit is not a casual nor a conventional organisation, but natural, necessary, and divinely constituted. Its testimony, therefore, is authoritative, for it is Divine. It testifies unequivocally to personality in the Godhead. It testifies to personal relations as essential to the consciousness of intelligence, to the consciousness of moral principle, to the consciousness of love. This is God's own testimony in the intelligible form of a living likeness, reflecting His own attributes and life, a likeness constructed by Himself. It testifies that He is essentially a social Being—that there are three Persons in the Godhead, the same in substance, equal in power and glory.

It may conduce to the further satisfaction of the understanding, and we trust may be an aid to faith, to show that there are rational grounds for affirming real individualising distinctions between the persons of the Godhead as truly as between the personalities of human nature. All being of one and the same nature, equal in all attributes, all equally perfect, how can elements of distinction be conceived to exist, so that any predication may be made of one which is not equally predicable, and in exactly the same sense, of all? How can

¹ Other members of the family partake of the social influence of the unit, and thereby contract the impress of the features of the image upon their several individualities, and are thus fitted to become principals in new units. Besides, each being in close relation with the parents, may in turn become the third constituent in the unit.

one have a cognition, a judgment, a volition, which is not simultaneously the common experience of all? But it is to be remembered that there is a distinctive experience belonging to each personality which cannot be possessed in common with any other. That experience is self-consciousness. We severally express our personality by the word "I," "the most exclusive word in the language," as Mr. Maurice says. When a man uses the word "I," he excludes all other beings. Every man, every intelligent being, has his own self-consciousness, as he has his own identity, neither of which can be held in common or shared with any other. There is great similarity among all men, but every man has the consciousness that he differs from all other men. He is conscious of being a distinct agent, with his own personality, his own identity, continuous and permanent, with the conscious power of self-determination.

All this must be true of the Persons of the Godhead. Each has His own personality and the exclusive consciousness of it. He has the consciousness of His own continuous identity as an exclusive experience, and He cannot have the consciousness of another. Identities are mutually exclusive, and their experiences are exclusive. There is a further ground of diversity of personal experience among the Persons of the Godhead, in that each has the condition of a perception impossible to each of the others, having an objective perceptible exclusively by Himself. For greater clearness, let us speak of the Divine Persons as first, second, and third. The second and third Persons, regarded as a group, form an objective to the first Person alone. All the judgments and feelings which that objective suggests, in the nature of the case, are confined to the first Person alone, because the perception is His alone. And to this is to be added the perception of likeness and difference between the two members of His objective, with all the judgments and feelings which of necessity belong to it. And these differing from the former, diversify the experience—an experience peculiarly and exclusively that of the first Person. Similarly, the first and third Persons form an objective to the second, and the first and second to the third. Each Person has thus a dual objective, but varied to each, therefore varying the perceptions, the cognitions, the judgments, and experiences of each.

Again, the first and second Persons have in the third an

objective common to both. This gives occasion for concurrence of judgment in their estimation of Him, and for fellowship in their complacency and delight in Him, both on the ground of their common relation to Him and of their admiration of the perfection of His personal characteristics. In like manner, the second and third Persons have a common objective in the first, and the first and third in the second, and afford to all further diversity of experiences, with experiences also which are in common. Both diversity and community of experience are the necessary conditions of fellowship—a necessity of all intelligents. Fellowship consists in mutual communication, in giving and receiving an interchange of thought. But if, in the Divine Personalities, cognitions and thoughts and judgments were all identical, there would be nothing to impart and nothing to receive. The distinctions necessary alike to intelligence and fellowship would be wanting, leaving blank negation.

It is also to be observed that, in the exercise of fellowship, each Person imparts to the others of His own special experience, and receives in return from them. And this interchange increases, by its eternal action, the variety of experience to all, giving us rational grounds of assurance that the Divine life is not a life of unvarying sameness and unchanging uniformity. The created universe verifies this conception of infinite diversity in the Divine life. It is an exponent of that diversity, a glorious illustration of it, reflecting itself in human thought and in the ever-changing pictures of the human imagination. And yet, great as the universe is, as man estimates greatness, it is but a finite indication of the infinite reality, containing within it springs of active happiness exhaustless as eternity. The created universe is no necessity to the Divine nature. The Trinity is self-sufficient and independent from everlasting to everlasting. In the eternal relations of three Persons in the unity of the Godhead, with all attributes absolutely perfect, all the Personalities absolutely perfect, all the conditions exist for perfect personal action, for perfect mutual knowledge, for perfect fellowship, for perfect happiness. That which is absolutely perfect admits of no increment, and will bear no diminution.

In the relation of three Divine Persons there are also the perfect conditions of a perfect moral order and a perfect moral

life. Every moral principle, as we have seen, is, in its very nature, relative, and absolutely without the conditions of action out of moral relations. A being who had never known personal relations could never have had the consciousness of a moral principle. Of such a being morality cannot be rationally predicated. To harmonise the relations of social life is the proper function of morality; and the morality of the individual is the product of the social action. The unit of the race is the unit of society. Three is the lowest number of persons which can constitute a society ruled by moral law. This is the family in its minimum number; and the family relations thus limited elicit the action of every moral principle in its simplest form in a pure state of life. They are elicited by the necessities of harmony, and they are sufficient to maintain it. And no other class of moral principles is ever disclosed by any association of human beings, whatever its form or whatever its magnitude.

In the relations of three Persons in the Unity of the Divine Nature, all the conditions of perfect moral action are absolutely perfect. The subjective conditions are absolutely perfect; and of necessity the objective conditions possess the same perfection, for the subjective action could not be perfect without the perfection of the objective. And both classes are within the same unity of the same absolutely perfect personalities, each of which is subject and object in turn. They comprehend within their relations infinite, moral perfection. Infinite perfection is ultimate: more or less than three Persons in the Unity of the Godhead is a contradiction. Three satisfy all the necessities of reason; and here thought may rest—but there is no resting-place beyond, and no finality; at no other point in numeration could a logical terminus be found. There can be no more reason for supposing the addition of one than of a million.

The line of argument which we have here pursued affords sufficient ground for repelling the charge of tritheism sometimes brought against the doctrine of the Trinity. Are not three persons three beings? Are not three Divine Persons three Divine Beings—therefore three Gods? But the term “being” is ambiguous; it is used in a collective sense as well as in a singular. We say man is a being possessed of reason when we mean the race, mankind. And we have before shown that

a single personality is not a being complete in itself, but is incapable of personal action except in relation with others. Christian Confessions have shown a just jealousy lest the distinction of Persons should be thought to imply "division of the substance," and so endanger faith in the Unity. Our safeguard is in the testimony of the image. No member of the race can separate himself from the race. He cannot carry away with him into a state of seclusion and solitude the objective conditions upon which depend the exercise of his intelligence and will and the play of his sensibilities. He cannot be an independent being complete in himself with a life and experience which owe nothing to his relations with the race. Even the mature man carries the traditions of the race with him into solitude. He is born of the race, born into it, a constituent of its unity, inseparable from it. The substance cannot be divided. There is distinction of persons, not division of the substance.

We reverently believe that the human image is in this respect, as in others, a true witness of the relations of the several Persons of the Godhead to the Unity, and to each other. The Divine essence is an indivisible Unity, yet embracing personal distinctions. No one is capable of independent and separate existence, for that would be division of the substance, and a dissolution of the Unity. And to predicate infinity of each in a state of separation would be to affirm three Gods: but as there can be only one Infinite Being in existence, to affirm the existence of three is equivalent to the affirmation of none. The One Infinite Being is the Trinity in Unity. "In the unity of the Godhead there be three Persons, of one substance, power, and eternity." And to this first and greatest of truths human nature is a witness chosen of God.

H. WALLACE.

The writer takes leave to say that years after he had formulated his own views on the subject of this article, he met with two books formally and ably discussing the same subject fundamentally on the same grounds, viz., one by Dr. Kidd of Aberdeen, entitled *An Essay on the Trinity*, published in 1815, and the other by William Cook, D.D., entitled *The Deity: an Argument on the Existence, Attributes, and Personal Distinctions of the Godhead*.

ART. III.—*Patience in Duty: and Duty in Patience.*

THE Christian life is, in almost all cases, such a combination of duty and patience that the motive under which it may be reasonably undertaken and successfully carried out demands the Christian man's most careful and constant attention.

That there is this combination of the active and the passive in the Christian life will be obvious to those who have had the slightest experience or observation in the matter concerned. Christian men have both to work and to be patient. "They labour and faint not" (Rev. ii. 3). They have to obey the Divine will, and to suffer it. They have to put forth positive energy to positive work, and they have to oppose meekness and patience to various trials and discouragements. These are the two spheres or departments between which a Christian's whole life is divided. The various proportions in which they fall to the lot of different Christians the Lord himself decides; and his undoubted lordship or sovereignty he often strikingly exhibits by the peculiar proportions and allotments which he makes. To some a long career of active labour is assigned, and a large share of health and vigour and enjoyment given to expend on energetic duty. They are a tower of strength to every child of God in their neighbourhood, and there is no end of their "works of faith and labours of love." "Patience of faith," again—waters of a full cup—wearisome days and nights;—these are what often force others to discover or invent some means of usefulness which an invalid may cultivate; and it would be hard to say how often and how extensively, in this light, the world has been indebted to invalid members of the Church. Through personal disease or affliction, some are seldom suffered to put their hand to much positive duty; others, through peculiar health and happiness, are seldom laid aside or restrained from it.

Indeed, there are none of Christ's who have not both had positive work to *do*, and not a little suffering to *endure*. The words of the blessed Redeemer to Ephesus have been in every age applicable to more than the Ephesians: "I know thy

works, and thy labour, and thy patience, and how thou canst not bear them which are evil : and thou hast tried them which say they are apostles, and are not, and hast found them liars : and hast borne, and hast patience, for my name's sake hast laboured, and hast not fainted" (Rev. ii. 2, 3). Active and energetic forthputting of positive obedience on the one hand, and meek and patient submission to trial on the other, oftentimes cannot be separated. In Jesus himself personally they could never be separated at all. In obeying, he suffered ; in suffering, he obeyed. Herein was his matchless perfection. "*He learned obedience by the things which he suffered*, and being made perfect, he became the author of eternal salvation to all them *that obey him*" (Heb. v. 8). His position no doubt was peculiar. He had to obey the commanding element of the Law, and at the same time endure its curse ; and the perfect combination of these constituted the *τετέλεσται* : "It is finished." Now we are told that "every one shall be perfected as his master" (Luke vi. 40). But every act of obedience *he* rendered was in the face of painful discouragement and suffering ; every suffering he submitted to was a positive offering of himself. His ever-matchless death upon the cross combined these two elements perfectly ; each also in the highest degree. He *died* ; but, more than this, he *laid down* his life ; he *gave himself* to God ; he *gave his life* a ransom for many ; by his "*one offering*" he hath for ever perfected them that are sanctified" (Heb. x. 14). "*He learned obedience by the things which he suffered*" (Heb. v. 8).

As it was always thus with Christ, it is frequently so with his people. "The disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his lord" (Matt. x. 24). To add suffering to his duty, they persecuted him ; think you they will not persecute *you* also ? Yea, your active *duties* are often *trials* ; your *trials*, it is often your *duty* to go forth and meet them. There is often no separating of the two departments of active exertion and discouraging pain. The very design of Providence with the Christian often seems to be to vary his duties, and to vary his trials continually ; and to produce still greater variation by varying their combinations and proportions. New difficult duties and new distressing trials seem purposely assigned by the Lord to his people, to exercise their faith in

every variety of action, and increase their dependence—their direct dependence—upon himself. Experience is precious: *but the Lord will not suffer believing souls to gather experience¹ in such fashion as to dispense with faith.* Were your combination of duties and trials always the same as had been assigned to you before, you would lean on your past *experience* and forget to make the Lord your present refuge and your strength. By continually varying these duties and trials, and especially by continually varying their combinations, God is ever bringing you into new circumstances in which your experience fails you, and you must in conscious helplessness and ignorance betake yourself to the light and power of the Lord, till at last “*patience* have her perfect *work*, and ye be found perfect and entire, wanting nothing” (James i. 4). And it is on grounds like these that God expects Christian souls to be nothing less than grateful to him for their trials, and that the apostle gives the somewhat startling yet reasonable call: “Count it all joy, brethren, when ye fall into divers temptations”—or trials (James i. 2).

To abide in active duty faithfully, and simultaneously bear trial meekly: to work (not the dilettante trifling that some call

¹ *Experience* is frequently the sum and substance of what we gather from our *failures*, more than our *successes*. Let not an invalid be discouraged by that, nor anything else. Experience is valuable in its own place. How often have we seen it degenerate, narrow, so limited that young people laugh among themselves, and not always without reason. Yes, *experience* has its place, and for many reasons we should like to write on this subject, though it were only to guard against risks and abuses. There are no risks and abuses about Christ. “Do not make a God of your experience,” we have seen more than one Christian, to whom we were inclined to say. Christ is a God already—the only living and true God. You can never be in excess with your love and regard for him. May your experience of him ever be as in these words:—

“The precious love of Jesus fill thy heart,
And overflow thy soul in every part—
A fount of living waters welling o’er,
Expanding, deepening ever more and more !

O may his presence cheer thee on thy way !
A blessing fresh from Heaven, day by day
Keeping in perfect peace thy trusting soul,
And exercising o’er thee sweet control.

May Jesus bear thee on his own dear breast,
Pillow thy head, and bid thee calmly rest—
Lull thee with sweetest songs from Heaven above,
And soothe thy soul with gentle strains of love !”

work, but to work hard), and be patient too : to labour and not to faint : to hold on unshrinkingly in the face of all discouragement ; for all this a high, a powerful motive is required. Where shall such a motive be found ?

Christ always recognises it where it is in action : "*For my name's sake* thou hast laboured, and not fainted." And every other motive has been found to break down.

Both "to labour and be patient for Christ's name's sake" implies both personal regard and affection for himself, and regard for his honour ; that is, personal affection between him and you secretly, and regard for his honour publicly. 'Tis of especial moment to remember that motive adequate to sustain the life of Christian activity and endurance is simply impossible, short of personal supreme attachment to Christ himself, personal admiration of his character, gratitude for his so great and exceptional services, and in a word truly personal love to the Redeemer. When one labours on diligently and bears up bravely in his service, he is doing so *for his sake*. Your secret love to him, your secret intercourse with him, your profound sense of obligation to him, and your unbounded admiration of him—all these re-animate you anew continually in acting and suffering in his service. His glorious love-worthiness, and the love he hath shown to you ;—these, apprehended by spiritual intelligence and personal appropriating faith, bind you in adoring love to his person, and bind you thereby to his service. His own infinitely glorious perfections, his infinitely gracious regard toward you—these you cannot increasingly apprehend by faith, and appreciate by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, without seeing that there is not anything but you ought willingly, when called upon, to do or to suffer for his sake.

The *personal* element will constantly be found indispensable. And yet there is an insidious proneness to dispense with it. For the deepest element of our depravity is our *ungodliness*—our natural proneness to live, and desire to live, without God in the world. The Christian life is one continued struggle and contest with that inveterate tendency to regard religion as something different from right relation and love to a personal God, and right subjection of ourselves to his personal will. The gospel of the grace of God is constructed with the utmost possible in-

genuity and success to meet and remedy that evil. It secures the identifying of necessary, eternal, moral law with the personal will of a most amazingly generous, self-denying, and loving Friend, even Jesus Christ the Son of God, the Lord Jehovah: and those with whom it is vitally influential will find that it is always and *only* while they are keeping Immanuel—God-man—in view as a personal friend, and labouring and bearing up *for his sake*, that they are really succeeding in some measure in running the race that is set before them.

"For Jesus' sake!" How simple and commonplace the words! But how noble the motive! Surely it is an inspiring thought,—a principle of power and patience which we may well rejoice to profess to own. *"For Jesus' sake!"* I discharge this duty; I bear this trial:—in the face of this carking, soul-withering trial, I discharge this painful, exhausting duty:—I labour and faint not:—*"for Jesus' sake."*

Is not this the motive, or reason, or ground, that the Father himself professes in all his purpose of grace and love? He loves you, he saves you, he forgives you, he bears with you, he blesses you—*for Jesus' sake!* When you are miserable, he pities you, *for Jesus' sake*; when you provoke him, when you do what might well forfeit his love and exhaust his patience, he deals graciously with you—*for Jesus' sake.* And that means for the love he bears to Jesus. And well it is that it should be so. Any love he might be supposed to have, at first hand, to *you*, how well you know that you have a thousand times done enough utterly to forfeit—finally to exhaust it! But the love he bears to Jesus has been from eternity, and will be unto eternity. It is among the eternal necessities of Godhead, with all the indefectible and unchanging all-sufficiency thereof; not among the contingencies of time. It is identical with the love of the Eternal Father, in the Eternal Spirit, to the Eternal Son. The persons loving are the same as from eternity, but the Second Person has become the Child of Bethlehem—the Blessor and the Blessing of little children—the friend of Martha and Mary and Lazarus—the meek and lowly—the man Christ Jesus—bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh—our representative, substitute, surety. In these capacities the eternal love of Godhead in the person of the Father to him remains as before. And being at once eternal, infinite, neces-

sary on the one hand, and sovereign, gracious, covenanted on the other, it is inexhaustible, inalienable, unchangeable. 'Tis difficult to say whether this love *now* is more love to Jesus in you, or love to you in Him. It is at least the love in Godhead which the Father, so to speak, draws upon when he loveth you, a sinner : and there is no other which would stand the drain or draft upon it which loving you a sinner must make upon it. Hence the full assurance of faith. Hence your continual appeal to the Father to hear your supplications *for Jesus' sake*. Hence the humble believer's right to hold that from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus, "neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us" (Rom. viii. 38, 39).

But if even God's eternal purpose of love and actings in grace towards us are all *for Jesus' sake*, how well may we resign our hearts and wills to the influence of the same motive also, that, in acting from it, we may be just so much the more, and that literally, even as our Father in heaven ! For with intense literality of truth, it is *Godlike* to act from a regard to Jesus, from esteem, admiration, and love to Him. And if the Father's regard to Jesus yielded a love to us which all our depravity and faithlessness and provocation never exhausted, shall not the same motive on our part yield a motive-power to stimulate for active duty and sustain under afflictive and probationary dispensations, which shall be literally and in all possible eventualities endlessly varied and sufficient ?

The liveliness and constantly quickening element in evangelical religion resulting from the predominance of the personal element is reciprocally brought out very wonderfully, when Jesus, in anticipation of his baptism of blood and wrath, devoting himself as an expiatory or atoning victim, says, "*For their sakes* I sanctify myself, that they also may be sanctified." But there is another consideration. You remember the terms in which Jesus asserted that fundamental and all-embracing exchange of places which we tried to explain in July number, and of which the Scripture speaks in the words, "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, who though he was rich, yet for our sakes became poor, that we through his poverty might be made rich" (2 Cor. viii. 9). *For our sakes !* View every par-

ticular of his career in this light. Bring in the action of this motive, and consider it as influentially and guidingly in operation at every successive stage of Christ's vicarious duties and griefs. See how in his temptations to abandon his duties (and we may take temptation to abandon duty for a very model of the union of the active and the passive in the Redeemer's career)—see how he meets every fawning hint or staggering alarm-cry from the tempter with the self-animating resolution: 'It is *for their sakes* I do it; for *their sakes* I became thus poor.' The Church in fact may almost reciprocate Christ's own language, 'We know thy works, most blessed Redeemer, and thy patience, and how *for our sake* thou hast borne, and hast had patience, and hast laboured, and hast not fainted.' And if that be true, then how exactly suitable and responsive, how precisely due, and how imperatively called for, that we should perseveringly conduct our career and patiently "bear up under its provings"¹ (James i. 22), *for his sake*.

Who is among us that places our energy and patience under the rule of this noble motive?—under the inspiring influence of our adoring and grateful personal regard to Jesus? (We speak upon the point as remembering, alas! how much one may gain of knowledge, on such a point, often more from failure than success.) And will you be slack to give obvious and world-perceptible evidence of its animating and sustaining power—its power to animate you in all zeal for good works—to sustain you in all patience under trial? When will it be time for you to stay your hand in your labours, or faint beneath your troubles²—so long as you can say of Jesus, "The Lord liveth; and blessed be my rock"? (2 Sam. xxii. 47.) Be the work only *for his sake*, will not the thought that it *is* for his sake prompt the needed perseverance? Be the trial only *for his sake*,—will not the thought of it *being* for his sake produce the needed patience? You are not prepared, are you, to acknowledge that this motive can be worn out; that its influence can be limited; that its power to stimulate to energy

¹ The true rendering is, "Blessed is the man that *stands out his provings*, for *when* he is *proved* he shall receive the crown of life, which the Lord hath promised to them that love him."

² Was it not John Newton who exclaimed, when justifying his long continued active occupation of the pulpit, "When will it be time for the graciously saved old African blasphemer to give up preaching Christ?"

or soothe into meekness (two things so awfully difficult to combine) is less than inexhaustible? No; let those who labour from minor motives, and for earthly objects,—for the world's riches and applause,—let *them* come upon the limits of their motives. Let *them* learn by experience that prompting and sustaining principles, fitted to meet literally every crisis, is what they do not possess: that their precise and discriminating want is that they have no motive calculated literally for all circumstances, and competent to all demands upon it. But be it yours to *prove*,—to bring these things (otherwise invisible) out into demonstration—in the every-day sphere of only too terribly real human life, with its vicissitudes of lively activities and languid sicknesses and inextricable sorrows,—and thus to give ocular demonstration and conclusive proof, that in acting from an adoring and affectionate regard to Jesus Christ you have found a motive which, like the fear of the Lord (and which, indeed, is embraced in it), “endureth for ever;” a motive continually fresh and powerful—applicable to all the variations that your case actually undergoes, and all the variations that even any case can? When tempted to resile from some painful post of duty, or to cease from some sore effort to possess your soul in patience,—let the love and (let me dare to say it) the loveableness, the love-worthiness and loving-kindness, of Jesus come into remembrance. Betake yourself to the consideration of the glory and the grace of your Master. And though your foes sting you—as the more maliciously they will, the more they see you inexplicably evading their malice, and making it sting themselves tenfold more than you—let your soul return unto its love and its rest. For Jesus' sake resume your energy, and for Jesus' sake maintain your patience.

It is of importance, however, to watch over the thorough healthiness of the mind in Christian motives, with which the world cannot sympathise; and while we are the thorough advocates of a manly enthusiasm, we would earnestly guard against whatsoever is fanatical. Certainly, to be conducting one's life from a leading consideration to our regard for an absent (in one sense) and unseen person, might easily become fanatical, sentimental, and disorganising. But if it be not only for Jesus' sake (or secret regard for him) that you work and

suffer, but for his *name's* sake (for his public honour), it is different. Not merely your private and individual friendship is then concerned in your labour and patience; but also Christ's *name*, according to scriptural wont, being the embodied manifestation of his glory as in the written Word, you have a cognisable and permanent standard of appeal,—a touchstone and safeguard, that is beyond all serviceableness and value. No man can in that case fanaticise himself and shelter himself from being called to account, on the plea that he is acting from feelings with which no one has a right to interfere, or of which no one has means or capacity of judging. The right and responsibility of private judgment will always be safe in the Church as long as she is Protestant, and holds the correct, *i.e.* the Westminster, doctrine of the inspiration of the Word. But the capacity in the Church to assert and defend the right of private judgment, as in the last resort truly individual, will always depend on its not being carried to a fanatical excess. Personal love to Christ is indispensable, and unless coupled with recognition of and regard for the ostensible revelation of his name, and thoroughly stateable character, and describable and well described personality as in the Word, might give the Church an amount of trouble which it would be alike difficult to endure or to control. How unutterably important is it, then, that we should carefully avoid everything that would foster what could call itself an adoring and grateful regard for what might turn out little more than the picture of a heated imagination: and to see to it that it is the very Jesus of the Bible, and his name and glory and honour as there set forth, that we are concerned for—willing always to be taken to task and called in question on this matter, if it only be the Word of God that is the ultimate referee!

In a word, the motive of which we have spoken is incomplete (under the circumstances, in which it must be here below called into requisition and drawn upon) unless you can supplement the phrase "for Christ's sake" by the fuller and more complete expression, "*for Christ's name's sake.*" The faithful Christian will not only maintain, *in his own soul*, an adoring and affectionate reference in all things to Jesus; but on the outward platform of his life it will be his aim and effort to embody His revealed character and declare

His name ; to make his beloved Master's name renowned ; to commend his religion and his truth to those who as yet have not embraced them ; to stimulate and strengthen, in their love and practice of them, those who have ; to adorn the gospel by exhibiting its influence in a life reflecting all that is fair and pure and true and honourable, and frank and noble and of good report : to stop the mouths of the adversary, and wrest from them every plea or pretence for the rejection of the faith : to outstrip the world in those virtues which the world can comprehend and cultivate, and to realise and illustrate those graces which the world can neither reach nor decri :—thus placing the crown of super-eminent royalty on Christianity, or rather on Christ :—this, in fact, is the mission and should be the aim of every Christian soul among us, and not of those only who become ordained missionaries, expressly so called. To make Christ's name great and honourable—what ought we not willingly and laboriously to do ?—what ought we not quietly and uncomplainingly to bear ? And if at any time we are tempted to abandon our exertions, or succumb beneath our trials, what reanimating influence—as of a war-trumpet, in one view, rekindling our energy,—as of an anodyne, in another, soothing our ruffled spirit into quiet, as a loving little child getting “*a good cry*” on a mother's bosom—may we not find in the blessed resolution, ‘I will return to my thankless toil, I will still bear this weary trial,—for the *sake of the name of Jesus*—to shield that name from dishonour, to cover that name with glory’ ?

‘Yea ; that name’ (may every believing soul go on to say) ‘has been a shield to me : to me that name has been a glory. When I had thrown away my glory, and lay polluted in my shame ; when, as a sinful man, without a shield of any kind I lay open to the scorn of holy abhorrence and the stroke of righteous vengeance, the Father cast around me the name of Jesus, and at once it was my shield and my glory. It yielded me most righteous and unchallengeable protection from righteous wrath—the Judge of all the earth being Judge : it gave me a claim to glory and honour, as well as immortality. Not for *my name's sake* did he do his deeds of love and grace omnipotent ; let that always be well known unto me. When a dying Immanuel says, “For *their sakes* I sanctify myself,” that they

also may be sanctified: still in reality the harmony of truth remains unaltered. He might, in free love, do much for myself; he could in justice do nothing whatever for *my* name's sake. "For his *own* name's sake," be it ever known, he could and did work for my recovery and salvation,—his own name's sake which I had polluted and profaned. He wrought *for me*, for his own name's sake; he wrought *in me*, for his own name's sake. For his own name's sake he pardoned mine iniquity when it was great. He restored my soul, and caused me to walk in the paths of righteousness, even for his own name's sake. And when I had by his own power and grace broken off from my mighty tyrant, and passed through the flood on foot, and sung my song of victory upon the shore, and tasted angels' bread in the wilderness, and drunk of that Rock that followed me—and that Rock was Christ; when, even after all this grace of my Lord,—ingrate that I was and corrupt—I burst the bonds of gratitude and love and loyalty, and made again for Egypt and its flesh-pots, and provoked the Lord till his fury came up on his face, and he threatened to disown and disinherit me, and cast me off,—fairly affrighted and alarmed, I hied me to his feet, and I could find no plea, neither peace nor plea, till I found it in his own "name." But *it* failed me not. For I said unto him, "Lest the Egyptians hear of it," for they know that I have professed thy name and covenant and service,—they know that thou hast been with me in better days, and hast brought me out with an high hand and an outstretched arm to be a Father unto me: and now shouldest thou slay and disinherit me, and leave me to perish, they will say it was because thou wast not able to bring me into the land; and what wilt thou do to thy great name? And when my spirit had mightily grappled with, and cleaved thus unto thy name; when the honour of that name had again become my highest desire; when once more I had entered into sympathy with its claims and glory, and my smitten, withered heart revived with satisfaction at the thought that even still in me—yea, eminently, the more eminently the more clamant the necessity,—the name of Christ might yet be made great, for a pattern to those who should hereafter believe on him to life everlasting (1 Tim. i. 16); my plea was prevailing with God, step by step, as it was returningly delighting me; and for his own name's sake he

was reconciled to me, and instated me once more in his favour and his work.

‘And now, if his name when I pleaded it with him prevailed even unto this that he wrought for me and had patience, in face of my ingratitude, instability, offensiveness, and provocations,—oh! surely I ought to work now and be patient, even till he has reason to say: “I know that for my name’s sake thou hast laboured, and hast not fainted.”’

’Tis a great thing to remember that *he knows* when, for his name’s sake, you “labour and faint not.” Christ knoweth it. The world cannot know it. The peculiar upholding Christian motive the world cannot comprehend. And hence the intense indignation that a Christian man feels at the disgraceful misunderstandings to which he is so often subjected, is often followed by the revulsion of kind compassion in the plain thought,—Really, after all, how could they know better? It must always be a first principle, that the moving powers and sustaining energies of a life of faith lie beyond the penetration of the natural man. To rationalise away here is treason. The doctrine of man’s total depravity must be stated most distinctly and emphatically, if there is to be any gospel at all. The need of an absolutely new life, which no mere moral excellencies nor scientific cultivations ever can dispense with, must be insisted on. The beautiful and indeed entrancing qualities of this new life, taking for granted as they do a God in Tri-unity, and the delightful relations of the Persons as arranged and averred in the covenant of grace, cannot be dwelt upon here. But there is nothing about them that proud Science can dare to throw nature’s scorn upon. If we have believed on Jesus, it must ever be maintained that “Henceforth the world knoweth us not.” Reasonably we decline the world’s judgment. Little sympathy need we expect or care for at the world’s hands, in anything so peculiarly evangelical and spiritual as “labouring without fainting for the sake of the name of Jesus.” The world knoweth us not.

Perhaps the *Church knoweth us not*. And that is a very hard case to have to contemplate. It is, however, most encouraging to notice that Holy Scripture has anticipated it; and that no strange thing has happened to us when it occurs. “Doubtless

thou art our Father, though Abraham be ignorant of us, and Israel acknowledge us not; thou, O Lord, art our Father; from everlasting is thy name" (Isa. lxiii. 16),—that name, for whose sake "we labour and faint not." Yet it is a very hard case when fellow-Christians misunderstand your motive, and requires great self-denial and Christian firmness to endure it. There is, however, always sufficiency of Christian thought and feeling to enable one, through grace, to succeed. Man is not omniscient. Your own imperfections, also, may damage and diminish the evidence of your single-eyed, unselfish, self-denying service. You were not *always* Christ's. You were not born a Christian. You had to be born again. And you may have to endure the taunts which reference (both by an ungodly world and a silly and decadent Church) to what you were before you were Christ's subjects you to. PAUL had, and wisely anticipated: "I am the least of the apostles, that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God" (1 Cor. xv. 9). And JOHN CALVIN, even amidst all his amazing self-denial and laboriousness, had to suffer from the same cause,—malignant and devilish reference to the days before he was Christ's. How touching the patience of his answer:—"The man grudges me my salvation!" Well, however, may we cultivate patience and seek wisdom under misunderstanding which our own very blameworthy delay in becoming Christ's, or our many blameable defects and inconsistencies since, may have caused. Of course you are entitled to the acknowledgment of your integrity, to sympathy with your Christian purpose and procedure, your perseverance and your patience: and you may be tempted to the stinging rejoinder, "God shall smite thee, thou whited wall" (Acts xxiii. 3). But why be overmuch moved? In one way or another Christian souls *must* be taught that "Jehovah-Tzidkenu is all things;" that God-in-Christ, as the portion of the soul, has to be taken before all, and in the room of all, and really in all cases in a dying hour as *alone* enough. And to the Christian invalid it may be said, 'Why grudge, my friend, if the Lord makes a point of teaching you earlier than he does most people?' And though an accumulation of sorrows should happen to you, why be shaken or despond? The Lord knoweth them that are his. The Lord understandeth all

hearts and knoweth the imaginations of the thoughts. There is not a duty you discharge for his sake, however humble, however trivial, however secret, but he taketh notice and beareth it in remembrance. There is not an insult that you quietly bear for his sake, and to ward off dishonour from his name, but the Lord God Immanuel, a Personal Friend, understands both the patience and the motive. You may be misjudged by others; you have always the relief that the Lord cannot misjudge you. You may be misrepresented by others; but in the book of God's remembrance there are no misrepresentations written down, no perversions, either of the outward fact or of the secret feeling. You have always the resource of a quiet protest and appeal to him. He knoweth when for his name's sake you labour and do not faint. Often, too, it is just the necessity for those protests and appeals that rescues us from our inveterate tendency to make little or nothing of an unseen Friend; that brings us back to our first love to him; and that compels the delightful song—"Whom having not seen we love; in whom though now we see him not, yet believing, we rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory, receiving the end of our faith, even the salvation of our souls," to the full bringing out of which it is necessary that "the trial of your faith, being much more precious than of gold that perisheth, though it be tried with fire, might be found unto praise and honour and glory at the appearing of Jesus Christ" (1 Peter i. 7-9).

But it is far more encouraging still to bear in mind, not only that the Lord knoweth that you are dutiful amidst patience, and amidst pain, it may be, or sorrow,—patience in still carrying on duty;—not only is this true, but *it is the Lord himself who tells you it is true*. He comes to assure you that it is true, and to remind you when you are forgetful of it: "*I know thy works, and thy labour, and thy patience*" (Rev. ii. 2). And surely that is unspeakably more animating and precious as a direct communication to you from Christ himself as to his knowledge of your joint labours and trials. An abstract doctrinal statement to that effect never possibly could comfort you as express word from Jesus to that effect can do. No doubt worldly spirits tell you to be reasonable, and not talk as if you had verbal communication with God. Of course

fanaticism has to be guarded against. But fanaticism would not be worth a thoughtful mind guarding against, were it not for the protection of that of which fanaticism is the silly and thoughtless extreme. And what scientifically able-minded Christian man will refuse the struggling soul the benefit of the glorious utterance of God to his afflicted people, “They shall know that *I am he that doth speak*: behold, it is I” (Isa. lii. 6). Read the whole chapter. Read from Isaiah li. 21: “Hear this, thou afflicted”—staggering under thy trials—“drunken (but not with wine); I have taken the cup of trembling out of thy hand, even the dregs of the cup of my fury, thou shalt no more drink of it again. I will put it into the hand of them that afflict thee; which have said to thy soul, Bow down that we may go over; and thou hast laid thy body as the ground, and as the street, to them (forsooth) to pass over” (Isa. li. 22, 23). But what saith Jehovah God unto thee, O troubled Church or child of the Lord? Read all that follows in the next chapter. *Strength* is his who is the Lord God omnipotent, and you worship no Unitarian Deity, a worship which is essentially not a whit better than Atheism. You worship a Triune Deity, who in the Second Person became weak, and fainted not on a criminal’s cross, nor yielded up the human life he had taken into his Divine Person, till he claimed that all given him to do was “finished” (τετέλεσται)—“It is finished” (John xix. 30). And for what conceivable object that eternal miracle (the death of Jesus) could have been accomplished, except that out of his weakness his believing Church might be made strong, and out of his death they might live for ever, it is impossible to conjecture. Go not about to say it was for others, not you. Read again. Not only is it a promise that sorrows, however terrible, shall end one day (Isa. lii. 1), and that he will make this *word* omnipotent as the means of ending them (lii. 15). But is he not himself in his own Person (the second of the Godhead), *the Word* from everlasting? When will we know all the import of his name (John i. 1-5) the Word? The gloriously unexcepted free offer of salvation is tied up with this comfort to the Church and child of God, “How beautiful upon the mountains are the feet of

him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace; that bringeth good tidings of good, that publisheth salvation; that saith unto Zion, Thy God reigneth" (Isa. lii. 7). Yes; and go on with the chapter still. If you are truly a *Christian* invalid, it is impossible for you not to know that a little light upon a few verses of the eternal and inspired Word (which is not an abstract doctrinal statement, but the living utterance of your Divine redeeming friend, as if he had a very mouth,—and has he not—the God-Man?) is worth all worlds. The Word personal and the Word proclaimed, also, how closely related, almost identified, are they:—

"The word that cometh from thy mouth,
Is better unto me
Than many thousands and great sums
Of gold and silver be."—(Ps. cxix. 72.)

And then if you need, as continually you do, the doctrine of substitution and the cross, that you may know the comfort of living "by the faith of the Son of God" (Gal. ii. 20), go on with your reading, and you have the ever-memorable Isa. liii.; drink in the "water of life," as Scottish Christians have ever been accustomed to find it there; and hide yourself, as you close your reading, under the wings of his intercession who maketh intercession for the *transgressors*, not the holy. Will *that* not do with you? "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous." If, in very trembling, putting in claim for that ever-blessed relief, you find you are scorned by a malignant world, among whom it is taken for granted that God sends you forth in the midst of WOLVES, you must just repeat what in the same circumstances JOHN CALVIN said, "This man grudges me my salvation!" and you must leave it to God to show whether the begrudger or the grudged has (so to speak) the better portion of the two.

How precious it is to have "the glorious Lord" (Isa. xxxiii. 21) himself thus telling you what he once told these Ephesians (Rev. ii. 2, 3), but is here and now telling yourself!—that he knows how thou hast both had "patience and hast laboured and hast not fainted," whether it be the past or the future that is the theme of your meditations.

1. Say that it is the *past* you are ruminating over, and that you see little to encourage you there. You have laboured; it is true, and not fainted; and it has been for Christ's name's sake that you have managed that difficult attainment. But you have had many a temptation to faint. You have trained your children (we may have to say to the invalid Christian mother or aunt); you have faithfully taught your class (we may have to say to the faithful Sabbath-school teacher, perhaps to the young missionary in a far distant land): and little fruit, scarcely a blade of grass (Ps. lxxii. 16), appears. You have warned your graceless, godless neighbour; and everything that wisdom could suggest to render your word not unacceptable you thoughtfully and with prayer attended to. You didn't give him those endless torrents of pious talk,—with which the frank and generous youth, beginning to learn science (with its beautiful brevities and richly-rewarding studies), is, in the contrast, so much disgusted; as who shall say it is any wonder that in such an unfortunate contrast some are disgusted? Rather you watched to find (as all Christian exhortators ought to do) "the word in season," which—ah, "how good is it!" (Prov. xv. 23);—you launched with a secret, loving prayer, and you know it was with undeniable love to his soul. Yet his ungodliness and gracelessness are as manifest and rampant as ever. You have sacrificed your comfort and wanted your rest for the good of others; and ingratitude and insult have been your recompence. You are almost "weary in well-doing" (Gal. vi. 9). What need you toil and vex yourself any longer? Why labour any more? or any more bear up in patience?

Dispirited, discouraged, ready to resile from your painful post, tempted and provoked to cast patience to the winds, ready to call the graceless and provoking wicked "whited walls," with Paul, or perhaps much worse. You are sitting—shall we say?—in your cheerless closet with folded hands and careworn brow, with countenance not over-cheerful or attractive, scarcely ornamented with Zion's beautiful garments of a meek and quiet spirit. O inhabitant of Zion! thy King cometh unto thee, meek and having salvation (Matt. xxi. 5);—in the entrancing combination which awakens moral enthusiasm of reception; in

meekness and in majesty alike. He hath the seven stars in his right hand, and he walketh among the seven golden candlesticks; and to thee he saith, "I know thy works and thy patience, and how thou hast borne, and for my name's sake hast laboured, and hast not fainted." Thy works,—unfruitful, unrecompensed, as thou imaginest and mournest them,—are all in my knowledge, all in my treasures. I am "not unrighteous to forget your work of faith and labour of love, which you have shown towards my name, in that ye have laboured, and do labour" (Heb. vi. 10). Not a cup of cold water given in the name of a disciple, which is the reflection of the Master's name; not a gift laid humbly on mine altar from a worshipper, howsoever "impoverished" (see Isaiah xl. 20), or secretly (to avoid ostentation) conveyed to my treasury—has escaped my notice or failed to secure my gratified regard; not a trial quietly endured, not a soft answer wisely returned, not a sigh that has heaved thy bosom for the affliction of Joseph (Amos vi. 6), not a smile of joy when the ark of God was evidently safe, not a groan when it trembled, not a tear when it suffered, have I once allowed to escape my delighted notice. And I know that these things with thee have been for my name's sake. Let the world scorn you and miserably repay your usefulness and efforts for its good; let the very objects of your beneficence and zeal misunderstand and misjudge and misinterpret and misrepresent; let it come even to this with you—"I looked on my right hand, and beheld, there was no one that would know me: refuge failed me: no man cared for my soul" (Ps. cxlii. 4). What then? *I*, even *I* who am from everlasting, care; and, with my care, you can dispense with all the world's—ay, and if need be, with all the Church's (Isaiah lxiii. 16) care too. "I know that for my name's sake thou hast laboured and hast not fainted." If thou hast ever thought that *I*, the *I AM*, was indifferent to thy toils and trials, thou hast misjudged and done injustice unto *me*, unutterably more than thou hast thyself ever been unjustly dealt with or misjudged. I have known thy soul in adversity: I have followed with ceaseless vigilance all thy path: I have understood with infinite perfection all thy feelings. I know, and I give thee the gratification of telling thee that I know, all that "for my name's sake" thou hast done or endured. I own thy service

and the motive that inspired it. I own thy patience, and the feelings that sustained it. I am very sensible that, for my name's sake thou hast served, and for my name's sake thou hast suffered.'

And can you hear such statements from the lips of Him who is the Lord of Glory, and was nailed to the cursed tree for your sake and for your salvation, without being at once rebuked for the inactivity and the impatience you were suffering to creep over you, and recalled to a more generous and genuine state of feeling? Do not your own numerous personal offences come now to your remembrance—your shortcomings and sins which the Lord might righteously have pleaded as making worthless and void your service in his cause, and as making your patience little to be wondered at? Those innumerable iniquities which the Lord hath graciously sworn to remember no more—do they not now come to your remembrance? and do not a thousand provocations plead with you for a little while more of patience, on *your* part, as the Lord hath had patience on *his*?—for you know, and are assured, are you not? that the Lord *will* come and never will or can forget you (Isa. xlix. 15)? Does not Christ's generous grace, in remembering your services and sufferings for his sake, and forgetting and forgiving all your iniquities, come upon your heart with a power to soothe and quiet your ruffled spirit (Ps. cxvi. 7) once again, for a little more of the weary journey, which can't last for ever, as you well know? Nay, is there not a world of splendid mystery in the thought that the Omniscient can forget your sins, or forget anything whatever? We cannot, to use the language of a dear departed one, whose memory we cherish very much, *fly off at a tangent* with a new topic; or, as Chalmers used to say, turn a collateral into a main topic. But we repeat, the simple thought that an eternal God has said, "He will forget" your transgressions, should secure miracles of patience in your person when required. How he can forget at all may be thought of afterwards. Enough now to say: Our Lord is both God and man in two distinct natures, and one person for ever. As God-man, he has a human soul that sympathises and synchronises with your own; and exactly what you would wish him to forget, he will forget indeed.

2. But suppose it is not so much the *past* that you are looking back upon with disappointment as the *future* you are looking

forward to with *dread*.¹ Its demands on your exertions and your patience seem threatening to increase. Your work and warfare as a Christian, far from growing easier, seem to grow more hopelessly tangled and trying. For one thing, your estimate of what your work as a Christian should be, is increasing; and what would have passed with you once as a tolerable discharge of duty dissatisfies you now. You strike a higher aim; you contemplate nobler attainments. And hence you are oppressed with a weighty sense of difficulty, a tendency to despond or to despair. The motives that once impelled you, the reasons that once weighed with you, are insufficient now. You feel you must have less to do with subordinate motives and more with that motive which is supreme. Even motives and considerations, not in themselves wicked or contemptible, have often to be abandoned, and the soul must betake itself to the *primordia* or first principles of evangelical Christianity—the vital faith of the Divine Saviour and the “fear of the Lord which is clean”—not relatively, but absolutely clean—“and endureth for ever” (Ps. xix. 9). For every subordinate consideration may fail; and the simple fact that *we have to die* shows that all subordinate considerations whatever have a set time, beyond which they cannot serve us. You may be forecasting the *future*, therefore, in the full assurance that, left to these secondary and subsidiary motives, your positive or passive obedience, your duty or patience, it may be both, are destined inevitably to give way through the increasing demands that are being made upon them. It is in such a crisis that the reviving visit of the King, even as to the seven early churches, is as the pouring of the elixir of life through the soul. Pointing to the lowering path of mingled duty and danger, and aware that no meaner motive than the highest can ever secure your willing, forward movement, he says, “Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves,” but I ask you *for my sake* to go. Feed the fountain of your energies in the nearness of my glory; prove the sufficiency of my grace; and show that for my name’s sake you can do and suffer what no other consideration could induce you to face.’

It is impossible for language to indicate aright the mingled

¹ This is very much the case contemplated in the Church of Smyrna (Rev. ii. 9, 10).

power and tenderness of this appeal of Jesus to his people, and especially at a time like the present. There can be no doubt that to those whose "senses are exercised to discern good and evil" (Heb. iii. 4), there are times and seasons when the tide of Divine grace, which flows over this dear land of ours, is more copious or less so. There are good reasons to think it is at present very considerably restrained; though, at the same time, the greatest caution is required when old men (and men growing old) begin to say, "The former days were better than these." It is possible to say this when it is not true, when evangelical religion may be undergoing a very subordinate change of manifestation, and not an alteration or surrender of reality and identity. God grant that such may turn out to be the explanation of many current circumstances which to an elderly vision take confessedly a serious form! μ

ART. IV.—*The Site of Paradise.*

A RECENTLY published volume¹ by a son of the celebrated Leipzig Professor adds yet another to the long list of attempts to solve the question of the position of Paradise. It still leaves the question as debatable as ever.

Of the 346 pages of which the book is made up, only 94 are really devoted to the statement and answering of the question which stands as its title. The remaining 252 consist of notes, appendices, and indices.

The appendices are five in number. The first, on the geography of Babylonia, is in three parts, and consists mostly of lists derived from the Assyrian monuments, of its rivers and canals, its provinces and towns, and the states and tribes on its borders. To the names in these lists, topographical and historical remarks are generally added, various readings of

¹ *Wo lag das Paradies?* eine biblischassyriologische Studie; mit Zahlreichen assyriologischen Beiträgen zur biblischen Länder- und Völkerkunde und einer Karte Babyloniens von Dr. Friedrich Delitzsch, Professor der Assyriologie an der Universität Leipzig. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1881.) Pp. xi, 346. 8vo. 20 mks.

the name in different inscriptions are given, and attempts are made to identify the names with those occurring in Greek or Arabic or Hebrew literature.

The remaining four appendices are—(1.) On the table of nations in the 10th chapter of Genesis, to the names contained in which the author seeks parallels among the cuneiform inscriptions; (2.) On the geography of Canaan; (3.) of Egypt; and (4.) of Elam. In these three last also the writer strives to identify names on the monuments with places in these different countries.

The book itself is divided as follows:—First, an introduction; next, the views current as to the position of Paradise: (*a.*) as mythological and existing only in Utopia, (*b.*) as historical and situated in Armenia, or (*c.*) in South Babylonia; then, Dr. Delitzsch's own view; and lastly, a few pages on the origin and age of the account of Paradise in Genesis. After this come the numerous notes on points arising in the text.

To go more into detail: In his introduction, Dr. Delitzsch maintains the historical character of the account in Genesis, saying (p. 3) that "the description contains points of reference and direction enough to make it clear" that the garden was still existing on the earth at the time of the composition of Genesis, as also at the time when Ezekiel xxxi. 9 was written. He distinguishes (p. 4) between עֵדֶן (Eden, Paradise) and the עֵדֶן of 2 Kings xix. 12, Isa. xxxvii. 12, Ezek. xxvii. 23, Amos i. 5; the former being the specific name of the garden, a name not native to Palestine, but borrowed, like the history, probably from Babylonia. This עֵדֶן, he says (p. 6), can hardly have been used in the meaning simply of "Fairyländ," "Pleasure-garden," as a general title, for then we should expect עֵדֶן like נֵדֶן; and besides, עֵדֶן in the sense of "pleasure, delight," is found only in the plural עֵדֶיִם, Ps. xxxvi. 9, 2 Sam. i. 24, translating, as he does, Ezek. xxxi. 9, 16, 18, by "trees of Paradise." For the position of the garden (p. 9) the rivers are most important. רִאשִׁים (heads), as in Arabic and Assyrian, can be applied to the point at which one river separates from another. It lay eastward from Palestine (p. 7), taking "eastward" in Gen. ii. 8 in the sense of eastward from the position of the writer, and in a warm southerly climate. This is implied by the whole account.

Of former opinions, the traditional one, reaching as far back at least as the time of Josephus, considers Paradise as no longer existing on the earth after the Fall. But among the ancient writers the fact of their identifying the Pison with the Ganges or Indus, and the Gihon with the Nile, is no proof that they did not assign a definite geographical position to the garden. It is true, we must not attribute to them mediæval ideas of geography, but some centuries after the writing of Genesis, in the days of Alexander, the Greeks imagined the Indus and the Nile to be but parts of the same stream; and yet they had very distinct notions of the geographical position of the latter.

This traditional view (p. 11, etc.) identifies the Pison with various streams—*e.g.* Josephus and Ewald with the Ganges; Renan with the Indus; others with the Hyphasis. Havilah they imagine to be India. Ethiopia they place as usual in Africa; and identify in general the Gihon with the Nile, though some—as Lassen, Renan, Maspero—see in the Oxus the modern representative of the Gihon.

The second explanation (p. 33, etc.), which was that maintained by Luther, seeks the garden in Armenia, near the sources of the Tigris and Euphrates. The Gihon is the Araxes, and the Pison is the Phasis. Havilah corresponds with Colchis; and Ethiopia is represented by the Cossæi.

The third set of opinions (p. 37, etc.) places Paradise in South Babylonia—so Calvin—towards the mouth of the Euphrates and Tigris. The canal Shat-el-Arab represents the stream which watered the garden, and its two arms together with the Euphrates and Tigris are the four rivers.

After discussing these former views and pointing out their difficulties, Dr. Delitzsch propounds his own. He begins (p. 45) by showing how all the primitive history of mankind collects round Babylonia, and states the first objection which may be urged against his idea of placing Paradise in this district as a place still geographically existing, viz., the difficulty of finding, besides the Euphrates and Tigris, two streams big enough to answer the requirements of the case. He gets over this by assuming (p. 48) that the Pison and Gihon were in reality canals. נֶחַר in Hebrew, as well as in Arabic and Babylonian, can mean "canal" no less than "river;"

and Ezekiel's "river of Chebar" was no more than a canal, though which of the numerous artificial water-courses of Babylonia it was cannot now be determined, owing to the frequent changes in the natural features of that region. These canals (p. 51) were large, navigable, of great antiquity, the source of numerous smaller streams along their course; so that the origin of their existence was forgotten, and they were considered natural, not artificial: some moreover were old beds of the Euphrates or Tigris. But before assigning any particular canals as the modern representatives of Pison and Gihon, he seeks two countries, bordering on Babylonia, answering to the Havilah and Ethiopia of the sacred text.

This is the second great difficulty (p. 52). From Genesis x. 29, x. 7, xxv. 18, and 1 Samuel xv., he gathers that Havilah represents the Syrian desert, especially the E.N.E. part, bordering on the Euphrates' stream. He assumes an Asiatic Ethiopia or Cush on the authority of the account of Nimrod in Genesis x., and explains (p. 56) the transference of the African name to an Asiatic district by the analogy of the similar transference in old Babylonian geographical lists of the names of South and North Babylonia to Egypt and Ethiopia. Canon Rawlinson, in his *Ancient Monarchies*, had already assumed the existence of a race of Asiatic Ethiopians, founding this opinion on the narrative in Genesis x.; on classical tradition—*e.g.* where Homer speaks (*Od.* i. 23, 24) of eastern and western Ethiopians, and from other writers; on comparative philology, though the list of words he gives as found on the oldest monuments of Babylonia might prove the relationship of the people with the Indo-Germanic races just as well as with the Ethiopians.

The products, too, of the land Havilah, says Dr. Delitzsch (p. 60), point to Babylonia, or a neighbouring district, as much as to another country—India for instance;—all three, gold, bdellium, and onyx-stone (*i.e.* shoham-stone, which he explains as a species of cornelian), being products of this region. The proof is that the first and third are mentioned in cuneiform inscriptions as products of Babylonia, and the second is mentioned by Pliny as found in the same district.

Further, in that part of the plain where the Euphrates and Tigris most nearly approach each other (pp. 66, 67), the country

may be said to be watered by only one stream. For here the Euphrates flows on a higher level than the Tigris, and all the streams and canals it gives off on its eastern side in this part of its course find their exit in the latter river. Below the ruins of Babylon this peculiarity of the Euphrates ceases.

The writer now returns to the canals, with the remark (p. 69) that it is very hard in Babylonia to fix anything for ancient geography, owing to the constant changes on the surface of the country through the variations in the course of the rivers, and the rapid growth of the fluvial deposit at the head of the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, two canals are found long enough and important enough to be represented as encircling, or flowing alongside, whole countries or districts, viz., the Pallakopas (p. 68) on the right or western bank of the Euphrates, leaving that river just below the ruins of Babylon; and the Shat-en-Nil (p. 70) on the left or eastern bank, which probably also left the Euphrates just below Babylon, and re-entered that river just before the Shat-el-Hai; but its course cannot now be traced for certain (p. 70).

As to the names (p. 71): Which is *Pison*, and which is *Gihon*? It has been shown already that *Havilah* is the E.N.E. part of the Syrian desert bordering on the Euphrates, and *Pison* "compasseth the whole land of *Havilah*," therefore *Pison* is the canal *Pallakopas*. And since *Pison* is the canal *Pallakopas*, *Gihon* must be the *Shat-en-Nil*. Now, the *Shat-en-Nil* (pp. 72, 73) flows through North Babylonia, which is *Accad*, which is *Melucha*; and this is the name applied in inscriptions also to African *Ethiopia*; hence the *Gihon* was confounded with the Nile.

The native name of the *Gihon* in the Babylonian cuneiform is, the author says (p. 75), *Ka-g'a-an-dê*, or *Gu-g'a-an-dê* = Assyrian *Arachtu*. This word "*dê*" means "to flow, to water," and does not seem to have been of much use to the name; therefore it can be left out. So this name occurs perhaps on a small fragment as *Ka-g'a-an-na*, or *Gu-g'a-an-na*. Hence the name of this stream is *Ka-g'a-an-na*, or rather *Gu-g'a-an-na*, pronounced *Gugâna*, to be read *Guhâna*, which answers to *Gihon*. *N.B.*—This "*dê*" is not a mere determinative for "water or river:" the word is already furnished with one at the beginning.

For the Pison no Babylonian equivalent, as a proper name, has yet been found: "but every Assyriologist (p. 77) will at once call to mind a word which often occurs in the bilingual vocabularies, namely, pi-sa-an-na, that is, pisâna, Assyrian pisânu, which not only in form, but also in meaning, suits the name Pison admirably. For pisânu has the meaning of jug, urn, also gutter, ditch, bason, river-bed, aqueduct, canal—in fact anything to hold water, or out of which water may be poured"—a most convenient word. "Hence Pison is the canal *par excellence*, and the name Pallakopas also is connected by Kiepert with 𐎶𐎵𐎲, Assyrian palgu, i.e. canal."

Eden then, in which the garden was placed (p. 79), is that part of Mesopotamia stretching northwards and southwards from the point where the Euphrates and Tigris most nearly approach each other; or, to speak more particularly, it is that part of Mesopotamia running southwards from Tekrit on the Tigris, and 'Ana on the Euphrates to the shores of the Persian Gulf (p. 80). And the garden is that part of this district just above the point where the canals Pallakopas and Shat-en-Nil leave the Euphrates.

Seeking an historical origin for this name—Eden,—Dr. Delitzsch finds it (pp. 79, 80) in a Babylonian-Assyrian word *edinu*, which, he says, is the same as a non-Semitic word *édin*, found on a syllabary in M. Rassam's collection, and answering to a Babylonian-Semitic word *šru*, meaning "field, plain, desert," originally "valley, depression." This also points to the position of Eden (p. 80), for just this portion of the Mesopotamian plain is called at the present day Zôr, meaning "depression."

In answer to the objection that the LXX. and Talmud had already lost all knowledge of the true position of Eden, he says (pp. 80, 81) that the translators of the LXX. would naturally seek to make the real Nile one of the streams of Paradise; and that the rapid changes in Babylonia would blot out all remembrance of ancient geographical conditions, long before the composition of the Talmud; indeed, at the time when the account in Genesis was written, the meaning of the names Pison and Gihon was already almost lost.

In conclusion (pp. 82-92), the author would derive the account in Genesis from Babylonia, and ends with the question,

How is it that in Hebrew literature before the exile (pp. 93, 94), no mention is made of the primitive histories contained in Genesis?—unless indeed Joel ii. 3 and Isaiah li. 3, liv. 9, be considered exceptions.

Such is the newest theory as to the position of Paradise. Out of the more than eighty, which our author divides into the three main divisions mentioned above, that of an Englishman, named Hopkinson, approaches most nearly to his own (pp. 126, 127 note). There are difficulties connected with all of them, and not the least with the present one. It seems useless to attempt to localise the notice of Eden as a country existing at present on the earth. It is not necessary to press the Biblical account too precisely. The Bible is not a text-book of geography, any more than it is a treatise on Natural Science. In both it simply expresses the ideas of the people contemporary with the writer. It is better to leave, with Milton, the exact position undetermined.

“ Southward through Eden went a river large,

· · · · ·
· · · · ·

And now divided into four main streams

Runs diverse, wand’ring many a famous realm

And country, whereof here needs no account.”

It may well be that Paradise lay in the regions of Babylonia or Armenia, to which the earliest accounts point as the cradle of the human race, but to define it more nearly seems, for the present at least, to exceed our powers.

In this particular case, it is hardly consonant with the account in Genesis to make two of the rivers into canals, with a comparatively very short course, and one of which, the Shat-en-Nil, enters again into the Euphrates. This, at any rate, is scarcely in keeping with the geographical knowledge of the district with which Dr. Delitzsch would endow the writer. Again, the Tigris can hardly be called the branch of a stream with which it never unites; though Dr. Delitzsch quotes from an unpublished pamphlet of Dr. Hausdorf of Prague (pp. 82, 140), in which the latter declares that in prehistoric times the Tigris united with the Euphrates, at the point where now they most nearly approach. But on the other hand the Tigris was still an independent stream before this point.

The author's view is largely supported from the cuneiform monuments of Assyria and Babylonia. It were to be wished that the statements of Assyriologists were more in accordance with the principles of a scientific philology. To outsiders, at least, they seem extremely arbitrary.

This book has called forth numerous reviews. An English translation is said to be preparing. T. STENHOUSE.

ART. V.—*The Scottish Philosophy, as contrasted with the German.*¹

IT is not very difficult to recognise a Scotchman wherever you happen to meet with him. He has stout, bony limbs, and stands well upon his feet; he is canny, that is, cautious, otherwise he would not be a Scotchman; but he is considerably independent, and can resist attack, his motto being *Nemo me impune lacessit*; he is firm, not to say obstinate, especially if he is from the Highlands, whose rocks and mountains he takes as his models; he boasts that his ancestors could not be conquered even by the Romans, when they subdued all other people of Europe and western Asia—except the Arabs. He is naturally quiet and submissive to circumstances, but is capable of being roused, like the Yankee, whom he somewhat resembles, into intense enthusiasm, as has been shown in his contests with England, and generally in his fights for the independence of his country and of his church. He uses a softer, broader speech than the English, coming more from the mouth and less from the throat; and he can make his meaning clear and carry it into practical effect. I mention these things because no man can understand the Scottish philosophy without knowing the Scottish character, of which it is a reflection and a picture.

I am not to dwell on its history, which dates from the second quarter of last century, when it came out of the school of Locke and of Berkeley. It started as a distinct school, with

¹ From the *Princeton Review*.

Francis Hutcheson of Glasgow (1694-1747), one of the most successful teachers of his age, and with Turnbull of Aberdeen (the teacher of Reid) (A.D. 1698-1748); but its true representative is Thomas Reid (1710-1796), first of Aberdeen and then of Glasgow, who gave to it its specific character. Adam Smith (1723-1790), the founder of political economy, belongs to the same school. In the succeeding ages we have Beattie the poet (1735-1803); Campbell, the author of the *Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1719-1796); and more influential than either, Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who trained so many distinguished pupils, and by his wisdom and the elegance of his style did so much to introduce the philosophy into England. There followed Thomas Brown (1778-1820), who so attracted young men by his rhetoric and his ingenuity, and who sought to bring about a marriage between the Scottish and the French schools. Next to Reid, the most powerful member of the school is Sir W. Hamilton (1788-1856), so distinguished as a scholar and a logician, who sought, not always successfully, to unite the forms of Kant with the observations of Reid. The philosophy of Reid and Stewart had a salutary influence in France at the end of last century and in the beginning of this: it helped to form the philosophy of Jouffroy and Cousin, and checked the sensationalism of Condillac and Helvetius. It can be shown that the Scottish philosophy has had more influence direct and indirect in America than any other for the past century and a half, both in colleges and in the churches, but it is now giving way to other systems, partly German, and partly English, as led by John S. Mill, Lewes, and Herbert Spencer. In the land of its birth it is not particularly strong at this present moment, being opposed by the materialism of Bain and the Hegelianism of Merton College, Oxford, and of Professor Edward Caird of Glasgow; but it has two genuine representatives in Professor Calderwood and Professor Flint of the University of Edinburgh.

But I do not profess in this paper to give a history of the school; my aim is to sketch its characteristics, which are very marked.

I.

It proceeds throughout by observation. It has all along professed a profound reverence for Bacon, and in its earliest works

it attempted to do for metaphysics what Newton had done for physics. It begins with facts and ends with facts. Between, it has analyses, generalisations, and reasonings; but all upon the actual operations of the mind. Its laws are suggested by facts, and are verified by facts. It sets out, as Bacon recommends, with the necessary "rejections and exclusions," with what Whewell calls the "decomposition of facts," but all to get at the exact facts it means to examine. Its generalisations are formed by observing the points in which the operations of the mind agree, and it proceeds gradually,—*gradatim*, as Bacon expresses it,—rising from particulars to generals, and from lower to higher laws. It is afraid of rapid and high speculation, lest it carry us like a balloon, not into the heavens, but a cloud, where it will explode sooner or later. It is suspicious of long and complicated ratiocinations like those of Spinoza and Hegel, for it is sure—such is human fallibility—that there will lurk in them some error or defect in the premise, or some oversight or weak link in the process weakening the whole chain. Thomas Reid was not sure whether Samuel Clarke's demonstration of the existence of God was more distinguished for ingenuity than sublimity. Bacon had said that philosophic speculation needs weights rather than wings. Reid thought that philosophy had been injured rather than promoted by the genius of its investigators. The philosophy of Scotland might take as its motto the doggerel of its great poet, "Facts are chieils that winna ding." It has to be added that the Scottish school uses deduction, but rather sparingly, and only after it has got its premises by a previous induction; and it refuses all wire-drawn conclusions.

But while the Scottish school held by the principle of induction, in common with Newton and all inquirers into material phenomena, it had other two principles by which it separated from all physicists.

II.

It observes the operations of the mind by the inner sense—that is, consciousness. In this philosophy, consciousness, the perception of self in its various states, comes into greater prominence than it had ever done before. Bacon did not appreciate its importance; he recommended in the study of the human mind the gathering of instances, to be arranged in tables, of memory,

judgment, and the like. Descartes appealed to consciousness, but only to get a principle such as *cogito*, to be used in deduction, *ergo sum*, arguing that there is an infinite, a perfect. Locke was ever appealing to internal observation, but it was to support a preconceived theory that all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection. Turnbull and Hutcheson and Reid were the first to avow and declare that the laws of the human mind were to be discovered only by internal observation, and that mental philosophy consisted solely in the construction of these. They held that consciousness, the internal sense, was as much to be trusted as the external senses; and that as we can form a natural philosophy out of the facts furnished by the one, we can construct a mental philosophy by the facts furnished by the other. They held resolutely that the eye cannot see our thoughts and feelings even when aided by the microscope or telescope. They were sure that no man ever grasped an idea by his muscular power, tasted the beauty of a rose or lily, smelt an emotion, or heard the writhings of the conviction of conscience. But they thought that the mind could observe the world within by consciousness more directly and quite as accurately as it could observe the world without by sight, touch, and the other senses, and could in the one case as in the other make a scientific arrangement of its observations and construct a science.

III.

By observation principles are discovered which are above observation, universal and eternal. All the genuine masters and followers proceed on this principle, and apply it more or less successfully. I am not sure that they have expressly avowed it and explicitly stated it. I am responsible for the form which is given it at the head of this paragraph. No man can understand or appreciate or do justice to the philosophy of Scotland who does not notice it as running through and through their whole investigations and conclusions. It was in this way that Reid opposed Hume. It was in this way that Dugald Stewart, and indeed the whole school, sought to lay a foundation on which all truth might be built. They were fond of representing the principles as fundamental, and they guarded against all erroneous, against all extravagant and defective statements

and applications of them, by insisting that they be shown to be in the constitution of the mind, and that their nature be ascertained before they are employed in speculation of any kind. By insisting on this restriction, their mode of procedure has been described as timid, and their results as mean and poor, by those speculators who assume a principle without a previous induction, and mount up with it, wishing to reach the sky, but stayed in the clouds. By thus holding that there are truths above and prior to our observation of them, they claim and have a place in the brotherhood of our higher philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle in ancient times, Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant in modern times.

They present these principles in the mind under various aspects and in different names. Reid called them principles of common sense in the mind itself, and common to all men. Hamilton defended the use of the phrase common sense. I am not sure it is the best one, as it includes two meanings: one, good sense, of mighty use in the practical affairs of life; and the other, first principles in the minds of all men, in which latter sense alone it can be legitimately employed in philosophy. He also called them, happily, reason in the first degree, which discerns truth at once, as distinguished from reason in the second degree, which discovers truth by arguing. Stewart represented them as "fundamental laws of human thought and belief," and is commended for this by Sir James Mackintosh, who is so far a member of the school. Thomas Brown represented them as intuitions, a phrase I am fond of, as it presents the mind as looking into the nature of things. Perhaps the phrase "intuitive reason," used by Milton when he talks of "reason intuitive and discursive," might be as good a phrase as any by which to designate these primary principles. Hamilton, who sought to add the philosophy of Kant to that of Reid, often without his being able to make them cohere, sometimes uses the Scotch phrases, and at other times the favourite Kantian designation, *a priori*. I remember how Dr. Chalmers, who was truly of the Scottish school, was delighted in his advanced years, on becoming acquainted with the German philosophy through Morell's *History of Philosophy*, to find that there was a wonderful correspondence between the *a priori* principles of Kant and the fundamental laws of Stewart.

I may be allowed to add, that having before me the views and the nomenclature of all who hold by these primary principles, I have ventured to specify their characteristics, and this in the proper order. *First*, they look at things external and internal. They are not forms or laws in the mind apart from things. They are intuitions of things. Under this view they are SELF-EVIDENT, which is their first mark. The truth is perceived at once by looking at things. I perceive self within and body without, by barely looking at them. I discover that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, that benevolence is good, that cruelty is evil, by simply contemplating the things. *Secondly*, they are NECESSARY. This I hold with Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant, and most profound thinkers. Being self-evident, we must hold them, and cannot be made to think or believe otherwise. *Thirdly*, they are UNIVERSAL, being entertained by all men.

But it is asked, How do you reconcile your one element with the other—your observation with your truth anterior to observation? I do hold with the whole genuine Scottish school, that there are principles in the mind called common sense, primary reason, intuition, prior to, and independent of, our observation of them. But I also hold, and this in perfect consistency, that it is by observation we discover them, that they exist, and what they are. I have found it difficult to make some people understand and fall in with this distinction. Historians and critics of philosophy are apt to divide all philosophies into two grand schools, the *a priori* and *a posteriori*, or in other words, the rational and the experiential. They are utterly averse to call in a third school, which would disturb all their classifications, and thus trouble them, and require the authors among them, especially the followers of Kant or Cousin, to rewrite all they have written. They do not know very well what to make of the Scottish school, and I may add of the great body of American thinkers, who will not just fall into either one or other of their grand trunk-divisions. In particular, when they condescend to notice the author of this paper they feel as if they do not know what to make of him. "Are you," they ask, "of the *a posteriori* or empirical school? You seem as if you are so, you are so constantly appealing to facts and experience. If so, you have no right to appeal to or

call in *a priori* principles, which can never be established by a limited observation. But you are inconsistently ever bringing in necessary and universal principles, such as those of cause and effect, and moral good." Or they attack me by the other horn of the dilemma: "You hold rather by *a priori* principles; you are ever falling back on principles, self-evident, necessary, and universal, on personality, on identity, on substance and quality, causation, on the good and the infinite." I have sometimes felt as if I were placed between two contending armies, exposed to the fire of both. Yet I believe I am able to keep and defend my position. Now I direct a shot at the one side, say at John S. Mill, and at other times a shot at the other side, say at Kant—not venturing to shoot at Hegel, who is in a region which my weapons can never reach. They pay little attention to me, being so engrossed with fighting each other. But I do cherish the hope that when each of the sides finds it impossible to extinguish the other, they may become weary of the fight, look for the *juste milieu*, and turn a favourable look toward the independent height which the Scotch, and the great body of the Americans who think on these subjects, are occupying. We invite you to throw down your arms, and come up to the peaceful height which we occupy. Hither you may bring all the wealth you have laid up in your separate positions, and here it will be safe. You have here primitive rocks strong and deep as the granite on which to rest it, and here you may add to it riches gathered from as wide regions as your ken can reach, and establish a city which can never be moved or shaken.

The late Chauncey Wright, in a paper written in his *Discussions*, characterised the distinction I am drawing as very ingenious, so much so that he could not accept it. But it is one easily comprehended by those who are willing to give their attention to it. When Newton established the law of gravitation, nobody imagined that he created the law, that he made the law in any sense—he simply discovered it. It existed before he discovered it, and he discovered it because it so existed. So it is with fundamental mental principles. They are in the mind just as gravitation and chemical affinity are in the earth and heavens, whether we take notice of them or not. Being there, we are able to discover them, find how they work,

and to generalise their operations, and express them in laws. These fundamental principles being combined, unfolded, and expressed, constitute mental philosophy, which is true so far as these are properly observed and formulated, and are capable of being more fully and accurately enunciated as they are more carefully investigated.

Under some aspects I like the phrase *a priori* introduced into philosophy by the Stagirite, used by Hume, and defined, as it is now understood, by Kant, who designates by it principles in the mind prior to experience and independent of experience. I approve of it, as denoting something in the very nature and constitution of the mind—to use phrases favoured by Butler and the Scottish school. But in some connections it is liable to be misunderstood, and may lead into serious error. It may mean that we are entitled to start with a favourite principle without previously inquiring whether it has a place in the mind, and what is its precise place; and then rear upon it, or by it, a huge superstructure. I use the phrase as one universally adopted, but I employ it only as I explain it. I denote by it those principles, intellectual and moral, which act in the mind naturally and necessarily. But I do not allow that we can use them in constructing systems till we have first carefully inducted them. I believe in *a priori* laws operating spontaneously in the mind, but I do not believe in an *a priori* science constructed by man. There is a sense indeed in which there may be an *a priori* science—that is, a science composed of the *a priori* principles in the mind. But then they have to be discovered in order to form a science, and their precise nature and mode of operation determined by *a posteriori* inspection. Like the Scottish school, I am suspicious of the lofty systems of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, which have been constructed by human ingenuity. Acting on this principle, I reject, with the majority of thinking people, and with metaphysicians themselves, more than half the metaphysics that have been constructed. At times I am grateful when I discover a native principle woven into these webs, only considerably twisted. In rejecting these speculations I am not to be charged with rejecting *a priori* truths in the mind. I am simply sceptical of the use that has been made of them by the ingenuity of man. With me, philosophy consists in a body of first principles in the mind, care-

fully observed and expressed. This may be as firm and sure as any system of natural science.

IV.

The study of the mind by consciousness may be aided by observations of the actions of the nerves and brain. This has always been allowed by the Scottish school. Reid and Adam Smith were well acquainted with optics, and generally with physiology, so far as these sciences had advanced in their day. Dr. Brown was a physician, a colleague of Dr. Gregory's, and well acquainted with all parts of the anatomy of the body. Hamilton made experiments on innumerable brains, and helped to cast aside phrenology. The Scottish school, in perfect consistency with its principles, welcomes all the researches of the present day into the physiology of the cerebro-spinal mass. Professor Calderwood has published a very careful work on Mind and Brain. I may be permitted to add, that last winter in Princeton College half a dozen of the younger officers formed a club to study Wundt's work on physiological psychology, and his anatomical experiments were repeated by skilful anatomists with a well-prepared apparatus. I have sought, in correspondence with one of our young professors, Dr. Osborn, to make all my students take an interest in the curious investigations which have been made by Dr. Galton of London, as to the Visualising Faculty, as he calls it, or the Phantasy, as I call it, after Aristotle, and we have sent the answers to queries on to Dr. Galton.

The tendency of the psychology of the day is certainly towards physiology. This should not be discouraged, but rather furthered. Physiology has already made many interesting discoveries bearing on mental action. Helmholtz and others have been carefully examining the senses, and have discovered some laws and more mysteries as to the connection of the physical with the psychical action. It has been shown that an action on the nerves of the senses takes a certain time to reach the brain, and that an act of the will takes a certain time to move the members of the body. Wundt is endeavouring to measure the time occupied by each of the ideas in the mind, and has found that about seventy or so, ideas pass through the mind in the minute. I find that other German investigators say that his observations are delusive. The researches on this subject by

Delbeauf and others are commonly reported in the *Revue Philosophique*, edited by M. Ribot. I believe that some light has been thrown on the operations of the mind by men like Carpenter and Maudesley in England, and by Lotze and Wundt in Germany. But their investigations have, after all, thrown more light on the operations of the brain and nerves than on the peculiar operations of the mind, its thoughts, its emotions and volitions. The scalping-knife has laid bare the brain, but has not disclosed to us the judgments, the reasonings, the imaginations, the hopes and fears of the mind. The multiplied microscopes employed have shown us the movements, the changes, in the soft, pulpy substance of the nerves, but have not yet lighted on the perceptions of the mind, on its ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good, the infinite, and our aspirations after perfect excellence. Let us accept and prize the curious and often instructive physiological facts, but let us carefully notice that they have not accounted for any proper mental act, for any conscious act, for any idea, thought, emotion, or resolve. In the study of the mind proper physiology may be a powerful auxiliary, as mathematics are to physics and astronomy, but cannot construct the science of psychology. The eye, the ear, the hearing, the smell, the touch, the taste, aided even by the microscope and blow-pipe, cannot tell us what any special mental act is, what perception is, what memory is, what the imagination is, what comparison is, what reasoning is, what joy and sorrow, what hope and fear are, what the idea of the perfect is, what wish is, what volition is, what the conscience is, what the remorse for evil is, and the dread of merited punishment is, what the approval of and the rejoicing in the good. These can be revealed and studied only in the light of consciousness, which furnishes the beginning and the end of psychology and mental philosophy.

The three first of these principles, with the aid of the fourth, constitute the Method, that is, the mode and manner of investigation, in the Scottish philosophy. In fact they are its specialties, its differentia, separating it from all other systems in ancient or modern times. So far as it adheres to these principles I adhere to it, thus far but no farther, and am quite willing to be regarded as one of its followers. If any profess-

ing member of the school does not act on these principles, I separate from him. I may add, that so far as any other philosophy adopts these principles, I approve of it.

Following the principles I have enunciated, the Scottish school have made a great many psychological investigations. They have taken great pains in classifying the faculties of the mind and observing their laws. They have inquired carefully into the senses and the nature of sense-perception, into the laws of association and habit, into conscience and the will. Alison and Francis Jeffrey have traced the influence of association of ideas on our perception of beauty, erring, however, in imagining that they have thereby explained the whole nature of beauty. Hamilton has discussed profoundly the nature of reasoning, and has thus thrown light on logic. With some of their views on these subjects I concur, from others I wholly dissent. I have endeavoured—it is for others to say with what success—to give a more correct analysis than they have done of the Emotions. I do not believe that their classification of the faculties is thoroughly scientific or final. Perhaps some of the questions involved cannot be settled till we have a more advanced physiology of the brain. It should be observed of the Scottish metaphysicians, that they never profess to give a full philosophy of the mind. This, they everywhere assert, is to be accomplished only by a succession of inquirers in a succession of ages. All that they claim is that they have contributed to real knowledge, without asserting that what they have done is ultimate and incapable of improvement; that they have gathered a few pebbles (to use a simile usually ascribed to Isaac Newton, but in fact employed in Milton's *Paradise Regained*), on the shores of a boundless ocean, rounded by being rolled, but real pebbles, some of them gems.

But what of other systems? “Do you acknowledge no other philosophy than the Scottish?” it is asked. I reply on the instant and without reserve, that I am guilty of no such narrowness. I believe there is more or less of truth in nearly all our philosophies—certainly in all our higher systems. Even the worst of them, pessimism (a name which should not be used of our world, in which there is so much good, but may be applied to the philosophic system, as it is the worst

possible), has a truth, as it shows what other philosophies have so much kept out of sight—that there is evil in the world. Some philosophies, such as that of Plato, of Leibnitz, and others, unfold great truths which have been very much overlooked by the Scottish school because of its caution. All philosophies have truth in so far as they have observed and unfolded to the view the deep principles and high ideas in the soul. Unfortunately, most of them have mixed up error with the truth which they have thus corrupted, and they have really no means of separating the one from the other, unless, indeed, they employ some such tests as those used by the Scottish school. The philosophies deserving the name should certainly be studied by all sincere inquirers, who should be anxious, while they accept the truth, to have some tests by which they may distinguish it from the error with which it is so apt to be associated.

The prevailing philosophies of the day are, first, Materialism (if philosophy it can be called which has and can have no philosophy), and, secondly, the German Philosophy founded by Kant. The former is held by many of the exclusive cultivators of the physical sciences, and those favouring sensualistic views; the latter by the higher minds addicted to speculation. Materialism has ever been opposed by all the higher philosophies. The Scottish philosophy has all along opposed it, and it has done so by arguments as likely as other and more recondite ones to prevail with the great body of thinking people. It shows that we have as good, as clear, and as valid arguments for the existence of mind as we have for the existence of matter. We know body by the external senses, such as touch and sight; we know mind by the internal sense, which, to say the least of it, is as trustworthy as the external senses. We know the two, first by different organs, and secondly we know them as possessing different properties: the one having extension and resistance, and the other thinking and feeling under all their forms.

The true rival of the Scottish philosophy is the German, which, I acknowledge, is at the present day much the more influential. The two, the Scotch and the German, agree and they differ. Each has a fitting representative—the one in Thomas Reid and the other in Immanuel Kant. The one was

a careful observer guided by common sense, with the meaning of good sense, suspicious of high speculations as sure to have error lurking in them, and shrinking from extreme positions: the other was a powerful logician, a great organiser and systematiser, following his principles to their consequences, which he was ever ready to accept, avow, and proclaim. The two have very important points of agreement, which all men should carefully note. Reid and Kant both lived to oppose Hume, the great sceptic, or, as he would be called in the present day, agnostic. Both met him by calling in great mental principles which reveal and guarantee truth, which can never be set aside, and which have foundations deep as the universe. Both appeal to reason, which the one called reason in the first degree, the other pure reason. The one represents this reason under the name of common sense—that is, the group of powers common to all men; the other as principles necessary and universal. The one had laws fundamental, the other forms in the nature of the mind; both pointing evidently to the same things. The one carefully observed these by consciousness, and sought to express them; the other determines their nature by a criticism, and professes to give an inventory of them in the *Kritik of Pure Reason*. All students should note these points of agreement, so far confirmatory of the truth of both philosophies.

The Scotch and German people do so far agree. Both have a considerable amount of broad sense, and I may add, of humour. Both can pronounce the sounds indicated by the letters *ch* and *gh*, which many other people cannot utter—no Englishman can ever take into his mouth the word *Auchterarder*, the name of a place famous in the contest of the Scotch Free Church for independence. Scotland and Germany, in the opinion of Americans, are not very far from each other. But between them there roars an ocean, often very stormy—as I can testify from having lived for years upon its shores. The philosophies certainly agree, but they also differ.

I may now specify their differences. As I do so, it will be seen that my preferences are for the Scotch.

First, they differ in their Method. The Scotch follows the Inductive Method, as I have already explained it. The German has created and carried out the Critical Method. It maintains

that things are not to be accepted as they appear; they are to be searched and sifted. Pure reason, according to Kant, can criticise itself. But every criticism ought to have some principles on which it proceeds. Kant, a professor of Logic, fortunately adopted the forms of Logic which I can show had been carefully inducted by Aristotle, and hence has reached much truth. Others have adopted other principles, and have reached very different conclusions. The philosophies that have followed that of Kant in Germany have been a series of criticisms, each speculator setting out with his own favourite principle,—say with the universal *ego*, or intuition, or identity, or the absolute,—and, carrying it out to its consequences, it has become so inextricably entangled, that the cry among young men is, “Out of this forest, and back to the clearer ground occupied by Kant.” The Scottish philosophy has not been able to form such lofty speculations as the Germans, but the soberer inductions it has made may contain quite as much truth.

Secondly, the one starts with facts, internal and external, revealed by the senses, inner and outer. It does not profess to prove these by mediate reasoning: it assumes them, and shows that it is entitled to assume them; it declares them to be self-evident. The other, the German school, starts with phenomena—not meaning facts to be explained (as physicists understand the phrase), but *appearances*. The phrase was subtly introduced by Hume, and was unfortunately accepted by Kant. Let us, he said, or at least thought, accept what Hume grants phenomena, and guard the truth by mental forms—forms of sense, understanding, and reason. Our knowledge of bodies and their actions, our knowledge even of our minds and their operations, are phenomenal. Having assumed only phenomena, he never could rise to anything else. Having only phenomena in his premises he never could reach realities in his conclusions except by a palpable paralogism, which he himself saw and acknowledged. We human beings are phenomena in a world of phenomena. This doctrine has culminated in the unknown and unknowable of Herbert Spencer, implying no doubt a known, but which never can be known by us. We all know that Locke, though himself a most determined realist, laid down principles which led logically to the idealism of

Berkeley. In like manner, Kant, though certainly no agnostic, has laid down a principle in his phenomenal theory which has terminated logically in agnosticism. We meet all this by showing that appearances properly understood are things appearing, and not appearances without things.

Thirdly, the two differ in that the one supposes that our perceptive powers reveal to us things as they are, whereas the other supposes that they add to things. According to Reid and the Scottish school, our consciousness and our senses look at once on real things, not discovering all that is in them, but perceiving them under the aspect in which they are presented—say this table as a coloured surface perceived by a perceiving mind. According to Kant and the German school, the mind adds to the things by its own forms. Kant said we perceive things under the forms of space and time superimposed by the mind, and judge by categories, and reach higher truth by ideas of pure reason, all of them subjective. Fichte gave consistency to the whole by making these same forms create things. But the great body of the German philosophers claim merely that the mind colours things out of its own rich stores. This doctrine historically has furnished the germ out of which has sprung the grand ideal poetry of Germany. I rejoice, I revel in their lofty poetry, but I would not have poetry regarded as philosophy. Let us in portrait-painting have, first, the true figure, colour, and expression, and then in ideal painting we may have as many ornaments and compositions as our imagination and fancy can supply.

“Back to Kant” is the cry in our day of the younger German school, re-echoed by the speculative youth of America. Yes, I say, back to Kant, who was a wiser man and held more truth than most of those who claim to be descended from him, and who have arrived at conclusions which he would have resolutely repudiated had they been made known to him. Yes, back to Kant; but do not stop there. Back to Reid, back to Locke, back to Descartes, back to Bacon, back to Saint Thomas, back to Augustine, back to Marcus Aurelius, back to Cicero, back to Aristotle, back to Plato. All of these have expounded much truth; let us covet the best gifts, and accept these wherever they are offered—in ancient Greece and Rome, in Germany, in Great Britain, in America. Let us choose what is good in

each, and here the method of the Scotch may guide us in the selection. It may give us the magnet wherewith to draw out the genuine steel from the dross mixture. When we go back to Kant, let it be to criticise his critical method and its results.

Our thinking young men in America, having no very influential philosophy in America, and with no names to rule them, are taking longing looks towards Germany. When circumstances admit, they go a year or two to a German university—to Berlin or to Leipzig. There they get into a labyrinth of imposing and binding forms, and have to go on in the paths opened to them. They return with an imposing nomenclature, and clothed with an armour formidable as the panoply of the middle ages. They write papers and deliver lectures which are read and listened to with the profoundest reverence—some however doubting whether all these distinctions are as correct as they are subtle, whether these speculations are as sound as they are imposing. All students may get immeasurable good from the study of the German philosophy. I encourage my students to go to Germany for a time to study. But let them meanwhile maintain their independence. They may be the better of a clew to help them out of the labyrinth when they are wandering. The children of Israel got vast good in the wilderness as they wandered; saw wonders in the pillar of cloud and fire, in the waters issuing from the rock, and the bread on the ground; but they longed all the while to get into a land of rest, with green fields and living rivers. We may all get incalculable good from German speculation, but let us bring it all to the standard of consciousness and of fact.

I should be sorry to find our young American thinkers spending their whole time and strength in expounding Kant or Hegel. Depend upon it, the German philosophy will not be transplanted into America and grow healthily, till there is a change to suit it to the climate. By all means let us welcome the German philosophy into this country, as we do the German emigrants; but these emigrants when they come have to learn our language and accommodate themselves to our laws and customs. Let us subject its philosophy to a like process. Let it be the same with the Scottish philosophy: let us take all that is good in it and nothing else, and what is good in it is its method.

It is one of the excellencies of the Scottish school, that it does not profess, like some of the German systems, to have discovered all truth, all about God and man and nature. It is reckoned by many like the country from which it has sprung, narrow and confined—some of us have had to migrate from the old country, seeking wider openings elsewhere. That philosophy has certainly not yet taken possession of the whole territory of truth, and there are regions open to it wide as the uncultivated land of America, inviting all to enter. The Scottish philosophy, if true to its principles, should welcome truth from whatever quarter it may come, provided it submits to be tried by an inductive entrance examination. For myself, I believe with Plato, and I may add with the Concord school, that there is a grand, indeed a divine idea in the mind, formed after the image of God and pervading all nature; but I wish that idea in the mind carefully examined, and its forms or law exactly determined; and it is for inductive science, and not speculation, to tell us what are the laws and types which represent it in nature. I hold with Aristotle, that there are formal and final as well as material and efficient causes in nature; but it is for a careful induction to determine the relation of these, and to show how matter and force are made to work for order and end. I am as sure as Descartes was that there is in the mind a germ of the idea of the infinite and the perfect, but I take my own way of showing what is the nature of these ideas, so as to keep us from drawing extravagant inferences from them. I see, as Leibnitz did, a pre-established harmony in nature; but it consists mainly, not in things acting independently of each other, but in things being made to act on each other. I attach as much importance to experience as Locke did; but I maintain that observation shows us principles in the mind prior to all experience. I allow to Kant his forms, and his categories, and his ideas; but their nature is to be discovered by induction, when it will be found that they do not superinduce qualities on things, but simply enable us to perceive what is in things. I believe with Schelling in intuition (*Anschauung*), but it is an intuition looking at realities. I am constrained to hold with Hegel that there is an absolute; but I believe that our knowledge after all is finite, implying an infinite, and that this doctrine can be so enunci-

ated as not to issue in pantheism. I reject with the school of Concord a sensationalism which derives all our ideas from the senses, and a materialism which develops mind out of molecules; but I am anxious that the physiology of the nerves and brain should aid us in finding out the mode of operation of the powers of the mind. I turn away with scorn from the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann; but I believe they have done good by calling attention to the existence of evil, to remove which is an end worthy of the labours and sufferings of the Son of God. I believe with Herbert Spencer in a vast unknown, above, beneath, and around us; but I rejoice in a light shining in the darkness. With all unsophisticated men, I see a power above nature in nature; but I reject the doctrine of Gods many and Lords many as held by the great body of mankind. I am willing to accept the whole body of grand ideas which the Concord school has been holding before the eyes of Americans for the past age; but it is because I believe they have a place in the mind, and I am not always willing to take them in the form in which they have been put. I receive with gratitude the whole casket of gems which Emerson has left us as a rich inheritance; but before they can constitute a philosophy they must be cut and set, and they will require a skilful hand to adjust them; and if they are cut, it must be as carefully as diamonds are, and this only to show forth more fully their true form and beauty.

I have rather been advising our young men not to seek to transplant the German philosophy entire into America. But as little do I wish them to transplant the Scottish philosophy. It is time that America had a philosophy of its own. It is now getting a literature of its own, a poetry of its own, schools of painting of its own; let it also have a philosophy of its own. It should not seek to be independent of European thought. The people, whether they will or not, whether they acknowledge or no, are evidently the descendants of Europeans, to whom they owe much. They have come from various countries, but on coming here they take a character of their own. So let it be with our philosophy. It may be a Scotch-German-American school. It might take the method of the Scotch, the high truths of the German, and combine them by the practical invention of the Americans. But no: let it in

fact, in name and profession, be an independent school. As becometh the country, it may take, not a monarchical form under one leader, like the European systems, let it rather be a republican institution, with separate states and a central unity. To accomplish this, let it not be contented with the streams which have lost their coolness from the long course pursued and become polluted by earthly ingredients, but go at once to the fountain, the mind itself, which is as fresh as it ever was, and as open to us as it was to Plato and Aristotle, to Locke and Reid, to Kant and Hamilton.

JAMES M'COSH.

ART. VI.—*The Logical Methods of Professor Kuenen.*¹

PROFESSOR KUENEN is Dutch; most of the other well-known reconstructionist critics are German. Very few English-speaking scholars read Dutch, compared with the number who read German. The directly critical works of Kuenen are scarcely known among us except through German channels. Most English and American readers know of him only by the English translation of his *Religion of Israel*, published some seven years ago, that of his work on the Prophets published two or three years later—both of them in limited editions, now already out of print—and the little volume of the Hibbert Lectures, now just published. In these circumstances, it is no slight tribute to the abilities of Professor Kuenen that his name, rather than any other, certainly stands before English-speaking people as the representative name of this type of criticism. We need not raise the question whether this estimate of him is correct. So far as the statement just made is concerned, it is enough that the estimate exists.

If we should revive the term *Neology*, so much used a generation ago in the writings of Professor Stuart and others, and should apply it, in the general sense in which it would be applicable, to the reconstructionist criticism now in vogue, it

¹ From the *Presbyterian Review*.

would at once be evident that the recent Neology is much more formidable than that of the last generation. Even if one wholly denies the validity of the results it has reached, he is compelled to respect and admire the industry, the painstaking, the genuine scholarship by which the results have been reached. Such being the case, the very existence of this type of criticism points out distinctly one great need of our times. Meaning by rationalism what that word ought to mean, no one will dispute that we are in pressing need of a genuine, sanctified Christian rationalism. In whatever other ways the assaults made on the Bible by destructive criticism may be met, they should also be met by a study of the Bible that is reverently, yet distinctively, critical.

In general terms, every one admits this. But many are startled and shocked at certain consequences which follow from it, or, rather, at their own misapprehension of these consequences. Professor Kuenen, for example, enters upon his subject from the point of view which recognises in the religion of Israel simply one of the great religions of the earth. He refuses to assume that there is anything supernatural or exceptionally inspired in the Old or New Testaments, or in the religion described in them. Is not this sufficient to condemn him at once? Have we any occasion for at all investigating views which start from the denial of the fundamental truths of revealed religion? Is it even consistent for one who holds the divine authority of the Scriptures to be a settled truth to engage in such a controversy as that to which these critics challenge us? Does he not thus stultify himself by virtually admitting that what he holds to be divine is yet controvertible in the courts of human criticism?

At the outset, then, one who would examine Kuenen's positions from Kuenen's point of view, may be compelled to vindicate his right to do so. If he is a Presbyterian in the United States, he certainly will be thus compelled. If two men, highly honoured among us, unite in producing the best statement of the strict doctrine of verbal inspiration which has ever been printed, there are not wanting newspaper critics who find their work characterised by laxity of doctrine, and hasten to remind its authors that they are set for the defence of orthodoxy. If one deems it important to insist that, in

matters of Biblical study, our ministers and teachers shall be held to have all the liberty allowed by the very general statements of our standards, instead of being restricted by the narrower limits of the doctrine of inspiration which has been generally held among us—if another, in adversely commenting upon the works of Mr. Robertson Smith, acknowledges his opponent's standing as a Christian teacher, instead of stigmatising him as a heretic—or if another, in presenting the theories of Julius Wellhausen, recognises the fact that we need information in regard to the prince of German reconstructionist critics, even more than we need to be defended from him—these men are at once made to understand that they have faithful friends, both in the high court known as the General Assembly, and in the high court known as the religious newspaper, who stand ready to perform all needful offices of admonition and rebuke.

We ought certainly to be gratified at these evidences of the existence of zeal for the truth and of kind concern for our loyalty thereto; but, however well meant, it may possibly be in some instances a zeal not according to knowledge. The frigates of the so-called higher criticism advance in an endless circle and with perpetual broadsides around the fortresses of established orthodoxy. It may be that they do not harm the fortresses much, but some of the people within are occasionally hurt, and more are frightened. If we return the fire from the walls, it is very difficult to hit the frigates, because they are always in motion. Before the guns can be trained upon them in one position, they have shifted from that position and are somewhere else in the ceaseless circle. Shall one be counted a traitor if he regards it as wiser to fit out a few armoured gun-boats to grapple with the frigates on their own element, even if this involves the leaving of the fortress for the time being that one may engage in the fight?

If we are at all to meet the destructive critics with their own weapons, we must, of course, subject ourselves to the necessary and fair laws of critical procedure. And every one certainly must recognise the propriety of the canon of criticism, which demands that we avoid undue assumptions; that we exclude, as far as possible, the influence of bias and prejudice. But a groundless assumption, in any investigated process, is

not necessarily one that has no ground anywhere. It is sufficient for its exclusion that it has no ground among the primary facts of that particular investigation. In particular, a proposition which is to be proved or disproved by the investigation itself must be omitted from the premises of the investigation, even if it is capable of proof from other sources.

Now it is extremely desirable that the critical argument be made to furnish independent evidence in regard to the alleged divine character of the Bible; but if one proposes to accomplish this, he must not begin by assuming that the Bible is inspired. He might conceivably begin by satisfying himself of this from considerations external to his argument, and then build his critical structure upon this foundation; but if he should do this, he would be precluded from afterward transforming his foundation into a structure based upon the critical results he had reached. He may thus prove the fact of inspiration and use it, or he may leave out, for the time being, the question whether the Scriptures are inspired, or in what sense they are inspired; expecting that his critical investigations will throw light upon these points. He may pursue either of these courses, but he cannot be allowed to begin by assuming the inspiration of the Scriptures; afterward building the proof of their inspiration upon this assumption. To do this would be, of course, to violate a fundamental rule of critical procedure.

This does not mean that, in order to be critical, a man must be without opinions or prejudices. One is not required to become an idiot to fit him for judging fairly. Every man who knows himself is conscious of having prepossessions. The one who is most fatally biassed is the one who is so thoroughly under the influence of his bias as to be unconscious of being biassed at all. But it means that a man, however conscious of his prepossessions he may be, shall yet be conscious of a determination to lay these aside, and of a power and habit of actually laying them aside, and of reaching conclusions purely in the light of the evidence presented. In Biblical studies it is not essential to genuine critical acumen that the student be without convictions as to the divine authority of the Word. The most ruinous of all processes of

thought is that in which one undertakes to abandon, arbitrarily, the convictions which he has been accustomed to hold, for the sake of allowing fair weight to new evidence. To attempt this is to attempt an impossibility. We cannot thus divest ourselves, by an act of will, of deeply-rooted opinions. The result of trying to do it is utter self-deception. The mind is brought into false relations with itself, and into the worst of all attitudes for the intelligent reception of truth.

One who holds to the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures is not under obligation to cease holding that doctrine as the condition of being able, with fairness, to pursue critical studies. And one who rejects all idea whatever of supernatural interference is not excluded, so far as the mere demands of the critical process are concerned, for his peculiarities of creed. But each must, provisionally, hold his creed in abeyance while the investigation is going on. And however confident each may be of the truth of his creed, he must hold himself ready to give it up if it is proved to be untrue. That the critical inquiry may yield its best results, it must be made strictly independent. That it may be so, it must be carried on in the spirit which loves the creed for the truth it contains, and not in that which loves the truth because it is contained in the creed, and by a method which refuses to demonstrate a proposition by first assuming it to be true. That the critical inquiry into the nature of the Scriptures may be independent, it must reject all evidence which is based on the assumption that the Books are inspired, just as it rejects that which is based on the assumption that they are not inspired. While it is in progress, it has nothing directly to do with inspiration. When it is finished and its results are reached, these may be compared with results reached in other quarters. It is conceivable that, on comparison, the two may be found to agree, and thus confirm each other. It is conceivable that one or both may require to be modified so as to make them agree. It is conceivable that they may be found to be in hopeless conflict. In this case it is conceivable that a man may find his critical results to be better founded than his dogmatic opinions concerning inspiration, and may be compelled to give

up the latter in favour of the former. It is equally conceivable that he may find it reasonable to give up his critical results and retain his doctrinal opinions. But all these possibilities are matters of subsequent consideration. While the inquiry is in progress, it must be untrammelled by assumptions in either direction.

All this is certainly fair and reasonable, and the truth never needs to fear fair play. There is no reason, therefore, why any lover of the Bible or of its religion should find fault with the application of purely critical methods to the study of Biblical questions. It would be unreasonable to reproach Dr. Kuenen for professing to have done this. But we have a right to test his work by the question whether it is genuinely critical, or only spuriously so.

One of the first canons of criticism, and one which many of the recent critics are very eager to assert, as against the alleged theological bias of the traditional view, is the one just mentioned, namely, that we must avoid groundless assumptions. Whatever offers itself in the shape of premises must either be proved or rejected. Professor Kuenen's work is uncritical if it has habitually violated this canon.

In matters of history, another canon of critical procedure is that reputable human testimony has a presumption in its favour. This canon, of course, is not to be understood in a sense which would make it inconsistent with the previous one. To say that the truthfulness of a history must be presumed, is very different from saying that it must be assumed. To assume that untested evidence is true would be to violate the first canon of criticism; to assume that it is false is equally to violate that canon. Very different from either is the presumption in favour of the untested evidence of a human witness. Attention to this presumption is nearly as essential to correct critical procedure as is the avoidance of false assumptions.

This would be true, even if the presumption in favour of historical evidence were merely formal. A merely formal presumption, as distinguished from evidence, never settles the question whether an allegation is true; but it may settle the question whether, for certain purposes of investigation, the allegation shall be provisionally taken to be true. Or it may

decide which of two imperfectly proved propositions is to be preferred. But the presumption in favour of historical testimony is seldom merely formal. In most cases it has something of the character of evidence. Men, to be sure, are not very truthful. They may lie, from evil motives. They may be mistaken, through ignorance or carelessness. Yet we are so constituted that we cannot even continue to exist without some attention to reality. The worst liar makes, in all, more true statements than false statements. Much more, if a man is enough interested in the reality of events to look them up and write out what he learns, it is likely that he will mainly tell the truth about them. The presumption in favour of historical testimony may, of course, be overcome by evidence; but in the absence of contradictory proof, it must be allowed its own proper validity. If Professor Kuenen has not sufficiently attended to this, he must plead guilty to the charge of being uncritical.

Another canon of true criticism is, that mere hypothesis proves nothing. The argument which consists in supposing that a thing is so and so, may always be sufficiently met by supposing that it is not so and so. If there is some positive evidence in favour of an allegation, hypotheses may remove objections or strengthen the proof, just as slanting sticks may brace something so firmly as to give it tremendous strength. But without some element of positive evidence, a hypothesis or a hundred hypotheses fail of themselves, as slanting sticks with nothing to brace against fall to the ground by their own weight. Any author is uncritical if he indulges in assertions which are based on mere hypotheses.

Another law of criticism is that we must go as near as possible to the original sources to obtain evidence. Of course, the reconstructionist critics will not object to this. It is the canon by which they justify their process of *crumbling* our present books of the Bible. They regard it as especially important to distinguish those crumbs of Scripture which originated contemporaneously with certain events from those of later origin. That truly distinguished man, Dr. Franz Delitzsch, must feel at once amused and complimented and sorry at the way in which we Americans, and many other people than Americans, use his honoured name in violation of this canon. If we wish

to defend the traditional view of the Pentateuch, we appeal from the opinions of our learned opponents to those of Delitzsch; and our opponents instantly meet us with the reply: "But Delitzsch concedes to some elements in the Pentateuch a later origin, and since his views are extremely conservative, this may be taken as proving much more than he concedes." However we may honour the attainments of distinguished scholars, we cannot afford to allow critical investigation thus to degenerate into a mere comparison of the results reached by leading men. Our conclusions must be tested, not by the reputation of the mind that draws them, but by the character of the evidence from which they are drawn. And the adverse critics will not flinch, of course, if we remind them that, under this rule, a statement of the Book of Chronicles, for example, whether strictly historical or not, is, at least, nearer to the original sources of evidence, by some twenty centuries or more, than a similar statement made by Graf or Reuss or Kuenen.

To make but one more specification, all the laws of deductive reasoning are fundamental canons of critical procedure. If one uses a middle term of reasoning ambiguously, or makes inferences that are wider than his premises, or draws positive conclusions where one of the premises is negative, or draws any conclusion at all from purely negative premises, his work is thereby rendered uncritical.

No one disputes the validity of these and similar principles. Let us, by applying them, test the logical methods used in Dr. Kuenen's works on *The Religion of Israel*, *The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*, and *National Religions and Universal Religions*, and in other works of the same school.

The three works just mentioned are not primarily critical. The first is the promulgation of a theory of the rise and progress, by development, of the religion of Jehovah in Israel. The second is a decidedly polemic discussion of the alleged supernatural element in Prophecy, conducted in defence of this theory. In the third, this theory is put to use, in the comparing of the great religions of the earth. But this theory is based upon certain views as to the structure of the Old Testament, and stands or falls with them. The proofs of the one are the proofs of the other. The logical procedure of Kuenen the religious historian, is identical with that of Kuenen the Old

Testament critic. And his method is such that in one part or another of the historical works, he has occasion to reproduce, or at least to recapitulate, a very considerable proportion of the contents of his distinctively critical works.

Stated in brief, his historical theory is that in the eighth century B.C. the religion of Jehovah, as it then existed in Israel and Judah, in what was, at that stage of its development, its normal type, was what we might now call a semi-pagan idolatry, being only imperfectly monotheistic, using images and similar accessories in worship as an essential part of the cultus; and that this semi-pagan idolatry was evolved from still lower previous forms of religion, and was now in those processes of change by which a higher monotheism was at length evolved from it.

In its general outlines, this is the view which has been so thoroughly popularised for English readers in the works of Dr. Robertson Smith. A recent and particularly brilliant, though somewhat school-girlish presentation of it, is Wellhausen's article on "Israel" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. Dr. Chambers, in the *Presbyterian Review*, has adversely discussed the theory of Kuenen, taken as a whole. Dr. Cave, in the *Princeton Review*, has paid his respects especially to those portions of it which deal with the Mosaic institutions, and Dr. Green, in the same *Review*, to its positions in regard to the prophets and prophecy; while its view as to Ezekiel in particular, is criticised by Dr. Gardner, in the *Journal of the Exegetical Society*, 1881. In the same journal, Professor Toy publishes certain studies on Ezekiel, which would go to sustain the views held by Kuenen. Kuenen's treatment of the Pentateuch is opposed at length by Dr. Stebbins, in his book, *A Study of the Pentateuch for Popular Reading*. His treatment both of the Pentateuch and of the rest of the Old Testament is reviewed in Dr. Green's new book, *Moses and the Prophets*. And this list of able discussions of the subject, in American publications, might easily be extended. The present article, however, confines itself to Dr. Kuenen's proof of his statement of the condition of things in the eighth century before Christ, not so much for the sake of avoiding the ground already traversed by these other writings, as because of the central position which that statement occupies in the work of Kuenen. Unless he has established that state-

ment, he has had nothing to establish, for either the previous or the succeeding period. And the logical methods by which he supposes himself to have established that statement are the same which he everywhere employs.

He begins by setting aside the historical character of both the Old and the New Testaments, taken as a whole. To this, for the present, we simply take exception, admitting Professor Kuenen's right, however, to present his case in his own way. He holds that, since the only evidence we have is, in its entirety, unhistorical, it is therefore impossible, for most of the time covered by the Old Testament history, to determine what parts of it can be depended upon. He says that we must "give up for good the knowledge of detail which is no longer attainable" (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 28). He does not profess to be able to tell, by inspecting the parts, which parts are historical and which are not. In this he is certainly far wiser than the critics, who having shivered, in their own view, the vase of historical testimony, depend upon their skill in putting it together again in a new shape, by the aid of the cement of a puerile verbal criticism. To Dr. Kuenen, apparently, no statement of either Testament is historical in its own right. But he recognises the historical principle that "an event does not pass away without leaving any trace, any more than it occurs without preparation. If we succeed in discovering its traces, our conviction of its reality is confirmed. But also conversely" (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 19). By the aid of this principle we may test statements, and arrive at approximations to the historical truth.

It is for the purpose of establishing a base-line of this sort, by which all his other measurements and angles may be tested, that he begins at the point where he does rather than at any other. He asks, What was the religion of Jehovah in the times of Hosea, Amos, and Isaiah? Here, he correctly avers, the number of contemporary writers is sufficiently large to give us the means of comparing one account with another, and testing, to some extent, the historical sketch presented. Having thus attained a knowledge of the condition of things at this point, we may know that any statement inconsistent with this, as to the previous or subsequent condition of things, is unhistorical, and that whatever will account for this con-

dition of things, or may be accounted for by it, has certain probabilities in its favour. By this process the whole history is to be reconstructed.

The mere statement of this outline is the assigning of a sufficient reason, both for the order which our author has followed in his books, and for that followed in this article. We can test his logical methods as well at this section of his work as at any other. But in addition to all discussion of his methods, if this section of his work be found insecure, every other section, being absolutely based upon this, falls with it.

Dr. Kuenen counts as contemporaneous writers of the eighth century before Christ, Amos, Hosea, Micah, the author of the last chapters of Zechariah, and Isaiah, to whom he assigns considerable, though rather fragmentary, portions of the first thirty-five chapters of the book which bears his name. Jeremiah, with Deuteronomy and fragments of the other books of the Pentateuch, and of the older historical books, of later date than the eighth century, are yet near enough to it to have some weight as evidence. Nearly all the rest of the Old Testament is considered to be several centuries later in date, and therefore too remote to be of any value.

On the testimony of these witnesses, our author first presents the idea of Jehovah and his religion which was held and preached by the prophets. This part of his work is superbly done. It is a series of sound assertions fortified by apt citations. It is a chapter which might well be commended to the perusal of a large class of very orthodox Christian interpreters, who are in the habit of magnifying the religion of Jesus by minifying that of the prophets. Kuenen finds that the prophets prophesy in the name of one God, who is boundless in might, in wisdom, in creative power, in love and tenderness, and, above all, in holiness and justice; who is in a peculiar sense Israel's God, but is at the same time the only God of all the nations, to the exclusion of everything else that is called God; whose word dwells in the hearts of his servants, and whose service is essentially moral and spiritual in its character. This view is maintained all through the volumes. It is stated in compact form in *Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. pp. 39-67. The higher elements of this view of religion were *nascent* in the minds of Isaiah and his contemporaries, and reached their maturity in

the following century.—(*Theological Review* for 1874, and "Hibbert Lect.," 1882, pp. 128, 340.)

The effect of this is somewhat marred by a certain line of flings at the prophets as men who had their own personal grudges and ambitions to serve, in the religion they preached. They are described as being men of the people, with strong plebeian instincts, by whom "the high and eminent is condemned, because it is high and eminent," as well as because of its injustice and insolence. Their political utterances are described as "lay-politics, so to speak, all the more easy to hold in proportion as those who propounded them had less need to apply them directly." Isaiah's zeal against the false prophets is explained by saying: "Probably it is they especially who hold up the preaching of an Isaiah to ridicule, and who are therefore the first to be aimed at in his announcement of punishment" (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. pp. 62, 63, 84). This attributing of mean motives to the prophets is entirely gratuitous, so far as the evidence is concerned. There is nothing in their utterances or conduct which requires to be thus accounted for. It is quite inconsistent with the spirit of disinterestedness and earnestness of conviction which seems to characterise them. Logically, it is a groundless assumption, and a nullity. But rhetorically, it is quite effective in preparing us presently to discredit some of the statements made by the prophets.

A similar effect is also accomplished by a seemingly unimportant inexactness of statement as to the political status of the prophets. On page 35 of vol. i. of *Rel. of Israel*, we have the assertion: "In the writings of the eighth century, we accordingly find clear proofs of the existence of two parties, which we may call the Assyrian and the Egyptian." This statement is accompanied by a full and valuable list of scriptural references, and by the statement that the prophets whose works have come down to us were opposed to both parties. His references rather prove, as he himself seems to acknowledge on the following page, the existence of two parties, one of which, headed by the prophets, opposed all foreign alliances whatever, while the other was disposed to seek alliances with whichever power seemed at the time to be most available for that purpose, whether it were Assyria or Damascus or Hamath or Egypt or the Empire of Merodach-Baladan. In this case,

the evidence of the prophets is corroborated by what we know of the geography of Palestine and of the analogies of history. In a small country, with peculiarly strong natural defences, on the highway between two conflicting groups of more powerful nations, the important question could never have been, for very long at a time, which foreign intervention should be allowed, but whether any intervention should be allowed. Upon this latter depended the very question of national existence. By refusing alliances in either direction, Israel might hope to maintain its independence, thanks to God, its own courage, its difficult mountain passes, and the jealousy of its neighbours. But to take either neighbour for an ally was virtually to take him for a master, and transform Palestine into a battle-field for his wars with the other. This was the permanent and important question, and the party on it with which the prophets acted, though not always dominant, yet never sank into insignificance. If evidence is of any weight, the great literary prophets of the eighth century were successful men of influence in public affairs, and not a group of soured and disappointed enthusiasts, whose statements concerning the times in which they lived must be discounted accordingly. Dr. Kuenen does not in words ascribe to them this character; but he certainly discounts their statements on precisely this basis, without mentioning the basis itself.

While reading what our author has to say concerning the religious teachings of the prophets, one involuntarily asks himself what force this testimony can possibly have toward proving that the religion of Jehovah then current was an image-worshipping paganism. Men of less ability than Dr. Kuenen have attempted to prove the same proposition by methods very different from this. They have done it by depreciating the views of the prophets, by exaggerating every apparently harsh expression, by interpreting grossly every representation that was capable of gross interpretation, by explaining away whatever sounded like sublime spiritual truth so as to make it mean something coarser and less sublime. In distinct contrast with everything of this sort, Dr. Kuenen, like several others among the chieftains of the higher criticism, displays a gratifying appreciation of the ethical and spiritual exaltation of the earlier literary prophets. More than

this: That the lofty views of religion held by the prophets must have been intelligible to their contemporaries, and must even have been widely current among them, is a conclusion which he does not leave to the reader to infer, but which he himself takes pains expressly to affirm.

On the face of it, this evidence, instead of tending to prove that the prevalent regular form of the religion of Jehovah was at that time idolatrous, seems conclusively to prove the direct opposite. Usually a religion is taken to be that which its representative men understand it to be. On all hands it is conceded that the prophets of Israel were the representative men of the religion of Jehovah. On what principles of reasoning, then, are we to understand that Jehovah's religion was, during that period, essentially in contrast with what His prophets declared it to be?

Rhetorically, this working up of the case is most admirable. It shows the hand of a master. Not a particle of evidence has yet been adduced to prove that the prophets were innovators—that their views of the character of the religion of Jehovah are something hitherto unheard of, and in complete contradiction with the character of that religion as it has formerly been understood and practised, and is, in their times, still understood and practised. Our author has abstained from asserting that these prophets belong to the class of reforming enthusiasts who are sometimes described as being in advance of their age, as being too good for this world, as being theoretically so extremely wise that they are practically very foolish, as constitutionally addicted to being members of a very small minority, as likely to be isolated by the very loftiness of their ideals, and possibly to be thus driven into a moroseness which they themselves shall mistake for virtue, and therefore, as very likely to describe current affairs in a light quite different from that in which they appear to average people; and yet he has paved the way for treating their testimony as if it were precisely of this character.

He opens the case with the following and similar statements: "The prophets are, above all, preachers of repentance. Wherever they look around them they find much to reprove. They bring accusations against kings, princes, judges, and even priests and prophets. Therefore it is quite necessary to dis-

tinguish their way of thinking from that of their contemporaries" (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 68). From the fact that the prophets are preachers of repentance, he infers two consequences. One consequence is, that we must make allowances in receiving their testimony. "Preachers of repentance usually furnish us with valuable contributions to the knowledge of their times, but yet they are not the guides to whom we prefer to trust ourselves. From the very nature of the case, they do not make sufficient distinctions." The other consequence is, that the religion of the people who were called upon to repent must have differed radically from the religion which summoned them to repentance. Dr. Kuenen is well enough aware that the second of these consequences is by no means a necessary one. A call to repentance is not always a call to change from one religion to another. It is much more commonly a call to a change of conduct and of feeling than to a radical change of religious views or practices. But in this particular instance our author affirms: "That Jahveh's precepts were acknowledged in theory, but denied in practice, is not the true state of the case" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 71). On page 235 of the same volume he makes these views distinct by distinguishing between three types of Jahvism, namely: (1.) The Jahvism of the people—that is, the religion of Jehovah as it was understood and received by its adherents in the eighth century B.C., and, indeed, up to the captivity. (2.) The Jahvism of the law—that is, the religion of Jehovah, in the form which it assumed after the exile, under the pentateuchal legislation; and (3.) The Jahvism of the prophets—namely, the religion of Jehovah as it was understood and preached by the prophets from the eighth century.

That there were people in existence, then and ever since, who professed to worship Jehovah, but whose service was idolatrous and unintelligent, every one would admit. Nobody would dispute the assertion that the prophets rebuked what they considered as the false worship of Jehovah, as well as the worship of other gods than Jehovah. What Professor Kuenen has to prove is, that this idolatrous Jahvism, ethically and spiritually bad as it was, was yet the true historical Jahvism of the time. In his attempt to prove this, he certainly illustrates the maxim which he quotes from Renan

(*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 389), that "*la vérité est dans les nuances.*" What else he illustrates will appear as we examine some specimens of his reasoning.

His first allegation is, that in answering the question how Jehovah is to be served, "the prophets do not point—as perhaps we expected—to a code of laws in which Jahveh is understood to have made known his will" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 55). He admits that they mention the Torah "a few times." He admits that they may possibly have had a written Torah in their minds. But by the Torah he alleges that they meant, not a body of laws, but the body of the prophetic teachings. Whether these statements are true or false, and whether they are apt or inapt for the purposes for which they are made, depends entirely on the shade of meaning to be attributed to them. "A few times," says Professor Kuenen. He seems to have in his mind the impression that these earlier literary prophets do not very prominently mention the Torah, even in the modified sense in which they are said to use the term. This impression he certainly conveys to his reader. But he himself cites ten instances of the use of it, in the note at the bottom of the page. He might have extended his list. By including the verb, as well as the noun, he might have doubled the number of instances. Now, twenty instances are not very many. With the right shade to the meaning, one might fairly say here, "a few times." But the twenty instances occur in the writings of Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah, as these writings are accepted by Professor Kuenen. The entire bulk of these is a trifle less than that of the Gospel by Luke. How many times does the Gospel by Luke mention the Law? If the Law is prominently spoken of in any part of the Old Testament, or in any part of the New, or anywhere else in literature, then it is prominently spoken of in the literature which Dr. Kuenen attributes to the literary prophets of the eighth century before Christ. Dr. Kuenen's phrase, "A few times," conveys an impression that is entirely misleading.

He says again, that "it is possible" that the prophets had in their mind some sort of a written Torah. This statement is so made as to suggest that we have no proof that the prophets ever connected the idea of writing with that of the law, but that Dr. Kuenen, out of his superabundant candour,

is willing to concede this, not indeed as a fact, but as a possibility, without proof. The meaning is skilfully shaded again. Somehow it looks as if the position of our author must be a remarkably strong one, since he is so willing to allow needless advantages to his opponents. Who would imagine that one of the prophetic passages which he cites here concerning the Torah is: "Bind up a testimony, seal a Law among my disciples"? No one can read the context of this, in the eighth chapter of Isaiah, without seeing at once that a Torah is here described as some sort of a written sealed document. In Isa. xxx. 9 there is a similar mention of writing in connection with the Torah. And in Hos. viii. 12 we read: "I have written to him the great things of my Law." That these prophets were familiar with a written Torah is not a mere possibility, conceded by Dr. Kuenen as a favour to his opponents, but a fact distinctly affirmed by themselves. Considered as a fact, it is very damaging to his position. We are not surprised that he should prefer to have his readers regard it as a concession on his part.

On the face of it, these prophets seem to speak of the Torah precisely as do the later writers, up to the times of the New Testament. But by Torah, Dr. Kuenen insists that they mean something very different from what the later writers mean. On any possible supposition, they have "made no essential distinction between those laws and their own preaching, and have ascribed to the former no higher authority." He intends this to apply, of course, only to that in their preaching which they uttered as the word of the Lord. Do the later Old Testament authors, then, or the authors of the New Testament, know of any Torah which is authoritative otherwise than as the prophetic word of the Lord? Dr. Kuenen cites, to establish his position, the statement in Hos. xii. 13: "By a prophet Jahveh has led Israel out of Egypt, and by a prophet was Israel preserved." According to Hosea, whatever authority Moses possessed he possessed in virtue of his character as a prophet. Is there anywhere in Israelitish literature, up to the taking of Jerusalem by Titus, a syllable which hints at the existence of any different view of the matter? The author of the eighteenth chapter of Deuteronomy, when he emphasises the declaration that the Lord will

raise up a prophet "like unto me," certainly holds that, under God, the prophet is the supreme authority in Israel, and that the authority of Moses is that of a prophet. The New Testament writers, when they cite this passage, indorse the same doctrine. It is the doctrine which was held in the times of the Maccabees, when Israel laid away the stones of the polluted altar, to wait until God should make known His will through a prophet.

According to Dr. Kuenen, the prophets held the Torah to be the body of authoritative instruction which Jehovah had revealed through His prophets. Of course, this may have been wholly or partly written, and must have included whatever authoritative instruction was then regarded as of Mosaic origin, since they regarded Moses as a prophet. How does this view differ from that of the Books of Chronicles, or of the New Testament, or of Josephus, or of the earliest Mishnaic traditions? Jesus and His opponents alike profess to be citing the Law when they quote from the Psalms (John x. 34 and xii. 34). Paul cites from Isaiah as being part of the Law (1 Cor. xiv. 21). When the New Testament authors attribute the Old Testament to inspiration, it is to prophetic inspiration that they attribute it. They too, like the prophets of the eighth century B.C., hold the Law to be the whole body of authoritative instruction revealed by Jehovah through His prophets. Neither they nor their opponents show any sign of recognising any part of it as having less or more than prophetic authority. In their case, this is consistent with their also using the term Law in a narrower sense to denote especially the Pentateuchal books; and it may be equally consistent with the same in the case of the earlier literary prophets.

Kuenen may be correct in asserting that the Torah of the prophets of this group is the authoritative body of instruction given through the prophets. It may be impossible to identify their Torah with our present Pentateuch as distinguished from the prophetic utterances. But this will serve his purpose only on the assumption that the Pentateuch itself, or some authorised claimant in behalf of the Pentateuch, makes a different claim. Kuenen makes this assumption. He assumes that the proper historical position of the Pentateuch is that of a

body of legislation separate from the prophetic writings, and having a different sort of authority from theirs. Unless the assumption holds good, his argument is a nullity. Does it hold good? The question will prove instructive in more ways than one.

We have here an illustration of the principle that the strength of a novel error often lies less in the points in which it differs from the received view, than in the groundless assumptions which it makes in common with the received view. The great body of traditional writers seem to be on the same ground with Professor Kuenen in ascribing to the Law of Moses a different sort of authority from that which they ascribe to the prophets. Many seem to think of the latter as mainly predictors of events, while the former contains God's will as to the conduct of life. We are accustomed to being regaled at irreproachably orthodox tables with scraps from the Talmuds and from other Israelitish sources, discriminating in favour of the Mosaic writings as compared with the rest of the Canon. From the same sources we learn how rigid and mechanical the Jews were in matters of ceremonial observance, and then make this our point of view for the interpretation of the Mosaic books. By these processes we identify the Old Testament ideas with those of the later Judaism. Instead of regarding these books in the light of their own statements and of contemporaneous history, we come to them from the point of view of the later Tanaite scribes, who flourished after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. All parties seem to be mainly agreed in this. The traditional interpretation is full of it. The current defence of Christianity, in particular, abounds in brilliant contrasts based upon it, between the narrowness of the old dispensation and the freedom of the new. To this procedure the newer critics do not object; on the contrary, they build upon it. They have scarcely a structure which would not be seriously damaged if this part of its foundation were removed.

But, when we think of it, is the point of view of the later Tanaim the best for understanding the proper spirit of the Pentateuch or of the remainder of the Old Testament? Certainly a great gulf separates these men from their predecessors. By the destruction of Jerusalem, temple, priesthood, and civil

rule were alike blotted out; leaving whatever of public authority remained in Israel concentrated in the hands of the scribes. Their control came to be probably the most absolute spiritual despotism that ever existed. Dr. Kuenen (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. iii. p. 289) describes their work as "the reorganisation of Judaism." In it the lines of tradition which Jesus was so constantly in the habit of condemning became supreme. They had not been so before. What was yet only a tendency as late as the time of Jesus, became, after the fall of Jerusalem, a fixed fact.

Now the prophets of the eighth century certainly knew of no Torah which they sharply distinguished from their own teachings, and regarded as possessing a higher grade of authority. It may be true that their language on this point is different from that of the Talmuds. It does not follow that their Torah was different from that of the Talmudists. The difference may rather lie in the fact that they conceived of legislation as a part of prophecy, while the Talmudists conceive of it as different from prophecy and superior to it. The assumption that if they had possessed the Torah of the Talmudists they must have regarded it as the Talmudists did, is not only incapable of proof, but can be completely disproved.

Add to this, that Isaiah and his contemporaries habitually speak of the Law in the way of distinct and emphatic appeal to its authority, and we have, on the whole, a decidedly different impression of the testimony of Professor Kuenen's chosen witnesses on this point from that which he himself would convey. Translating Torah and its verb by the English words *instruction*, *instruct*, we may put the testimony into the form of a Bible-reading, as follows: God instructs men (Isa. xxviii. 9). Sometimes, perhaps, He instructs them through their own perceptions (Isa. xxviii. 26). But He has His constituted instructors—prophets who are instructors, priests who gave instruction—who, if unfaithful, are guilty of peculiar baseness (Isa. xxx. 20; ix. 15; Mic. iii. 11). The nations shall flock to Sion, that He may instruct them (Isa. ii. 3 and Mic. iv. 2). Instruction may be written. Indeed, this is, perhaps, the characteristic which distinguishes it from other teaching (Isa. viii. 16, 20, and xxx. 8, 9; and Hosea viii. 12). This point will be greatly strengthened if we add here the

passages in which these prophets in other terms speak of an appeal to written documents. The prophets are familiar with a definite body of instruction known as *the instruction*, and by other definite forms of expression (Mic. iv. 2 ; Isa. ii. 3, xxx. 9, i. 10, v. 24 ; Hosea iv. 6, viii. 1, 12 ; Amos ii. 4). God instructs in respect of righteousness (Hosea x. 12). But, as several of the passages show, His instruction has something to do with services of worship as well as with other matters. In short, it cannot escape notice that their Torah contained many things which are now contained in the Pentateuch, and nothing which is not now contained in the Old Testament books, which tradition regards as having been written by these prophets or before them.

The evidence thus far cited clearly does not tend to prove that the Jahvism preached by the prophets was something then radically new, which they were endeavouring to introduce in place of the received religion. Whatever weight it has is decidedly in the opposite direction. But our author further alleges that the prophets, while recognising the existence of a defined Jahvistic cultus, "nowhere insist upon fidelity in observing these holy ceremonies. On the contrary, they speak of them with an indifference which borders upon disapproval, sometimes even with unfeigned aversion" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 57). This last statement, by the time he reaches page 78, has grown into the assertion that "the prophets frequently speak of the outward worship of Jahveh in a tone of censure." The instances by which he supports these allegations are Amos v. 21-23, Hos. vi. 6, and Isa. i. 11-14. The three passages are alike in spirit. It will be sufficient here to cite Professor Kuenen's translation of the first :—

"I hate, I despise your feasts,
And have no delight in your assemblies.
Although ye offer me burnt-offerings and gifts, I will not accept them,
And your thank-offering of fatted calves I will not regard.
Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs :
I will not hear the melody of thy viols."

Is there here any sign that the speaker is indifferent to the offices of worship of which he speaks? Do men express indignation of this sort over that for which they care nothing? Here again our author has shown his wonderful skill in shade-

pencilling. The prophets do indeed sometimes express strong aversion for something which they find in connection with the worship of Jehovah. It is uniformly the indignant emotion which one feels over the perversion of something which he regards as sacred. By a felicitous turn of language our author transforms this verbally into "an indifference which borders upon disapproval" and sometimes grows into positive dislike. But the verbal transformation is untrue to the fact. The prophets cannot be placed in the attitude of men who regard the order of public worship as of small account. When they speak of it, their language is uniformly impassioned. It was a matter on which they felt deeply. Their hearts were stirred by it. They certainly said harsh things about the public worship in certain circumstances. But this does not show that they were indifferent; it rather shows the contrary. It also shows either that they gravely disapproved the new moons and public feasts and sacrifices, or else that their zeal for these was so well known that they need not limit their language when they had occasion to speak of the worthlessness of the public worship which yields no moral and spiritual fruit. Here again the true outline of the fact, when we disentangle it from the deceiving shadows, is inconsistent with the supposition that the prophets were radical religious innovators. For certainly no one would hesitate in his decision as to which of the alternatives just mentioned is the true one.

It is conceivable that we may reach a different result when we come to examine the nature of the charges which the prophets bring against the religion of their day. In the Hibbert Lectures (p. 61), Kuenen expresses his opinion in the matter, by asserting that the traditional view denies that the religion of Jehovah was the national religion of Israel until after the exile. Up to that time, he declares, "Yahvism was the religion of a minority, and the worship of other gods had a better claim to be called national." In opposition to this, his own view is that the religion of Jehovah was always the national religion, but that it existed in lower types, which were afterward confounded, in the records of the historians, with the false religions of the neighbouring peoples. In distinction from both these views, most persons who hold the traditional view suppose themselves to hold that the national

religion of Israel was always the religion described in the Law and preached by the prophets; and that it existed, during the national existence of Israel, in perpetual and fierce conflict both with internal corruptions and with other religions.

This portion of Kuenen's argument is based mostly on what the accounts say in regard to the bull-worship in the northern kingdom, and the Baalite accessories to worship in both kingdoms. He says, for example, "In the kingdom of Judah also the images, pillars, and asheras were not considered by those who worshipped them as antagonistic to the acknowledgment of Jahveh as the God of Israel, and therefore by no means antagonistic to the worship of Jahveh." He reminds us that "not even of Uzziah and Jotham—although they 'did that which was right in the sight of Jahveh'—do we read that they tried to abolish the high places," but on the contrary, it is "expressly asserted that the high places were not removed" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. pp. 80, 81). To the statement in this last citation it might be added that we nowhere read that these kings did *not* try to abolish the high places. If the narrative implies either, it certainly implies that they tried and failed, rather than that they failed to try. Again, on page 82, our author says of the assertion of Rabshakeh that it was Jehovah's altars which Hezekiah had cast down: "Here the Assyrian envoy is simply the mouthpiece of the discontented in the kingdom of Judah. The prohibition to sacrifice on the high places and altars must have been so novel, and at the same time so scandalous in their eyes, that the king seemed to them to have forfeited thereby all claim to Jahveh's assistance." But if there was such a disaffection as is here assumed, it must have played a prominent part in the history then transacting. It is strange that we find no allusion to it in the remarkably full Hebrew and Assyrian records of these events. This is the more noticeable because, according to Kuenen, the adherents of the Jahvism of the high places included the great majority of all the people, and even the great majority of all the regularly constituted prophets of Jehovah. On page 84 he says: "It does not appear that the prophets against whom these complaints were raised spoke to the people in the name of other gods than Jahveh. It is true that they are called soothsayers, and are mentioned in com-

pany with the 'Teraphim,' but nothing more can be concluded from this than that they upheld that form of Jahvism to which the great majority of the people were also addicted." On page 371 he speaks of "the decline of the prophetic schools, to which we heard Amos bear witness." This witness of Amos is described on page 82, by asserting that he "thinks it necessary to state expressly that he is no prophet, neither a prophet's son, and therefore he decidedly does not regard that title as an honour." The implication from this is that the men whom we know as the prophets of the eighth century are men of a new departure. "They occupied a hostile position toward a great majority of those who called themselves prophets."

Our space forbids any detailed discussion of the passages by which Dr. Kuenen supports these affirmations. It is sufficient to say that his reasoning is throughout very much like the game of run, skip, and jump among the boys. He runs carefully over the ground of evidence which proves that some persons may likely enough have worshipped Jehovah idolatrously; just as they, or others, idolatrously worshipped false gods. Then he skips to the conclusion that they *actually did* so worship Jehovah; and jumps from that to the statement that this was the prevailing worship of the "great majority" of the people and prophets. He runs carefully over the ground, which proves that the prophets who are rebuked cannot always be shown to be prophets of the false gods. Then he skips to the inference that they comprised the great body of the men who had been connected with the prophetic schools, Isaiah and his friends being simply a group of dissenters; and from that jumps to the conclusion that the idolatrous Jahvism of the times was in conformity with the traditional doctrines which had been handed down in the schools of the prophets from the times of Samuel. He runs carefully through the steps which might prove that some of the worshippers at Bethel may probably have intended to worship Jehovah, in their worship of the calves, skips to the conclusion that this was indeed their intention, and then jumps to the result that the bull-worship was actually a characteristic of the earlier Jahvism. And, in each case, the distance between his premises and his conclusion is wide

enough to give him an opportunity to display the most tremendous agility.

On the face of it, there is some probability that, in the midst of the prevailing idolatry, some persons introduced idolatrous ideas and rites into their worship of Jehovah. Apart from the antecedent probability, the proof of this is not very convincing. Even Professor Kuenen would not claim most of the alleged instances as at all decisive. Rabshakeh is, I believe, the only witness who testifies precisely and unequivocally to the point. And in the circumstances, his testimony, to use a familiar phrase of our critical friends, "does not inspire confidence." Were the high places, the pillars, the asheras, and the calves to demand trial, it would be difficult to convict them of having ever participated in Jahvistic worship. But if this participation on their part were proved, or were admitted, that would be a very different thing from admitting that this type of Jahvism was the prevailing and established type, the genuine religion of Israel, up to that date, handed down from ancient times, while the Jahvism of the prophets was an innovation.

In all this part of his argument, Kuenen, like many of the other critics, indulges in a neat ambiguity in the use of general expressions, which would have made the fortune of a Greek sophist. When we say that a practice existed in a certain community, we may mean that one or two instances of it have been known, or we may mean that it was so prevalent as to be characteristic. By affirming something in the first of these senses, and then drawing inferences from it as if it were true in the second, one might accomplish the most marvellous feats of logic. For instance, one might reason as follows concerning the Jahvism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in the United States of America: Assassination was practised under the claim of inspiration from Jehovah (by Charles Guiteau). Polygamy and polyandry were alike practised and defended as meritorious in themselves and as according to Jehovah's ordinance (witness, Brigham Young and the Oneida Community). Marriage was prohibited (in the case of the Shaker communities and of the Roman priesthood). People built joss-houses and burned incense in them (that is, the Chinese did, on the Pacific Slope). And all the while, there

were certain men who claimed to be Jehovah's ministers, who were thundering out their condemnations of these things, and of the moral corruptions and the spiritual deadness of the times ; which proves that in America, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the lofty and pure monotheism preached by the prophets of Jehovah is a novelty, while the practices which they condemn indicate the true nature of our holy religion, in its present stage of development. This is precisely Kuenen's reasoning, and not at all a travesty of it. Page after page of his volumes might, without making a single change in the form of the reasoning, be transformed into proof that our present Christianity has never yet reached the stage at which a religion becomes properly monotheistic and spiritual. If our author has established his conclusions concerning the religion of Jehovah as it existed in Israel in the year 800 B.C., he has also shown that substantially the same is true of the religion of Jehovah as it exists among us.

Having established, satisfactorily to himself, the fact that there was a radical difference between the actual Jahvism and the ideal Jahvism preached by the prophets, our author gives large space to the details of the actual Jahvism. In this we can only follow him to the extent of the rapid mention of a few statements. He affirms that in Egypt "the Hebrews were undoubtedly Polytheists," and that the great majority of the people continued to be polytheistic up to the exile (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. pp. 270, 223). He accounts for the ark and the tables of the law, on the theory that Jehovah was originally supposed to be, or to inhabit, sacred stones, which were therefore carried around as objects of worship. In the Hibbert Lectures he frequently speaks of the images of Jehovah and counts the ephod as having been originally an image of this sort (pp. 79, 81, 87, 88). He regards the story of Jephthah and similar narratives as proving that human sacrifices were once more or less customary in the service of Jehovah, and counts the dedication of the first-born and the circumcision as relics of that custom (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. pp. 237-40). Commenting upon the expression in Micah, "Shall I give my first-born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" he says : "It is undoubtedly implied that in his days such a sacrifice was not

looked upon as at all unreasonable. The prophet himself has other ideas of what Jahveh requires; but if human sacrifice had been foreign to the service of Israel's God, he could not have mentioned it in this manner." But we ourselves, in our public services and confessions, constantly use these words of Micah, and other similar language. Is this to be taken as proof that human sacrifices are not now regarded as foreign to the service of Israel's God?

We cannot specify further as to the testimony which Professor Kuenen draws from these prophetic witnesses. We must notice, however, that he does not at all claim that the prophets themselves intended any such meaning as he extracts from them. He distinctly admits and asserts the contrary. "The prophets do not bring forward their ideas as anything new; on the contrary, they consider themselves entitled to exact submission to their demands from the whole people. But the reality is very far from corresponding even partially to their demands" (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 374). "It may not be doubted that the bull-worship was really the worship of Jahveh. The prophets refuse to acknowledge it as such, it is true, but this proves nothing more than" that the acknowledgment would have been inconsistent with their improved theology (*Rel. of Israel*, vol. i. p. 235). Pure Jahvism our author declares to have been a "spiritual monotheism" (p. 368). As it was formulated in Deuteronomy, "All depends upon the state of the heart: the inward, and not the outward circumcision is the main thing (Deut. x. 16, comp. xxx. 6). In a word, religion, to the Deuteronomist, is above all *a matter of the heart*" (vol. ii. p. 23). But whence came this pure Jahvism? Kuenen's answer is: "In the eighth century B.C. the prophets came forward as champions of pure Jahvism. What can be more natural than to regard the new conception as their creation? And this we have not a moment's hesitation in doing."

One would suppose that men who were thus under the power of a spiritual monotheism, of a religion which was above all a matter of the heart, whose lives were spent in calling their compatriots to the true acceptance of a just and truthful God, would themselves have seen the importance of being at least ordinarily truthful. They themselves uniformly declare,

as Professor Kuenen readily admits, that the Jahvism they teach is not a new creation of their own, but is the old truth which has been taught from the beginning. Why should we assume that their statements are untrue? Why should we apply to their testimony the so-called critical process which consists in guessing that a witness needs to be corrected, and then guessing at the correction? This is precisely what our critic does. He assumes that these men were likely to warp the truth in the direction which would adapt it to their purposes. He conjectures what kind and amount of warping would answer their purpose, and estimates the original truth accordingly.

We are on the field of criticism, let us remember. As cold-blooded critics, we have no indignation to express at the subjecting of the words of holy prophets to treatment of this sort. But we have a right to inquire whether such treatment is called for by the canons of criticism. Certainly, some things in the language of the prophets can be accounted for, by supposing that they needed and therefore sought the help of pious fraud; but the same things can equally well be accounted for by supposing that they were truthful men, telling the truth. Which mode of accounting for them does accurate criticism prefer? If Professor Kuenen were a guest at some house, and after his departure no spoons were found to be missing, this might, of course, be accounted for by supposing that the Professor had been very closely watched. But it would be more reasonable, as well as more gratifying, in the absence of proof in the matter, to account for it by supposing that the Professor had no disposition to steal spoons. Sincere men of large abilities and earnest convictions may be untruthful, as they may be dishonest; but there is a presumption, and not merely a formal presumption, but a strong preponderance of probabilities, in favour of their being both honest and truthful. Gratuitously to assume the opposite is uncritical.

But to assume the opposite, in the present case, is not merely gratuitous, but is in the face of strong probabilities. By claiming that the religion they taught was the old established Jahvism of the nation, the prophets challenged the assertion and the proof of the contrary. This was foolish policy for them, unless their claim was true. It would have

been more natural for them, and more in accordance with the analogies of history, to have laid stress on the new revelation which God had given them, and on its superiority to the old. Like the disciples of Jesus, or like Mohammed, or Jo. Smith, they might have claimed for their religion a certain sort of identity with that of the past; but they would have been sure to have emphasised the fact of the new revelation. This they abstained from doing. They prefer to challenge exposure by insisting on the genuine and exclusive antiquity of the Jahvism which they preach.

Did any one meet their challenge? Did any one oppose them, on the ground of their being innovators? They met with opposition of many sorts. We have many and detailed accounts of this. If they were innovators, they must inevitably, in the circumstances, have been prominently opposed upon that ground. It could hardly have happened but that some trace of such opposition should have been somewhere handed down. Is there any such trace? We must add this to the other reasons for holding that the prophets were not innovators.

We turn to other sources than the testimony of these prophets themselves. The larger part of the bulk of Dr. Kuenen's volumes is occupied with a patient and industrious induction of all portions of the Old Testament, showing what historical value should or should not be attached to each fragment, and how the various fragments may be made to fit into his view. In this we cannot at present follow him. It is sufficient to say that critical weaknesses appear everywhere, in all the vast collection of details. They are of the same types with those which we have already noticed. And considered as proofs of our author's main position, they all have this additional weakness, that they depend for their validity upon the positions we have already traversed, and which we have found to be untenable.

Let us turn, however, from all points of detail, to consider our author's treatment of the Old Testament as a whole. And although we must confine our discussion of this to very narrow limits, let us yet remind ourselves that we have here infinitely the most important of all the questions traversed in the recent critical discussions. The Pentateuch

might conceivably be proved to be of post-exilic origin without at all impairing its credit. We might conceivably come to recognise a second Isaiah, and yet count him as worthy as the first. As between the traditional view that the post-exilic prophets and scribes revised and annotated the earlier books, and the view that they incorporated these into new works, giving them their present literary form, there is much less difference than many imagine. But if, in the process of proving any of these theories, or as preliminary to proving them, we discredit the historical truthfulness of the Old Testament, that is a different matter. Our blessed Christianity is so magnificently strong that it could survive the loss of even such a bulwark as the historicity of its Bible. Its record as a universal religion, and its record in the hearts and lives of men, would still keep it triumphantly above the waves, even if most of the structures it has built for itself out of its holy books should be wrecked. But if the Old Testament is not properly historical, a large proportion of these structures are wrecked. This, in distinction from all else, is the question of questions with which our criticism has to deal.

Early in this discussion we took exception to Professor Kuenen's method, because he entirely excluded a large amount of testimony which, on the face of it, seemed entirely relevant. We now recur to that exception, for the purpose of trying its validity. In addition to all the defects we have shown in our author's case, we now propose to offer, as opposing evidence, the entire Bible, and especially the whole Old Testament.

Dr. Kuenen's rejoinder to this is peculiarly satisfactory, because it is unmistakeable in its meaning. He decidedly objects to the evidence we offer as unhistorical, and distinctly admits that the evidence, if taken, would be conclusive against him. The following quotations are made at random. Page after page of the like might be added. Mentioning that the Old Testament, as a whole, claims a supernatural origin for the religion of Israel, he says: "He who relies upon the impression made by the whole, without interrogating the parts one by one, repudiates the first principles of all scientific research." This would be true if it meant that we must interpret the whole by the parts, and the parts by the whole. But he uses it as if it meant that, untrustworthy as the parts are, the whole

is still more so; so that we ought to prefer that interpretation of the parts which makes them disagree with the whole, and thus discredits both. We have already seen that he does not treat the parts—the testimony of the prophets, for example—as entitled to the credence ordinarily accorded to historical witnesses. This is not sound critical procedure. But we just now have to do, not with its unsoundness, but with the fact that it is the avowed method of Kuenen.

The extract just given is from p. 11 of the first volume of the *Religion of Israel*. On p. 220 he says: "Let no one be surprised that we do not rather let the Old Testament itself decide." "The Old Testament narratives relating to the past can lay no claim to unlimited confidence." And what is thus repeatedly alleged against the Old Testament in general is said to be especially true of the Books of the Chronicles. It is asserted, for example (p. 324), that the history of David, as given in 2 Sam., "is modified or completed on all these points by the chronicler, not because he had consulted other, more exact accounts, but because he considered it certain that David would not have acted in opposition to the stipulations of the Law. Conversely, we find in these particulars a fresh proof that the Law did not yet exist at that time."

Kuenen's frankness is in refreshing contrast with the indecisiveness of some of his disciples. He does not take the trouble to assign to the Scriptures even the *quasi*-historical value recognised by those who claim that they consist of a substratum of historical fact, allegorically expressed; although he actually finds in them some of this sort of composition. He does not profess to hold to the historicity of the Scriptures, while denying a large proportion of their statements, and regard himself as persecuted when men charge him with inconsistency. He is, perhaps, no more conscious than his comrades that the natural impression made by the reading of the Old and New Testaments, as a whole, is absolutely against them; that, in order to reach their conclusions, they must break down the testimony of the Bible in its historical entirety; that if these writings are ordinarily trustworthy, they themselves have no case. Their arguments, as well as his, depend upon the proposition that the two Testaments are historical only by piecemeal, and not in their complete character; and

lose all logical value, if this proposition be not maintained. But Professor Kuenen is bolder than most of the others in accepting the issue.

Is this proposition a mere assumption, or is it capable of proof? If it can be proved, we must accept it, with all the revolutionary consequences that follow. If it is mistaken, it is the most mischievous of all the mistakes of recent critical science. It is the most important question to be considered in this argument. Technically subsidiary as it is, the main questions with which criticism deals are insignificant by the side of it.

Dr. Kuenen is not guilty of assuming that the Scriptures are unhistorical, but undertakes to prove this. Apparently he is conscious that the presumption is against him, although he is too consummate a rhetorician to call attention to this by very prominently mentioning it. The presumption exists, however. It is his task to overthrow it, if possible.

To accomplish this task, he cites certain alleged analogies of history. "It is certain that the thirst for reality which is proper to our age was unknown to antiquity. Numerous examples prove to us that men then went to work with great freedom even in representing the immediate past" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 23). Under this general charge he alleges that the Israelitish history is likely to have been changed while it was orally transmitted, to have been further changed by the men who first committed the oral traditions to writing, and still further by those who compiled the present books from the other written sources. This lack of historical fidelity our author does not regard as very culpable in them. "Most ancient historians, and among them the Israelitish, had what we should now call a secondary purpose, but what for them was really their principal object. They wished to instruct their readers as to what they ought to do" (p. 384).

These assertions of the comparative lack of historical truthfulness among the ancients are by no means beyond dispute, even if we assume that Greece and Alexandria are the proper types of all antiquity. But Josephus, nearly eighteen centuries ago, called attention to the differences which then existed between the Greek-speaking peoples and the Egyptian and Semitic peoples in just this matter of historical realism. The

discoveries recently made along the Euphrates and the Nile conclusively prove that Josephus was mainly in the right in this matter, even if this were not otherwise sufficiently proved. No one would now dispute the existence of a genuine sense of historical reality among the Egyptians and the Assyrians. Is there any reason to hold that the Israelites were behind their neighbours in this respect? The criticism of Kuenen and his school makes great use of the fact that the compilers of the Old Testament were accustomed substantially to copy from the documents they used, instead of telling the story afresh in their own words. That looks like a sense of reality. Through the use of the verbs *ascend*, *descend*, and the other Hebrew verbs of motion, they have made their writings fit the acclivities and declivities and other topographical features of Palestine, as the squeeze fits the tablet from which it was taken. It is inconceivable that they can have accomplished this as a mere feat of realistic writing. In their books it is a token of reality, and not of realism. To argue the point with any fulness would require an article. As a matter of fact, the assumption that the Israelitish writers were lacking in historical instinct is not merely baseless, but is opposed to pretty decisive evidence. And the additional assumption that a man who attempts to make history instructive thereby becomes an untrustworthy narrator of facts, is really equivalent to assuming that in order to be truthful one must cease to love the truth.

Dr. Kuenen brings forward another consideration. The Old Testament witnesses are too remote from events which occurred before 800 B.C. to make it safe for us to depend on what they say concerning those events. "In the eighth century B.C. the prophet of Jahveh has become a writer." "It does not appear that the older prophets, Samuel and his contemporaries, and afterward Elijah and Elisha and their disciples, thought of writing down what they had spoken, or of taking care that it was written down by others" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. pp. 208, 209). There is no evidence on this point, except the statements of the Old Testament; and according to these, as any one may see by the aid of a concordance of proper names, Elijah and Samuel, with Nathan, Gad, Shemaiah, Ahijah, Moses, Joshua, and many other earlier prophets, were writers. Kuenen him-

self admits the existence of written narratives previous to the eighth century, and admits that they were regarded as historical, but denies that they were really so.

As against both the original narratives and our present versions of them, he alleges that they contain many particulars "which cannot possibly pass for history" because of their inherent improbability. Here, again, we are precluded from following him in detail. The large majority of his alleged discrepancies and other difficulties are made such only by strained interpretations. Most of the remainder are capable of being easily explained, and therefore have no weight to overthrow even the slightest presumption in favour of the historicity of the writings. The utmost that any one would infer from just such instances as these, if he found them in the recovered Assyrian or Egyptian records, for example, would be that there was some need of care in separating the probable from the improbable. Our Associated Press reports contain a multitude of errors, but no one doubts that the daily press gives a fairly correct account, on the whole, of current events. Few, if any, of the absurdities which Kuenen charges upon the Old Testament can be proved to be real. But if they were all real, they would not prove the Scriptures to be less credible than an average newspaper. And if, at the start, even this degree of credibility be accorded to them, they will easily vindicate their own historical character.

In short, the vast mass of detailed proofs by which our author would invalidate the testimony of the Bible narratives is so utterly valueless for that purpose, that one is led to ask how it could possibly seem to him worth while thus laboriously to advance them. And when we ask this question, we find the answer to it in certain assumptions which underlie his whole argument. One of his proofs that the narratives of Genesis cannot be historical, is the fact that they represent the patriarchs "as not inferior to the prophets of the eighth century in pureness of religious insight and inward spiritual piety" (*Rel. of Is.*, vol. i. p. 108). Another proof is, that the familiar intercourse of the patriarchs with the Deity shows the accounts to be legendary. The first of these proofs rests on the assumption that all religions arise by evolution, and never by direct revelation, and that the evolutionary process must have been further

advanced in the eighth than in the previous centuries. The second rests on the broader assumption, that what is commonly called the supernatural is incredible. In some of the forms in which he states these propositions he makes some show of proving them, rather than assuming them to be true, but he never proves them by anything more ultimate than themselves. And without these assumptions his charges against the body of the Old Testament Scriptures amount to nothing.

Now, a Christian dogmatist might start from the assumption that the religion of Israel originated in supernatural revelation. Dr. Kuenen would object at once to this procedure as uncritical. That is one of the important questions to be settled by the investigation. We must not, in advance, assume it as settled. But how would his procedure differ from that of the opposing critics, when they start from the assumption that the religion of Israel originated in evolutionary development? That is one of the questions to be settled by the investigation. It is uncritical for them to assume it in advance.

This is a point which will bear emphasising. The critical canon is not merely that one should hold himself free from the doctrinal prepossessions of orthodox theology, but from all other prepossessions as well. If he has no right to assume that the Bible is inspired, he has no more right to assume that it is uninspired. One of the most evident facts in the case is that these writings have been commonly supposed, by those most familiar with them, to possess a peculiar divine character. It is as uncritical to assume that this view is mistaken, as to assume that it is correct. One assumption is just as much an instance of theological bias as the other. The only truly critical course is to refuse to make either assumption.

No dogmatist could be narrower than is Dr. Kuenen in some of the assertions he makes in this matter. On page 11 of the *Religion of Israel* he says: "The belief in the exceptional origin of the religion of the Israelites is founded simply and solely on the testimony of their holy records." He argues that this must be taken as discrediting the records, and not as proving the fact to which they testify. This statement coolly ignores the vast body of the evidences of revealed religion, as they are commonly presented in treatises on that subject. Considering the religion of Jehovah as a fact now in existence;

considering the connection between this fact and the moral convictions and spiritual experiences of men ; considering the wonderful history and the present peculiar position of the Israelitish people ; considering the remarkable critical history of their Scriptures—the one literature which, during many centuries preceding the last, was transmitted in a genuinely critical text ; considering the part which these books have played in the history of Israel, of Christianity, and of civilisation ; looking at a multitude of other considerations abundantly presented in current works on the subject ;—there is no absurdity in supposing that historical facts which are so exceptional in their character may be equally exceptional in their origin. The procedure which assumes that all these evidences go for nothing, and even that the conclusion to which they lead is untrue, does not commend itself to a genuinely critical mind.

The case needs no summing up. The critical craze of the last half of the nineteenth century is only more respectable than its æsthetical craze. In its own proper strength it is not very formidable. But it is possible for us, who oppose it, to endow it with amazing power for mischief. All that is requisite to accomplish this is that we proscribe its authors, and proscribe those who object to proscribing its authors. The leaders of this movement appear to be serious men, of strong convictions, given, in matters of scholarship, to a painstaking industry which we might be proud to rival. They are excellent stuff to make martyrs of. They have the ear of the world, and to some extent deserve it. Their claims are of a sort which most people will settle, not on their merits, but according to the impressions they have concerning the claimants. If we wish men to adopt their views as well as to discuss them, we need only denounce them instead of answering them. For the purpose of concealing the weakness of their position, no cloak would be better than that of violent accusation. By methods like these, and only by methods like these, can we make the impression that our orthodoxy is helpless before criticism of this type, and conscious of its helplessness.

We have something better to do. The traditional treatment of the Old Testament has not been altogether as broad and intelligent as could be desired. We have not adequately used the materials which recent research has provided, and have by

no means exhausted those which we formerly possessed. Such work as that of Kuenen is legitimate and valuable, if we regard it as a discussion of the question whether the hypothesis that the religion of Israel originated in merely natural evolution will account for what appear to be the historical facts in the case. And his argument, so far as it can be regarded as having any logical weight, favours the negative of this question, for it conditions our acceptance of the affirmative upon our wholesale repudiation of what ordinary investigation would accept as the facts. On the other hand, much of the traditional treatment of the subject is really a discussion of the question whether the religion of Israel can be accounted for as the product of a special divine revelation. This is also legitimate and valuable, but it does not cover the whole ground. To prove that it *can* be thus accounted for does not prove that it *must* be. Conceivably the facts might equally suit any one of several theories. The scholarship of to-day ought to aspire to a wider and stronger treatment of the Old Testament, a treatment that should recognise the fair presumption which exists in favour of what purport to be historical statements, while it tests and cross-examines the statements themselves at every point; a treatment as thorough and exhaustive as that of Kuenen, without the weakness of his bad logic. The results of such criticism must needs rejoice the heart of every one who loves the Bible as the Word of God. WILLIS J. BEECHER.

ART. VII.—*The Relation of Ezekiel to the Levitical Law.*¹

WITH this unavoidably prolonged discussion ² the ground is cleared for a comparison of the *cultus* set forth in the vision of Ezekiel with that commanded in the Mosaic law, and an examination of the relation between them. This discussion

¹ From the *Journal of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis*.

² We have omitted the introductory portion of this article, in which Professor Gardiner contends for the ideal and symbolic character of Ezekiel's vision. Throughout, our readers will see, he assumes that the vision is not to be read literally; but this does not essentially affect his argument.—(ED. B. and F. E. R.)

is embarrassed by the difficulty of finding any historical data which will be universally accepted. If we might assume that any of the older historical books of the Old Testament were as trustworthy as ordinary ancient histories making no claim to inspiration, or that the books of most of the prophets were not pious frauds, the task would be greatly simplified. As it is, I shall endeavour to conduct the examination on the basis of such obvious facts as would be admitted by the authors of what seem to the writer such strange romances as Kuenen's *Religion of Israel* and *Prophets and Prophecy in Israel*.¹

The first point to which attention may be called is the landed property of the priests and Levites. According to the Mosaic law, they had no inheritance of land like the other tribes, but merely scattered cities for residence; and were to depend for support, partly upon their portion of the sacrifices, and chiefly upon the tithes of the people. While the payment of these tithes was commanded, there was absolutely no provision for enforcing their payment. This rested entirely upon moral obligation, and the condition of the whole Levitical tribe was thus dependent upon the conscientiousness of the Israelites. When the sense of religious obligation was strong, they would be well provided for; when it was weak, they would be in want. And this is exactly what appears from the general course of the history, as well as from such special narratives as are universally admitted to be of great antiquity. (See Judg. xvii. 7-18, etc.) Now, after the exile, at a time when there can be no question in regard to the facts, we find the priests and Levites similarly unprovided with landed property. The Mosaic law, the condition of things before the exile and after, agree together; but Ezekiel represents a totally different state of things. He assigns two strips of territory, one to the priests and the other to the Levites, each of nearly the same size as the allotment to any of the tribes (xlvi. 9-14). This very small tribe would thus have had almost twice as much land as any other; and such a provision would obviously have profoundly modified the whole state and relations of the priestly

¹ Substantially the same views, especially in relation to Ezekiel, are taken by Graf (*Die Geschichtl. Bücher des alten Test.*), Smend (*Der Prophet Ezechiel*), and others, with sundry variations in detail; but as Kuenen is the author most widely known, and presents his theories in the most favourable point of view, the references of this paper will be confined to his works.

order and of the subordinate Levites. In this point, therefore, we find that if any process of development was going on in the ecclesiastical system of Israel, it was such as to leave the final result just what it had been before, while the system of Ezekiel, which, on that supposition, should be a middle term between the two, is entirely foreign to both of them.

There are other noteworthy points involved in the same provision. According to Deut. xix. 2-9, three cities, and conditionally another three, and according to Num. xxxv. 9-15 the whole six, were to be selected from the cities of the Levites and appointed as cities of refuge in case of unintentional manslaughter. The same provision is alluded to in Ex. xxi. 13, 14, and it plainly forms an essential feature of the whole Mosaic law in regard to manslaughter and murder. After the conquest, according to Josh. xxi. this command was executed, and the cities were distributed as widely as possible in different parts of the land, three of them on either side of the Jordan, the eastern side being considered as an extension of the land not included in the original promise, and therefore bringing into force the conditional requirement of Deuteronomy.¹ But by the arrangement of Ezekiel, the Levites were not to have cities scattered through the land, and their central territory could not afford the necessary ease of access from the distant parts. There is here therefore an essential difference in regard to the whole law in reference to manslaughter and murder, and it is plain that the Mosaic law in this point could not have been devised from Ezekiel.

But besides this obvious inference, it is in the highest degree improbable that this provision of the Mosaic law could have originated after the captivity, when it would have been entirely unsuited to the political condition of the people. Still more, it is inconceivable that the record of the execution of this law by Joshua could have been invented after the time of Ezekiel; for neither in his vision is any such selection of cities indicated, nor in the actual territorial arrangement of the restoration was there any opportunity therefor. Yet the same

¹ Deuteronomy was indeed written after the conquest of the trans-Jordanic territory; but it was immediately after, and when this territory was yet hardly considered as the home of the tribes. Some writers prefer to consider the number of six cities as fixed and the three conditional, which in their view were never set apart, as making nine.

account which records the selection (incidentally mentioned in connection with each city as it is reached in the list) clearly recognises the distinction between the priests and the Levites (Josh. xxi.). This distinction then must have been older than Ezekiel.

In quite another point Ezekiel's assignment of territory, taken in connection with Numbers and Joshua, has an important bearing upon the antiquity of the distinction between priests and Levites. According to the Mosaic law the priests were a higher order ecclesiastically than the Levites, and in accordance with this position were provided with a more ample income; for being much less than a tenth of the tribe, the priests received a tenth of the income of all the other Levites (Num. xviii. 25-28). Both these facts are in entire accordance with the relations of the priests and Levites in post-exilic times; but they are at variance with those relations as set forth in Joshua, if that be post-exilic, and also with Ezekiel considered as a preparatory stage of the legislation of the Pentateuch. Of course, the whole body of the Levites must have been originally many times more numerous than the members of the single family of Aaron, and if Joshua xxi. be very ancient we need not be surprised that the forty-eight Levitical cities provided for in Numbers (xxxv. 1-7) should have been given, thirteen to the priests and thirty-five to the other Levites (Josh. xxi.); for this gave to the priests individually a much larger proportion than to the Levites. The same thing is true of the provision made by Ezekiel. The equal strips of land given to the priests collectively and to the Levites collectively, gave much more to the former individually. But all this would have been entirely untrue after the exile. In the census of the returning exiles, given in both Ezra and Nehemiah, the number of priests is set down as 4289 (Ezra ii. 36-38; Neh. vii. 39-42), while that of the Levites—even including the *Nethinim*—is 733, or but little more than one-sixth of that number (Ez. ii. 40-58; in Neh. vii. 43-60 the number is 752).¹

¹ Kuenen (*Relig. of Israel*, vol. ii. pp. 203, 204) and his school undertake to explain this disparity of numbers by the supposition that the Levites were "degraded priests," of which he thinks he finds evidence in Ezek. xlv. 10-16. For the present point this is quite immaterial; all that is here required is admitted by him—the fact of the great disparity in numbers. But the supposition itself is quite gratuitous, and rests upon two unfounded

It may indeed be argued that Ezekiel has no regard to the actual numbers of the two bodies, but writing at an early stage of the process of separation between the priests and the Levites, intends to put them upon a precise equality; and that only at a later period was the pecuniary provision for the Levites made inferior to that of the priests. If this be so then Joshua xxi. must be post-exilic; for in its whole arrangement it clearly recognises the distinction and the superiority of the priests. Yet this gives thirty-five cities to the very few Levites and only thirteen to the comparatively numerous priests—in other words, is self-contradictory. In this respect the bearing of Ezekiel is plain: it makes the Mosaic law and the history of Joshua consistent if they were ancient, but inconsistent and self-contradictory if Ezekiel's vision was a stage in the late differentiation of the priests from the Levites.

We are now prepared to go a step further. It is agreed on all sides that Ezekiel recognises a distinction between the priests and the Levites. To an ordinary reader of his book it appears that he makes this recognition incidentally and as a matter of course, as of an old, familiar, and established distinction. He nowhere states that there shall be such a distinction, nor gives any grounds upon which it shall rest, nor describes who shall be included in the one body and who in the other, except that he confines the priests to "the sons of Zadok" (xl. 46; xliii. 19; xliv. 15; xlviii. 11), of which more will be said presently. Certainly this does not look, upon the face of it, like the original institution of this distinction. But Kuenen (*Relig. of Isr.*, vol. ii. p. 116) asserts that at the time of Josiah's reformation, "all the Levites, without exception, were considered qualified to serve as priests of Jahveh," and that "Ezekiel is the first to desire other rules for the future;" and that the priestly laws of the Pentateuch, of which he had no knowledge, were subsequent. Again he says (*ibid.* p. 153), "Ezekiel, in uttering his wishes as to the future, made a beginning of committal to writing of the priestly tradition.

assumptions: (1) that "the Levites," in verse 10, cannot be used *καὶ ἐξοχήν* for the priests—a point to be spoken of elsewhere; and (2) that the "sons of Zadok," verse 15, is synonymous with "sons of Aaron," which is not true. The simple and natural explanation of the passage in Ezekiel is that the prophet means to degrade the *priests* who have been guilty of idolatry. (See Curtiss' *The Levitical Priests*, pp. 74-77.)

The priests in Babylonia went on in his footsteps. A first essay in priestly legislation—remains of which have been preserved to us in Lev. xviii.-xxvi.—was followed by others, until at last a complete system arose, contained in an historical frame. Possessed of this system, the priestly exiles, and among them Ezra in particular, could consider themselves entitled and called upon to come forward as teachers in Judea, and to put in practice the ordinances which hitherto had been exclusively of theoretical interest to them.”¹ These passages are cited from Kuenen simply to bring distinctly before the mind the theory which has recently gained acceptance with an intelligent school of critics; it is the bearing upon this of the vision of Ezekiel which we are to consider. The question to be asked is, whether the more careful examination of this vision bears out the *prima facie* impression produced by it, or confirms the somewhat elaborate theory of Kuenen.

There can be no manner of doubt that in Ezekiel’s time there already existed two classes of persons known respectively as “priests” and as “Levites.” Whatever may have been the ground of the distinction, and whether or not all were equally entitled to offer sacrifices, Ezekiel certainly recognises the two classes as existing, since he could not otherwise have used the terms without defining them. The Levites, of course, may be considered already well known as the descendants of the tribe of Levi; but why not the priests in a similar way? How could he have used the term in distinction from the Levites, if no such distinction had been hitherto known?

But further: Ezekiel assigns to the priests the functions of offering the sacrifices and of eating the sin-offering, while to the Levites he gives the duty of “ministering in the sanctuary.” Of course the mere expression “minister” (xliv. 11) might, if it stood alone, be understood of any sort of service; but the whole context shows it is meant of a service inferior to the priests, and the existence here of the same distinctions as those of the Mosaic law has been so universally recognised as to lead some scholars to argue that the provisions of this law must have been derived from this prophet. It is found, however, that precisely the same distinction appears, and

¹ He admits that the distinction is recognised in 1 Kings viii. 4, but says “this is merely in consequence of a clerical error.” (*R. I.*, vol. ii. p. 301.)

precisely the same duties are assigned respectively to the priests and to the Levites in the ages before Ezekiel. There is no occasion to speak of the functions of the priests, since there is no dispute about them; in regard to the Levites, I will refer only to a single passage already cited by Kuenen (*ubi sup.* p. 304) as pre-exilic, and of special interest because it is taken from Deuteronomy (xviii. 1-8), and is partly in the same words as those used by Ezekiel. At first sight it appears to join the two classes together, but on closer examination is found to make a clear distinction between them. "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part nor inheritance with Israel; they shall eat the offerings of the Lord made by fire, and his inheritance" (ver. 1). This statement has been thought to show that the whole tribe was here treated as a unit, with no distinction between its members. If it stood alone it might be so regarded; but the lawgiver immediately goes on to speak separately of the two parts of the tribe: "And this shall be the priest's due from the people, from them that offer a sacrifice," specifying the parts of the victim and also the first-fruits; "for the Lord thy God hath chosen him out of all thy tribes, to stand to minister in the name of the Lord, him and his sons for ever." So far about the priests. Then follows, "And if a Levite come from any of thy gates out of all Israel, where he sojourned, and come with all the desire of his mind unto the place which the Lord shall choose; then he shall minister in the name of the Lord his God, as all his brethren the Levites do, which stand before the Lord. They shall have like portions to eat, besides that which cometh of the sale of his patrimony." There is here nothing, as in the case of the priests, about sacrifice; but the Levites appear to be inferior ministrants, just as in the Book of Numbers; and it is provided that any of the tribe, wherever he has before lived, may come and join himself to their number and share in the provision for their support, without regard to his private property. The supposition that the Levites referred to in these last verses were also priests, i.e. entitled to offer sacrifice, would be exegetically inadmissible; for they are said to "come from any of thy gates out of all Israel," while in Josh. xxi. 9-19 the cities of the priests (described also as the sons of Aaron) are confined to the tribes of

Judah, Benjamin, and Simeon. Consequently those who were to offer sacrifice could not "come from any of thy gates out of all Israel"¹ But independently of this fact, the priests are mentioned in Deuteronomy with their duties, then afterwards the Levites separately with their duties, which are not the same; and the point would require to be otherwise most clearly proved before it could be admitted that the persons were the same. Of course Ezekiel's vision, while it separates clearly the priests from the Levites, yet in assigning to each of them a compact territory, looks to an entirely different state of things from that contemplated in Numbers or fulfilled in Joshua.

Again: the expression "the priests the Levites," used seven times in Deuteronomy (xvii. 9, 18; xviii. 1; xxi. 5; xxiv. 8; xxvii. 9; xxxi. 9) and twice in Joshua (iii. 3; viii. 33), has been relied upon as a proof that the two classes were not distinguished when these books were written. That this argument will not apply to Joshua has already appeared, and Curtiss in his *Levitical Priests*² has shown that the same expression is used in the post-exilic Books of Chronicles; but our concern is with Ezekiel. He has the expression twice (xlii. 19; xlv. 15), and each time with an addition which leaves no possible doubt of his meaning: "that be of the seed of Zadok" and "sons of Zadok." Hence the same reasoning which would make all Levites into priests in Deuteronomy, Joshua, and Chronicles, would make them all into "sons of Zadok" in Ezekiel.

But this leads to another fact in the prophet's description of the priesthood. As already said, he recognises as the priests of the future only "the sons of Zadok" (xl. 46; xliii. 19; xlv. 15; xlviii. 11). Kuenen indeed seems to assume (*ubi sup.* p. 116) that "sons of Zadok" and "sons of Aaron" are synonymous terms; it needs no argument to show that they are really very different. By universal agreement, the priesthood was not of old restricted to the "sons of Zadok," and it may be added, I suppose by the same universal agreement, it was

¹ This difficulty might be avoided by supposing Joshua to be later than Deuteronomy; but it has already been shown that this would only involve other and no less formidable difficulties on the other side.

² *The Levitical Priests, a Contribution to the Criticism of the Pentateuch*, by S. J. Curtiss, jr., Ph.D., with a preface by Franz Delitzsch. Edinburgh and Leipzig, 1877.

not so restricted afterwards. The return of other priests is mentioned by Ezra (ii. 36-39) and Nehemiah (vii. 39-42), and I do not know that there has ever been any question that priests of other families served in the temple in later ages. Here then the prophet is found, as in so many other cases, to be at variance alike with the earlier and the later practice and with the Mosaic law, instead of constituting a link between them. If it be alleged that he proposed to restrict the priesthood to the family of Zadok, but that this was found impracticable and his successors carried out his plan as far as they could, by restricting it to the wider family of Aaron, it may well be asked, Where is the proof of this? Where is the thought or suggestion anywhere outside of Ezekiel that such a narrower restriction was ever desired or attempted? If we look upon the prophet's description as ideal, the whole matter is plain enough. "The sons of Zadok," in view of the facts of history, are the faithful priests, and only such would Ezekiel have to minister; but as a scheme for a change in the actual and literal priesthood, the whole matter is inexplicable.

Another point in which Ezekiel differs from the Mosaic ritual is in regard to the persons who were to slay the ordinary sacrificial victims. According to Lev. i. 5, 11; iii. 2, 8, 13; iv. 4 (cf. 15), 24, 29, 33, the victim was to be killed by the one who made the offering, and according to Exod. xii. 6 the same rule was to be observed with regard to the Passover. This was apparently the custom in all ages. The language of Josephus (*Ant.* iii. 9, § 1), although not very clear, favours this supposition, and the record in 2 Chron. xxix. 20 ss., 34, xxx. 17, seems decisive. In this post-exilic book, in the account of the purification of the sanctuary under Hezekiah, the exceptional sacrifices of the purification are said to be slain by the priests, and the assistance of the Levites in flaying the victims is expressly excused on account of the insufficiency in the number of the priests, while at the subsequent Passover it is said "the Levites had the charge of the killing the passovers for every one that was not clean." These excuses for these acts imply that, in the time of the Chronicler, it was still the custom for the people to kill their own sacrifices, and for the priests to flay them. The Levitical law and the post-exilic custom (as well as the pre-exilic) here agree as usual; but

Ezekiel is quite apart from them, and provides (xliv. 11) that the Levites "shall slay the burnt-offering and the sacrifice for the people." Here again he is not at all in the line of a developing system. It may be added incidentally that the Samaritan Pentateuch shows what would have been the actual progress of development if it had existed in these matters in Israel; for, by changing the number of the pronouns and verbs in Leviticus, it makes the priests the slayers of the victims in all cases.

It has often been noticed that the office of high priest is ignored in this vision, and an argument has been based on this fact to show that the writings of Ezekiel mark an early stage in the development of the Jewish hierarchy, when the precedence of the high priest had not yet been established. The fundamental statement itself is not strictly true, and it will appear presently that the prophet, in several different ways, incidentally recognises the existence of the high priest, and of some of the principal laws in relation to him. But the high priest fills a prominent and important place in the Mosaic legislation, and if it could be shown on the one hand that there was no high priest before the captivity, and on the other, that Ezekiel knew of none, it would certainly create a presumption that the laws of the priesthood might be of later origin. But the facts are so precisely opposite that the maintenance of such propositions seems very strange. It may be well to refer again to Kuenen, as a fair exponent of this school of critics, to show that the non-existence of the high-priesthood before the captivity is distinctly maintained by them. He admits, indeed, "that one of the high priests, who bore the title of *Kohén hagaddél* ['the high priest'] or *Kohén rôsch* ['the head priest'], at any rate from the days of Jehoash, stood at the head of the Jerusalem priests," but he associates him in honour and rank only with the three "doorkeepers," and tells us that the various passages cited "teach us that one of the priests superintended the temple, or, in other words, kept order there, in which duty he was of course assisted by others;" and that "it follows, from 2 Kings xi. 18; xii. 12; Jer. xxix. 26, that this post was instituted by Jehoiada, the contemporary of King Jehoash" (*Relig. of Isr.*, vol. ii. p. 304). Again he marks emphatically, as one of the evidences of the late origin of the high-priesthood, that

"the distinction between the duties of the priests and the high priest, Lev. xxi. 1-9, and verses 10-15, does not occur at all in Ezekiel" (*ibid.* p. 190). And still again (*ibid.* p. 214), he represents that, even in the days of Ezra and Nehemiah, the duties and authority of the high priest were still in a vague and unsettled condition.

The point here to be determined is whether we have evidence of the existence before the captivity of a high-priesthood as an important, regular office, transmitted by inheritance, and forming one of the fundamental features of the Israelitish polity. Of course, we could not expect to find in such histories as have been preserved other than meagre and incidental allusions to the details of the high priest's duties, his dress, and such matters. Such allusions do occur, as in the case of Ahimelech at the time of David's flight (1 Sam. xxi. 1-9), and of the ephod of Abiathar (1 Sam. xxiii. 6, 9—observe that in verse 9 it is *הַכֹּהֵן* with the definite article), in connection with David's inquiry of the Lord. (Comp. also the charge against Ahimelech that he "inquired of the Lord" for David : 1 Sam. xxii. 10, 15.) But the question is not about these matters of detail; the main point is, that in Israel the priestly order had, and almost of necessity must have had, especially in the times before the monarchy, an authoritative and real head, as was the case with other nations of antiquity. Even the exception here proves the rule, and we find that temporarily, in one anomalous period of the history, during the reign of David, there were two heads or high priests, Zadok and Abiathar. The latter, after the slaughter of his father and kinsman by Saul, had fled to David in his outlawry, and had become, as he was entitled to become by inheritance, his high priest. Meantime the office could not be left in abeyance under the regular government, and when David ascended the throne he found the high-priesthood occupied by Zadok. He did not presume to displace him, and neither would he displace the faithful sharer of his own adversity; so it came about that both were recognised. This anomalous state of things was the more tolerable because at the same time, according to the history, the ark and the tabernacle were separated, while the duties of the high priest were connected with both of them. The high priest, or, during the period just referred to, the two high priests, are mentioned

in the following passages which are expressly cited by Kuenen (*The Religion of Israel*, Note II. on ch. viii.; vol. ii. p. 304) as pre-exilic: 2 Sam. viii. 17; xx. 25; 1 Kings iv. 4; ii. 22, 26, 27; 2 Kings xii. 10; xxii. 4, 8; xxiii. 4; xxv. 18; Jer. xx. 1. It is well known how greatly this list might be extended, and also how often the high priest is mentioned in the books of Joshua and 1 Samuel, the names of Eleazar, Phinehas, Eli or Ahiah, being often given in connection with the office, besides those of Ahimelech, Abiathar, Zadok, and Ahitub. It would be hard to find any single fact in the whole compass of Israelitish history in itself more probable or more abundantly attested than the existence of the office of a real high priest, an important functionary in the kingdom, the counsellor of the rulers, and whose especial office it was to "inquire of the Lord" and communicate His commands at important national emergencies. There is also perfectly clear and ample evidence of the continued existence of the same office after the captivity. Jeremiah (lii. 24-27) and the author of the Second Book of Kings (xxv. 18-21) give the name of the person who held the office at the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, Seraiah, who was put to death by Nebuchadnezzar; while Ezra (ii. 2; iii. 2, 8, 9; iv. 3; v. 2; x. 18) and Nehemiah (vii. 7; xii. 1, 7, 10, 26) unite with Haggai (i. 1, 12, 14; ii. 2, 4) and Zechariah (iii. 1, 3, 6, 8, 9; vi. 11) in mentioning Joshua, or Jeshua, the son of Josedech, as the high priest of the restoration. But Ezekiel's vision, it is said, recognises no such office, and, as will be seen presently, intentionally excludes it. Once more then, this vision not only gives no countenance, but is in direct opposition to the theory, that Ezekiel originated or was a direct link in the development of the priesthood from an earlier to a later differing form.

There is, however, one curious point incidentally occurring in the vision which shows that Ezekiel was familiar with the office of high priest. In the various measurements of the temple and all its details given in chaps. xli, xlii., the prophet everywhere accompanies the measuring angel until he comes to the holy of holies. There the angel enters alone, as is shown by a sudden change in the language (xli. 3). This certainly has the appearance of a consciousness on the part of Ezekiel, the priest, that he might not enter there, and (since it cannot be supposed that this part of the temple was not to be entered

at all) an allusion to that provision of the law by which entrance into the holy of holies was forbidden to all, save to the high priest only on the great day of atonement. I do not know of any other explanation, and if this be the true one, it shows that not only the high priest, but the principal Mosaic law in regard to him, and also the day of atonement, was known to the prophet.

That the omission of the high priest from this vision is not accidental but intentional is shown by the laws of the priesthood here set forth. These laws treat the priesthood as a single body without distinction, and, considered only in themselves, admit of either of two interpretations: (1.) on the development hypothesis, that they are original and general laws which were subsequently differentiated into the special stricter ones for the high priest, and the less strict for his brethren; or (2.) that the specific laws were actually older than Ezekiel, but when he omitted the high priest from his scheme, he combined them into a certain mean between the two. The choice between these two hypotheses is at once determined in favour of the latter, if, as has already been shown, there was a real high priest in the previous ages. All reasonable ground of argument from these laws in favour of the development hypothesis is thus taken away; and not only so, but it is evident from the vision that Ezekiel knew of those stricter laws in regard to the high priest which did not apply to the priesthood in general. Besides the allusion already mentioned, the peculiarity of the prophet's laws appears especially in two points: in regard to marriage, and in regard to mourning. For the former, the Levitical law allowed the marriage of the ordinary priest to any but a profane or divorced woman, laying no restriction upon the marriage with a widow (Lev. xxi. 7); but it restricted the high priest to marriage with "a virgin of his own people" (*ibid.* 14). Ezekiel makes a general compromise law for all, allowing marriage with a widow in case her former husband had been a priest (xliv. 22). The same thing is true of mourning. Ezekiel in general repeats literally the law of Lev. xxi. 1-3, 11-14; but while there is there a distinction between the high priest and the ordinary priest, here there is one intermediate regulation. In Leviticus the ordinary priest might be "defiled for the dead" "for his kin that is near unto

him," while this is in all cases whatever forbidden to the high priest; in Ezekiel (xliv. 25-27) such defilement for the dead that "is near of kin" is allowed to all, but must be followed not only by the ordinary cleansing after contact with a dead body (see Num. xix. 11-17), but also by a second special period of seven days closed by a sin-offering before the priest again enters upon the discharge of his duties. It will be noticed that there is here not only allusion to the laws of Leviticus, but also to a cleansing, apparently that prescribed in Numbers.

The regulations for the priests' dress (xliv. 17-19) require no especial notice. They are very brief; and as far as they go, are a simple reproduction of the provisions of Lev. xxviii. They have altogether the air of presupposing a knowledge of that law, and specifying only a few particulars to recall the whole. As far as any inference is to be drawn from them, it is decidedly in favour of a recognition of the detailed precepts of Leviticus as already familiar.

We may now pass to the feasts and sacrifices, and under this general head two points are to be considered: 1st, The changes in the ritual of the particular feasts and sacrifices; and 2d, The changes in the cycle of the feasts themselves. Under the former head the change which, if literally carried out, would have been the most striking one to the Israelite because most constantly before his mind, was that in the daily burnt-offering. Ezekiel requires that there shall be a burnt-offering every morning; he says nothing whatever of an evening sacrifice, and his language is justly thought to exclude the idea of one (xlvi. 13-15). The Mosaic law commanded that there should be a burnt-offering *both* morning and evening (Ex. xxix. 38, 39; Num. xxviii 3, 4; cf. also Lev. vi. 8, 9). Is this an enlargement of, and therefore later than, Ezekiel's prescription? Of course this will depend upon whether there is evidence of the custom of evening sacrifice before the time of the exile. There are two passages which, as they stand in our version, are clear and decisive upon this point. In 1 Kings xviii. 36 it is said, in connection with the controversy between Elijah and the prophets of Baal on Mount Carmel, "It came to pass at the time of the offering of the evening sacrifice, that Elijah," etc. Here this is evidently regarded as so fixed a custom as to suffice in itself to mark the hour.

Again, in 2 Kings xvi. 15, when Ahaz had introduced his own idolatrous altar, and yet wished the legal sacrifices to go on as usual, he "commanded Urijah the priest, saying, Upon the great altar burn the morning burnt-offering, and the evening meat-offering," etc. Either of these passages, much more both of them, would be entirely decisive were it not for the fact that the word used for the evening sacrifice in both cases is מִנְחָה, and it is urged that this means an unbloody sacrifice. After the restoration also, when Ezra on one occasion "sat astonished until the evening sacrifice" (Ezra ix. 4) the word is the same. It is therefore suggested by some interpreters that before and after the exile, as far as the time of Ezra, the custom may have been to offer a burnt-offering in the morning and an unbloody oblation in the evening; and this interpretation is thought to be confirmed by Ps. cxli. 2, "Let my prayer be set before thee as incense, and the lifting up of my hands as the evening מִנְחָה." From this it is argued that the Mosaic law, being at variance with this custom, and also with Ezekiel, must be of later origin; but if so, it must be also later than the Book of Daniel (which these critics place at 165 B.C.), for he also describes the hour of evening sacrifice as "the time of the evening מִנְחָה" (ix. 21). As far as Ezekiel is concerned, this argument is seen, on a moment's reflection, to have no force; for it is just as difficult to account for his omission of a regular evening oblation as of a burnt-offering. But the matter cannot be left here, for the whole interpretation is wrong. The technical meaning of מִנְחָה as an unbloody oblation belongs to the Levitical law, and if this law be of later origin, as is claimed by some critics, this sense cannot be carried back to an earlier time. Besides, this oblation was never offered alone except in certain peculiar cases which do not bear upon the question; ¹ it was always an accompaniment

¹ The only certain exception is the offering of jealousy (Num. v. 15-26). In addition the unbloody oblation was allowed (Lev. ii. 1-9; vii. 9, 10) as a voluntary offering, although this was probably in connection with the other sacrifices. Also it was a special offering of Aaron and his sons "in the day of their consecration" (Lev. vi. 20-23 [13-16]) in connection with their other offerings. Further, an offering of the first-fruits of vegetable products was allowed (Lev. ii. 12-16; vi. 14-18 [7, 8]), but in so far as this was "the first-fruits of the harvest" it was to be accompanied with a lamb for a burnt-offering (Lev. xxiii. 10-12, 17, 18). The sin-offering of fine flour of the very poor (Lev. v. 20-23) is expressly distinguished from the מִנְחָה.

of the bloody sacrifice. If, therefore, it could be proved—which it cannot—that in 1 and 2 Kings and Ezra the unbloody oblation was meant, it would yet remain that the mention of it implies and involves also the animal sacrifice. But the sense of the word outside of the technical language of the law is very general, being applied to an ordinary present (Gen. xxxii. 13 [14], 18 [19], 20 [21], 21 [22]; xxxiii. 10; xliii. 11, and frequently), or to tribute (Judg. iii. 15-18, and frequently); and when this is a present to God, or sacrifice, it is applied indifferently to the unbloody or to the animal sacrifice. Thus it is used of the animal sacrifice of Abel as well as of the unbloody offering of Cain (Gen. iv. 3-5); in 1 Sam. ii. 29 it is clearly meant to include all sacrifices, but with especial reference to those of animals; in 1 Sam. iii. 14 it is used with מִנְחָה of a propitiatory sacrifice; in Mal. i. 13 it clearly refers to an animal sacrifice, since the “torn, and the lame, and the sick” are mentioned. In fact, it is a general word for sacrifice of any kind, and while, following the technical language of the law, it is often used specifically, and applied to the unbloody, as distinguished from the animal, sacrifice, yet it is also used of sacrifice in general in such a way that it must be supposed to include the animal sacrifice (see 1 Sam. ii. 17; xxvi. 19; 1 Chr. xvi. 29; Ps. xcvi. 8; Zeph. iii. 10; Mal. i. 10; ii. 12, 13; iii. 3, 4). There is therefore no ground for the theory that the evening מִנְחָה of 1 Kings xviii. 29, 2 Kings xvi. 15 and Ezra ix. 4, refers to an unbloody offering. In fact, the argument would prove too much; for the same expression is used also of the morning sacrifice in 2 Kings iii. 20,—“it came to pass in the morning, when the מִנְחָה was offered.” It remains, therefore, that here, as elsewhere, Ezekiel’s provisions stand quite apart from the law and the custom, and give no indication of being a step in the development of a *cultus*. We regard these divergences, on the contrary, as intentional and designed to show the people, familiar with the Mosaic law, that his vision was to be understood ideally and not literally.

There is another point in connection with this daily offering. According to the law (Num. xxviii. 3-5) with each of the lambs, morning and evening, a meat and drink offering was to be made of 1-10th of an ephah of flour, $\frac{1}{4}$ of a hin of oil, and $\frac{1}{4}$ of a hin of strong wine. As Ezekiel speaks of but one offering

he increases the accompanying meat-offering to 1-6th of an ephah of flour, and to $\frac{1}{3}$ of a hin of oil. This is the same sort of change as in the case of the priests' marriage and mourning: the omitted provision is compensated for by an increase in what remains. And in this case also, the omitted provision having been certainly customary before the time of Ezekiel, this compensation has a manifest reference to the familiar, and therefore previously existing, provisions of the Mosaic law.

An objection may be here interposed that the non-observance of the detail of Ezekiel's ritual in the subsequent ages is no more surprising than the corresponding non-observance of many particulars in the detail of the Mosaic ritual, which is very evident in the time of the Judges and the early monarchy. There is really no parallel between the two cases. The times of the Judges and of the early monarchy were a period of disorder and anarchy, in which the general confusion of society forbids the inference that such laws did not exist; but the times after Ezekiel were times of over-scrupulous and even superstitious observance of the minutest details of ritual, when it is inconceivable that his scheme should have been neglected through mere inadvertence and carelessness.

The ritual of the great feasts is considerably changed. Pentecost and the Day of Atonement are entirely omitted. In regard to the comparative value of these omissions in the historical books and in Ezekiel, the same thing is to be said as before: the omission in the former may have been merely accidental, and proves nothing; in Ezekiel it must have been intentional. It will appear presently, however, that while omitting the Day of Atonement from his scheme, he does probably allude to it in a way that shows familiarity with its observance. There remain to be considered the Passover, the Feast of Tabernacles, and the "New Moons."

The Passover, according to Ezek. xlv. 21-23, is to be kept at the same time and for the same number of days, as in the Mosaic law, but there is no mention of the Paschal lamb itself; the sin-offering by the Mosaic law (Num. xxviii. 17, 22) was to be a he-goat for each day, here (ver. 23) a bullock for the first day and a he-goat for each of the other days; the burnt-offering for each day by the law was to be two bullocks, a ram and seven yearling lambs, here seven bullocks and seven rams;

the meat-offering by the law was to be 3-10ths of an ephah of meal mixed with oil for each bullock, 2-10ths for each ram, and 1-10th for each lamb, or in all $1\frac{1}{2}$ ephahs daily—here a whole ephah for each victim, or in all 14 ephahs daily and as many hins of oil (ver. 24). The offerings in Ezekiel therefore are richer than those required by the law. The same thing is to be said of the special sacrifices for the Sabbaths. According to the law (Num. xxviii. 9) these were to be marked by two lambs for burnt-offerings, each with the usual meat and drink offering; but according to this vision (xli. 4, 5) the Sabbath burnt-offering was to be six lambs and a ram, with an ephah for a meat-offering with the ram, and that for the lambs dependent upon the ability and generosity of the prince, and in all cases a hin of oil to each ephah. (Nothing is said of the drink-offering.) It is difficult to assign reasons for these details. They plainly do not agree with the Mosaic law, and it is well known that the custom of later ages was founded upon that law. We have no data in history before the exile to determine the custom in these details one way or the other; but the presumption is that here as elsewhere the prophet has intentionally varied from the known law and custom in order to mark the ideal character of his vision. Certainly this is no beginning or early stage in a developing *cultus*; for otherwise, in these details, which could as well be arranged one way as another, the authority of the prophet would have been followed; but there never was any attempt even, so far as history shows, to realise his ideal.

The Feast of Tabernacles, which has no name given to it in Ezekiel, but is simply a feast of seven days in the seventh month (xlv. 25), is greatly simplified. Here the sacrifices are to be the same as in the case of the Passover,—an entire change from the elaborate ritual of the Mosaic law (Num. xxix. 12-24)—with, on the whole, a great diminution in the number of victims and an omission of the extra eighth day added to the feast in Lev. (xxiii. 36, 39) and Num. (xxix. 35), and which in the law was expressly characterised as an addition,—sometimes included and sometimes not in the mention of the feast. In regard to these changes the same remarks are to be made as in the case of the Passover, with only this addition, that it appears from both 1 Kings viii. 65, 66, and 2 Chron.

vii. 8-10, that this eighth day was always looked upon in the same way—as a part, and yet not a part, of the feast. Solomon keeps the feast to that day inclusive, and then he makes a solemn assembly, and yet on that day dismisses the people to their homes.¹

In regard to the New Moons, or the first day of every month, the Mosaic law prescribes (in addition to the burnt and meat offerings) a he-goat for a sin-offering (Num. xxviii. 15). In Ezekiel's scheme of the feasts, these new moons are entirely omitted, except for the first month, though afterwards incidentally alluded to. The Mosaic law also provided on the tenth of the seventh month for a day of atonement, with special and very peculiar sacrifices (Lev. xvi.). All this is condensed, as it were, in this vision, into two sacrifices, each of a young bullock, one upon the first and one upon the seventh day of the first month, with particulars in regard to them (to be mentioned presently) which seem to refer to the Day of Atonement. Now, it is certain from the history of David (1 Sam. xx. 5, 18, 24) and from other historical records (2 Kings iv. 23; 1 Chron. xxiii. 31; 2 Chron. ii. 4; viii. 13; xxxi. 3), as well as from allusions in the pre-exilic prophets (Isa. i. 13, 14; [lxvi. 23; Ps. lxxxii. 3]; Hos. ii. 11; Amos viii. 5) that the new moons were kept as sacred feasts in the ages before the exile, as it is known that they were also afterwards (Ezra iii. 5; Neh. x. 33). The omission of these new moons from this description of the feasts is particularly instructive, because Ezekiel himself, in other parts of the vision (xliv. 17; xlv. 3), incidentally, but repeatedly, mentions the "new moons" (in the plural) as days to be sanctified by special sacrifices, and requires the prince to provide the same offerings for them as for the Sabbath (xlv. 6).² He thus shows that he was familiar with them and expects them to be continued, but in this setting forth of the

¹ The inconsistency which Kuenen (*Relig. of Israel*, Note II. on chap. viii.; vol. ii. pp. 296-7) thinks he finds between the passages above cited is wholly imaginary. Solomon observed seven days for the dedication of the altar in imitation of Lev. viii. x., and then kept the feast for seven days after the altar had been consecrated. Hence 1 Kings viii. 65 speaks of "seven days and seven days, even for fourteen days," and then of the following "eighth day;" while 2 Chron. viii. 9 explains more fully "they kept the dedication of the altar seven days and the feast seven days."

² The word is, in this last case, in the singular, as is also the Sabbath; but both are evidently used collectively.

cycle of the feasts he does not mention them. This cannot be taken then for a part of the development of a priestly law.

He differs from the Mosaic law also in the ritual of the blood of these sacrifices on the first and seventh days of the first month. The Levitical law gives no directions for the blood of the offerings on the first day of the month, doubtless because it followed the ordinary rule and was simply sprinkled on the side of the altar; but it required the blood on the Day of Atonement to be brought within the Holy of Holies and sprinkled before and upon the mercy-seat. Ezekiel again compromises and directs that the blood of the sin-offering on the first and seventh days of the first month shall be put "upon the posts of the house, and upon the four corners of the settle of the altar, and upon the posts of the gate of the inner court." There may be here a reminiscence of the day of Atonement, but nothing like a generic law which could have been specialised into the particular observances of the Mosaic law. It is rather a purely ideal ritual, which nobody ever thought of reducing to practice. There is no such congruity between it and the Levitical regulations as a development hypothesis would require.

We may now consider, in a few words, the general cycle of the feasts. As is well known, the Mosaic law prescribes three great feasts,—that of the Passover for seven days, preceded by the putting away of leaven and the killing of the Paschal lamb; that of "weeks," or Pentecost, lasting only one day; and that of Tabernacles, lasting seven days, and with an eighth special day added; these three great annual festivals are all expressly recognised in Deuteronomy (xvi. 1-16), which is held by all to be pre-exilic. Besides these, the first day of every month, the weekly Sabbath, and the Day of Atonement were to be kept holy and marked by special sacrifices. The observance of nearly all of these is recognised in the historic and the older prophetic books. The cycle of Ezekiel's vision is very different. He omits the feast of weeks, the Day of Atonement, and the new moons (except that of the first month), and inserts a new feast on the seventh day of the same month. This last, in connection with that on the first day of that month, he seems to intend as a compensation for the missing Day of Atonement; for he describes the sacrifices of the two (xlv. 20) as "for every

one that erreth, and for him that is simple : so shall ye reconcile the house." If this interpretation is correct, we have here an incidental recognition of the older observance of the Day of Atonement, although it is not mentioned. But however this may be, Ezekiel's cycle of feasts accords neither with what went before nor with what followed after him. Yet, as already said, it is plain from his incidental allusions to the New Moons, that, in this point at least, he knew of the old order, and expected it to go on; and it is noticeable that the sacrifices prescribed for the New Moons (xlvi. 3-6) are not the same as the special sacrifices of the first month (xliv. 18-20). Those were to be in each case "a young bullock" for a sin-offering; these, six lambs and a ram for a burnt-offering (xlvi. 4). It is clear, therefore, that he did not intend this vision to form the basis of an actual *cultus*; but knowing the old observances, expected them to continue.

Before leaving this part of the subject it may be well to refer briefly to a few other places in which Ezekiel evidently recognises the Mosaic law, although either altering or omitting its provisions. In xlii. 13 he requires the priests to eat in the appropriate "holy chambers" "the meat-offering, and the sin-offering, and the trespass-offering." He says nothing of the peace-offerings, though he elsewhere repeatedly mentions them (xliii. 27; xlv. 15, 17; xlvi. 2, 12), nor does he anywhere give the ritual for them. On the other hand, in the following verse (and also in xlvi. 18, 20) the prophet is more explicit than the law, requiring that "the priests'" garments wherein they minister "shall not be carried" out of the holy place into the outer court. There is no such general direction in the Levitical law; but the same thing is required in certain special cases, and may therefore be thought to be implied in all (see Lev. vi. 10, 11). Now, whatever theory is adopted concerning the relation of Ezekiel to the Mosaic law must equally explain this omission and this insertion. The theory of the later development of the law does neither; for, in the one case, it would be a violent supposition that the ritual of the peace-offerings and the directions about eating them were evolved from the prophet's silence, and in the other case, it would be very strange that in such a matter as the care of the priests' robes the later law should be the less definite. But the

hypothesis of the greater antiquity of the law explains both facts satisfactorily; Ezekiel had no occasion to repeat important provisions of the law with which both he and the people were familiar, but it was natural that in a matter of detail he should express what was probably the common understanding of the law.

In xliii. 11 it is required that the priests' sin-offering should be burned "in the appointed place of the house, without the sanctuary." This refers to a building "in the separate place" which is provided only in Ezekiel's vision (xli. 12-15; xlii. 1, 10, 13), and of which there is no trace either in the Pentateuch or in the temple of the restoration. In such cases it was simply required in the law that the body of the victim should be burned "without the camp" (Lev. iv. 12, 13, 21; xvi. 27, etc.). No doubt such a building as Ezekiel provided would have been a great convenience; but it was never erected.

The provision for large landed estates for the priests has already been mentioned; but in view of this the statement in xliv. 28, that the priests' office and perquisites "shall be unto them for an inheritance: I am their inheritance: and ye shall give them no inheritance in Israel," can only be looked upon as a reminiscence of the expressions in the Mosaic law, without any nice regard to the other parts of the vision.

The provision for the Sabbatical year was distinctly pre-exilic, since it is given at length in Deut. xv.; yet there is no trace of its observance before the exile, and its non-observance is given by the Chronicler (2 Chron. xxxvi. 21) as the determining reason for the length of the captivity. We know that it was observed after the restoration (1 Macc. vi. 49; Jos. *Ant.* xiv. 10, § 6; Tacitus, *Hist.* lib. v. 2, § 4). Here again is an important and characteristic institution, certainly forming part of the Hebrew legislation before the captivity, neglected until that period, and observed afterwards. Exodus (xxiii. 10, 11) and Leviticus (xxv. 2-7) contain the commands for it, but Ezekiel does not mention it. He certainly is not in this respect a bridge between Deuteronomy and Leviticus, between pre- and post-exilic legislation.

The omission of all mention of tithes in Ezekiel, a provision certainly in force from the earliest to the latest times, can only be accounted for on the supposition of its familiarity.

In the Mosaic law all the males of the people were required

to present themselves at the sanctuary at the great annual festivals (Ex. xxiii. 14, 17; xxxiv. 23; Deut. xvi. 16); there is no such command in Ezekiel, doubtless because it was already entirely familiar. But in xlv. 9, while speaking of the gate by which the prince shall enter, he incidentally recognises the custom, "But when the people of the land shall come before the Lord in the solemn feasts," etc. He has made no provision for this, but recognises it as a matter of course.

The omission in ch. xliii. is not only very striking in itself, but is of especial importance in its bearing upon the main question under discussion. In verses 18-27 a detailed order is given for the seven days' consecration of the newly erected altar, at once recalling the similar consecration of the altar in Lev. viii. But in that case the consecration was a double one, — of the altar and of the priests; here the priests are entirely omitted. Why? Evidently because the altar only was new and required to be consecrated; the priests had been consecrated of old.

But the question may be asked in regard to the changes of ritual, Why could there not have been deviations by the later priests from the scheme of Ezekiel, just as well as by Ezekiel from the laws of Moses? Simply because there is a good reason for them in one case and none at all in the other. If Ezekiel wished his description to be understood ideally, it was important that he should introduce arbitrary variations from the recognised law and custom; but if he intended to set forth a scheme of actual future worship, there is no known reason why his successors should have deviated from it.

Passing now to what may be called the economic, or political features of the vision, there are only three points which call for especial attention, and even these but briefly; the provision for the cost of the sacrifices, the division of the land, and the regulations respecting the prince.

There is no distinct provision in the Mosaic law for defraying the cost of the general sacrifices, and we are told that this was still one of the many questions in dispute between the Pharisees and the Sadducees at a much later date. But it is fully and clearly settled in Ezekiel's vision. The cost is to be wholly borne by the prince (xlv. 17, 21-26; xlv. 4-7), who is to be provided with ample territorial possessions (xlv. 7, 8;

xlvi. 20-22). As far as we have any record, this arrangement was quite new, and it was never followed out. It was, however, so wise and excellent a solution of the difficulty that we can only wonder at its never having been adopted, if any Israelite had ever looked upon this vision as a basis for theocratic legislation.

The division of the land has already been spoken of in connection with the evidence of the ideal character of this vision; but there are one or two other points which require mention. A striking feature of it is the ample provision here made for the prince, with the proviso that it shall belong inalienably to him and his sons (xlv. 17, 18); for in connection with this assignment it is said (xlv. 18), "And my princes shall no more oppress my people," and again (xlv. 18), "the prince shall not take of the people's inheritance by oppression." A vivid remembrance of the exactions and oppressions of former kings was evidently in the prophet's mind, and he provides a new and wise remedy. It was unfortunate for his people that they never thought of making this the basis for actual legislation, and so avoiding once for all the evils under which they continued to suffer.

Another very curious provision is that at the southern end of the "oblation" a strip of land is reserved, 5000 by 25,000 reeds (xlvi. 15-19), in the midst of which is to be the city with its "suburbs" 5000 reeds square. The remainder, *i.e.* two pieces of land, each 5000 by 10,000 reeds, is set apart that the "increase thereof shall be for food unto them that serve the city. And they that serve the city shall serve it out of all the tribes of Israel." It is quite unnecessary to point out the purely Utopian character of such an arrangement in actual life; it is sufficient to call attention to the fact that neither this nor any other of these economic regulations ever formed a part of the Mosaic law, or were ever in any degree attempted to be carried out.

The law of the tenure of the Levites' land is considerably changed from that of the Mosaic legislation. According to Lev. xxv. 32-34 the Levites might sell their houses, and even their cities (only retaining the right of redeeming them at any time, and their reversion in the year of jubilee)—but they might not sell at all the fields of their suburbs. This last

provision is here (xlviii. 15) extended to all their landed property in the most emphatic way, and changes the whole tenure of the Levitical land. It is certain that it was never carried into effect, for there never was any such territory assigned to the Levites. It is remarkable that nothing of this kind is mentioned in connection with the priestly territory.

One other particular must be noticed in connection with the division of the land. Under the Mosaic law this was to be wholly parcelled out among the tribes of Israel; and although frequent reference is made to the "sojourning" of strangers among them, no provision is made for allowing them any interest in the soil of the holy land. Ezekiel, on the other hand, expressly commands (xlvii. 22, 23), "Ye shall divide the land by lot for an inheritance unto you and the strangers that sojourn among you, which shall beget children among you; and they shall be unto you as born in the country among the children of Israel; they shall have inheritance with you among the tribes of Israel. And it shall come to pass that in what tribe the stranger sojourneth, there shall ye give him his inheritance." Both these provisions were adapted to their different times: in that of Moses the land was looked upon as the sole and peculiar possession of the chosen people, and if strangers came among them it should be as "sojourners" only; in the time of Ezekiel matters were greatly changed, and large numbers of foreigners had long had their permanent residence among the tribes of Israel. It is only for these permanent residents "which shall beget children among you" that Ezekiel provides. It is very difficult to suppose that the Mosaic legislation should have been subsequent to his arrangements.

But by far the most important laws of this vision in political matters are those concerning the relation of the prince to the temple worship. A brief mention of these will close this paper. It is plain that under the old theocracy the monarch had no properly ecclesiastical standing. He had great influence of course, either like David in advancing and improving the worship, or like Ahaz in corrupting and injuring it. But he was not recognised at all in the laws of the Pentateuch, except that, in Deut. xvii. 14-20, it is declared that, in case a king should be afterwards desired, his otherwise arbitrary power must be checked by various limitations. Quite in

accordance with the supposition of the great antiquity of that legislation, it is found that the monarch never had any other than a purely political position. This obvious fact is certainly very remarkable if the Mosaic law was subsequent to the introduction of the monarchy; indeed it is almost inconceivable that the laws of a theocratic state, if written when there was a monarch upon the throne, and prescribing the duties of all other officers, should take no notice of the monarch himself. But the difficulty is still greater if it could be supposed that these laws were inaugurated or largely developed by Ezekiel, who gives such a prominent place in his scheme "to the prince." It is certain that the arrangements here suggested were never carried out, even when such an excellent prince as Zerubbabel was the leader of the restoration. At a subsequent time the offices of prince and priest were indeed combined in the Maccabees, but this was in virtue of their priestly descent, and ended with their family; it has nothing to do with the vision of Ezekiel, who, while he makes the prince very prominent in his ecclesiastical system, yet assigns to him no priestly functions.

Let what Ezekiel says of "the prince" be carefully noted. His large landed estate, given expressly to prevent oppressive exactions from the people,¹ and to enable him to furnish all the victims and other offerings for the national sacrifices, have already been mentioned. Besides these things he is to take a very active and peculiar part in the *cultus* of his people. The

¹ In this connection general provision is made (xlv. 10, 11) for just weights and measures among the people. No one can read the passage without observing a connection between it and Lev. xix. 36 and Deut. xxv. 13. The question of priority is indicated by the terms employed. The words used here and in various parts of the Pentateuch are: (1.) *Ephah*. This occurs in all ages of Hebrew literature from Exodus to Zechariah. (2.) *Homer*, in the sense of a measure, found in the law (three times), in Isaiah and Hosea (each once), and in Ezekiel (seven times). (3.) *Hin*. This is found only in the middle books (Exodus-Numbers) of the Pentateuch (sixteen times), and in Ezekiel (six times). (4.) *Omer*, מֵאָר, in the sense of measure, in Exodus only (six times). (5.) *Gerah*, in the sense of a measure of value, only in Exodus-Numbers (four times), and in Ezekiel (once). (6.) *Bath*, as a measure, does not occur earlier than Kings (twice), Chronicles (three times), Isaiah (once), but in Ezekiel seven times. (7.) *Cor*. In Kings and Chronicles seven times, in Ezekiel once. That is to say, all these terms which are used in the law, with the exception of *Omer*, are also used in Ezekiel, while *Hin* and *Gerah* appear to have gone out of use, and are found afterwards only in this vision, and *Homer* only elsewhere once each in Isaiah and Hosea; on the other hand, *Bath* and *Cor*, which came into use at a comparatively late date, are not found in the law, but are used by Ezekiel.

east gate of the court of the temple had been, according to this vision, peculiarly sanctified by the entrance through it of the glory of the LORD (xliii. 1-7; xlv. 1, 2); in consequence it was to be for ever after shut, except for the prince (xlv. 3). He was to enter and go out through it on the Sabbaths and the new moons (xlvi. 1-3), and was to worship at the threshold of this gate while the priests were offering his sacrifices, "the people of the land" meantime worshipping without "at the door of this gate." On these occasions the gate, although not to be used by any one else, is to stand open until the evening. In these cases, when few of the people were expected to be present, the prince seems to have been looked upon as their representative, and it was his duty to be always present and offer the required offerings. When the prince saw fit to offer any "voluntary burnt-offering or peace-offerings" the same gate was to be opened for him, but immediately shut when he had gone out (*ibid.* 12). On occasion of the "solemn feasts," on the other hand, when the mass of the people were expected to be present, the prince was to take his place among them, and to enter "in the midst of them" by the north or south gate, and go out by the opposite one (*ibid.* 9, 10).

There is also another provision which puts the prince in the same light of the religious representative of the people. To enable him to furnish the required sacrifices and oblations, he is to have not only the large and inalienable landed estate already mentioned, but also is to receive from the whole people regularly a tax in kind of the things required for these purposes. This tax is prescribed in detail in xlv. 13-16, and was to consist of one-sixtieth of the grain, one-hundredth of the oil, and one two-hundredth of the flock. The connection shows that it was to be used by him for supplying the offerings. This is an entire change from both the older and the later custom, whereby the people gave directly to the sanctuary, and it again brings forward "the prince" as the representative and embodiment, as it were, of the people in their duties of public worship.

The argument from all this is clear, and has already been hinted at. If Ezekiel thus presents the civil ruler as a representative of the people and an important factor in their temple worship, it is simply impossible that any actual legislation, influenced by his vision, should have so totally ignored "the prince" as is notoriously done in the Levitical laws. It would

seem that even if the priests and the people had not insisted upon their sovereign's occupying his proper position in their worship, every pious prince would have claimed it for himself. The conclusion is obvious: the Levitical laws are older than Ezekiel, and his vision had no direct effect upon the polity of the Jewish people.

All the more important features of the vision of Ezekiel, so far as his relation to the Mosaic law is concerned, have now been passed in review. Others, such as the detailed arrangements of his temple, with its various peculiar outbuildings, and its large "precincts," etc., would require too much time to examine in detail, as I have elsewhere done,¹ and would only add fresh illustrations of the fact which has been everywhere apparent. If we compare the customs of the Jews as they are known after the exile with those which are known to have existed before, they are found perfectly to agree in everything, except negatively in so far as data are wanting to show in some respects what were the customs of the more ancient time. This deficiency was of course to be expected in dealing with matters of such antiquity, where the records we have are almost wholly occupied with other matters. Moreover, both the ancient custom as far as it was regulated by law and can be traced (making allowance for some small difficulties in understanding such very ancient legislation), and the later practice perfectly agree with the Mosaic legislation. But quite late in the history of Israel, during the captivity in Babylon, the prophet Ezekiel comes forward and in a remarkable vision sets forth a general scheme of theocratic laws and worship. His scheme presents incidentally many obvious allusions to the Levitical laws, but in its direct enactments is quite at variance with both former and later custom, and also with the Mosaic law. It is in no sense, and in no point on the line of development from what existed before to what existed afterwards. Yet we are asked to believe that the Levitical law only existed in a very imperfect and inchoate form before him, that he gave the great impetus to its development, and that within forty years afterwards the nearly perfect scheme was accepted as their ancient law by his nation. The thing required is beyond our power.

F. GARDINER.

¹ Com. on Ezekiel, in Bp. Ellicott's Commentary for English Readers.
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ART. VIII.—*Current Literature.*

DR. STEINMEYER, the eloquent University preacher, formerly of Bonn and Breslau, and now of Berlin, is about to supplement his famous *Contributions to the Understanding of Scripture in Sermons*, by a series of *Contributions to Christology*. The third section, entitled *The Manifestations of the Glorified Christ* (1), has just come to hand. By way of introduction, the Idea, the Need, and the Fact of such manifestations are treated, and, by way of expansion, there successively come under review, *first*, the Vision of the Protomartyr,—its occasion, its motive, and its intention; *secondly*, the Witness of the Persecutor,—the appearing of the Lord, the effect on the persecutor, and the King of the Empire; and, *thirdly*, the Revelation to the last of the Apostles—the recipient, the gift, and the giver. In these sermons the individuality of Dr. Steinmeyer strikingly appears. Forty years ago the young preacher was hailed as one of the most promising of those who had come under the influence of Schleiermacher, and all the more gifted that he was able to address his hearers in a clear, ornate, attractive, and unscholastic speech. A further secret of his pulpit power has undoubtedly lain in his strong and persistent grasp of Scripture. Schleiermacher preferred to unfold personal experience. Steinmeyer's aim has been to expound the Bible. These sermons will be found to sustain the justly high reputation of their author by their precision, beauty, strength, and expository ability, although, like all his writings and addresses, they are remarkable for a certain over-subtlety.

In the *Biblical History of the Beginning of Things* (2), we have another volume of foreign sermons put into more

(1) *Die Christophanien des Verherrlichten*. Von F. L. Steinmeyer. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben. London: Williams and Norgate.

(2) *Die Geschichte der heiligen Schrift vom Anfang der Dinge*; für Gebildete erläutert von Löhr, Pastor in Zirchow auf Usedom. Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben. London: Williams and Norgate.

permanent shape, and addressed to the educated classes. They are, of course, of an apologetic nature, and, as a statement of the views of a cultured and Christian German upon the great problems of the first chapters of Genesis, may be of some value in their own land. But surely such problems cannot be touched by suggestions merely, calling as they do for accurate scientific knowledge, as well as exhaustive scriptural examination.

"That the *Epistle of James* (3) is by no means 'an epistle of straw,' but affords a rich fruit in full ear which has ripened upon the Judæo-Christian soil of the apostolic harvest-field, has been shown by the impartial exegesis and the biblico-theological labours of Neander, Messner, Lechler, Schmid, Weiss, Gess, and others, and especially by the important exposition of its doctrinal contents by W. G. Schmidt. But there always remains a sufficient task for exegesis to explore, both on its historical and moral side, this the apparently oldest scripture of the New Testament, presenting as it does not a few difficulties of interpretation, and at the same time to put in its right light this noble testimony, on the part of the oldest Judæo-Christian Church of the apostolic age, to the new-born life in Christ Jesus produced by the word of truth, and to the authentication of that life by works." Professor Erdmann could scarcely have better expressed his aim in writing this exposition. By gathering up the treasures of the past, and distilling them in the alembic of his own genius, a valuable addition has been made to our stock of New Testament commentaries. The various introductory problems have been touched with a firm and thorough hand, as have the more knotty exegetical problems. It is scarcely possible to judge of such a work without frequent and long-continued consultation, but, as far as has been examined, it displays a manifest caution, an evangelical spirit, a well-balanced scholarship, and an admirable clearness both of style and thought. The perspicuous arrangement, the succinct summaries of chapters and sections, and the index and headings of pages, add largely to the ease of reference.

(3) *Der Brief des Jakobus*, erklärt von Dr. David Erdmann. Berlin : Wiegandt und Grieben. London : Williams and Norgate.

In his Egyptian stories, Georg Ebers has shown that it is possible for a scholar with imagination to make the dry bones of archæology live in the pages of fiction. Professor Delitzsch is as great an authority on Hebrew literature as Ebers in Egyptology, and if he has not the imaginative powers of the great Egyptologist, he has the advantage of writing on a subject in which the public feels a deeper interest. This translation of *José and Benjamin* (4), which is executed with unusual skill and care, will be welcome to many. It gives a sketch of times which we have all endeavoured to picture to ourselves, but which we have often felt it hard to realise. Professor Delitzsch has come to our assistance, and by the help of his almost unrivalled acquaintance with Jewish literature, has shown how men lived and acted in the days when "James the Just" was bishop of Jerusalem. The book is to be recommended to the notice of all who desire to get a clearer knowledge of New Testament times, while ministers and Sunday-school teachers will find it specially useful. The archæological notes enhance the value of the volume.

By his erudite work upon *Canonicity*, reviewed in these pages at the time of its appearance, Professor Charteris laid the world of scholars under large obligation because of his careful collection of all the early testimonies bearing upon the momentous questions concerning the Canon of the New Testament. It is with much pleasure we see that he has now issued a companion volume (5), in which the results of his previous studies are formulated for the benefit of a wider circle of readers. This second volume is arranged in lecture form, in the same form, indeed, in which the lectures were delivered on the Croall Foundation; and, as the learned author reminds us, technicality of all kinds has been avoided, with an express view to those who are unable, or who have not leisure, to bestow time and thought upon the close study of the copious literature relative to the subject in hand. The outline of these useful

(4) *José and Benjamin: A Tale of Jerusalem in the time of the Herods.* By Professor F. Delitzsch, Ph.D.; translated by J. G. Smieton, M.A. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

(5) *The New Testament Scriptures: their Claims, History, and Authority.* being the Croall Lectures for 1882. By A. H. Charteris, D.D. London: James Nisbet and Co.

lectures is as follows : A foundation is first laid for the argument in certain claims made by the New Testament Scriptures themselves. It is shown, with admirable clearness and point, that these Scriptures claim to be true, that they also claim to have unity, and that they equally claim to possess authority. These claims are then emphasised by showing that these were the very attributes associated by the writers with the Books of the Old Testament. Further, it is also demonstrated that no extra-canonical books made similar demands. From this significant internal evidence, the lectures then proceed to show that the several characteristics mentioned were believed in and advanced by all the witnesses available in the earlier Christian centuries. This stage in the argument may be admirably put in the author's own words : "It is another step," he says, "in the argument to maintain, as we now seek to do, that from the earliest times of which we have record those books were acknowledged to have made good their claim. . . . It is no light thing this. We have not merely intellectual assent to the claim of the books, but we have the testimony of all those Churches that their amazing growth was due to their life being fed by the words which proceeded out of the mouth of God, and were contained in those precious Epistles and Gospels." In proof of this contention quotations of many sorts are given from apologists like Justin Martyr, ancient versions of the Bible like the Latin and the Syrian, from leaders of Christian thought and life like Irenæus, Origen, and many others, and even from heretics like Marcion and Basilides. To sum up, the whole elaborate course of reasoning is presented thus : Supposing the question to be asked, why the Bible is presented as the Word of God, the reply should be,—not on objective grounds merely, on the declaration of the Canons of Trent, or the Articles of the Established Church of England ; not on purely subjective grounds, because of the self-evidencing power of Scripture, as Luther and Coleridge declared, nor even irrespective of any historical evidence, following the example of some incautious German critics ; but on both objective and subjective grounds. "There are before us," as the author says, "two great facts, which Coleridge called the primary evidences of Christianity, viz., Christianity itself and Christendom : we have nothing like them ; nothing with claims, nothing with achieve-

ments like them : we find that they both rest on this Book." On the other hand, "When our souls are opened to receive it, we find a revelation of God which all that is best in us bows before, and which also the demon-part of us acknowledges while trying to think that we have nothing to do with Jesus, the Son of the Most High God ; it brings life and immortality to light." As against some recent works, this volume is of very distinct service. It is admirably conceived, clearly expressed, sympathetically constructed, and, best of all, so fulfils its promise of simplicity as to be within the range of the most ordinary powers of concentration. May it have the success it so richly deserves, and do the work for which it has been so ably planned !

Another series of lectures lies before us of not unequal merit,—the Cunningham Lectures (6) upon the Holy Spirit. Professor Smeaton, who won his laurels in his exhaustive work upon the Atonement exegetically considered, has now given us another valuable monograph upon a different branch of Doctrinal Theology. In this case the lectures have been considerably supplemented, to the enhancement of their completeness. In addition to the lectures proper, which treat of the positive truth generally accepted by the Christian Church, under such headings as the Personality and Procession of the Holy Spirit, the Work of the Spirit in the anointing of Christ, the Work of the Spirit in connection with Revelation and Inspiration, the Spirit's Regenerating Work on the Individual, the Spirit of Holiness, and the Work of the Holy Spirit in the Church, there is a prologue and an epilogue. In the former, the Biblical testimony is carefully considered ; and in the latter a historical survey is given of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit from the apostolic age to the present century. We have therefore a complete dogmatic examination of the section of Christian doctrine treated. A more timely contribution to the religious thought of our day there could scarcely be. There is a spirit of deep expectancy on all hands and in all Churches. To direct the view of many to the great scriptural groundwork as well as the vast ecclesiastical unanimity upon this great

(6) *The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: the Ninth Series of the Cunningham Lectures*, by George Smeaton, D.D. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark.

central truth is a very laudable ambition. Again we would express the wish that these lectures too may meet with a large circle of readers. The writer has had distinctly in view those great epochs of revival when the Church of God, having been waiting for a fresh outpouring of the Spirit, who comes from Christ and leads to Christ, has been quickened and energised as with the might of the Lord. The writer has also clearly recognised that it is right views upon the doctrine of the Spirit which can best counteract such dangers in the religious life of our time as irreverent criticism of Scripture, and the resort to ritualistic or sensational appliances for producing by human means what can only be effected from above. All truth has its practical side, and the masterly exposition of doctrine given in these lectures has been augmented in value by the wise references to current needs and common misconceptions. We should sometimes differ from the lecturer in his understanding of Scripture passages and in his reading of history; nevertheless the entire work is deserving of the closest scrutiny, for it is a fine product of the theological life of our age, and contains many a titbit of criticism and statement as well as a clearly interwoven argument.

Commendation, alas! is not always possible; and the critic has sometimes to speak his convictions at the cost of some considerable pain to himself. We could devoutly wish that Dr. Dods' *Handbook to Genesis* (7) had never been written, or at any rate had not been written in its present form. The first rule of science is to be complete and unbiassed in the collection of data; the second rule is, never to dignify with the position of established conclusions those hypotheses which the mind must frame in the pursuits of knowledge so long as those hypotheses are questionable; and a third rule is also commonly recognised, namely, that it is improper to perplex popular expositions by a statement of theories which are little else than hypothetical. All these rules have been broken in the book before us. The data given are incomplete and one-sided, questionable hypotheses are cited as actual truths, and the general reader is introduced to a multiplicity

(7) *Handbook for Bible Classes: Genesis*, by Marcus Dods, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

of confusing and bare theories. The several preceding volumes in this useful series, whilst they have displayed tact and pertinence, clearness and precision, have carefully avoided purely controverted matter; and it is a pity one of the editors has become the first sinner. Undoubtedly Genesis is a difficult book to annotate, and this handbook contains, it is cheerfully acknowledged, much that is suggestive and able in statement, arrangement, and exposition; but the one vice which mars many virtues is that the treatment is too fragmentary and authoritative for the careful student, and too bewildering for the ordinary reader. Were Dr. Dods writing an exegetical treatise, with full and accurate formulation of the premises upon which his conclusions are based, those conclusions would command respect, if not assent; but is it quite fair to the members of a Bible-class, who stand in especial need of positive teaching, to speak of Genesis as "coming upon our hands as a foundling," to talk categorically of a compiler "piecing together parallel accounts," to state that "critics are agreed that materials from a variety of sources have entered into the composition" of Genesis, to allege that there are at least four hands visible in the writing, or to assert that although "in other parts of the Bible" the first five books of Scripture are called the Books of Moses, "this expression is used loosely" (by our Lord Himself presumably)? As surely as a biologist treats a popular audience unfairly who in the present state of our knowledge represents the Darwinian theory as unquestioned fact, is Dr. Dods also unfair, however unintentionally, in laying before the attendants of Bible-classes the unproven views of certain German writers, for the most part of avowed rationalistic tendency, in the manner he does. It is not for a moment contended that Genesis does not present a ground for new and protracted research even as regards the materials employed by its author; the sole contention is that it is premature, to use a mild term, to present to the rising generation of our Churches as positive truth what is really unproven hypothesis.

The new series of theological translations issuing from the justly-celebrated publishing house in Edinburgh will certainly not lessen their prestige. The first volume of Weiss's *Biblical*

Theology (8), while characterised by more freedom of thought than, we think, the subject warrants, is not lacking in reverence. Conservative interpreters may even gain many suggestions of no insignificant value for the strengthening of their own position from statements which at first seem only distasteful. There is certainly an advantage in being brought face to face with urgent questions, although we may not be prepared to accept the solution our author offers. For such as are disposed to enter upon the wide field of investigation which Biblical Theology presents—and there is perhaps no field in the present day in which richer harvests may be reaped—so far as we can judge by this instalment, Professor Weiss may be accepted as one of the most instructive and stimulating guides. Martensen's *Christian Ethics* has been already recognised as a most thorough and interesting exposition of a subject hitherto too much neglected, and the volume on *Social Ethics* (9) is particularly seasonable in its appearance. Such volumes as Spencer's *Data of Ethics* and Leslie Stephen's *Science of Ethics* can be best met by an exhibition of the uniqueness and sufficiency of the code contained in the Scriptures. Let the best findings of nature be fairly confronted with the law of Christ, and we have no fear as to the result. One of the most serious dangers consequent upon the spread of Agnosticism is that which threatens social revolution. Those who reject the gospel are aware of this; and they are extremely anxious to formulate satisfactory laws of action for the conservation of all that is good and valuable. Hitherto they have had no noteworthy success in their efforts. They are finding out that two important factors are wanting—a foundation of authority and an inspiring force. We have both in the gospel of God; and when we are able, as volumes like this aid us in doing, to demonstrate the wondrous adaptation and fitness of gospel ethics to all the conditions of human activity and relationship, we occupy a position of strength from which it will be our own fault if we are dislodged.

Dr. Martensen, in the volume before us, discourses on the "Moral life of Society and the Kingdom of God." With great

(8) Weiss's *Biblical Theology of the New Testament*, vol. i. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

(9) Martensen's *Christian Ethics*. Second Division: *Social Ethics*. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

wealth of thought and singular clearness of judgment, he applies scriptural truth to the varied circumstances presented by the Family, the State, and the Church. We have repeatedly consulted our author on ethical questions, and we have always been impressed by what we may term a rare combination of insight and foresight. We need hardly add, that national and ecclesiastical differences have some influence in preventing us from always seeing alike.

Mr. Paxton Hood's *Oliver Cromwell* (10) is the Cromwell of Thomas Carlyle; this our author frankly confesses, and every page of his book gives evidence of the fact. For those who have gone through Carlyle's great work, therefore, that before us will have comparatively little value, save in the case of those whose interest in the great Protector insures a welcome to every writer who weaves a new wreath of honour for the brow of their hero. To those, however, who have not had the opportunity, or, it may be, the patience, to go through the "Letters and Speeches," Mr. Hood has rendered a very important service; for they will find here a very graphic and vivid portraiture of the man. The artistic gift, which is seldom wanting to our author in any of his numerous writings, has certainly not failed him here: and we follow Oliver from stage to stage of his life with unabating interest. The boy in his Huntingdon home having his early tussle with Charles; the member for Cambridge, with his plain cloth suit, bespeaking a clumsy provincial tailor; the hero of Dunbar; the bold Protector; the dying Christian;—in all these aspects we have him portrayed in these pages. All this we can say for the book: and those who here see Cromwell for the first time, so to say, will form an estimate of him—well, of a very different kind from that which could be gained from popular sketches of him a century ago.

For our own part, however, we could have wished for a more discriminating estimate of Cromwell; it might have been less popular, it would have been more valuable. In our day the pendulum of criticism has swung from most unfair depreciation to most unquestioning panegyric. Mr. Hood's defence of him

(10) *Oliver Cromwell: his Life, Times, Battlefields, and Contemporaries*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

in regard to the execution of Charles I., for instance, is warm, but it is not conclusive; and, before our misgivings with regard to that transaction are quite cleared, we must have something more than reiterated reference to the inveterate habit of deceit which—it is but too true—characterised the King. This we say from no sympathy with the character either of Charles or his Court, and with ample admission of the fact that it was no easy thing to do otherwise than Cromwell and his friends did, as against one whose party-name had become a synonym, not only for irreligion, but flagrant immorality.

Again, Mr. Hood's unbounded admiration of Oliver's love for religious liberty is somewhat qualified in our minds by Oliver's utter failure to understand the views and feelings of Scotland in matters of religion. And when we read of his memorable entreaty of the Scotch to admit that they might perhaps be mistaken, *perhaps*, we are apt to say, the claim to infallibility was not all on one side.

We have only space further to indicate one or two trifling errors in the book. The reference to Cromwell as "that sloven" is on p. 17 attributed to Sir Philip Warwick, and on p. 114 to Lord Digby. On p. 56 there is some confusion—probably due to a misprint—as to the date of Cromwell's son Oliver's baptism. We must also place a mark of interrogation against Mr. Hood's statement that John Milton was Cromwell's "familiar friend." Cromwell indeed befriended Milton, whose great powers he cannot have failed to see; and Milton, on his part, admired Cromwell and served him nobly. But this idea—a common one—that Cromwell and Milton were great personal friends, seems to us to have the most slender historical basis possible.

But, taken for all in all, Mr. Hood's volume forms most instructive and delightful reading, and adds one more skilful portraiture to the many of Cromwell and his times.

Professor Binnie's handbook on *The Church* (11) is written with much ability and with great clearness. He starts with a definition of the term, and an answer to the question where the Church is to be found, setting forth in this connection the "notes" of the Church of Christ, and calmly vindicating its

(11) *Handbooks for Bible-Classes: The Church*, by William Binnie, D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1882.

true catholicity. This is followed by an exposition of Christ's Headship over His Church, and of the chief end of the Church's existence : and the latter half of the book treats of the "Christian Ordinances," and of "The Polity of the Church." The work may be characterised generally as an exhibition of the Presbyterian view regarding the constitution and order of the Church of Christ. There is little controversial matter in it, and its special value lies in this, that it will give the young reader a very lucid and very fair view of the ecclesiastical principles of Presbyterianism. Young ministers also might well have it put into their hands, for in these days of revolt against the assumptions of ecclesiasticism, there is no small tendency to ignore the importance of the Church of Christ as a corporate institution.

In the same series of handbooks there has more recently appeared a brief *History of the Reformation*, from the pen of Professor Lindsay of Glasgow (12). This will, we are certain, take a very high place in the series to which it belongs, and we can scarcely conceive of a better digest of this part of Church history than that which is here given. There are manifestly two dangers in the way of the writer of such a work : he is apt either to be concise and dry, or discursive and shallow. Professor Lindsay has avoided both dangers, and we have, as the result, a manual alike comprehensive and popular. The style is graceful, while there are marks throughout the whole book that it is based upon most accurate and profound study. The plan which the author has followed is to trace first the German Reformation as issuing in the Lutheran Churches, next the Swiss Reformation as ending in the Reformed Churches, including those of Switzerland, France, and Scotland. After this he traces the history of the "Anglican Reformation," and he concludes with a brief exposition of the principles of the great movement itself. It will be seen at once that this enables the reader to understand the progress of the Reformation much more thoroughly than he could do according to the usual method of taking each country by itself. The grand distinction between the historical Protestantism, for instance, of Scotland and that of England is in this way seen at once ; and it will become much easier to those who pursue the study further to

(12) Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark, 1882.

understand the theological and ecclesiastical diversities within the one movement represented by the names of Luther, Calvin, and Cranmer. We are afraid that Professor Lindsay's discussion of Reformation principles, however, is somewhat too philosophical to be fully understood by youthful readers, such as those who form a large proportion of our Bible-classes; certainly it will be necessary for the teachers of such classes to take a little less "hard thinking" for granted than the author seems to do. This is the only defect which we have noted in the book, which strikes us on the whole, we repeat, as being one of the best of Messrs. Clark's series of handbooks.

Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton have added to their series of volumes, entitled *Men worth Remembering*, a Life of Andrew Fuller (13) by his son. It is a picture of what is now an old time, and it has all the advantage of being drawn by one who is himself a child of that time, the author being now evidently over eighty years of age. He writes with all the enthusiasm of a devoted son, and the value of the sketch which he gives may be estimated by what he himself says in his preface: "I *knew* Mr. Fuller, knew him as a father, lived in the same house with him, and witnessed scenes in his life which were witnessed by no other person now living. More than that, I remember him, and can recall his words and acts, and even looks and tones of voice, with a vividness which at times renders it almost incredible that so great a part of a century has passed away since I stood by his dying bed." There is very much to interest one in the earlier part of the volume, which shows the circumstances amid which Fuller's course was shaped; and the sketch of the old, straitened church-life at Soham is a perfect study in the religious feeling of many devout in England a century ago. So straitened in their views that to many of them it appeared a presumptuous thing to entreat the unconverted to come to Christ, lest they should not be of the elect, these people are a marvel to us now; we feel that they entirely misread the doctrine of Election; and, while holding to that doctrine in its Bible sense most distinctly, we are glad to think that they must often have been inconsistent. Anyhow, many of them, if they dared not commend Christ to sinners by their

(13) *Andrew Fuller*, by his Son, Andrew Gunton Fuller. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

words, did so by their lives ; they were epistles of Christ seen and read of all men, and God often, doubtless, used their testimony for that blessed purpose, which they could not venture directly to seek. Amongst such people Andrew Fuller was reared, and in early life he shared their extreme views : by and by he grew out of them, and lived in a freer spiritual atmosphere. Unless he had thus emerged, it is not easy to see how he could ever have "held the ropes" for Carey and his friends. Indeed, when the fire of his missionary zeal began to burn, one of the chief forces which strove to quench it was just this caricature of Calvinism which was then so prevalent. The story of Fuller's later life, and especially of his connection with the Baptist Missionary Society in its foundation, is no doubt familiar to many readers ; but they will none the less be interested in the sketch of that work, drawn, as it were, from within the home-circle by his son. We see once more that there was nothing mean about this man, nothing small, and he appears on the private and homeward side as true and pure as in his public life he was zealous. We are struck, too, with his quiet force, and we have in him one more instance of the power which is wielded by the Christian who can "possess his soul in patience." Much of the strength which was given to him for his great after-work was gained amid the severe, and almost galling, discipline which he bore through so faithfully at Soham. There was ample room for this new biography of Andrew Fuller.

About ten years ago we made the acquaintance of the author of *Gesta Christi* (14), by the perusal of an interesting volume in which he described his labours among the neglected and dangerous classes of New York. Since then we have read his contributions to *Ethnology* ; and we are not surprised that he has turned his attention to the historic achievements of Christianity in the advancement of the human race. His attention has rightly been directed, not to the development of an ecclesiastical organisation, but rather to the influence and spread of distinctively Christian ideas. The plan of his work embraces an investigation of the influence of Christianity on

(14) *Gesta Christi : or, A History of Humane Progress under Christianity*, by C. Loring Brace. London : Hodder and Stoughton.

the practices, laws, customs, and morals (1.) of the Roman Period; (2.) the Middle Ages; (3.) the Modern Period. There are also two concluding chapters; one, on Humane progress among non-Christian peoples (Brahminists, Buddhists, Confucianists, and Mohammedans); another, on objections which may be urged against the Christian ideal, together with a forecast of the future which Christianity is fitted to secure. Mr. Brace brings to his subject varied learning, full intelligence, and a strong sympathy with the well-being of mankind; and he has produced a volume at once full of information and suggestion.

Many of our most valued treatises on Homiletics come from the other side of the Atlantic. We have to this hour a grateful memory of the enjoyment and help gained from some of the older writers more than a quarter of a century ago. We confess to an eagerness still to read the fresh and independent utterances of our American friends on this important subject. When the newest volume (15) reached us a few days ago we sat down at once to its perusal. Whether from the perennial interest of the subject, or from the fascinating treatment it receives at the hand of Professor Hoppin, we found ourselves as much absorbed in our reading as in the days of our earlier enthusiasm. Indeed, the longer we live we find there is the more to learn, and we are always willing to listen to one who speaks either from insight or experience. There are two preachers whom we do not envy: the man who thinks that his preaching is perfect, and the man who is hopeless of making further advance. To these no arguments of ours are likely to commend such a treatise as this; but to all others we confidently recommend it as replete with information and stimulus. It is both philosophical and practical. It expounds the science of effective preaching, and it explains the art.

Two additional volumes (16) complete the issue of Meyer's *Commentaries on the New Testament*. It would be ungracious

(15) *Homiletics*, by James M. Hoppin, Professor in Yale College. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(16) *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Hebrews*, by Dr. Gottlieb Lünemann.

Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles of James and John, by Dr. J. E. Huther. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

not to acknowledge the very real privilege conferred upon English-speaking students by Messrs. Clark, in publishing for their use these admirable translations of Exegetical Handbooks, second to none in their wealth of information and general judiciousness. Dr. Lünemann interprets the Epistle to the Hebrews with great care and no little sagacity. In most cases he may be followed with confidence; and in all cases he furnishes us with material for forming our own judgment. He presents the evidence as to authorship very fully and fairly; his own leaning evidently is to the Apollos theory. Much has been gained recently in the almost universal agreement as to the *Pauline character* of the contents of this Epistle; and although it does not affect the authority of the book, we are disposed to think the time is not far distant when the conviction of its Pauline authorship will again have the "widest currency and the most lasting acceptance."

Dr. Huther's treatment of the Epistles of James and John leaves little to be desired. No point of any importance seems to escape his notice, and his perspective is excellent. These two volumes, like the others in the series, ought to become general favourites. While not lacking Teutonic minuteness of criticism, they are favourably distinguished by the absence of Teutonic diffuseness. In these days of many books, our patience is severely tried, and our preference is given to the writer who can say most in fewest words.

Mr. Beet's *Commentary on the Romans* made good his claim to rank among the scholarly and painstaking expositors of Scripture. We are glad to find he has not forgotten his promise to continue his exegetical studies, and we cordially welcome the volume on the *Epistles to the Corinthians* (17). Occupying, as we do, a different doctrinal standpoint, there are many interpretations to which we might take exceptions; but, in view of the general trustworthiness, and hermeneutical value, of the book before us, we are rather disposed to give emphasis to its value and helpfulness. Even when we differ from him his method commands respect. The whole treatment

(17) *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians*, by Joseph Agar Beet. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

of these two important, and, in many respects, difficult Epistles, is marked by a full comprehension of the purposes for which they were written; and by a singularly clear discernment he follows and illustrates the argument of the apostle throughout. For practical usefulness, this commentary commends itself to us as pre-eminently fitted both by its fulness and clearness.

A brochure from the pen of Dr. Symington (18) deserves honourable mention. It is written in very simple language, and can be easily read; yet it is full of fruitful thought. In the course of a few pages he brings out with much impressiveness the contents of the letters addressed by the apostle John to the "Elect Lady" and to Gaius. There is no *ex professo* comment on either. Nevertheless he succeeds admirably in presenting forcibly, so that forgetfulness becomes impossible, the purpose and spirit of each Epistle. Both refer to the treatment of Evangelists. In the one there is warning against reception of the false; in the other there is commendation of the wise and kindly treatment of the true. Dr. Symington's remarks on orthodoxy are seasonable and scriptural. While it is not to be dissociated from Christianity, it ought never to be sacrificed to it. His words on "love in the truth" are specially interesting and instructive.

From Wales a thoughtful series of expository sermons on the Acts of the Apostles (19) reaches us in a second edition. They are neither conventional nor commonplace. With a fair measure of Welsh fire, they contain also strong common sense, and are marked by much sobriety of judgment. They speak to men of the present day, in familiar language, of the weighty truths which quickened and organised Christian life in the first century.

The Editors of the *Pulpit Commentary* have been well-advised in extending their scheme to the books of the New

(18) *The Elder and his Friends: Christian Friendship delineated in the Private Letters of John*, by Alex. Macleod Symington, D.D. London: Nisbet and Co.

(19) *Studies in the Acts of the Apostles*, by the Rev. J. Cynddlam Jones. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

Testament. The first instalment (20) of their new venture is before us in the form of two goodly volumes devoted to the homiletic exposition of the Second Gospel. The exposition is by the Dean of Lichfield, and the homiletical department is under the care of Professor J. R. Thomson ; and, as usual, there are various homilies supplied by different authors. The introduction is brief, business-like, and satisfactory ; and we have been particularly pleased with the section devoted to an examination of the genuineness and authenticity of the last twelve verses of the Gospel. It is a model of clear, succinct, and judicial statement. The hints for pulpit preparation supplied in the homilies proper vary both in character and quality. Some of the contributors almost invariably run their thoughts into the *propositional* form rather than the *textual*. We are aware that to many hearers this seems more scholarly and profound ; yet we are confident that it generally proves least profitable. There is really more ingenuity, and certainly there is more prospect of powerful address, when the lines of the text being followed the subject is presented in fresh scriptural forms. If the Editors would compare the work done for them already in these two directions, they might issue instructions calculated to make their excellent Commentary even more useful. But wise readers can find hints under the most diverse forms. We cannot give higher praise than in saying that the new volumes worthily sustain the reputation already won.

Professor Cocker of the University of Michigan proposes to issue a series of handbooks of Philosophy, embracing such subjects as Logic, Ontology, and the Philosophy of Religion. The first volume (21), devoted to Psychology, lies before us. At the first glance it seems full of promise, and after a fuller examination we find that it amply satisfies our expectations. There are very few noteworthy works on the subject which have not been laid under contribution, and the result is a compendium of the best thought on the subject, which cannot

(20) *The Pulpit Commentary : St. Mark*, 2 vols. London : Kegan Paul, Trench and Co.

(21) *The Student's Handbook of Philosophy : Psychology*. By B. F. Cocker, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Psychology, Speculative Philosophy, and Philosophy of Religion, in the University of Michigan, U.S.A. London : Hodder and Stoughton.

easily be surpassed. The problems of philosophy are stated, and the various schools are classified according to their relation to these problems. Then follow chapters on Methodology, Consciousness, Phenomenology, Sense, Reason, Primitive Judgment, Imagination, Understanding, Sensibility, Will. Either as a guide to the study of Psychology, or as a *résumé* in reasonable compass of psychologic theories and facts, this book is entitled to stand in the first rank. If we had to conduct a class of students over the province which it describes we could not wish for a better or more useful manual. It is sure to be appreciated wherever it is known.

In an Encyclopædia of Quotations, if it is to be of real use, there must not only be an assemblage of noteworthy sayings, there must also be some arrangement whereby the seeker may find a clew to the saying he wants. We have often thought that a good Concordance would be the best help to those who are fortunate enough to possess a well-stocked and well-selected library. A goodly volume (22) prepared in America, though printed in England, comes as near to our ideal of a really valuable and practical digest of quotations as anything we have yet seen. To test its value we sought in it for a Shakespearean phrase, which, on a former occasion, we vainly sought to recall, and we also failed to find it, notwithstanding our possession of more than one volume of *Shakespeare Quotations*. As then, we began by remembering the first word only. Turning to our Dictionary we find the word at once in the Alphabetical Concordance, and we are referred to p. 639 for the quotation in full :—

“Consideration, like an angel, came
And whipp'd the offending Adam out of him.”

There, too, we learn that the words occur in *Henry V.* Act i. Scene 1. We do not think it would be possible to convey a better impression of the real serviceableness of this Encyclopædia than by such an illustration of its actual employment as we have given. The book is eminently satisfactory.

(22) *The Cyclopædia of Practical Quotations, English and Latin, with an Appendix containing Proverbs from the Latin and Modern Foreign Languages, Law and Ecclesiastical Terms and Significations, etc. etc., with copious Indices.* London : Richard D. Dickinson.

Expository preaching is not confined to the region north of the Tweed. Although by no means general in England, there are instances not a few in which it has been adopted, and successfully carried out. Mr. Dale of Birmingham has just published a volume of lectures on the Epistle to the Ephesians (23), which were delivered on Sunday mornings, in the ordinary course of his ministry. He tells us that they "were intended to illustrate to a popular audience the doctrine and the ethics" of the Epistle expounded. The language is clear and striking throughout, so that it is impossible for the reader to mistake his meaning in any case in which the meaning is clear to himself. We make this reservation, because in one or two cases it does not seem to us that his thoughts are quite definite enough. The reader will have no difficulty in discovering these instances if he reads with any care the earlier lectures, which deal with doctrinal truth. So far as Calvinism is concerned, Mr. Dale is hopelessly at sea. He makes no secret of his dislike to it; and it is as little secret to the intelligent student that he fails to comprehend it. But we are not now inclined to be polemic. We can speak in terms of hearty commendation when we turn to the ethical part. Here Mr. Dale is manly, clear-headed, and vigorous. His application of scriptural truth to daily life is always apt and trenchant. His discourses on practical truths are models both in style and thought.

We give a cordial welcome to the second edition of Janet's masterly volume on *Final Causes* (24). It is becoming yearly more apparent that the true battle-ground on which modern controversies must be fought out is philosophical rather than scientific. The quarrel is between ideas, not facts. Positivism simply declines the contest. With the clearest apprehension of the question to be determined, M. Janet raises the issues and meets them fearlessly. As he himself tells us, his method is not polemic but critical. "Polemic is a method of combat;

(23) *The Epistle to the Ephesians: Its Doctrine and Ethics*, by R. W. Dale, M.A., Birmingham. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(24) *Final Causes*, by Paul Janet, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Faculté des Lettres of Paris. Translated from the second edition of the French, by W. Affleck, B.D., with preface by Robert Flint, D.D., LL.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark.

criticism is a method of research." In following out his method he guards most carefully against one-sidedness. With scrupulous fairness he states and examines all pertinent arguments. His conclusions, as given in the preface to this new edition, are these three :—

"I. There is no *a priori* principle of final causes. The final cause is an induction, or hypothesis, whose probability depends on the number and character of observed phenomena.

"II. The final cause is proved by the existence in fact of certain combinations, such that the accord of that combination with a final phenomenon, independent of them, would be a mere chance, and that nature altogether must be explained by an accident.

"III. The relation of finality being once admitted as a law of the universe, the only hypothesis appropriate to our understanding that can account for this law, is that it is derived from an intelligent cause."

The student who masters the contents of this volume will find himself fairly equipped for taking part in a contest which is at once important and imminent.

The Rev. L. Tyerman, whose name is already so honourably associated with the elucidation of the rise and progress of early Methodism, has made another contribution to the history (25). Fletcher of Madeley, who is more widely known on account of his singular piety, appears in the volume before us a controversialist of no mean order. There can be no doubt that his once celebrated *Checks to Antinomianism* had considerable influence in determining the doctrinal position of Wesleyanism; and it may also be frankly admitted that his exposure of the consequences which might be fairly charged against certain hyper-Calvinist assertions prepared the way for the more moderate and scriptural Calvinism which in later times checked the advance of Arminianism. We are not disposed to stir the embers of an old controversy, from the study of which men of both parties may nevertheless learn much. Indeed, the lines, both of attack and defence, are now so greatly

(25) *Wesley's Designated Successor: The Life, Letters, and Literary Labours of the Rev. John William Fletcher, Vicar of Madeley, Shropshire*, by Rev. L. Tyerman. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

changed that the arguments of a bygone time are scarcely available, and it is possible for both disputants to traverse the old battle-field with more interest than passion. For this very reason we give a hearty commendation to Mr. Tyerman's graphic history. We accept, and, in one sense, admire his partisanship, and we are willing, under his guidance, to reconsider a now somewhat distant discussion. The volume is full of interest and merit. Although, from our point of view, it is rather marred by its doctrinal bias, it is none the less valuable as indicating the real danger of a rash zeal which exceeds the warrant of Scripture.

We are glad to find an old favourite reappearing. Professor Balfour's *Botany and Religion* (26) has been prized by us for many years, and if the present generation does not appreciate the republication of a book in which science and devoutness are so admirably combined we shall be grievously disappointed. From a long-continued intimacy with its contents, we bespeak for this excellent manual the welcome which it undoubtedly deserves.

Dr. Paterson will have conferred a boon upon many by publishing, in more permanent form, the first series of his excellent Thursday morning lectures (27). These lectures attracted considerable attention at the time of their delivery, and may now be read by a wider circle with interest and profit. They are expressly addressed to "busy people." They do not pretend to grapple with the various critical questions involved according to academic method. The problem they attempt in some degree to solve is this: Is it possible, in the face of the sceptical assaults of the present day from the side of a rationalistic criticism and an unbelieving natural science, for a cultivated man to believe intelligently in the Mosaic and the Divine authorship of the Five Books almost universally attributed to Moses? A distinctly affirmative reply is given, and that for two reasons: on the one hand, because of the positive contents of the books, and their adaptation to the

(26) *Botany and Religion*, by J. H. Balfour, A.M., M.D. Fourth edition. Illustrated. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier.

(27) *In Defence: The Earlier Scriptures*, by H. Sinclair Paterson, M.D. London: John F. Shaw and Co.

religious need and faculties ; and, on the other hand, because of the changing character and inherent weakness of the principal antagonistic theories. These two reasons are illustrated with much force, ability, and directness. In technical language, one would say, indeed, that these lectures form a valuable contribution in popular speech to the theology and the apologetics of the Pentateuch. For in all three points—the exposition, the defence, and the popularisation—there is much that is noteworthy. Thus, in the positive exposition, the entire narrative, with its apparent digressions, is grouped around the leading thought of the several books, and Genesis is shown to be the book of beginnings, Exodus of redemption, Leviticus of worship, Numbers of pilgrimage, and Deuteronomy of obedience, the several books standing out sharply as parts of a great Divine plan. Then the intercalated examination of objections—and all the leading objections are dealt with—is conducted with the ease and surefootedness of a master. It is manifest everywhere that, if arguments are adroitly suited to the understandings of “busy people,” their cogency and selection imply much more knowledge than is actually employed. The author is evidently at home in the latest researches in Oriental archæology, Biblical criticism, and physical science. Further, the dress is striking. There is orderly plan, eloquent expression, and careful adaptation everywhere, whilst there is a rare skill, in addition to these general qualities of style, in wrapping up points in memorable form. Take such a sentence as this, in reference to the indirect value of the so-called higher criticism, “What I thank the critics for is, that they are teaching us to study the Bible microscopically ;” or this, in reference to the changing views of scientific men, “Were I challenged to reconcile Genesis with geology, I would ask, Can any man reconcile Sir Charles Lyell’s last edition of his *Principles of Geology* with his first, issued less than half a century ago ?” or this, on the difficulty of explaining a mature man by the protoplasm in his blood, “The fact still stands that *evolution* must have been preceded by *involution* ;” or this, on the weak point of the critical argument, “A law not observed proves that a law has not been given !” or this, as an analysis of Numbers, “We find three leading thoughts running throughout the whole book, warfare, work, and walk ;” or this, on the

leading idea of Deuteronomy, "Note, therefore, that obedience rests on redemption, worship, and guidance." A man who can write sentences like these has an exceptional gift of popular exposition. Not the least interesting part of the book is the Appendix, in which some most pertinent extracts are given, from works not generally known, in support of assertions in the text. Altogether, it is to be wished that this book may have a wide circulation, as an able and well-written defence of the earlier Scriptures, boldly conceived, carefully elaborated, thoughtfully compressed, and considerably adapted to the general reader.

ALFRED CAVE.

We have also received from the Religious Tract Society—

The Sunday at Home.—Volume for 1882.

The Leisure Hour.—Volume for 1882.

We have examined these volumes with some care, and have been most favourably impressed by the variety and interest of their contents. We need not say that they are wholesome throughout. Among the articles which seem to us most noteworthy are, the series on *Ancient Religions*, by Canon Rawlinson, on *Proverb Lore*, by Rev. T. N. Thiselton Dyer, on the *Pulpit and the Parson*, by Paxton Hood, and on the *Authorship of the Pentateuch*, by Principal Cave.

Sea Pictures, drawn with Pen and Pencil. By James Macaulay, M.A., M.D.

The engravings are excellent and the letterpress completes the charm.

Historic Landmarks in the Christian Centuries. By Richard Heath.

An admirable and interesting outline of the prominent and characteristic events in the past eighteen centuries.

The Life of Frederick Oberlin, Pastor of the Ban de la Roche. By Mrs. Josephine E. Butler.

A worthy memoir of "the great apostle of charity and saint of the Protestant Church."

Rest from Sorrow; or the Ministry of Suffering. By W. Guest, F.G.S.

A manual for mourners, whereby they may learn the secret of patience, and enter into the blessedness of chastisement.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1883.

ART. I.—*Dr. W. Robertson Smith on the Prophets of Israel.*¹

WE have read this second volume of Dr. Robertson Smith with disappointment and pain. The announcement of a fresh course of lectures from his vigorous and graphic pen, in which the prophets of Israel were to be treated in relation to their own times, naturally awakened high expectations. It would have been unreasonable to demand in all his productions an equal measure of the literary charm that attached in such an extraordinary degree to *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*; in which even unprofessional readers found the dry details of technical discussion invested with the interest of an exciting story, as they were led by a connected argument through the mazes of Biblical criticism, from the state of the text to the age of the Pentateuch. And it need occasion no surprise that his conclusions respecting the prophets cannot be accepted by those who have been constrained to dissent from his views previously expressed. But we confess that we were not prepared for the extremely low estimate here put upon the religion of Israel and the teaching of the prophets.

With the devout spirit that breathed in the former work there

¹ *The Prophets of Israel, and their Place in History to the close of the Eighth Century B.C.* Eight Lectures by W. Robertson Smith, LL.D. Edinburgh, 1882.

seemed to be joined a high appreciation of the Old Testament revelation and of Old Testament saints, and particularly the prophets as the advocates of a spiritual in opposition to a ritual or materialistic worship. And with this the critical conclusions respecting Deuteronomy and the Levitical law were not necessarily inconsistent. Though it was alleged that the Pentateuchal Law did not proceed directly from Moses, it was held to be the work of other servants of God, and to have been given to Israel in successive portions at later periods of time. The date was altered but the contents remained the same, and there was no apparent disposition to underrate their meaning or value. This might seem rather to be enhanced by the assumption that such laws were insupposable in the infancy of the nation and at the outset of God's dealings with Israel, and that they must mark subsequent epochs in the divinely-guided history. The prophets, however, suffer much more severely at his hands. They are with some exceptions allowed to stand each in his own proper date, but the contents of their teaching are evaporated in the crucible of the new hypothesis until an almost impalpable residuum of religious truth is all that is left; and even this was inaccurately conceived by the prophets, who are, moreover, irreconcilably at variance with one another in their statements of it. And this is commended to us as the revelation of God through the prophets.

We admit without hesitation that we can no more determine *a priori* what a revelation from God must contain as a whole, or in any of its parts, than we can prescribe how the world should be made. The Most High must always act worthily of himself, and suitably to the end which he has in view. But we learn what he judged it fit to do by ascertaining what, in actual fact, he has done. It is by the direct study of the Scriptures themselves, and of each separate portion of them by itself,—in the declarations there made and the phenomena exhibited,—not by *a priori* reasonings, that we are to discover in what sense the Scriptures are the Word of God, and what revelations he has therein made to us. And in interpreting Scripture we must not make it square with our notions of what it ought to be, but simply inquire what it actually is. There must, we insist, be a thoroughly unbiassed and candid interpretation of its facts and contents. If force must not be put

upon it to bring forth spiritual mysteries which it does not contain, or to find in its earlier sections disclosures which were reserved for a later time, neither must it, on the other hand, be pared down to the level of what some philosophical theory of religious development may be willing to allow.

The human element in Scripture, of which we hear so much at the present time, is not to be discarded or explained away. It has its importance and value for the proper understanding and due appreciation of the sacred volume. But neither is the divine character of Scripture to be depreciated or set aside. No theory of inspiration or of non-inspiration can be accepted, as the final truth upon this subject, which cannot abide the most searching examination in the light of all the facts bearing on the case. Any investigations which enter more deeply into this question, or elicit any fresh data for its determination, are to be welcomed. Every advance made toward a correct appreciation of any of the factors which have contributed to the formation of the Bible, or any of its books, is a positive gain, whatever may have been the motive or immediate aim of those by whom it is brought out. And particularly it is a hopeful sign if increased attention is directed to the persons of the prophets and the times in which they lived, the conceptions which then prevailed, the ordinary life of the people, the questions which agitated men's minds, the emergencies which called for prophetic interference, and what was from time to time attempted or accomplished by it. Assuredly we shall decline no aid in these matters even from Wellhausen, Kuenen, or Duhm, especially as their views are interpreted for us in the lucid periods of Dr. Robertson Smith, or modified into more acceptable forms by his independent reflections.

We have no quarrel with our author for the extent to which he is disposed to trace the personality of the prophets in their several messages. This does not conflict in the slightest degree with the common doctrine of inspiration. The entire person of the prophet was God's organ in making known his will. His native endowments, the experiences of his life, all that contributed to form his character, to determine or deepen his convictions, to shape his style of thought or action, in fine, to make him what he was, was a part of his providential training for his work. The more thoroughly we know him as a man,

the better we can appreciate his adaptation as a prophet to his own age and to his own countrymen. The vexed question respecting Hosea's marriage, which has been a fruitful source of disputation from the days of Jerome, may never be settled to universal satisfaction. But there is certainly much that is attractive in the idea (pp. 178 ff.) that the prophet was first taught the lesson by a bitter domestic experience, which he subsequently laboured to impress upon the transgressing people, and that the yearnings of his own affectionate heart, toward one who had so basely wronged him, led him up to his conception of the persistent love of God to idolatrous Israel, and gave him a clearer insight into his providential dealings with his people. And we have in the Book of Habakkuk a remarkably clear instance of the wrestling conflict of which revelations were born: the inward struggle with great moral problems that clamoured for solution, the mental process by which the strife was calmed and assured conviction attained; and distinguished from this, and additional to it, the divine communication for which the mind was antecedently prepared.

Dr. Robertson Smith expresses his dissent (p. 9) from the views of those who

"maintain that there was no specific difference between the growth of divine truth in Israel and the growth of truth among other nations. The prophets, who were the organs of God's teaching in Israel, appear to them to stand on the same line with the other great teachers of mankind, who were also searchers after truth, and received it as a gift from God. . . . The practical point, in all controversy as to the distinctive character of the revelation of God to Israel, regards the place of Scripture as the permanent rule of faith, and the sufficient and unfailing guide in all our religious life. When we say that God dealt with Israel in the way of special revelation, and crowned his dealings by personally manifesting all his grace and truth in Christ Jesus the incarnate Word, we mean that the Bible contains within itself a perfect picture of God's gracious relations with man, and that we have no need to go outside of the Bible history to learn anything of God and his saving will towards us,—that the whole growth of the true religion up to its perfect fulness is set before us in the record of God's dealings with Israel, culminating in the manifestation of Jesus Christ. There can be no question that Jesus himself held this view, and we cannot depart from it without making him an imperfect teacher and an imperfect Saviour. Yet history has not taught us that there is anything in true religion to add to the New Testament. We still stand in the nineteenth century where he stood in the first; or rather he stands as high above us as he did above his disciples—the perfect Master, the Supreme Head of the fellowship of all true religion" (pp. 10, 11).

The imperfect knowledge of God reached by Gentile nations, the lack of any solid and continuous progress in religious things among them, and the decay of their noblest religions, as contrasted with the steady progress in the knowledge of God given to Israel, until it "merged in the perfect religion of Christ which still satisfies the deepest spiritual needs of mankind," is urged in proof that the revelation of the Old and New Testaments may fairly claim to be the revelation of God to men in a special and absolute sense (p. 14). "It is not necessary," he adds, "to encumber the argument by comparing the way in which individual divine communications were given to Israel, with the way in which the highest thinkers of other nations came to grasp something of spiritual truth;" that is, as we understand him, it is undesirable to raise the question whether Hebrew prophets ascertained the truth in any such way as made them authoritative teachers of the will of God, and exempted them from errors in its communication.¹

Now this may, in the connection, simply refer to the place that the supernatural claims of the prophets should hold in an apologetical argument. In endeavouring to force conviction on unbelievers, it might not be wise to bring the supernatural evidences of our religion to the front, and engage in a disputa-

¹ On page 82 the Doctor draws a distinction between prophets and uninspired preachers, which might seem, at first sight, to be identical with the commonly-received doctrine on this subject. "Jehovah did not first give a complete theoretical knowledge of himself, and then raise up prophets to enforce the application of the theoretical scheme in particular circumstances. That would not have required a prophet; it would have been no more than is still done by uninspired preachers. The place of the prophet is in a religious crisis, where the ordinary interpretation of acknowledged principles breaks down, where it is necessary to go back, not to received doctrine, but to Jehovah himself. The word of Jehovah, through the prophet, is properly a declaration of what Jehovah, as the personal King of Israel, commands in this particular crisis; and it is spoken with authority, not as an inference from previous revelation, but as the direct expression of the character and will of a personal God, who has made himself personally audible in the prophet's soul." A careful inspection of these words, however, shows with what care they have been selected. God may "make himself personally audible in the prophet's soul" simply as he does in the divine illumination enjoyed by all truly pious men. Their devout intercourse with God leads to an intimate acquaintance with his character, and an instinctive apprehension of what his will must be in any given case. And thus the thought will not be excluded that, along with "the word of Jehovah through the prophet," there may be uttered much that savours of human weakness and error. And that this is his real meaning appears from the entire tenor of the volume.

tion upon inspiration and infallibility in the first instance. As he says (p. 16): "The miraculous circumstances of its promulgation need not be used as the first proof of its truth, but must rather be regarded as the inseparable accompaniments of a revelation which bears the historical stamp of reality." There is unquestionably reason and sound sense in this. If the measureless superiority of the religion of the Bible over any Gentile system be first established by palpable and undeniable considerations, it may be hoped that the minds of opposers will thus be better prepared to admit the evidence of its supernatural origin. It is as the accompaniment and the attestation of revealed truth, and not as isolated prodigies, that miracles are convincing.

But when we consider the whole drift of the Lectures which are thus prefaced, we think that no injustice is done the distinguished lecturer by surmising that he meant more than appears upon the surface. If he can suggest no other reason for the sacredness of Sinai than (p. 34), "the storm that broke on the mountains of Sinai, and rolled across the desert in fertilising showers, made the godhead of Jehovah real," and if the teachings of the prophets were such as he *in extenso* represents them to be, we cannot help suspecting that his distrust of the supernatural facts of the Bible contributed to his reluctance to lay too much stress upon them.

And when he proposes (p. 16) to place the defenders of revelation on such vantage-ground that they "need no longer be afraid to allow free discussion of the details of its history,"—that "they can afford to meet every candid inquirer on the fair field of history, and to form their judgment on the actual course of revelation by the ordinary methods of historical investigation,"—the implication seems to be that a fair application of the ordinary methods of historical investigation would seriously alter the views commonly entertained respecting the actual course of revelation; and this it is the object of the volume before us to establish in regard to the prophets.

It informs us, for instance, that the prophet Elijah was indifferent to the worship of the golden calves (p. 109). It seems that Hosea was the first to discover that there was anything wrong in this form of idolatry:—

"There is no feature in Hosea's prophecy which distinguishes him from earlier prophets so sharply as his attitude to the golden calves, the local symbols of Jehovah adored in the northern sanctuaries. Elijah and Elisha had no quarrel with the traditional worship of their nation. Even Amos never speaks in condemnation of the calves" (p. 175). "The revolution inaugurated by Elijah and Elisha appealed to the conservatism of the nation. It was followed therefore by no attempt to remodel the traditional forms of Jehovah's worship, which continued essentially as they had been since the time of the Judges. The golden calves remained undisturbed, though they were plainly out of place in the worship of a Deity who had so markedly separated himself from the gods of the nations" (p. 96).

Such statements cannot be characterised otherwise than as an atrocious misrepresentation. If there is any one thing of which Jehovah expresses his utter abhorrence everywhere throughout the Scriptures, it is the practice of idolatry in whatever form; and that a true prophet of the Lord, jealous as Elijah was for his name and worship in a time of widespread apostasy, and to whose divine commission such signal attestations were given by the Lord himself, could possibly have been "indifferent" to what was so grossly dishonouring to God, or, as it is mildly put in the passage above cited, "plainly out of place" in his worship, is absolutely beyond belief. The earlier prophets were precisely of the same mind with Hosea in respect to the golden calves. Ahijah of Shiloh, in the tribe of Ephraim, who had foreshown to Jeroboam his elevation to the throne (1 Kings xi. 29 ff.), denounced his sin in the strongest terms (xiv. 9). So did the man of God who came from Judah to prophesy against Jeroboam's altar (xiii. 2), and whose words were reaffirmed even by the lying prophet of Bethel (ver. 32). And Jehu, the son of Hanani, uttered a like message of denunciation to Baasha for walking in the way of Jeroboam (xvi. 1, 2). Jehoshaphat's distrust of the four hundred prophets who professed to declare to Ahab the will of the Lord, and his insisting on a prophet of Jehovah besides, shows what he thought of the worship of the calves; and when Micaiah was summoned, he distinctly charged his antagonists with speaking under the influence of a lying spirit (1 Kings xxii.).

Unless therefore Dr. Robertson Smith is prepared to deny with Kuenen that any dependence is to be put upon predictions recorded in the historical books, the prophets did lift up their

voice against the worship of the calves from the very beginning. And even though these particular narratives be discredited, the fact remains; for such stories could not have arisen, and gained credence, unless they correctly represented the known attitude of the Lord's true prophets.

We are told (p. 109) that the histories of Elijah and Elisha, as "every one can see," are ancient and distinct documents, which represent an earlier belief than the Books of Kings in which they have been incorporated. It is nevertheless plain that the author of Kings, who never lets slip an opportunity to express his detestation of the worship of the calves, could not have suspected Elijah or Elisha of complicity with it, or he would not have failed to enter his dissent (2 Kings xvii. 13). If the reformation undertaken by Elijah aimed at nothing more than was accomplished by Jehu, it would have been spoken of in similar terms (2 Kings x. 28, 29). These lectures, however, assert that Elijah's zeal was not directed against the golden calves, which were recognised symbols of Jehovah, but simply against the service of Baal; though "in building and endowing a temple for his wife, Ahab did no more than Solomon had done without exciting much opposition on the part of his people." Perhaps the Doctor forgets that on this very account Solomon was threatened with the loss of his kingdom (1 Kings xi. 33), and the danger was sufficiently formidable to lead him to seek the life of Jeroboam (ver. 40). Ahab, it seems, had no idea that he was breaking the first commandment. "Even if we are to suppose that practical religious questions were expressly referred to the words of this precept, it would not have been difficult to interpret them in a sense that meant only that no other God should have the pre-eminence over Israel's king." If this be so, we do not see why a like latitude of interpretation might not have been applied to Deut. xii. 5, and "the place which the Lord shall choose" have been understood to mean any place whatever where divine worship was established. Jeroboam may not have thought himself guilty of any infraction of this law, nor any other adherent of the alleged "local sanctuaries." What then becomes of the argument for the non-existence of Deuteronomy, drawn from the neglect of this fundamental statute? It was simply set aside by a mistaken exegesis.

Elijah's austere opposition to "the god of a friendly state" was an advance upon all previous practice :—

"Hitherto all Israel's interest in Jehovah had had practical reference to his contests with the gods of hostile nations, and it was one thing to worship deities who were felt to be Jehovah's rivals and foes, and quite another thing to allow some recognition to the deity of an allied race. But Elijah saw deeper into the true character of the God of Israel. Where he was worshipped, no other god could be acknowledged in any sense. This was a proposition of tremendous practical issues. It really involved the political isolation of the nation ; for, as things then stood, it was impossible to have friendship and alliance with other peoples if their gods were proscribed in Israel's land. It is not strange that Ahab, as a politician, fought with all his might against such a view ; for it contained more than the germ of that antagonism between Israel and all the rest of mankind which made the Jews appear to the Roman historian as the enemies of the human race, and brought upon them an unbroken succession of political misfortunes, and the ultimate loss of all place among the nations" (p. 80). "From the point of view of national politics, the fall of Ahab was a step in the downfall of Israel. . . . In this respect, the work of Elijah foreshadows that of the prophets of Judah, who in like manner had no small part in breaking up the political life of the kingdom" (p. 78).

From all this it may be inferred that Ahab was a more sagacious statesman, even if he was not a better man, than Elijah ; and, while religion might have suffered, the political prosperity of Israel and of Judah would have been greater if Elijah and the prophets had not interfered as they did. It was not without reason, then, that Ahab accosted the Tishbite as the troubler of Israel (1 Kings xviii. 17). This libel upon the prophets, and apology for impious transgressors and persecutors, which is continued *ad nauseam*, overlooks the cardinal fact that virtue and piety, and the blessing of Jehovah, are the true foundations of national welfare. It was the loss of these, far more than the want of foreign alliances, or even the encroachments of the great empires, which led to Israel's downfall.

Elijah's ministry was exercised in a great crisis. The idolatrous worship of Jehovah established by Jeroboam was not enough for Ahab ; he openly introduced the worship of Baal, and sought to make it the religion of the state (1 Kings xvi. 31-33). It may be true that he did not intend to give up the service of Jehovah (p. 48) as this was represented by the golden calves ; but the Lord's altars were thrown down, and

his true prophets slain with the sword (xix. 14), or forced to hide themselves in caves (xviii. 13). In this state of things, when the alternative was between Jehovah and Baal, rather than between the pure and the corrupted service of Jehovah, it need not surprise us if the golden calves are not more directly and pointedly alluded to. If some one were to place in our hands a plea for the Christian religion, issued when atheism and ungodliness were rampant in the French Revolution, would it ever enter our minds to charge its author with "indifference" to the various corruptions which have defaced Christianity, because these were not discussed in the pamphlet? Elijah shows plainly enough where he stood, and to what he would recall the people. He never said or did anything which can be tortured into approval of the golden calves. He never sacrificed before them himself, nor urged others to do so. His one great sacrifice, designed to demonstrate to the people of the Ten Tribes the deity of Jehovah, was offered, not at Bethel,¹ nor at Dan, but at Carmel. He addressed Jehovah as "the God of Abraham, Isaac, and of Israel" (1 Kings xviii. 36). Now we are told (p. 117) that the narratives of the patriarchs, as we possess them, are for the most part gathered about the "northern sanctuaries," and were there constantly rehearsed. They must therefore correctly represent the ideas which Elijah and his countrymen had of their ancestors, and of the great object of their worship. From them we learn that Jehovah was to the patriarchs "the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth" (Gen. xiv. 22; xxiv. 3), the almighty (xvii. 1) and everlasting God (xxi. 33), who has all nature under his control (xlix. 25), whose dwelling is in heaven (xix. 24; xxviii. 12, 13), who, when he manifested himself on earth, appeared in human form (xviii. 1, 2; xxxii. 24, 30), and who was worshipped without any idolatrous symbols (xxxv. 2; comp. xxxi. 19, 30).

Jehovah was to Elijah not only supreme but exclusive in his

¹ We subjoin here some characteristic specimens of Wellhausen's fairness in statement. He speaks (Bleek's *Einleitung*, p. 246) of Elijah as fleeing for his life "to the ancient sanctuary of Beersheba, in southern Judah, which was much frequented likewise by Israel," because he left his servant at that most southern point of the country, on his way to Sinai (1 Kings xix. 3 ff.). Again (p. 245), "he was nourished by a widow, in the very land of Baal, thus showing not the least hatred to heathenism in itself." How far he sanctioned heathenism by that visit appears from xvii. 12, 14, 24.

Godhead (1 Kings xviii. 21, 24). It is not merely that "there was no room for two gods in the land" (p. 76). Elijah makes no such limitation; to his mind there could be but one God in existence. Such a conception of God does not consist with image-worship, which is, moreover, confirmed by his ridicule of the senselessness and vanity of idolatry (ver. 27). The twelve stones of the altar (ver. 31) show that he did not recognise the rightfulness of the schism, nor, consequently, of the apostasy to the worship of the calves, which was one of its direst fruits. But he utters his mind in a more direct and positive manner, when he declares to Ahab, in the name of Jehovah, "I will make thine house like the house of Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, and like the house of Baasha, the son of Ahijah." The whole passage (xxi. 21-24) is a manifest repetition of the language of preceding prophets (xiv. 10, 11; xvi. 2-4), and the reference to the crime of the golden calves is unmistakable. They are classed along with serving Baal, as similarly offensive to Jehovah, and incurring a similar doom. It is confessed in these Lectures (p. 99) that Hosea, ii. 5, 8, 13, means by Baalim "the local manifestations of Jehovah under the form of the golden calves." Ahijah expressly calls them "other gods" (1 Kings xiv. 9). We are accordingly justified in assuming, that, when Elijah charges both Ahab and his father's house (xviii. 18) with having "forsaken the commandments of the Lord and followed Baalim," he combines Ahab's service of Baal and Omri's service of the golden calves (xvi. 25, 26) under a common name.¹ The image-worship nominally paid to Jehovah is an offence of like character with the open and declared worship of Baal, and finds in this its culmination. To the prophet these are different grades of the same criminality, and, in standing up for Jehovah against Baal, he sets the pure worship of the one true God against them both alike.

In answer to Elijah's complaint against Israel the Lord directs him among other things (1 Kings xix. 15) to anoint Hazael to be king over Syria, that his sword may inflict deserved punishment. Elisha subsequently fulfils this com-

¹ This is still the case if "thou," in this verse, is restricted to Ahab alone; for his father's house, which worshipped the calves, is involved with him in "forsaking the commandments of the Lord."

mission (2 Kings viii. 12, 13), and Hazeel executes the appointed vengeance, but not until the reigns of Jehu and Jehoahaz (x. 32; xiii. 3, 22), after the worship of Baal had been abolished and that of the calves re-established. Elijah therefore foretells a penalty to be inflicted on the worshippers of the golden calves; and this is in direct response to his arraignment of Israel for having forsaken the covenant of Jehovah. This conclusion cannot be evaded even by the desperate expedient of assuming a *vaticinium ex eventu*; for the narrative, which puts this prophecy in the mouth of Elijah, is not from the fault-finding "Judæan editor" but "clearly took shape in the northern kingdom" (p. 116). It is correctly conceived therefore in the spirit of Elijah. And we are at liberty to conclude that it would have been quite in character for him to regard Hazeel's invasion of Israel as a proper penalty for their forsaking Jehovah's covenant, though their adoration was paid not to Baal but to the golden calves.

The significance of Elijah's journey of forty days and forty nights unto Horeb, the Mount of God (1 Kings xix. 8), is acknowledged in the Lectures (p. 83):—

"It is highly characteristic, for his whole standing, that in the greatest danger of his life, when the victory of Jehovah on Mount Carmel seemed to be all in vain, he retired to the desert of Sinai, to the ancient mountain of God. It was the God of the Exodus to whom he appealed, the ancient king of Israel in the journeyings through the Wilderness." "The God whom he declared to Israel was the God of Moses."

It might be supposed from this that some satisfactory statement was about to be made respecting the conception of Jehovah, which this transaction involved. And we experience something like the sensation of suddenly dropping down from the sublime to the trivial, when we find that all this prelude has no further meaning than that Elijah, as a native of Gilead, had a proclivity for "the old nomadic life of the age of Moses," and was akin to the Nazarites, whose "vow to abstain from wine . . . was undoubtedly a religious protest against Canaanite civilisation in favour of the simple life of ancient times."

We press the question, however: What notions were entertained of the God of Moses, whom Elijah by this significant action so plainly declares to be his God likewise? A few quotations will show us the point of view from which this

question is regarded by Dr. Robertson Smith. He tells us (p. 70) that the difference between Jehovah and other gods

"was not defined once for all in a theological dogma, but made itself felt in the attitude which Jehovah actually took up towards Israel in historical dealings with his nation.

"The current ideas of the Hebrews about unseen things were mainly the common stock of the Semitic peoples, and nothing is more certain than that neither Moses nor Samuel gave Israel any new system of metaphysical theology. In matters of thought as well as of practice, the new revelation of Jehovah's power and love, given through Moses, or rather given in actual saving deeds of Jehovah which Moses taught the people to understand, involved no sudden and absolute break with the past, or with the traditions of the past common to Israel with kindred nations. Its epoch-making importance lay in quite another direction—in the introduction into Israel's historical life of a new personal factor—of Jehovah himself as the God of Israel's salvation. . . . It was from this personal experience of Jehovah's character, read in the actual history of his dealings with his people, that the great teachers of Israel learned, but learned by slow degrees, to lay down general propositions about divine things. To suppose that the Old Testament history began with a full scheme of doctrine, which the history only served to illustrate and enforce, is to invert the most general law of God's dealings with man, whether in the way of nature or of grace" (p. 58). "General propositions about divine things are not the basis but the outcome of such personal knowledge of Jehovah, just as in ordinary human life a general view of a man's character must be formed by observation of his attitude and action in a variety of special circumstances" (p. 82).

There is much in all this that is true and vastly important. Only God's revelation is arbitrarily limited to his manifestation of himself in history, which men are to interpret with more or less divine assistance; while his direct and positive communications in matters of faith and duty are altogether overlooked. The principles above stated are applied to the age of Moses with the following result,—all preceding revelations made to the patriarchs being peremptorily set aside:—

"It would seem that the memory of the God of the Hebrew fathers was little more than a dormant tradition when Moses began his work" (p. 33). When Jehovah delivered them from the oppression of Egypt, "the new circumstances of Israel . . . created a multitude of new questions. On these Moses had to decide, and he sought the decision from Jehovah, whose ark now led the march of Israel" (p. 36). From these solitary facts the lecturer deduces (p. 40) "the essential difference between Jehovah and the Baalim, which had to be preserved amidst all changes of circumstances if Jehovah was still to maintain his individuality. In the first place . . . Jehovah represented a principle of national unity, while the worship of the

Baalim was split into a multitude of local cults without national significance."¹ Further, "Jehovah represented to Israel two of the greatest blessings that any people can enjoy. . . . The first of these was *liberty*, for it was Jehovah that brought Israel forth from the house of bondage; the second was *law, justice, and the moral order of society*, for from the days of Moses the mouth of Jehovah was the one fountain of judgment. So in the Ten Words, the fundamental document of the religion of the Old Testament, the claim of Jehovah to the exclusive worship of Israel is based on the deliverance that made Israel a free people, and issues in the great laws of social morality."

But if the Ten Words are Mosaic, and may be taken into the account in estimating the knowledge of God which was then possessed, they imply a conception of him vastly beyond the meagre and purely political ideas suggested in these Lectures. Dr. Robertson Smith does not tell us just what he thinks of the Ten Words. From the manner in which they are here referred to, it might be taken for granted that he ascribed them to the period of the Exodus.² But the contents of the first table are strangely overlooked. And he seems quite oblivious of any connection between Mount Sinai and the giving of the Ten Commandments. God's "kingly seat on earth" he tells us (p. 34) was by "an ancient tradition placed on Mount Sinai, which still appears in the song of Deborah as the place from which the divine majesty goes forth in thunder-storm and rain to bring victory to Israel;" and (p. 43) "in the song of Deborah,

¹ If this be so, we submit that, upon the Doctor's own showing, it is naturally to be expected that Moses would issue just such a command as that in Deut. xii. 5. Later events may have interfered with its strict observance. But if "the religion of Jehovah . . . lost the best part of its original meaning when divorced from the idea of national unity" (p. 47), it would have been an unaccountable oversight in Moses not to have enjoined the perpetuation of that unity of the Sanctuary which was so essential, and which it is confessed was maintained in the wilderness and during the conquest.

² *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church* (p. 331) seems to impute the writing of the Ten Words to Moses, and (p. 334) plainly fixes them in the life of the great legislator. The Doctor there says: "The events of Sinai, and the establishment of the covenant on the basis of the Ten Words, did not cut short this kind of Torah," i.e. Moses' judging "his contemporaries by bringing individual hard cases before Jehovah for decision." This can only be reconciled with what he represents to be the Mosaic idea of God by assuming that the Ten Words of Moses were very different from the Ten Commandments as we now possess them. But of this he gives us no hint.

And there are other cases in which we are left in some uncertainty as to the Doctor's precise meaning. Thus in the volume before us (p. 34) he speaks of Jehovah as having "wrought the great deliverance at the Red Sea;" and he finds in the Exodus "a marvellous display of Jehovah's saving strength . . . when the proud waters rolled between the Hebrews and the

Jehovah has not yet a fixed seat in the land of Canaan, but goes forth from Sinai to help his people in their distress." It might with precisely the same propriety be inferred from Hab. iii. 3, that Jehovah had not a fixed seat in Canaan down to the time of Habakkuk, but still came forth from the desert for the succour of his people. All the sacredness of Sinai is in consequence of the revelations which Jehovah there made of himself to Moses (Ex. iii. 2) and to Israel. No trace is to be found of any prior hallowing of the place, or of its being hallowed for any other reason. In the narrative of the first of the divine manifestations granted there, Horeb is called "the mountain of God" (Ex. iii. 1; comp. iv. 27) by anticipation; just as Eben-ezer is spoken of (1 Sam. iv. 1) before it received that name (vii. 12), or as we might say that the Indians wandered along the Hudson or over Mount Washington before America was visited by Europeans.

Every allusion to Sinai or to Horeb in the Old Testament is linked with the marvellous occurrences recorded at length in Ex. xix. xx., and is a fresh confirmation of their truth. The song of Deborah celebrates the victory over Sisera by him who once met Israel at Sinai with cloud and tempest, while the earth trembled and the mountain shook (Judg. v. 4, 5; comp.

shattered power of the Egyptians." We would never have dreamed that this could mean less than the miraculous interference which this transaction has always denoted to the great mass of the readers of Scripture, were it not that in the very same connection the Lord's descent upon Sinai is frittered away to a thunder-storm; and in all the discussion about Elijah the supernatural events in his life are not once alluded to. The Doctor is ordinarily so frank in the statement of his views, even the most startling, that we can imagine no motive for concealment here, much less for the employment of misleading phrases. Perhaps we do him injustice by the suggestion, but this unwonted reticence inclines us to suspect some remaining hesitation in his own mind respecting the ultimate issue of "historical investigation" into these matters, and a disinclination to drift altogether away from long-cherished traditional opinions until the last strand of the cable is parted.

Wellhausen, however, has no hesitation on this point. We quote from his article "Israel," in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (vol. xiii. p. 397), in which he says of Moses and the Exodus: "It was not through any merit of his that the undertaking (of which he was the soul) prospered as it did; his design was aided in a wholly unlooked-for way, by a marvellous occurrence quite beyond his control, and which no sagacity could possibly have foreseen. One whom the wind and sea obeyed had given him his aid. Behind him stood one higher than he, whose spirit wrought in him, and whose arm wrought for him. . . . It was Jehovah. Alike what was done by the deliberate purpose of Moses, and what was done without any human contrivance, by nature and by accident, came to be regarded in one great totality as the doing of Jehovah for Israel."

Ps. lxxviii. 8, 17). The blessing of Moses (Deut. xxxiii.)—though its genuineness is denied in the face of the positive declaration in ver. 1, corroborated as this is by internal evidence—yet “shows us better,” we are told (p. 118), “than any other part of Scripture how thoughtful and godly men of the northern kingdom understood the religion of Jehovah.” Confessedly, then, it shows us the belief entertained by Elijah that God revealed himself to Israel at Sinai, in brilliant splendour, and there gave them his law through the instrumentality of Moses (vers. 2-5; comp. Hab. iii. 3, 4; Neh. ix. 13; Mal. iv. 4). And the prophet’s visit to Horeb was not merely to some traditional seat of the Godhead, but to the place where Jehovah gave his law to Israel in awful magnificence, and where he established that covenant with them which the children of Israel had now so basely forsaken.

Now of this law—that in actual fact and in the belief of Elijah (which is the point of especial consequence to us just now) was given at Sinai—the Decalogue must undoubtedly have been a part. It is the Ten Commandments which are said to have been spoken by the mouth of God amid the grand displays which betokened his presence on the mountain. And the ark, which is admitted to be as old as the time of Moses¹ (pp. 36, 43), contained the tables of stone on which the Ten Words were written (Ex. xxxiv. 28; xl. 20; Deut. x. 4, 5; 1 Kings viii. 9, 21), and was hence called the Ark of the Testimony (Ex. xxv. 21, 22) and the Ark of the Covenant (Judg. xx. 27). The existence of the ark is a palpable evidence, which cannot be set aside, of the antiquity of the commandments inscribed on these tables. If anything whatever is known of the Mosaic age, it is certainly known that the Ten Commandments were given then. There is nothing more surely accredited than

¹ Even Wellhausen owns (article “Israel,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, vol. xiii. p. 398) that “Jehovah’s chief, perhaps in the time of Moses his only, sanctuary was with the so-called Ark of the Covenant.” So Kuenen (*Religion of Israel*, vol. i. p. 289): “Scarcely any tradition of Hebrew antiquity is better guaranteed than that which derives the ark of Jahveh from the lawgiver himself.” The atrocious manner in which the latter critic is capable of perverting history may be illustrated by his utterly baseless substitution of an image of the deity, or a fetich, for the tables of the law (p. 233): “Was the ark empty, or did it contain a stone—Jahveh’s real abode, of which the ark was only the repository? This we do not know, although the latter opinion, in connection with the later accounts of the Pentateuch, appears to us to possess great probability.”

this, whether by historical testimony or by monumental evidence.

Wellhausen, however, is keen-sighted enough to perceive that if the antiquity of the Ten Commandments is allowed, his whole critical hypothesis is undermined. "If," he says (article "Israel," p. 399), "the legislation of the Pentateuch cease as a whole to be regarded as an authentic source for our knowledge of what Mosaism was, it becomes a somewhat precarious matter to make any exception in favour of the Decalogue." He accordingly urges the four following arguments against its authenticity.¹

"(1.) According to Ex. xxxiv. the commandments which stood upon the two tables were quite different."

The ingenious conceit was first suggested by Goethe, that the laws of Ex. xxxiv. are the Ten Commandments according to a different tradition from that followed in Ex. xx. and Deut. v. It rests upon the assumption that the last clause in ver. 28 records the fulfilment of the direction given, ver. 27, to Moses to write the words which precede, and which are alleged to be just ten laws, and hence identical with the commandments written upon the tables.² Its falsity appears from ver. 1, which shows that Jehovah, and not Moses,³ wrote upon the tables, and that he wrote not the words now spoken but those that were in the first tables, which Moses had broken. This is a plain allusion to the preceding narrative (Ex. xxxii. 19) of the sin of the golden calf and the consequent rupture of the

¹ Kuenen, on the other hand, admits the authenticity of "the Ten Words as a whole," but saves himself by arbitrarily rejecting as much of each individual commandment as he sees fit. "The tradition which ascribes them to Moses is worthy of respect on account of its undisputed antiquity. Nevertheless, if it were contradicted by the contents and form of the Words we should have to reject it. But this is not the case. Therefore we accept it. Reserving our right to subject each separate commandment to special criticism, and, if necessary, to deny its Mosaic origin, we acknowledge it as a fact that Moses, in the name of Jahveh, prescribed to the Israelitish tribes such a law as is contained in the Ten Words."—*Religion of Israel*, vol. i. p. 285.

² In identifying the words which Moses is here directed to write with the Ten Commandments (*The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 331) Dr. Robertson Smith appears to give his sanction to the extraordinary hypothesis now under consideration. But he does not openly avow it.

³ The change of subject in verse 28 cannot occasion the slightest embarrassment. It is of constant occurrence in Hebrew construction, where it would be readily understood by the reader or hearer. Comp. Gen. xxiv. 32; 2 Sam. xi. 13.

covenant so lately formed between Jehovah and Israel, which is further implied in the second pair of tables (xxxiv. 4), in the divine mercy and forgiveness emphasised in vers. 6, 7, in Moses' supplication (ver. 9), and in Jehovah's engaging to make the desired covenant (ver. 10). The words, vers. 11-26, according to the tenor of which God proposes to make this covenant, and which Moses is told to write, are taken substantially and in part *verbatim* from "the words of the Lord" which Moses wrote at the original ratification of the covenant (xxiii. 12 ff.). The selection is made with definite reference to the great crime just committed. As they had offended in the matter of worship, the injunction is repeated of the service to be paid to Jehovah, and to him exclusively. They had forfeited all claim upon his promise to expel the Canaanites; accordingly this is repeated likewise. While Moses was to rewrite this portion of the original engagement, which had been particularly infringed, thus impliedly giving fresh sanction to the whole as the representative of the people on whose behalf he had been interceding, the Lord once more engraved in stone the same Ten Words which he had uttered from Sinai in the audience of the people, thus re-enacting on his part his imperishable covenant.

And while the critics, who claim that a variant version of the Decalogue is to be found in Ex. xxxiv., are unanimous in affirming that this chapter contains just ten commandments, they are not altogether agreed where the first of the commandments begins nor how the division is to be made. From the diversity which exists among them it is plain that they could equally well have made out any other number that was desired, from seven to thirteen. And if it could be certainly established that there are just ten laws, it would not follow that, in the intent of the writer, they formed the original Decalogue. It has at least been quite plausibly maintained that the decenary structure prevails in several series of Mosaic laws, which are thus framed in imitation of the fundamental law of the system.

The commandments written upon tables of stone and preserved in the ark are consequently not recorded in Ex. xxxiv., but, as has been universally believed from the beginning, in Ex. xx. and Deut. v. These two are manifestly copies of one

and the same Decalogue, the textual discrepancies being purely verbal and without the slightest effect upon the sense except in the reason annexed to the fourth commandment. Exodus no doubt preserves the exact official transcript, and Deuteronomy its substantial repetition and enforcement by Moses in his address to the people. It is of no consequence, however, so far as our present argument is concerned, which of these is held to be the primitive form, or whether the attempt is made to elicit a text superior to either by the comparison of both.

Wellhausen's second objection to the authenticity of the Decalogue is (we quote again from the article "Israel") :—

"(2.) The prohibition of images was during the older period quite unknown ; Moses himself is said to have made a brazen serpent which down to Hezekiah's time continued to be worshipped at Jerusalem as an image of Jehovah."

The second commandment occasions endless perplexity to this most recent school of critics. How ineffectually Kuenen struggles to rid himself of it appears from the following passage in his *Religion of Israel* (vol. i. p. 287) :—

"Moses' attitude towards the worship of images is a very disputed point. The second of the Ten Words forbids it without reserve, but is strongly suspected to have been remoulded and enlarged. Its great length of itself alone gives rise to this presumption. If it embraced nothing more than the words 'Thou shalt have none other gods before my face,' we should not think of calling it incomplete ; the rest is superfluous, and is therefore suspected. Besides this, it has been remarked that the words 'thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or on the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth'—sever the connection between the preceding and the following sentences, and that after these words have been removed, nothing remains but the prohibition to serve other gods. Thus the Ten Words themselves alone give abundant ground for throwing doubt upon the Mosaic origin of the warning against images. But history also seems distinctly to bear witness against it. The worship of Jahveh under the form of a bull was very general in Israel in later times ; and in the kingdom of Ephraim, during the two and a half centuries of its existence, it was the religion of the state. Is it likely then that Moses expressly declared himself opposed to it ? According to a narrative in the Book of Judges, a grandson of Moses, Jonathan ben Gershom, served as a priest at Dan in a temple in which a graven image of Jahveh was placed : would the commandment of the law-giver have been broken in this way by the members of his own family ? Again, the author of the Books of Kings informs us that Hezekiah 'broke in pieces the brazen serpent which Moses had made, for unto those days

the Israelites had burned incense in honour of that serpent, and it was called *Nehushtan* ' (i.e. brass-god) ; surely this implies that Moses was not so averse to images as the Pentateuch represents him to have been."

Dr. Kuenen might have pushed his argument much further. Professedly Christian states grant divorces for very insufficient reasons : is it likely that this can be prohibited in the New Testament ? The Roman Catholic Church forbids its priests to marry, and commands its adherents to abstain from meats on Fridays and other special seasons : would it do this if 1 Tim. iv. 3 were in its canon of faith ? The Lord Jesus Christ instituted the Eucharist, the bread of which is held up to adoration in every celebration of the mass : would even Dr. Kuenen dare to hold him responsible for this perversion ? And yet this is all that he has to say against the Mosaic origin of the second commandment ; and this is taken back by himself in the very next paragraph. He owns that the story of the brazen serpent, as every rational man must see at a glance, " signifies very little." " If it proves anything it proves only this, that the people knew nothing of a Mosaic prohibition so absolute as that which appears in the Decalogue." Will he say the same of the more modern worshippers of saintly relics ? He adds : " The same applies to the other two facts to which we referred above. . . . The *existence* of the bull-worship is no sufficient argument against the supposition that Moses forbade any image of Jahveh. But the fact that this form of Jahveh-worship *continued to exist undisturbed* is very difficult to reconcile with that supposition." It " continued to exist undisturbed," only as other crimes which are perpetrated in the face of the known statute. It was not sanctioned or approved by the prophets or other good men. It was openly denounced and censured, and the people punished for it by being given into the power of their enemies. Dr. Kuenen proceeds :

" There is one fact of which we may not lose sight in this investigation. From the Mosaic times downward there always existed in Israel a worship of Jahveh without an image. Scarcely any tradition of Hebrew antiquity is better guaranteed than that which derives the *Ark of Jahveh* from the Lawgiver himself. . . . If Moses believed this (viz. that the Ark was the abode of Jahveh), and accordingly offered the common sacrifices before the Ark, then he himself certainly did not erect an image of Jahveh, much less ordained the use of one."

His conclusion is that while Moses opposed the use of

Jahveh-images indirectly, the prohibition of them "was not decreed by him, but at a much later period, although it was done in conformity with his spirit;" a conclusion which must be accepted, if at all, upon his sole *ipse dixit*.

Dr. Dillmann¹ gives the following compact statement of the case :—

"It cannot with good reason be maintained that such a prohibition, involving the idea of the impossibility of making any representation of God, as well as his invisibility and spirituality, is too advanced for Moses' time and his stage of knowledge, and therefore cannot have been given by him, but must have been first introduced into the Decalogue at a much later date. Apart from Ex. xxxii., where the narrative attributes to Moses a clear perception of the unlawfulness of an image of Jehovah, it is certain, in the first place, that in the traditions of their fathers a cultus without images is ascribed to the patriarchs; and secondly, that in the post-Mosaic period it was a recognised principle, at least at the central sanctuary of the entire people, and at the temple of Solomon, that no representation was to be made of Jehovah.² The worship of an image of Jehovah at Sinai (Ex. xxxii.), in the time of the Judges, and in the kingdom of the ten tribes, does not prove that the prohibition of images was unknown, but only that it was very difficult to secure its proper recognition by the mass of the people, especially of the northern tribes, who were more Canaanitishly disposed. Or rather, it was for centuries an object of contention between the stricter and the more lax party,—the latter holding that it forbade only the images of false gods, the former that it likewise forbade any image of Jehovah. Prophets such as Amos and Hosea, who contended against the images of the calves at Bethel and at Dan, never announce the principle that no representation can be made of Jehovah as anything new, but simply presuppose it as known. However far we go back in the post-Mosaic history, we find it already existing, at least as practically carried into effect at the central sanctuary; from whom, then, can it have proceeded but from the legislator, Moses himself?"

Dr. Robertson Smith does not explicitly deny the antiquity of the Decalogue, nor the right of the second commandment to a place in it, but he more than once expresses himself in a manner that appears to lead in that direction :—

"The principle of the second commandment, that Jehovah is not to be worshipped by images, which is often appealed to as containing the most characteristic peculiarity of Mosaism, cannot, in the light of history, be

¹ *Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus*, pp. 208, 209.

² As a specimen of the fairness of Wellhausen's statements, compare his remark, article "Israel," p. 406: "Images of the Deity were exhibited in all three places [Jerusalem, Bethel, and Dan], and indeed in every place where a house of God was found."

viewed as having had so fundamental a place in the religion of early Israel" (p. 63). "If the prophecy of Hosea stood alone it would be reasonable to think that this attack on the images of the popular religion was simply based on the second commandment. But when we contrast it with the absolute silence of earlier prophets we can hardly accept this explanation as adequate" (p. 176). Hosea does not condemn the worship of the calves because idols are forbidden by the Law; he excludes the calves from the sphere of true religion because the worship which they receive has no affinity to the true attitude of Israel to Jehovah" (p. 177).

How he can say that "Amos never speaks of the golden calves as the sin of the northern sanctuaries" (p. 140) is unaccountable, since this prophet expressly groups together as objects of the divine judgment, "they that swear by the sin of Samaria, and say, Thy god, O Dan, liveth, and, The manner of Beersheba liveth" (Am. viii. 14). The god of Dan can be nothing but the golden calf; and the sin of Samaria is the same thing, for they that swear by it, say, "By the life of thy god, O Dan." It is called the sin of Samaria as the object of idolatrous worship to both the capital and the kingdom; in like manner Hosea calls it the calf of Samaria (Hos. viii. 5, 6; comp. also Deut. ix. 21). The Doctor, in disregard of the connection, thinks that Amos alludes rather to the Ashera in Samaria (2 Kings xiii. 6). But why upon his principles, Amos should inveigh against this, even if it were still there in his time, is not so clear; for we are told¹ that this is one of "the old marks of a sanctuary . . . which had been used by the patriarchs and continued to exist in sanctuaries of Jehovah down to the eighth century," and the prohibition of which in Deuteronomy "is one of the clearest proofs" that this book is posterior to Hosea, Isaiah, and Micah. The terms in which Amos, with distinct allusion to the second commandment (Ex. xx. 4), expresses his contempt and abhorrence of the objects of Israel's idolatrous worship, "which ye made to yourselves" (v. 26), equally cover the golden calves, and include them in the same category of man-made divinities. (Comp. Hos. viii. 6.) He also very plainly declares that Jehovah was not to be found at Bethel (v. 5), which cannot be interpreted differently from the precisely similar language of Hosea iv. 15; that to worship at Bethel was to transgress (Am. iv. 4); that its altars were specially obnoxious to the divine judgment (iii. 14), while

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 353.

Zion and Jerusalem was Jehovah's earthly abode (i. 2). When these passages are viewed in connection with those first cited, it is plain that the idolatry of the calves is prominent in his thoughts in these denunciations.

Elisha's attitude to the golden calves is shown by the message which he sent to Jehu (2 Kings ix. 9), in which he repeated the very words of Elijah (1 Kings xxi. 22). When Jehoram, who had "put away the image of Baal that his father Ahab had made" and adhered simply to the worship of the calves (2 Kings iii. 2, 3), sought the aid of Elisha in perilous circumstances, the prophet's response was: "What have I to do with thee? Get thee to the prophets of thy father, and to the prophets of thy mother. . . . As the Lord of hosts liveth, before whom I stand, were it not that I regard the presence of Jehoshaphat king of Judah, I would not look toward thee, nor see thee"¹ (vers. 13, 14). It is also a significant fact that it was children of Bethel that mocked Elisha, and upon whom he pronounced his fatal curse (ii. 23, 24). In that seat of image-worship, the children had caught the bitter feelings of their elders towards the aged prophet of the Lord. It is further a suggestive circumstance that it is precisely in the kingdom of the ten tribes that the prophets assume such unwonted prominence, and that such full and striking narratives are given of their labours as these of Elijah, Elisha, and the sons of the prophets under their superintendence. Whether the record is accepted as true, or dismissed as legendary, it nevertheless shows, in contrast with the dearth of like stories in Judah, that either in the plan of God or in the general sense of the people there was a peculiarity in the state of affairs in Ephraim which did not exist in Judah, and which demanded a measure of prophetic interference and activity in the one, that was not requisite in the other.

The way in which the worship of the calves was regarded by other and earlier prophets has been shown already; so that all objection to the prior existence of the second commandment on that score is fully set aside.

¹ And this though the king, both in his exclamation (ver. 10) and in his appeal to the prophet (ver. 13), confessed his belief in the supreme government of Jehovah. "The Lord hath called these three kings together, to deliver them into the hand of Moab."

Wellhausen's third objection to the authenticity of the Decalogue is :—

"(3.) The essentially and necessarily national character of the older phases of the religion of Jehovah completely disappears in the quite universal code of morals which is given in the Decalogue as the fundamental law of Israel ; but the entire series of religious personalities throughout the period of the Judges and the Kings—from Deborah, who praised Jael's treacherous act of murder, to David, who caused his prisoners of war to be sawn asunder and burnt—make it very difficult to believe that the religion of Israel was from the outset one of a specifically moral character. The true spirit of the old religion may be gathered much more truly from Judg. v. than from Ex. xx."

Dr. Robertson Smith has relieved us from the necessity of replying to this objection. In opposition to both Wellhausen and Duhm, he affirms in the most positive manner that the religion of Israel was moral from the beginning, and that its specific character was determined by the exalted nature of Jehovah himself ; by which he means the living, acting personality of the Most High, and not barely the conceptions formed of him by his worshippers :—

"The real difference between the religion of Jehovah and the religion of the nations . . . lies in the personal character of Jehovah, and in the relations, corresponding to his character, which he seeks to maintain with his people. Properly speaking, the heathen deities have no personal character . . . in the sense of a fixed and independent habit of will. The attributes ascribed to them were a mere reflex of the attributes of their worshippers. . . . The god always remained on the same ethical level with his people. . . . Not so Jehovah. . . . He had a will and purpose of his own,—a purpose rising above the current ideas of his worshippers, and a will directed with steady consistency to a moral aim. . . . All his dealings with Israel were directed to lead the people on to higher things than their natural character inclined towards. To know Jehovah and to serve him aright involved a moral effort" (pp. 66, 67). "When we speak of Jehovah as displaying a consistent character in his sovereignty over Israel, we necessarily imply that Israel's religion is a moral religion, that Jehovah is a God of righteousness, whose dealings with his people follow an ethical standard" (p. 71)

And the difficulty which Wellhausen deduces from the low moral standard and conduct of certain Old Testament worthies is dealt with in the following manner :—

"The fundamental superiority of the Hebrew religion does not lie in the particular system of social morality that it enforces, but in the more absolute and self-consistent righteousness of the Divine Judge. . . . There are many

things in the social order of the Hebrews, such as polygamy, blood-revenge, slavery, the treatment of enemies, which do not correspond with the highest ideal morality, but belong to an imperfect social state, or, as the Gospel puts it, were tolerated for the hardness of the people's hearts. But, with all this, the religion of Jehovah put morality on a far sounder basis than any other religion did, because in it the righteousness of Jehovah as a God enforcing the known laws of morality was conceived as absolute, and as showing itself absolute, not in a future state, but upon earth. . . . There was no ground to ascribe to him less than absolute sovereignty and absolute righteousness. If the masses lost sight of those great qualities, and assimilated his nature to that of the Canaanite deities, the prophets were justified in reminding them that Jehovah was Israel's God before they knew the Baalim, and that he had then showed himself a God far different from these " (pp. 73, 74).

Wellhausen's fourth and last objection is :—

"(4.) It is extremely doubtful whether the actual monotheism which is undoubtedly presupposed in the universal moral precepts of the Decalogue could have formed the foundation of a national religion. It was first developed out of the national religion at the downfall of the nation, and thereupon kept its hold upon the people in an artificial manner by means of the idea of a covenant formed by the God of the universe with, in the first instance, Israel alone."

No further reply seems necessary to an allegation so purely subjective, than that Professor Wellhausen's opinion is no law to other persons.

If, then, anything whatever is certainly known of the Mosaic age, it is indubitably established that the Mosaic ark contained tables of stone on which were engraved the Ten Commandments. These were treasured in the most sacred apartment of the sanctuary. They formed the basis of the covenant between Jehovah and Israel. They were the fundamental law of the commonwealth of Israel, by which all further enactments were regulated, and to which they were supplementary. They were believed to have emanated directly, and even verbally, from Jehovah himself, and to have been by him recorded in stone to indicate their perpetual, binding force. This sacred ark, with its precious contents, was safely guarded until the time of Solomon, when it was transferred to the temple (1 Kings viii. 6-9, 21 ; 2 Chron. v. 7-10 ; vi. 11, 41). It is still spoken of in the time of Jeremiah (iii. 16), and the covenant on stone, which it contained, was only to be superseded by the law written on the heart (xxxi. 32, 33 ; see also 2 Chron. xxxv. 3). Under these circumstances it is impossible

that these commandments should not have been carefully and accurately preserved and transmitted. The positive statements in the Pentateuch itself that Moses wrote certain laws, Dr. Robertson Smith¹ seeks to limit to the Decalogue, but in so doing acknowledges that there is definite and explicit testimony that he did at least write it. Two copies of these commandments exist, attached to different codes of laws, and, with unimportant variations, are identical throughout. If monumental and historical evidence is of any worth, these are the very commandments delivered to Moses. And this conclusion is not to be set aside by conjectures of the critics, which have not even the pretence of any evidence to support them.²

These things being so, some important consequences follow. The sacredness of Horeb to Elijah sprang from the giving of the Ten Commandments on its summit; and his recognition of the God of Horeb is in diametrical opposition to the worship of the calves.

But there are also two other deductions which have a much wider reach. First, Moses had a far more exalted conception of Jehovah than is allowed to him in these Lectures. The God of the Ten Commandments is a being of whom no image or representation can be made; the Creator of heaven and earth and sea, and all that in them is; the exclusive object of Israel's worship; a God of truth, punishing iniquity, and who lays his demands upon the affections and not merely upon the outward conduct, expecting the love of his worshippers, and forbidding them to covet the possessions of others. The religion of Israel began on this high plane, so far as divine revelation and requirements are concerned. And the prophets, instead of evolving a spiritual religion from mere political ethics, or something lower still, simply recalled the people to this ancient standard, and enforced upon their contemporaries what had already been taught by Moses.

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 331.

² Such assertions as these of Wellhausen cannot be dignified by the name of proofs, unless his word is to be taken in lieu of evidence: "Some passages of the Decalogue have a Deuteronomic tinge, e.g. 'thy stranger that is within thy gates' (Ex. xx. 10), 'out of the house of bondage' (ver. 2), and the whole of ver. 6." How does he know but that, on the other hand, Deuteronomy received its tinge from the Decalogue? "The reason for the law of the Sabbath in ver. 11 first came from the last redacteur of the Pentateuch." —*Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, xxi. p. 558.

Secondly, the Decalogue affords palpable instances of laws well known, and of the highest authority, which were flagrantly disregarded. Every apostasy to Baal and Ashtoreth in the period of the Judges was in open violation of the first commandment. It was, as Dr. Robertson Smith concedes, a falling away to the service of the gods of their enemies, which endangered the very existence of the religion of Jehovah. It was a departure from the fundamental law of Israel, even on the low ground assumed by the critics themselves that Jehovah was but a national deity like Chemosh or Milcom. And if Ahab could persuade himself that worshipping the god of a friendly state was no violation of this commandment, this is but a fresh illustration of the point in question. The second commandment was broken by Aaron at the very foot of Sinai, by the idolater Micah and the renegade Danites, and by the ten tribes which followed Jeroboam in the worship of the calves. If there could be these notorious violations of covenant laws, cut in stone and deposited in the ark, what becomes of the argument that the non-existence of a statute may be inferred from the persistent disregard of it?

These two principles, thus established, completely overturn this recent critical hypothesis from its foundations, and demolish its reconstructed history of Israel's religion. The ark of the covenant is an invincible argument of its utter falsity.

Dr. Robertson Smith undertakes (p. 109) to divide the histories of the Old Testament into distinct groups, and to assign to each a separate legal standard according to the period in which it was written:—

"The latest history in the Books of Chronicles presupposes the whole Pentateuch; the main thread of the Books of Kings accepts the standard of the Book of Deuteronomy, but knows nothing of the Levitical legislation; and older narratives now incorporated in the Kings—as, for example, the histories of Elijah and Elisha, which every one can see to be ancient and distinct documents—know nothing of the Deuteronomic law of the one altar, and, like Elijah himself, are indifferent even to the worship of the golden calves. These older narratives, with the greater part of the Books of Samuel and Judges, accept as fitting and normal a stamp of worship closely modelled on the religion of the patriarchs as it is depicted in Genesis, or based on the ancient law of Ex. xx. 24, where Jehovah promises to meet with his people and bless them at the altars of earth or unhewn stone which stand in all corners of the land, on every spot where Jehovah has set a memorial of his name."

The histories of Elijah and Elisha are not indifferent to the worship of the golden calves; and they would not have been modelled on the religion of the patriarchs if they were. In the entire lives of these two prophets there is but one recorded act of sacrifice, the miraculous test of Jehovah's Godhead at Carmel. If a sweeping conclusion is to be drawn from this single fact, it would certainly be as natural to infer that they chose to abstain from sacrifice on ordinary occasions, inasmuch as they were debarred from the central sanctuary, as that they actually did sacrifice in various parts of the land, though this is nowhere intimated in the narrative.

It is plainly, however, a venturesome affirmation that Deuteronomy was unknown, or even the Levitical law, when these narratives were framed. Elijah's first word to the idolatrous king, "There shall be no rain" (1 Kings xvii. 1), is in precise conformity with the threatening in Deut. xi. 16, 17. The material for sacrifice and its manipulation (xviii. 23, 33), accords with the requirements of the law, even to the use of its technical terms (Lev. i. 6-8; ix. 16); its time was fixed by that of the daily meat-offering (xviii. 29, 36), which was presented both evening and morning (2 Kings iii. 20), agreeably to Ex. xxix. 38-41; its consumption by fire from the Lord (xviii. 24, 38) has its counterpart in Lev. ix. 24. Indeed, almost all the miracles in these narratives bear a striking resemblance to those of the Pentateuch; *e.g.* the supernatural supply of food (xvii. 6; xix. 6; comp. Ex. xvi. 12) and of water (2 Kings iii. 17; comp. Num. xx. 8); necessary things made to last for an indefinite period (1 Kings xvii. 14; comp. Deut. xxix. 5); fire to consume the prophet's adversaries (2 Kings i. 10, 12; comp. Num. xi. 1; xvi. 35); the Lord's "taking" him to heaven (ii. 3 ff.; comp. Gen. v. 24); dividing the Jordan (ii. 8, 14; comp. Ex. xiv. 21; Josh. iv. 23); healing the waters (ii. 21; comp. Ex. xv. 25); the promise of a son to the Shunammite (iv. 16; comp. Gen. xviii. 10); the infliction of leprosy on Gehazi (v. 27; comp. Num. xii. 10¹); the healing of Naaman (v. 10; comp. Num. xii. 13; Lev. xiv. 7, 8); guarded by angels (vi. 17; comp. Gen. xxxii. 1, 2); smiting

¹ "Leprous as snow" occurs only in these passages and in Ex. iv. 6. And in some other instances here adduced the identity of characteristic expressions adds force to the similarity of the incidents.

with blindness (vi. 18; comp. Gen. xix. 11). Even if it should be charged that these are legends and not real occurrences, such stories could only have originated among a people familiar with the narratives of the Pentateuch. The slaughter of the priests of Baal (1 Kings xviii. 40) was in obedience to Deut. xiii. 9, xvii. 5. Elijah's visit to Horeb implies all that made this mountain sacred at the time of the Exodus, and his fast of forty days and forty nights (xix. 8) has its parallel in Ex. xxxiv. 28. The law concerning one devoted to utter destruction (xx. 42) is found Lev. xxvii. 29. Naboth's refusal to part with his vineyard (xxi. 3) is based on Lev. xxv. 23; comp. Num. xxxvi. 8, 9. The forms of law were observed in the judicial murder of Naboth (xxi. 10). The accusation was based on Ex. xxii. 28, which Dr. Robertson Smith considers ancient; but the two witnesses are in conformity with Num. xxxv. 30, Deut. xvii. 6, 7, xix. 15; and the mode of inflicting the sentence with Deut. xiii. 10, xxvii. 5. Micaiah (xxii. 17) adopts the language of Moses (Num. xxvii. 17), and, ver. 28, declares his readiness to abide by the test given of a true prophet (Deut. xviii. 22). The double portion which Elisha asks (2 Kings ii. 9), was the legal inheritance of a first-born son (Deut. xxi. 17). The infliction upon the children at Bethel (ver. 24) is in accordance with Lev. xxvi. 22. Persons were made servants for debt (iv. 1; comp. Lev. xxv. 39, 40). The Sabbath and new-moon were observed (iv. 23; see Lev. xxiii. 3; Num. xxviii. 11), and presentation was made of the first-fruits (iv. 42;¹ see Num. xviii. 12, 13; Deut. xviii. 4, 5); but, in the absence of a lawful sanctuary, the "holy convocation" assembled about the prophet, and his devout adherents brought the first-fruits to him as to one who, for the time, "ministered in the name of the Lord." 2 Kings v. 7 borrows from Deut. xxxii. 39. The king, no doubt, recognised in the horrid transaction (vi. 28, 29) the fulfilment of Lev. xxvi. 29, Deut. xxviii. 53, and was the more exasperated against Elisha in consequence. "Make windows in heaven" (vii. 2, 19) alludes to Gen. vii. 11, and is equivalent to saying, "Send a deluge of bread." The law of leprosy was enforced even in a time of siege (vii. 3; comp. Lev. xiii. 46; Num. v. 2).

¹ The word translated "full ears of corn" occurs nowhere else, in this sense, outside of the Levitical law (Lev. ii. 14; xxiii. 14).

Now, it is not here affirmed that any one of these allusions, or all taken together, amount to an invincible demonstration of the existence of Deuteronomy and of the Levitical law before the time of Elijah and Elisha, or that they admit of no other possible explanation; but it is safe to say that these allusions are as numerous and clear as could reasonably be expected if Deuteronomy and Leviticus were then already known; that no prejudice can possibly arise against the common belief on this subject from any deficiency in such allusions; and that the presumption which they naturally create in its favour is not to be magisterially set aside, but only by the production of counter evidence of a decisive nature, and this does not exist.

The Doctor tells us further that "the main thread of the Books of Kings . . . knows nothing of the Levitical legislation." It has always been thought difficult to prove a negative; but the critics do it without the slightest trouble. Any witness who did not see the culprit commit the deed, ought, in their judgment, to convince the jury of his innocence. It would certainly be very stupid in any one to adduce the absence of classical quotations from the volume before us in proof that the Doctor knows nothing of the classics. He abstained from such quotations simply because he found no occasion to make them in the course of his discussion. If the sacred historian had no reason for speaking of the distinctive requirements of the Levitical law, the fact of his not mentioning them has no significance. His silence respecting them is no argument that he was not aware of their existence, or that he did not recognise their binding authority. No adverse conclusion can be drawn unless something is positively said, which is incompatible with the existence of the law or with the writer's knowledge of its existence.

But do the Books of Kings, in fact, know nothing of the Levitical law? The elaborate description of Solomon's temple and its vessels (1 Kings vi. vii.), and the entry into it of the glory of the Lord (viii. 10, 11), presupposes the account of the Mosaic tabernacle and its furniture (Ex. xxv. ff.; xxxvi. ff.). The correspondence, not only in general plan but in a multitude of details, is so exact and pervading that one must of necessity have been derived from the other. The

temple is either an enlarged tabernacle, built of more solid materials; or else the tabernacle is reduced in size from the temple, so as to be capable of being transported from place to place. The most radical critics do not shrink from the latter alternative. They do not hesitate to assert that the account in Exodus of the Mosaic tabernacle is altogether fictitious; that it is a purely imaginary structure, to which no reality ever corresponded; that its measures and arrangements are mere deductions from the temple of Solomon. But altogether apart from such a wholesale and unwarrantable challenge of the truthfulness of a narrative, which has every appearance of being historical, and has always been so regarded, no motive has ever been shown for such a fiction. It must surely have been a most dreary exercise of the imagination to figure out all the boards and curtains and coverings and loops and taches and pillars and sockets and bars and hooks and fillets and hangings, and to record them in long and wearisome detail, as though each minute particular was of the utmost consequence, when, in point of fact, the whole thing was utterly baseless; and the building, in regard to which so much pains was taken to invent and circulate a false account, had ceased to exist ages before, and was no longer of any present, practical interest. But if these details are real and genuine, and represent the actual tabernacle of Moses, then this portion of the Levitical law, at least, must have been in the possession not only of the author of Kings, but of the architect of Solomon's temple.

Further, the altar in use before the temple was built had horns (1 Kings i. 50, 51; ii. 28), and accordingly was conformed to the regulation, Ex. xxvii. 2. Solomon's temple was completed in the eighth month of the year (1 Kings vi. 38); but in order to add impressiveness to its dedication, this was fixed at the time of the annual feast in the seventh month (viii. 2). Jeroboam changed the month in the northern kingdom, thus fixing the feast on the fifteenth day of the eighth month (1 Kings xii. 32, 33). The proper time for its celebration was therefore, according to the Book of Kings, the fifteenth day of the seventh month, as it is defined Lev. xxiii. 34; Num. xxix. 12. Neither the month nor the day is named in Deuteronomy (see xvi. 13 ff.); and according to the critics this is one

of the later innovations of the Levitical law, the day of the observance having previously been free, and regulated by the season. We are also told that there is no indication of a priestly hierarchy in Deuteronomy, that all Levites could be priests, and all stood upon a level. But 2 Kings xii. 10, xxii. 4, 8, make mention of the high priest; xxiii. 4, xxv. 18, of priests of the second order; and 1 Kings viii. 4, of priests and Levites as distinct classes. We also read repeatedly of Abiathar the priest, Zadok the priest, Jehoiada the priest, Urijah the priest, Hilkiah the priest, who were successively at the head of the sacerdotal body. All this is manifestly governed by the Levitical law. According to 2 Kings xxiii. 9, the direction given in Deut. xviii. 6-8, as the Doctor interprets it,¹ was disobeyed, which is a fresh reason for questioning the accuracy of his interpretation. But apart from this, unleavened bread is here spoken of as the provision of priests; of this Deuteronomy says nothing, but we find it stated over and over in Lev. ii. 10, 11, vi. 16-18, vii. 10, x. 12. In 2 Kings xii. 16,² the trespass and sin offerings are spoken of, which are peculiar to the Levitical law; so are the meat-offerings (1 Kings viii. 64), and the morning and evening daily sacrifice, and the sprinkling of sacrificial blood (2 Kings xvi. 13, 15). King Uzziah, when a leper, was dealt with (2 Kings xv. 5) according to the law, Lev. xiii. 46, which is alluded to but not given in Deut. xxiv. 8.

So far, therefore, from the Books of Kings knowing nothing of the Levitical legislation, and accepting only the standard of the Book of Deuteronomy, they follow the law of Leviticus whenever they have occasion to mention anything which falls within the scope of that law. They show acquaintance with its sanctuary, its calendar, its priesthood, and its ritual. That critic must be hard to please who asks for anything more.

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 362.

² This passage speaks of "trespass-offering money and sin-offering money." The former admits of a ready explanation (Lev. v. 15-19; Num. v. 7, 8). What is meant by sin-offering money is more doubtful. It has been conjectured to be money given to the priest for the purchase of the victim, a portion of which became his perquisite in return for this service, or a gift voluntarily bestowed upon the officiating priest (Num. v. 10). But, however this may be, the Doctor's idea, that it was a money-equivalent paid by the transgressor for his sin, is palpably false. This has no analogy in the whole Old Testament, is abhorrent to all Israelitish ideas, and is justly characterised by himself as "a gross case of simony" (*The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 251).

When, in the paragraph already quoted, the Doctor finds allusion in "the ancient law of Ex. xx. 24," to "the altars of earth or unhewn stone which stand in all corners of the land," he is plainly substituting his own interpretation of the law for the law itself. That surely would not be "closely modelled on the religion of the patriarchs as it is depicted in Genesis:" for the patriarchal family was a unit, and offered its worship at a single altar. Though in their wanderings altars were successively reared by them in various places, each was for the time their exclusive sanctuary. Nor does it correspond any better with the state of things in the time of Moses. The ark of Jehovah then "led the march of Israel." The Doctor speaks of "the first beginnings of [Israel's] national organisation centering in the sanctuary of the ark." "The sanctuary of Jehovah" was "the final seat of judgment" (p. 36). And he strenuously insists upon the vast importance of the national sense of unity thus created in its contrast with "a multitude of local cults without national significance" (p. 40). If now this law was given to Moses at Sinai, as it claims to have been (Ex. xx. 22 ff.), and was written and acted upon by Moses himself (xxiv. 4), and specific injunctions were given by him in respect to it (Deut. xxvii. 5, 6) which were obeyed by his successor (Josh. viii. 30, 31), and through all this period, by the Doctor's own admission, the host of Israel had but one central sanctuary, the sanctuary of the ark, and if, furthermore, the consciousness of national unity thus produced was of vital consequence to Israel as a people, and as the people of Jehovah, —we surely have a right to assume that the law is to be interpreted in conformity with the circumstances in which it was enacted, and with the practice of Moses himself under it.

If, further, the language of the statute be examined, there is nothing in it to require the assumption that a plurality of co-existing altars is intended. The terms are in the singular number throughout—an altar of earth, an altar of stone, mine altar, place (not "places," as in the Authorised Version)—and are quite consistent with the view that but one altar at a time was meant at each successive place of encampment, or wherever God might subsequently appoint. If a multiplicity of altars, as opposed to one common sanctuary for all

Israel, is denoted by this law, this cannot be inferred from the language used. It can only be established by proving that in actual fact Jehovah recorded his name at different places simultaneously. The whole matter was governed by fixed principles and rigidly confined within plainly marked limits. Unlimited discretion was never accorded to men to build altars and establish sanctuaries at their own pleasure or convenience. And, apart from supernatural manifestations or extraordinary emergencies, there was from Moses to Malachi but one divinely sanctioned and permanent sanctuary, the sanctuary of the ark, and but one legitimate altar of sacrifice, the altar in its court.

But, we are told (p. 393), "the climax of absurdity is reached" when this law of an altar of earth or of whole stones is regarded as comprehending the brazen altar of the tabernacle and the temple. It is not easy to see wherein the absurdity lies. The construction of the altar remains unchanged. It is simply encased in a frame overlaid with brass, to mark it as belonging to the tabernacle court, of which brass was the dominant and characteristic metal; and likewise to suggest that the altar, renewed at each station on their march, was still substantially the same altar, for it had the same external covering, and stood in the same sacred surroundings. That neither priests nor worshippers saw any "absurdity" in this appears from the fact that the altar continued to be built of "whole stones according to the law" in each successive temple, and as long as the temple stood (1 Macc. iv. 47; Josephus, *Against Apion*, i. 22; comp. also his *Jewish War*, v. 5, 6).

The Doctor, however (pp. 110-112), thinks himself absolved in his discussion of the work of the prophets, from any "detailed inquiry as to how much of the Pentateuchal Law was already known." The Pentateuch, even if extant, "was practically a buried book." The question of its Mosaic authorship is accordingly of no significance in the history and religion of Israel, and may be left on one side while attention is directed to things that "had practical place and recognition in Israel."

"We have not found occasion to speak of Moses as the author of a written code, and to inquire how much his code contained, because the history itself makes it plain that his central importance for early Israel did not lie in his writings, but in his practical office as a judge who stood for

the people before God, and brought their hard cases before Him at the sanctuary" (Ex. xviii. 19 ; xxxiii. 9 seq.).

Can, then, the bare fact that Moses exercised the office of judge, and was the medium of divine communications to the people, be so important, and yet the judgments which he actually rendered, and the messages which he delivered to the people as from God, be of no account? Can the tribunal at the sanctuary have been so weighty an affair, and the regulations which governed its decisions not worth considering? In order to estimate the value of that tribunal, and its influence in shaping the current life of Israel, precisely what we most need to know is what was the system of justice therein represented, what sort of cases came before it, and upon what principles they were settled. This will give an insight into the usages and ideas of the people, and the management of their affairs, that can be gained in no other way. The civil code introduced by Moses, and the ordinances of worship appointed by him, furnish the needed starting-point in the study of the institutions and life of Israel. There is just the same authority for referring these to Moses as there is for believing that he acted as judge and leader of Israel in their coming forth from Egypt. The whole subsequent history unfolds from this fixed point, is determined by it, and cannot be properly understood without it. The Pentateuch was not a "buried book" because some of its statutes may not have been rigidly enforced in all the troublous and degenerate periods that followed. The very statutes that were temporarily obscured are needed to set those periods of defection in their true light. What would be thought of that historian of Roman Law who should set aside all consideration of the code of Justinian, because in the disorders and distractions of later ages some of its provisions were temporarily overborne, and only slowly rose to full recognition again in later jurisprudence?

But the Doctor presents us with an *a priori* argument, which easily disposes of the whole matter and obviates the necessity of a laborious examination into the facts:—

"It is perfectly clear that the great mass of Levitical legislation, with its ritual entirely constructed for the sanctuary of the ark and the priests of the house of Aaron, cannot have had practical currency and recognition in the northern kingdom. The priests could not have stultified themselves by

accepting the authority of a code according to which their whole worship was schismatic. . . . The same argument proves that the code of Deuteronomy was unknown, for it also treats all the northern sanctuaries as schismatic and heathenish, acknowledging but one place of lawful pilgrimage for all the seed of Jacob."

And so it might be argued that no rogue would ever stultify himself in a court of justice by admitting the validity of laws which make him a criminal and pronounce his doom. The ten tribes had undoubtedly the most powerful inducements to deny and to renounce the authority of the laws of Moses, if it was possible for them to do so. But if we find them living under these very institutions, only modified by being blended with their idolatry; if we find evidence, in their departures from Mosaic requirements, that they nevertheless confess their divine original and their binding obligation; then the stress of their motive to do otherwise but renders the confession that is wrung from them more significant. The question of the genuineness of the Mosaic legislation is all-important in its bearing on all the subsequent stages of Israelitish history, and is only to be settled by a direct appeal to the facts in the case.

We are referred in these Lectures (p. 117) to two chapters in the Bible as authority for the state of things in the northern kingdom,—Deut. xxxiii., "the so-called blessing of Moses," and Josh. xxiv. It is refreshing to find some firm footing in this dismal quagmire, to which everything has been reduced by the critics. And there are two points in these chapters which are well worthy of consideration. The priesthood is distinctly attributed to Levi (Deut. xxxiii. 8, 10), and notwithstanding this the fact is that in the ten tribes the priests were taken indiscriminately from all the people, and "were not of the sons of Levi" (1 Kings xii. 31; xiii. 33). And Josh. xxiv. 26 tells us of "the book of the law of God," which was already in existence in the time of Joshua, for he wrote in it an account of that solemn day which was passed in Shechem. So that Israel, halting between Jehovah and Baal in the days of Elijah, was confessedly in possession of the book of the law of God and of Joshua's serious and tender admonitions.

And here we must join issue with the statement on page 115 :—

"In the time of Amos and Hosea the truest hearts and best thinkers of Israel did not yet interpret Jehovah's dealings with his people in the light of the Deuteronomic and Levitical laws ; they did not judge of Israel's obedience by the principle of the one sanctuary or the standard of Aaronic ritual."

This is not to be decided magisterially by one flourish of the pen. Let us put together the scattered hints which these prophets afford us on this subject, that we may obtain, as far as we can, an accurate idea of the divine standard of duty which then prevailed. According to Amos ii. 4, the great crime of Judah, for which a terrible penalty awaits them that the Lord will not turn away, is that "they have despised the law of the Lord, and have not kept his commandments." Hosea (viii. 1), in the name of God, denounces swift vengeance upon Israel, "because they have transgressed my covenant, and trespassed against my law." This "law of Jehovah," then, to which both these prophets alike appeal, was common to both kingdoms, and both were culpable and obnoxious to the severest judgments for violating it. In Hos. iv. 6, according to the Doctor's own understanding of the verse, the priests are charged with having forgotten the law of their God ; and in ver. 5 the prophets are involved with them in a like condemnation. "Thus Hosea, no less than Amos, places himself in direct opposition to all the leaders of the religious life of his nation" (p. 156).

And yet both priests and prophets are spoken of as charged with sacred functions, and are not the objects of an indiscriminate denunciation. The priests were intrusted with the administration of the law. It was theirs to declare God's law to the people, and exercise the highest judicial functions under it. Hence, when Hosea would by one stroke set forth the extreme of presumptuous daring and hopeless obduracy that possessed the people, so that it was useless to labour longer for their correction, he says (iv. 4), "Thy people are as they that strive with the priest."¹ The form of expression is peculiar and highly significant. The censure which he passes upon

¹ The text of this clause needs no correction, least of all any such bungling emendation as those which the Doctor gravely discusses (p. 406). The allusion to the priests' judicial function, coupled with the thought, which at once presents itself to the prophet's mind, of their culpable unfaithfulness to this high trust, leads to the denunciation, ver. 5,—the suppressed thought, which links vers. 4 and 5, coming to full expression in ver. 6.

the people is not that of resistance to the priesthood ; for, considering the character of the priests, as that is described immediately after, such resistance might be in many cases highly commendable. But they are "as they that strive with the priest;" they are compared to bold and reckless men, who resist the officers of law, and refuse submission to the authority of the supreme tribunal. It was in fact this prerogative of the priesthood which gave such fearful point to the charge already cited, that they whose duty it was to teach and to enforce the law had themselves forgotten it, so that the people were destroyed in consequence, and God rejected these unfaithful priests from being priests to Him any longer. So, too, while the prophets are rebuked and threatened, and there were those to whom prophecy was a trade, and whose only concern was to get their bread (Am. vii. 12),—just as there were those who craved the priest's office for a living (1 Sam. ii. 36),—the sacred character and functions of prophets are distinctly set forth. They are immediate messengers of God, to whom he makes confidential disclosures of all his purposes (Am. iii. 7), and through whom he declares his will and purposes to men (Hos. vi. 5 ; xii. 10).¹ Amos (ii. 11, 12) includes among God's distinguishing benefits to Israel his raising up prophets of their sons, and charges them with the sin of having "commanded the prophets, saying, Prophecy not." Amos, no doubt, intends to associate himself with the prophets who were thus obstructed in the performance of their divine commission ; for, though not by regular profession a prophet, nor one of the sons of the prophets, he too had been sent by God to prophesy to Israel, and had been interdicted from doing it (Am. vii. 15, 16). While Hosea and Amos do not apply the term "law" to the utterances of the prophets, it

¹ The Doctor tells us (p. 182) : "The possession of a single true thought about Jehovah, not derived from current religious teaching, but springing up in the soul as a word from Jehovah himself, is enough to constitute a prophet, and lay on him the duty of speaking to Israel what he has learned of Israel's God." If he means to efface the distinction between the inspiration of the prophets and the illumination enjoyed by all pious men who are led to clearer views of truth and duty through their own devout experiences, enlightened by the Holy Ghost,—and further, if he means to deny to the prophets any direct and immediate commission from God to speak in his name, beyond the general obligation resting on all to impart of that which they have received,—then his statement falls below the conception entertained by Hosea and Amos.

might be, and it was so applied; in Isa. i. 10, "the law of our God" is an equivalent expression to "the word of the Lord" spoken by the prophet himself. (See also xxx. 9, 10.) But that the law was something more than the oral instructions of the prophets and the judicial decisions of the priests, delivered from time to time as occasion required, appears from the fact that they could be charged with forgetting it. There must, therefore, have been a fixed body of law, independent of and superior to those who were appointed to teach or to administer it, which neither priest nor prophet could modify or set aside, and which was binding on them as on the people.

The obligation of obedience resting on Israel is further set forth by representing this law in the light of a covenant (Hos. vi. 7; viii. 1) or solemn engagement between Israel and Jehovah, the breach of whose stipulations is a just ground of controversy to Jehovah with his people (xii. 2), and calls for the exercise of his righteous judgment (v. 1, 11; vi. 5). Hosea (i. 2 ff.) further presents it under the image of the marriage relation, of which sacred bond their sin was a gross and shameless violation. This covenant union is traced back to the Exodus: "I am the Lord thy God from the land of Egypt, and thou shalt know no god but me" (Hos. xiii. 4; xii. 9; see also xi. 1; Am. iii. 1, 2; ii. 10). It is even traced beyond that to God's dealings with their pious ancestor Jacob (Hos. xii. 3, 4). The leader out of Egypt, to whose charge the people was committed, was a prophet (ver. 13), which implies that God made known his will through him. And in its infancy the nation cordially responded (Hos. ii. 15).¹ The covenant between Jehovah and Israel was accordingly formed in the days of Moses; and of this there is, besides, monumental evidence in the existence of the Ark of the covenant. The giving of the law began with Moses; whether he gave the law in full, or simply made a beginning which was added to and developed subsequently, may be left undetermined for the present.

Of what compass was this law in the time of Hosea and Amos? and what did it contain? It is observable that neither of these prophets thinks it necessary to expound the requirements of the law or to argue their obligation. They assume

¹ For "sing," in the Authorised Version, read "answer;" the reference is to Ex. xxiv. 3.

throughout that these are well known and their binding force acknowledged. They deal chiefly in charges of transgression and threatenings of punishment. We may take it for granted that the sins with which the people are charged are violations of this law, and that the virtues whose absence is deplored were enjoined by it. One comprehensive word used several times by Hosea, and variously rendered "goodness," "mercy," and "kindness" (Hos. vi. 4; see margin), embraces both love to God and love to man. He heaps together a number of particulars (iv. 1, 2): "There is no truth, nor kindness (or piety), nor knowledge of God in the land; swearing and lying and killing and stealing and committing adultery; they commit violence, and blood toucheth blood." It is plain that this law must have embraced such duties of man to his fellow as chastity and sobriety (Hos. iv. 11; vii. 4, 5; Am. ii. 7; vi. 4-6); fidelity to engagements (Hos. x. 4); justice, kindness, and truth (Hos. x. 12, 13; xi. 12; Am. v. 7, 24; vi. 12); upright dealing as opposed to fraud and heartless oppression, particularly of the poor (Hos. vii. 1; xii. 6-8; Am. ii. 6-8; iii. 10; iv. 1; v. 11; viii. 4-6); and judicial integrity (Am. v. 10, 12, 15). The Doctor concedes (p. 113) the existence at this time of "the book of the covenant" (Ex. xxi.-xxiii.). "The ordinances of this code closely correspond with the indications as to the ancient laws of Israel supplied by the older history and the prophets. Quite similar, except in some minor details which need not now delay us, is another ancient table of laws, preserved in Ex. xxxiv. These two documents may be taken as representing the general system of sacred law which had practical recognition in the northern kingdom."

The prophets, however, deal still more largely and emphatically with the criminality of the people against Jehovah. Duties toward God must, therefore, have had a prominent place in the law. Israel is charged with being grossly unfaithful to her conjugal relation to Jehovah (Hos. i. 2; v. 7; vi. 7), and forsaking him for other lovers (Hos. ii. 7 and *passim*); and, without a figure, with idolatry (Hos. iv. 12, 17; viii. 4; xi. 2, xiv. 3, 8); a lack of the true knowledge of God (Hos. iv. 1, 6; vi. 6); forgetting God (Hos. ii. 13; viii. 14; xiii. 6); not seeking God (Hos. v. 15; x. 12; Am. v. 4, 6); not waiting for him (Hos. xii. 6); not hearkening to him (Hos. ix. 17); rebelling

against him (Hos. xiii. 16); profaning his holy name (Am. ii. 7); not returning to God after the infliction of judgments (Am. iv. 6, 8-11, where there is distinct reference to Deut. iv. 30; xxx. 2); backsliding from him (Hos. xi. 7; xiv. 4); transient piety (Hos. vi. 4); presumptuous trust in God in their wickedness (Am. v. 18; vi. 1); mixing themselves with heathen nations, and becoming like them (Hos. vii. 8); placing their dependence in a heathen monarch instead of Jehovah (Hos. v. 13; vii. 11; viii. 9; xii. 1; xiv. 3). For this they had been visited with famine, drought, blasting, mildew and locusts, pestilence after the manner of Egypt (comp. Deut. xxviii. 27, 60), the sword, and overthrow like that of Sodom and Gomorrah (Am. iv. 6-11; comp. Deut. xxix. 23). And still heavier judgments were in store for them: the kingdom should come to an end (Hos. i. 4; Am. ix. 8), the land be utterly desolated (Hos. ii. 3; iv. 3; Am. iii. 11-15); their idolatrous sanctuaries destroyed (Hos. x. 2, 8; Am. iii. 14; comp. Lev. xxvi. 30), and the people exiled (Hos. ix. 3; Am. v. 27). See this identical catalogue of evils, Lev. xxvi. 14 ff.; Deut. xxviii. 15 ff. All this tends to create the impression that in the law, to which these prophets appeal, Israel's duty to Jehovah of worship and service had a greater proportional space accorded to it than is the case in Ex. xx.-xxiii.

Was "the principle of the one sanctuary" included in the law to which Hosea and Amos appeal, and by which they "judge of Israel's obedience"? The northern sanctuaries are separately and by name denounced as centres of iniquity and false worship by both these prophets; and, according to Amos i. 2, God's earthly seat was in Zion and Jerusalem. Hosea in express terms exposes the iniquity of the golden calves, as the Doctor concedes, though he maintains that this had always before been regarded in the ten tribes as a legitimate form of the worship of Jehovah, and sanctioned by all preceding prophets, as Elijah, Elisha, and Amos. That the skirts of these prophets were clear of any complicity in this idol-worship has already been abundantly shown. But it is further plain, from the language of Hosea himself, that he is making no innovation and announcing no new doctrine. His words are not those of a man proclaiming for the first time that what the people had all along considered right was outrageously wrong. He enters

into no argument with these hereditary idolaters ; he refutes no objections ; he anticipates no opposition to his most startling statements. Confident of carrying the consciences and the convictions of his hearers with him, he calls their whole system of worship by the name of the grossest offence known amongst men. Their service nominally paid to Jehovah, he declares, was really rendered to Baalim (ii. 13). The indignant and contemptuous manner in which he speaks of the calves (viii. 5, 6 ; x. 5) and the stupidity of their worshippers (xiii. 2), and warns them of the wrath of God thus provoked and the judgment that should follow, shows that this is not some new light that has but recently dawned on his own mind ; but that as the servant of Israel's God he is confronting those who were knowingly transgressors of his holy law, while they willingly walked after a human commandment (v. 11), that of Jeroboam the son of Nebat.

When, now, Amos sharply contrasts seeking Jehovah and seeking Bethel (v. 4-6), and declares in the strongest terms the loathing that Jehovah feels for their services professedly offered to him (vers. 21-23), the Doctor takes the meaning simply to be, "He is not to be found by sacrifice, for in it he takes no pleasure ; what Jehovah requires of them that seek him is the practice of civil righteousness" (p. 139). "The whole ritual service is to Amos a thing without importance in itself" (p. 140). Amos "shows a degree of indifference to all practices of social worship which is not uncharacteristic of an inhabitant of the desert" (p. 167). A worship which to Hosea was basely criminal, which was an atrocity to be punished by the direst judgments,—because Jehovah spurned the degrading homage offered to the calves, refusing to accept it as rendered to himself,—cannot have been to Amos a matter of indifference. When Amos speaks of the god of Dan as the sin of Samaria (viii. 14) ; when he says of Israel's multiplied services, "Come to Bethel and transgress ; at Gilgal multiply transgression" (iv. 4) ; when he makes the northern sanctuaries the centres of iniquity and corruption that pervaded the kingdom, so that in the day that God visited the transgression of Israel upon him, he would also visit the altars of Bethel (iii. 14),—this is not simply because he attached no importance to ritual service. The service there paid was not merely of no account, inadequate

as a substitute for the practice of virtue: it was abhorrent. It was a nuisance to be abated, and which the Lord would tolerate no longer. "I hate, I despise your feast-days, and I will not smell in your solemn assemblies. Though ye offer me burnt-offerings and your meat-offerings, I will not accept them; neither will I regard the peace-offerings of your fat beasts. Take thou away from me the noise of thy songs, for I will not hear the melody of thy viols." It is not feast-days as such that are thus abominable. It is not disgust at offerings and an outward ceremonial that is here expressed. It is "*your* feast-days" and "*your* solemn assemblies" that the Lord detests, because the worship itself was of a debased, idolatrous character, and it was coupled with the practice of iniquity.¹

The Doctor seems at a loss to find a proper antithesis to these denunciations of Amos. "If we ask what Amos desired to set in the place of the system he so utterly condemns, the answer is apparently very meagre. He has no new scheme of Church and State to propose—only this, that Jehovah desires righteousness and not sacrifice" (p. 141). Would Amos, then, abolish ritual worship altogether? and not sacrifices only, but "songs" of praise as well? Are there to be no acts of adoration and homage, social or individual? Would he have no direct intercourse between Israel and his glorious King, no temple, no altar, no prayer, no thanksgiving, no outward expression of devotion,—only "the practice of civil righteousness"? This would be a nearer approach to Confucianism than we can well imagine in a prophet of Israel.

If, however, he is not aiming at the abolition of all forms of worship, then it must be urged again that the intense language of Amos cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis of indifference. It betrays the most powerfully excited feeling. His emotion is wrought up to the highest pitch. This

¹ The Doctor tells us (p. 139): "When Amos represents the national worship of Israel as positively sinful, he does so mainly because it was so conducted as to afford a positive encouragement to the injustice, the sensuality, the barbarous treatment of the poor, to which he recurs again and again as the cardinal sins of the nation." This statement is defective, since it does not penetrate deeply enough into the source of this moral degradation. It is not merely because of the manner in which the worship was conducted, but because of what it was. It was not the service of the pure and holy Jehovah, the giver of the moral law. It was a bestial nature-worship, to which the name of Jehovah was attached, but in which his attributes were disregarded.

could not arise from that which he held to be of small account, but only what was most precious and most dear. He cannot bear with the desecration of what was so sacred, the profaning of what was so holy. It is not that worship is so little worth, but because it rises in value and in awfulness above everything beside, that he cannot look with equanimity upon Israel converting the worship of Jehovah into a besotted mummerly, the mimicry of devotion.¹

Place now beside this that significant reference at the very beginning of his prophecy (i. 2) to the fact that the God whose warning message he bears,—the divine Judge of Israel and the nations,—utters His wrathful voice from Jerusalem and from Zion. Jehovah speaks from the temple on that holy mountain; from thence he thunders with a mighty roar against all the wicked of the earth. If Jehovah is there, he dwells in a temple erected for sacrifice and for ceremonial observance. He is there for the purpose of being worshipped, and of receiving the adoration of his subjects. His presence there is the sanction of the purpose for which the house was built, and for which it was resorted to by those that feared his name. While Bethel and Gilgal and Beersheba are denounced (v. 5), as well as the high places of Isaac and the sanctuaries of Israel (vii. 9), Zion was the spot where Jehovah might be found.

Add now to this, that in Hosea's eyes the multiplication of sanctuaries is of itself a sin. When Israel worships on the tops of mountains and upon the hills, and under oaks, poplars, and terebinths (iv. 13) she acts the part of an unfaithful wife, who leaves her lawful husband for the love of strangers. When she worships at Gilgal and at Bethaven (he will not call it Bethel, for it is no longer the "house of God") she does the same (iv. 15). Snares are set on Mizpah and Tabor (v. 1). Gilgal is a seat of detestable wickedness (ix. 15). Ephraim hath multiplied altars to sin (viii. 11),—each fresh altar not only a fresh occasion of sin, but its erection itself a sin. The

¹ This consideration is of itself sufficient to show that the interpretation which the Doctor would put upon Amos v. 25 cannot possibly be correct. It cannot mean that "the Israelites offered no sacrifice in the wilderness, and yet Jehovah was never nearer to them than there" (p. 140), as an argument that sacrifices are of small consequence. The real emphasis in the verse lies in the words "unto me." Their apostasy from God began even in the wilderness, in idolatries perpetrated there. And this is no more inconsistent with Amos ii. 10 than Hos. ix. 10 is with Hos. ii. 15.

vast number of his altars is also charged against him in x. 1, and perhaps in xii. 11 likewise; they are as devoid of all sacredness as ordinary stone-heaps, unless indeed the stone-heaps represent the state of utter ruin to which they shall be reduced. Consider further, that while the Lord declares that he will no more have mercy upon the house of Israel, he will have mercy upon the house of Judah, and save them by Jehovah their God (i. 6, 7); that for the present God refuses to recognise Israel as his people, or to be himself their God (ver. 9); but that hereafter Judah and Israel shall be joined again (ver. 11), as before the schism and apostasy of Jeroboam, and then (iii. 5) the children of Israel shall return and seek the Lord their God and David their king. And can there be a remaining doubt as to where the true place of worship was in the mind of Hosea?

With all this associate one more fact, and the chain of argument will be complete. The binding obligation of "the principle of the one sanctuary" was recognised by Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii. 4, 22), as the critics confess, shortly after the time of Hosea, or perhaps even before his long ministry was ended. This was, then, we may affirm without hesitation, an integral part of the law recognised by Hosea and Amos as the standard authority in both Israel and Judah in their day.

But, if this point is established, some further consequences follow. The fact that the principle of the one sanctuary was enforced by Josiah with greater rigour than before is the staple argument of the critics for dating the Book of Deuteronomy from his reign, or shortly before it. If, however, that principle, instead of being a recent invention of "the prophetic party" of that period, was already standard law in the time of Hosea, and in fact had been law in Israel ever since the days of Moses, what becomes of the critical argument, and what of the conclusion based upon it? Much of Deuteronomy certainly was of ancient date. Dr. Robertson Smith correctly says:¹—

"The Deuteronomic code is not a mere supplement to the first legislation. It is an independent reproduction of its substance, sometimes merely repeating the older laws, but at other times extending or modifying them. It covers the whole ground of the old law, except the law of treason (Ex. xxii. 28) and the details as to compensations to be paid for various injuries."

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 317.

And he gives a very serviceable comparative table,¹ showing "how completely Deuteronomy covers the same ground with the first legislation." Now, according to the Doctor's own theory, the first legislation, or the Book of the Covenant, existed long before the time of Hosea. All this portion of Deuteronomy, then, belonged in substance, if not in form, to the law in Hosea's days. And in regard to the remaining provisions of Deuteronomic law, can the critics point out one which was introduced between the age of Hosea and that of Josiah? If not, what good reason can they give for questioning that the whole Deuteronomic law was in the possession of Hosea and of Amos? In fact, what good reason can they give for questioning that it had been in existence ever since the days of Moses? The Doctor tells us (p. 35), "It is difficult for us to determine with precision how far Moses in person carried the work of giving to Israel divine ordinances." Is it not in fact so difficult that the safest way for us is to accept the explicit testimony of the sacred record, that both the Book of the Covenant and the Deuteronomic law were given by Moses himself, confirmed as this is by the uniform belief of all post-Mosaic times and by all the tests which we are capable of applying to it? The advocates of development may be reluctant to concede this. But we do not really see what they have to stand upon, in refusing their assent, but their own *a priori* theory. The facts, so far as they are capable of being ascertained, are all the other way.

Had the law, to which Hosea and Amos appeal, any ritual requirements? It will not be necessary to reproduce here the evidence already given² that Israel in the time of these prophets had an extensive ceremonial. But was this of divine obligation? The Doctor reminds us that—

"Israel, like the other nations, worshipped Jehovah at certain fixed sanctuaries, where he was held to meet with his people face to face. The method of worship was by altar gifts, expressive of homage for the good things of his bestowal, and the chief occasions of such worship were the agricultural feasts, just as among the Canaanites. The details of the ceremonial observed were closely parallel to those still to be read on Phœnician monuments. Even the technical terms connected with the sacrifice were in great part identical" (p. 56).

¹ *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 431.

² *B. and F. Evang. Review* for 1882, p. 357.

If these heathen parallels are of any significance in accounting for the attitude of the prophets toward the ceremonial worship in Israel, it might be supposed that they did so in one or the other of two ways. In the first place, Israel's religious rites may be conjectured to have been of heathen origin and imported into the worship of Jehovah from the worship of heathen divinities, and thus may have been regarded as foreign to God's true worship and offensive to him. Or, in the second place, it may be imagined that these rites, being common to Israel and the heathen, contained nothing that was distinctively characteristic of the religion of Jehovah in contrast with other systems, and may for this reason have been considered a matter of indifference. It was of no account whether men engaged in the ritual or not. Jehovah was to be served not by sacrifice but by righteousness. Upon either hypothesis the bare fact that Hosea and Amos refer to these ceremonies as observed in Israel, would not establish for them a place in the law which was to these prophets the standard of divine obligation.

Now as to the first supposition, it is evident that the ritual practised in their days was not regarded by the prophets as heathenish importations which were in themselves criminal and offensive; for in all their censures of Israel's worship they never intimate anything of the kind. On the contrary, Hosea represents sacrifice by which pardon was obtained, and the ephod by which the will of God was consulted, as essential to the maintenance of Israel's intercourse with Jehovah; so that when he would depict the people in the seclusion of the Exile, —awaiting a happier future, but their relation to God and to idols both severed for the present,—he speaks of them (iii. 4) as on the one hand without a sacrifice and without an ephod, and on the other hand without an image and without teraphim. As the latter were indispensable instruments and accompaniments of idolatry, so were the former of the true worship of Jehovah. When he says (v. 6), "They shall go with their flocks and with their herds to seek the Lord, but they shall not find him," the antithesis implies that there was reason to expect that going with such offerings they would find him. The real cause of their failure is immediately added: "He hath withdrawn himself from them." When the Most High declares (vi. 6) that he desired "the knowledge of God more than

burnt-offerings," it is implied that burnt-offerings were desired. When their petitions, offered at their sacrificial festivals, are contemptuously called "howling upon their beds" (vii. 14), it was not that this was a prohibited mode of entreating his favour, but because of their rebellion against him, and that they did not cry unto him with their heart. The threatened captivity would be aggravated by their inability to observe the laws of ceremonial purity: "They shall eat unclean things in Assyria" (ix. 3). The acceptability of drink-offerings properly presented is taken for granted (ix. 4); and sacrifice must have been regarded as pleasing to God, when it is made the symbol of praise: "So will we render calves, our lips" (xiv. 2). So that when their predicted shame and disappointment is attributed to their sacrifices (iv. 19), it is not because sacrifices are in themselves criminal, but theirs are not what sacrifices ought to be. Amos speaks of it as a divine favour to Israel that their sons were led to take the Nazarite vow (ii. 11), and reproaches the people for a breach of the ceremonial in giving them wine to drink (ver. 12), and in adding leaven to their thank-offering (iv. 5). And if Jehovah dwells in Zion (i. 2), he necessarily sanctions that form of worship for which his house on Zion was expressly built.

Sacrifice as such is not offensive to God, therefore; and the warmth of the language of Amos regarding it has already shown us that it is not a matter of indifference. It must, consequently, have been esteemed obligatory; and, as the intensity of the prophet's feelings with regard to it reveals, the obligation must have been so solemn and imperative that a dereliction of duty in this particular awakened the most intense indignation. There is no escape from the conclusion that the developed ritual of their day was enjoined in the divine law.

And if this law contained all that they describe, it must have contained much more; for their allusions are merely incidental, and not made with any view of covering the entire round of required observance; and there is the greater reason to believe that this was the case, because the scope and tenor of their teaching was mainly directed to a different matter,—not so much to the forms of worship, with which the people were sufficiently familiar, as to the spirit of piety which should animate them, and the life of uprightness which should accom-

pany them. And, further, a law containing these particulars must have likewise included other things which they necessarily imply. If there were priests and offerings and tithes and distinctions of clean and unclean, there must have been specifications under each of these heads, to enable the people to act intelligently with regard to them, and the ministers of religion to decide the questions which would be constantly arising about them. There must have been rules regulating the support of the priests and the contributions of the people. Directions must have been given with some detail as to the ritual to be observed in different kinds of sacrifice, and what were proper occasions for their presentation. And so in regard to other matters. The particulars positively stated by the prophets not only justify but compel the assumption of an extended ceremonial law. These few hints and allusions do not of course enable us to determine all its contents in detail. But all these allusions accord with the Levitical law of the Pentateuch. They are just such as might be expected if that law, in its full extent, was in the hands of these prophets. There is not one statute of that law which may not have been in it then, so far as we can gather from the intimations given by Hosea and Amos, or so far as we can infer from contemporaneous or subsequent history. They must have possessed the Levitical law as we now have it, or one so closely resembling it that no critic can point out a single particular in which it must have differed from it.¹

So that Professor Rudolph Smend,² though an advocate of Graf's hypothesis, uses the following language:—

“That purity and holiness, and the corresponding lustrations and atoning sacrifices, must at all times have played a great part in Israelitish worship, and this [worship] must, in the temple of Jerusalem, have had essentially

¹ As a further suggestion of the source of this ritual, it may be observed that the usage of the Feast of Tabernacles, alluded to in Hos. xii. 9, finds its explanation neither in the Book of the Covenant nor in Deuteronomy, but only in Lev. xxiii. 42.

² In his elaborate and extremely able article “On the Stage of Development of the Religion of Israel presupposed by the Prophets of the Eighth Century,” in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1876, pp. 655, 661. This was written shortly after the appearance of Duhm's *Theology of the Prophets*, and chiefly with the view of pointing out the serious errors of that work. I have been largely indebted to the suggestions of this article in the preceding discussion.

the form which is presented in Leviticus, cannot be denied, even though the casual intimations of the older prophetic writings do not suffice to prove it. For this reason we cannot see what essential alterations the conceptions hitherto entertained of the inner development of religion in Mosaism must undergo, even if a few particulars should be shown to be post-exilic." "Accordingly we do not know what objection can be made to the earlier composition of Leviticus on the ground of the older prophetic writings."

There is no reason in fact why the Levitical law may not have been given by Moses, except the figment of development. There is nothing but this philosophical theory, unsupported by any Biblical facts, to outweigh the positive and repeated declarations contained in Leviticus itself—and accredited to us by the testimony of all subsequent ages, through which it has been handed down, and by which it was esteemed most sacred—that these laws were announced by Moses as divinely communicated to him. That the absence of these ritual laws from Deuteronomy cannot be urged in support of the theory, as though Leviticus must be the development of a later age, is also confessed by Smend:—

"If a law-book, which professedly aims to give a complete order of the cultus, speaks of many things about which another, which has no such design, is silent, it nevertheless does not follow that the former, on account of the greater copiousness of its contents, must belong to a later time, in which the worship was further developed" (p. 654).¹

We inquire further, Was the law of which Hosea speaks written or oral? The usage of the period is very clearly shown by his contemporary Isaiah, who speaks of it as a matter of course that enactments were committed to writing. "Woe unto them that decree unrighteous decrees, and to the scribes that write grievousness" (Isa. x. 1). The fact that Hosea and Amos wrote their prophecies not only implies an already existing literature, which is besides sufficiently attested in other ways; but, inasmuch as they were designed to enforce the divine law, and were themselves regarded as a supplementary law of the Lord (Isa. i. 10), if they were reduced to writing, it must have been because this was like-

¹ Dr. Robertson Smith must acknowledge the cogency of what is here said by Smend, since he himself considers the aim of Deuteronomy to be different from that of Leviticus. See *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 318.

wise the case with the code to which they were virtually annexed. It was customary at that time to write whatever was to be carefully preserved (Isa. viii. 1; xxx. 8). Samuel wrote the manner of the kingdom (1 Sam. x. 25). David had a recorder and a scribe among the chief officers of his court (2 Sam. viii. 16, 17; xx. 24, 25); so had Solomon (1 Kings iv. 3) and subsequent kings (2 Kings xii. 10; xviii. 18). The commission, appointed by Joshua to divide the land, made their report in writing (Josh. xviii. 9). In the song of Deborah, whose antiquity is universally acknowledged, scribes marshal the troops (Judges v. 14). Writing was in familiar use in ordinary matters. David wrote a letter about Uriah (2 Sam. xi. 14, 15), Jezebel about Naboth (1 Kings xxi. 8, 9), the king of Syria about Naaman (2 Kings v. 5-7), Jehu about Ahab's sons (2 Kings x. 1). Lots were inscribed (Num. xvii. 2; Lev. xvi. 8); writing by the priest was part of the ceremonial in the jealousy-offering (Num. v. 23); and an old Canaanitish city bore the name of Kirjath-sepher (Book-town). The law of divorce (Deut. xxiv. 1) implies that men generally were able to write. Gideon required a young man, taken at random, to write out for him the princes of Succoth (Judg. viii. 14; see also Isa. x. 19). In such a state of things it would be utterly unaccountable if the law, which was held to be of divine authority, and believed to have emanated from God himself, which lay at the foundation of public justice and regulated public worship, was suffered to remain unwritten and exposed to all the risks of oral transmission.

The Ten Commandments were not only written but engraved in stone in the lifetime of Moses himself. In Josh. xxiv., to which we are referred (p. 118) for a reliable exposition of Israelitish views, it appears (vers. 25, 26) that Joshua at once wrote the statute and ordinance which he gave to the people in Shechem; and further, that "the book of the law of God" was already in existence at that time. The Doctor himself concedes (p. 113) that there were "ancient laws" which had "currency in a written form;" only he tells us that they must be sought not in Deuteronomy nor in Leviticus, but "in other parts of the Pentateuch, particularly in the Book of the Covenant (Ex. xxi.-xxiii.)." And while he asserts (p. 114) that "neither Hosea nor Amos alludes to an extant written law,"

he adds that "this fact does not prove that written laws did not exist." When, therefore, Hosea (viii. 12),¹ speaking in the name of God, says in express terms, "I write to him the ten thousand precepts of my law; they have been counted as a strange thing," this is just such a declaration as the facts already reviewed prepare us for and warrant us in crediting. The law known to Hosea and Amos was an extensive code, embracing a multitude of requirements, and it was in written form; and although transgressed as though it were something foreign to the people, and which had no claim upon them, it had nevertheless proceeded from the Lord himself.

One more question remains: Who wrote this law, to which Hosea and Amos attach undoubted divine authority, and upon which they base all their denunciations? We have a right to ask, and to demand an answer, for it is universally allowed to be one of the great legal systems of the world. Such a body of law never grew up by accident. It is not the aggregate of judicial decisions rendered in the course of ages, at various tribunals by successive judges. In that case there would necessarily be conflicting and incoherent statutes, and the bare record of such decisions would be a tangled wilderness of disconnected utterances. Even if resting ultimately on such decisions, it must have been carefully codified. It is a systematic body of law, based on great fundamental principles, which are carried out to their logical results in a consistent and masterly manner.² Every part of it evidences clear thought, a high faculty of administration, and comprehensive views. Who produced this body of law, or who digested it and reduced it to order? Whose thought reigns in the whole?

The critics have felt the pressure of this question, and

¹ The Doctor says, "Hos. viii. 12 is mistranslated in the Authorised Version." If this is to be settled by confident assertion we may balance his statement by the contrary one of Professor Smend (p. 633 of the article before cited), whom we may without disrespect presume that the Doctor will admit to be his peer in Hebrew learning. (See last vol. of this *Review*, p. 356, note.) Smend (p. 637) thinks that there were several written collections of laws; but of this there is no evidence. Hosea and Amos speak of but one divine law; and their words leave no room for the supposition of various rival codes with conflicting statutes.

² If, as has sometimes been alleged, some of these institutions—as, for example, the Year of Jubilee—were merely theoretical, and never came into practical operation, this but adds to the evidence that the whole sprang from one constructive mind.

sought at one time to fasten Deuteronomy upon Jeremiah, as they have assigned Leviticus to Ezra. But they have themselves abandoned the former as untenable; and even those who allege that Leviticus in its present form was written by Ezra, must concede that the chief provisions of that law were much older. Both of these codes must have been substantially, at least, and in their main features, prior to Hosea and Amos—long prior, for the law of which these prophets speak was no recent production, no modern innovation, but the old, established, authoritative law. Could its author have been David? Of his reign we have a full account—of his enterprises, of the measures which he carried into effect, of his schemes of government and of worship. But there is no record of his having prepared or introduced any such body of law; this is in fact not shaped upon the theory of a kingly government; and later ages never suggest that it is to be referred to him. Could it have been Samuel, the great reformer, prophet, and judge? But the chaotic period, in which he lived and laboured, is just the one in which these laws were more in abeyance than in any other. Is the great legislator of Israel, then, buried in complete oblivion, his name forgotten quite, and no tradition, however faint, preserved respecting him? Did the mastermind that shaped these laws and institutions, which are the wonder of all who study them, leave no impress of himself upon his nation and his age?

One is involuntarily reminded of the story which used to be told of the Englishman making his first journey in France, who innocently inquired of one who sat next him in the coach, "Whose are these elegant grounds and buildings that we are passing?" The bewildered native, ignorant of English, simply replied, "*Monsieur, je ne sais pas.*" Accepting this as the real name of the owner of this magnificent estate, the Englishman repeated his question from time to time, as fresh villas came into view, receiving uniformly the same response. At length, astonished at such vast possessions belonging to one proprietor, he exclaimed, "*Monsieur Je-ne-sais-pas* must be a very rich man." And the Unknown, to whom the critics would introduce us, must be a man without his equal in the whole history of Israel. Yet he has himself completely vanished out of history, and left no trace of his existence,

no memory even of the age in which he lived. Nay, by the strangest of all freaks of fortune, a unanimous, persistent, and unvarying tradition has confounded this commanding spirit, this unique legislator, with a rude chieftain who never gave any laws, so far as the critics know, except in so far as he decided petty disputes between his followers, and whose only distinction is that of having led a horde of undisciplined nomads out of bondage into a desert many centuries before.

Is it the whole history of Israel that is at fault, or is it only that the critics have been dreaming? Possibly the real Moses of history may after all have been quite different from the fictitious personage substituted for him by the critics. And in the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, who intermarried with the Egyptian priesthood, and was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, who was fired with an enthusiastic attachment to his people and their God, and was inspired by the Holy Ghost—the great commander and organiser who shaped the institutions of his nation and impressed his own ideas ineradicably upon their entire subsequent history,—we may find a rational and sober answer to our question, which else must remain unanswered or land us in the most incredible of paradoxes.

The critics will smile incredulously at the suggestion of what they are pleased to call the traditional view, as though it were some unfounded opinion, which has come to be believed merely by dint of constant repetition, and which accordingly has no claim upon the faith of candid and honest inquirers in comparison with the so-called critical or scientific view, and is now only held in ignorance or defiance of advancing light. But let us understand the sort of tradition on which it rests. The Pentateuchal law claims in the most unambiguous manner to have been given and recorded by Moses. The general character of the legislation, and the terms in which it is couched, accord with this claim. Its truth is further vouched for in the most direct and positive manner in the history of his trusted attendant and successor, Joshua (i. 7, 8; viii. 31-34; xii. 5; xxiii. 6); also by xxiv. 26, which the critics with unwonted clemency suffer to stand; further by Judges iii. 4; 1 Kings ii. 3; 2 Kings x. 31; xiv. 6; xvii. 37; xviii. 6, 12; xxi. 8; xxii. 8; xxiii. 24, 25, not to speak of numerous testimonies of

later date. The history and legislation of the Pentateuch lies at the basis of all the subsequent history of the Old Testament. It is presupposed in the Psalms.¹ It is presupposed in the Prophets. Moses' authorship has the explicit sanction of our blessed Lord himself. The prior existence of the Pentateuch is shown by its being so interwoven with all subsequent portions of the history and literature of Israel that it cannot be torn from it without the destruction of the whole. It is upon this immovable foundation that the traditional view securely reposes. The tradition is imbedded in the Scriptures from first to last, and can only be surrendered when the inspired volume itself is abandoned as untrustworthy, and Jesus ceases to be trusted as an infallible teacher. When progress means marching over such a precipice as this, sensible men will be apt to call a halt, and prefer to abide on the *terra firma* of tradition a little longer, rather than adventure themselves upon the cloud-land which lies beyond.

Besides Elijah and Elisha, who have already been spoken of, the prophets whose work is particularly discussed in these Lectures are Hosea and Amos in the Ten Tribes, Isaiah and Micah in Judah. The aim of the whole is to exhibit them in their individual character and their mutual relations, and in their relations to the times in which they lived. What is known of each prophet is briefly sketched, and the specific character of his times depicted, and the bearing of this upon

¹ No prominence has been given in any of the preceding discussions to the testimony rendered by the Book of Psalms to the truth of the Pentateuch, and to the divine authority as well as the Mosaic origin of its institutions, for the simple reason that the critics exercise the same right of peremptory challenge in regard to unwelcome witnesses that Anglo-Saxon law allows in the case of jurors deemed unfriendly. The titles of the Psalms are set aside without ceremony; and each individual Psalm is arbitrarily assigned to whatever date best suits the critical theory which chances to be in vogue at the time. Under the operation of this rule the Psalter becomes merely the hymn-book of the Second Temple; the great mass of the Psalms are reckoned post-exilic, if not Maccabean; and nothing is allowed to be Davidic until the critics have first satisfied themselves by a thorough search that it contains nothing capable of being used against them. In fact it has been discovered that the safest course is to exclude David from the Psalter altogether, and to deny to him any devotional composition in the proper sense, allowing to him only "sportful forms of unconstrained mirth." "Melodies of the temple service were borrowed from the joyous songs of the vintage, and so it was possible that David should give the pattern alike for the songs of the sanctuary and for the worldly airs of the nobles of Samaria."—(*The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, p. 205.) Accordingly, any argument *ex concessis* from the Psalms is out of the question.

his ministry is shown ; special traits are pointed out, which distinguish the teaching or mode of thought of each of these prophets ; and the different aspects, under which they severally set forth the proximate or the ultimate future as they conceive it, are indicated and contrasted with one another. In all this there is much that is valuable and suggestive. The chief occasion of regret is that the bias derived from his critical prepossessions inclines him at every point to reduce the religious meaning of the prophets to a minimum, to foist upon them inaccuracies with which they are not chargeable, and to represent them as in irreconcilable conflict, because of those differences in their portraiture by which they really supplement and complete each other.

It illustrates the facility with which the drift of events can be comprehended after they have actually taken place, that Dr. Robertson Smith can see no evidence of prophetic foresight in the disclosures of Amos. "The most ordinary political insight," he tells us (p. 131), could have seen the danger which threatened Israel from Assyria ; "and what requires explanation is not so much that Amos was aware of it as that the rulers and people of Israel were so utterly blind to the impending doom." But it is obvious that Amos claims no political shrewdness above those whom he addresses. He points to no political causes that are at work ; he makes no political deductions. It is not from this quarter that his inspiration proceeds. The one thought that possesses his mind is that of the moral causes which are at work. Israel has sinned, and Jehovah has sent him to announce the penalty. The Doctor says (p. 129) : "It is not Israel's sin that brings him forward as a preacher of repentance ; but the sound of near destruction encircling the land constrains him to blow the alarm." Precisely the reverse is true, as appears from the whole tenor of the prophecy. The encroachments of Assyria had not yet affected Israel. The northern kingdom had never been more prosperous, and there seemed to be no reason to question the stability of this prosperity. Even after Assyria had pushed its conquests westward, until Damascus was overthrown, Israel's ancient rival and enemy, politicians still thought that Israel might be secure and prosperous in alliance with or in nominal subjection to the Great King. They

were chiefly divided upon the question which of the rival empires, Assyria or Egypt, was the safer ground of dependence. But through all the fluctuating schemes of politicians, and their alternate hopes and fears, the steadfast word of the prophet went on to sure accomplishment. And so did the prediction of Hosea (i. 6, 7), which no degree of political insight could have dictated, that while Assyria should overthrow the northern kingdom, its weaker sister, Judah, should be miraculously delivered. Their prediction can only be discredited by imputing to them what they do not say, and what their language cannot be fairly interpreted to mean. Thus (p. 183), "To Hosea, as to Amos, the fall of the house of Jehu and the fall of the nation appear as one thing; both prophets, indeed, appear to have looked for the overthrow of the reigning dynasty, not by intestine conspiracy, as actually happened, but at the hand of the destroying invader."

According to the Doctor's view of the matter (p. 184), the comparison of Hosea i. 4 with 2 Kings x. 30, "places in the strongest light the limitations that characterise all Old Testament revelation. It shows that we can look for no mechanical uniformity in the teaching of successive prophets." Hosea speaks of "a revolution accomplished with the active participation of older prophets," as "the bloodshed of Jezreel, the treacherous slaughter of the house of Ahab." "Elisha saw and approved one side of Jehu's revolution. He looked on it only as the death-blow to Baal-worship; but Hosea sees another side and condemns as emphatically as Elisha approved." There is, however, no real discrepancy between these prophets, as the Doctor himself suggests in the very act of urging it. What Elisha approves and what Hosea condemns are distinct things. By divine direction Jehu executed the just judgment of God upon the house of Ahab; so far he did right and was approved. There was, however, a converse to this, which is immediately added by the sacred historian (2 Kings x. 31), "But Jehu took no heed to walk in the law of the Lord God of Israel with all his heart; for he departed not from the sins of Jeroboam, which made Israel to sin." Jehu had been explicitly told (2 Kings ix. 9), by the prophet who gave him his commission, that the house of Ahab was to be made "like the house of Jeroboam the son of Nebat, and like the house of Baasha the

son of Ahijah," who were punished for the criminality of the golden calves. This very criminality was subsequently perpetuated by Jehu. From an executioner of God's righteous sentence he thus became an accomplice and participant in the crime; and in judging the house of Ahab he pronounced a like doom upon himself. A slaughter, which found its justification only in its being inflicted in obedience to the declared will of God, ceased to be justifiable as performed by one who set that will at defiance (1 Kings xvi. 7; Deut. viii. 20). We have tacitly assumed that "blood" in this passage means "bloodshed," as the Doctor paraphrases it. It may, however, signify "blood-guiltiness," and the sense of the passage be that a guilt equivalent to that contracted by Ahab in Jezreel should be avenged upon the house of Jehu, which by following in a like course of sin, justified, and as it were assumed, the crimes of their predecessors.

In order to give a more precise idea of the method and aim of these Lectures, we quote a summary statement (p. 229) of the relation between Isaiah and the prophets of Israel, as the author conceives it. The errors of the passage are too obvious to require further correction:—

"Isaiah builds on the foundations laid by his predecessors, Amos and Hosea. But his treatment of the problem is more comprehensive and all-sided. The preaching of Amos was directed only to breaches of civil righteousness, and supplied no standard for the reformation of national worship; it left even the golden calves untouched. Hosea, on the other hand, has a clear insight into the right moral attitude of the religious subject to God; but that subject is to him the personified nation, sinning and repenting as one man, and therefore he has no practical suggestions applicable to the actual mixed state of society; his prophecy leaves an unexplained hiatus between Israel's present sin and its future return to Jehovah. Isaiah, on the contrary, finds in Jehovah's holiness a principle equally applicable to the amendment of the state and the elevation of religious praxis, an ideal which supplies an immediate impulse to reformation, and which, though it cannot be fully attained without the intervention of purging judgments, may at least become the practical guide of those within Israel who are striving after better things."

The allegation (p. 268) that Isaiah's prophecy to Ahaz (chaps. vii. viii.) was "of the nature of a shrewd political forecast rather than of exceptional prediction, and, as the future actually shaped itself, his worst anticipations were not realised," is based on two unfounded assumptions, viz., that viii. 4

describes the ultimate overthrow of Samaria, and that the pictured desolation of Judah belonged to a single campaign. The prediction in chap. xx. is allowed to have been accomplished; but he says (p. 282), "this result had not come about in the way that Isaiah anticipated;" which anticipation we learn not from the prophet, but from his critic, who tells us that Isaiah had expected the Assyrian king to press forward against Egypt on the fall of Ashdod. In regard to Isaiah's predictions of the blissful future under the forms of the old dispensation, we are told (p. 337) that they have not only "received no literal fulfilment, but it is impossible that the evolution of the divine purpose can ever again be narrowed within the limits of the petty world of which Judah was the centre and Egypt and Assyria the extremes." He objects (p. 339) to a figurative interpretation of such prophecies, but nevertheless admits (p. 342): "It is plain from the very freedom with which Isaiah recasts the details of his predictions from time to time,—adapting them to new circumstances, introducing fresh historical or poetical motives, and cancelling obsolete features in his older imagery,—that he himself drew a clear distinction between mere accidental and dramatic details, which he knew might be modified or wholly superseded by the march of history, and the unchanging principles of faith, which he received as a direct revelation from Jehovah himself and knew to be eternal and invariable truth."

Now, if the meaning of all this is simply that Isaiah did not understand, nor was it given to him to reveal, the divine plans in all their extent and fulness, this is readily conceded. And it is a very proper subject of investigation, What were the limitations of the revelation granted to him, and what is the exact conception expressed in his words? But if "the lion which eats straw like the ox, the seas and rivers dried up to facilitate the return of the exiles to Judah," are "plainly figurative" (p. 303), and if the prophet clearly distinguishes substance and form in employing the symbolic institutions of the Old Testament to body forth the future, no correct exegesis can fasten upon the prophecy the inaccuracy of declaring, nor upon the prophet the narrowness of supposing, that his picture was to be realised in the particular forms in which he has drawn it. These were more or less consciously used and

accepted as figures of a reality more glorious, but as yet only partially disclosed and dimly understood; just as the vision of the New Jerusalem is to us the picture of a future whose magnificence impresses us, but in what precise form it shall be realised we cannot tell.

The "Branch of the Lord" (Isa. iv. 2) is referred (p. 248) to "the simple blessings of agricultural life." Immanuel (vii. 14 ff., p. 271) was simply an ordinary child, born at the time, and gave no such pledge to Ahaz of the stability of his royal house as an allusion to the promised and expected Son of David might have done. "It is by no means clear" (p. 306) whether the child with the remarkable names (ix. 6) is "one person or a race of sovereigns." At any rate no divine person is intended, for "there is no reason to think that they denote anything metaphysical." And Isaiah ii. 2-4 "is far from implying a world-wide sovereignty of Israel" (p. 309). Micah, it seems (p. 290), did not predict the captivity; "thou shalt come even to Babylon" (iv. 10) is a gloss. So, while Isaiah is represented (pp. 259, 260) as declaring "the inviolability of Jerusalem," and Jeremiah the "captivity of Jerusalem," Micah is made to affirm, in contradistinction from both, and contrary to what actually occurred, that the city shall be taken, and its population driven forth into the open field; "there, and not within her proud ramparts, Jehovah will grant her deliverance from her enemies." "Jehovah's righteousness," as declared by the prophets, is limited (p. 245) to "kingly righteousness," which "aims at, not the transformation of the hearts of men, but the removal of injustice in the state."

And thus by emptying words of their meaning, by attributing to the prophets ideas which they never entertained, by representing them as in collision where there is nevertheless entire harmony, and by the application of the potent wand of criticism in a few obstinate cases where less summary measures would not avail, the revelation of God through the prophets is made out to be a very different thing from that which it actually is.

WILLIAM HENRY GREEN.

ART. II.—*The Marbles of Ancient Rome.*

MARBLE-HUNTING is one of the regular pursuits of the visitor in Rome. The ground in almost every part of the ancient city is strewn with fragments of historical monuments; crumbs that have fallen from a feast of beauty and splendour which the world has never since equalled. The largest and most valuable pieces have long since been removed by builders and sculptors, to fashion some miserable Papal folly, or to adorn some pretentious church or palace; and at the present day, in almost every stonemason's shed, blocks of marble, belonging to ancient edifices, may be seen in process of conversion into articles of modern furniture. Many bits of the rarest kinds, however, still remain, which not unfrequently bear traces of the richest carving. For ages such spots have been quarries to *dilettanti* travellers from all parts of the world, who wished to bring home some memorial of their visit to the Eternal City; and the supply is still far from being exhausted. That so much material should have survived, not only the extraordinary changes through which the city has passed, its numerous conflagrations and civil dissensions, but also the wholesale conversion, during the middle ages, of columns and statues into lime—in kilns erected where the temples and palaces were most crowded,—and the vast exportation of objects of antiquity to other countries, is a striking proof of the prodigious quantity of marble that must have existed in ancient Rome. Now, however, such relics are more carefully preserved; and as the places where they are found in greatest quantity have been taken under the charge of the Government, and soldiers are constantly on the watch, it is not so easy as it used to be to abstract a fragment that has taken one's fancy.

Marble fragments are so eagerly sought after, because they make most suitable and convenient souvenirs. Their own beauty and rarity, apart from all historical associations, are a great attraction. Many of them will form, when cut and polished by the lapidary, pretty tazzas and paper-weights; and even the smallest bits can be put together in a mosaic

pattern, so as to make extremely beautiful table-tops. Whole rows of lapidary shops in the English quarter of the city, especially in the Via Babuino, and the Via Sistina, are maintained by this curious traffic. In the Forum and Colosseum great quantities of marble and alabaster used to be found; but these localities have been so much ransacked, that they now afford very scanty gleanings. The Baths of Caracalla and Titus, the recent excavations on the Esquiline, the ruins of the palaces of the Cæsars on the Palatine, and the open space marked out for new squares and streets between Sta. Maria Maggiore and St. John Lateran, are the best situations within the walls of the city. Outside, the supply is almost as large as ever. All over the vast Campagna the foot of the wayfarer strikes against some precious or beautiful relic; and along the Appian and Latin Ways, broken pieces of different kinds may be found in such profusion, that such spots look like the rubbish-heap around a marble quarry. In the vast grounds over which the imposing ruins of Hadrian's Villa spread, heaps of fragments of marble flooring or casing may be seen in almost every neglected corner, from which it is easy to obtain some lovely bit of giallo antico or pavonazzetto, or green porphyry. Beside the ancient quay of Rome, leading to the ruins of the Emporium or Custom-house—at a spot called in modern phrase "*La Marmorata*," because marble vessels still discharge their cargoes there—immense quantities of marble, alabaster, and porphyry are piled up, that were unshipped untold ages ago for Roman use; and a vineyard a short way off, on the slope of the Aventine, is much frequented by collectors on account of the richness of its finds.

But it is not as a mere amusement, or as a means of collecting pretty souvenirs of travel, that such marble-hunting expeditions are to be recommended. They may have a much higher value. The different kinds of marble collected are peculiarly interesting owing to their association with the different epochs of the history of the city and empire; and as the specimens which the geologist obtains throw light upon the formation of the rocky strata of the earth, so the small marble fragments which the student finds in Rome afford a clue to the various stages of its existence. Indeed, a competent knowledge of the marbles of Rome is indispensable to a clear understanding of the age of its ancient

monuments. An immense amount of controversy has raged round some remarkable building or statue, which would have been prevented, had the nature and origin of the marble of which it was composed been first investigated. The famous statue of the Apollo Belvidere in the Vatican, for instance, was long regarded as the master-sculpture of antiquity, and as an original production either of Phidias himself, or of his school. But the discovery that the marble of which it is wrought is Lunar or Carrara marble—which was unknown until the time of Julius Cæsar, who first introduced it into Rome—is of itself a strong presumption that it is not a genuine work of Greek art of the best period, but a monument of the decadence, or a copy of an original, wrought in imperial times for the adornment of a summer palace in Italy. In numberless other cases, ancient monuments have been identified by the mineral character and history of their marble materials. The first thing, therefore, which the student during his visit to the city ought to do, is to make himself acquainted with the different varieties of marble that have been found within the walls or in the neighbourhood. For this purpose, the Museum in the Collegio della Sapienza or University of Rome, will afford invaluable aid. In this institution, conveniently arranged in glass cases, are no less than 607 specimens of various marbles and alabasters used by the ancient Romans in the building or decoration of their houses and public monuments. The collection was made by the late Signor Sanginetti, Professor of Mineralogy in the University, and is quite unique. A great deal of instruction may also be obtained from the mineralogical study of the thousands of marble columns still standing in the older churches and palaces of Rome, most of which have been derived from the ruins of ancient temples and basilicas. Several excellent books may also be consulted with advantage—especially Faustino Corsi's Treatise on the Stones of Antiquity, *Trattata della Pietre Antiche*, which is the most approved Italian work on the subject. A second edition appeared in Rome in 1833, and it has not yet been superseded. Sir George Head, in an appendix to his valuable book, *Rome, a Tour of Many Days*, has given a careful abstract of the information contained in Corsi's work, besides embodying in the text the results of his own indepen-

dent examination, made during repeated visits for the very purpose, of the quality of the marble treasures in the great majority of the churches in Rome. Professor Hull's volume, *On Building and Ornamental Stones*, is, as its title indicates, of a very general and comprehensive character; but it contains a chapter upon the Continental marbles, which throws considerable light upon the materials of the ancient Roman structures; while good accounts of the history and quality of the Italian marbles will be found in Mr. Jervis's *Mineral Resources of Central Italy*, a book which is now somewhat scarce.

No marble quarries exist in the vicinity of Rome. The Sabine hills are indeed of limestone formation, and large masses of travertine, a fresh-water limestone of igneous origin, occur here and there; but no mineral approaching marble in texture and appearance is found within a very considerable radius of the city. The nearest source of supply is at Cesi, near the celebrated "Falls of Terni," about forty-five miles from Rome, where "Cottanello," the red marble of the Roman States, is found, of which the great columns supporting the arches of the side aisles of St. Peter's are formed. The hills and rocks of Rome are all volcanic; and only the different varieties of eruptive rock were first employed for building purposes. The oldest monuments of the kingly period, such as the Cloaca Maxima, the Mamertine Prison, the Walls of Servius Tullius, and some of the earliest substructures on the Palatine Hill, were all built of the red volcanic tufa found on or near their sites. This is the material of which the famous Tarpeian Rock, and the lower part of most of the Seven Hills, is composed. It is the oldest of the igneous deposits of Rome, and seems to have been formed by an agglomeration of ashes and fragments of pumice ejected from submarine volcanoes, no trace of whose craters can now be discovered. It reposes upon marine tertiary deposits, and over it, near the Church of Sta. Agnese, where it is still quarried for building stone, rests a quaternary deposit, in which numerous remains of primeval elephants have been found. Though the Consular or Republican period was a very stormy one, and the reconstruction of the city, after its partial demolition by the Gauls, seems to have been too hurried to allow much attention to be paid to the materials and designs of architecture, yet there are numerous

indications in the existing remains of that period, that there was a decided advance in these respects upon the ruder art of a former age. Finer and more ornamental varieties of volcanic stone were introduced from a distance, such as the *peperino* or greyish-green tufa of the Alban Hills, the *Lapis Albanus* of the ancients, with its glittering particles of mica interspersed throughout its mass; the hard basaltine lava from a quarry near the tomb of Cecilia Metella, on the Appian Way, and from the bed of the Lago della Colonna, once the celebrated Lake Regillus, to which the name of *Lapis Tusculanus* or *Selce* was given; and the *Lapis Gabinus* or *Sperone*, a compact volcanic concrete found in the neighbourhood of the ancient Gabii on the road to Tivoli, extensively used in the construction of the earliest monuments, particularly the Tabularium and the huge Arco di Pantani. Brick was also largely employed in the construction of the foundations and inner walls of public buildings, being arranged at a later date into ornamental patterns, to which the names of *opus incertum* and *opus reticulatum* were given; and in the manufacture of this substance, which they were probably at first taught by the Etruscan artificers of Veii in the neighbourhood, the Romans reached a high degree of perfection. The earliest tombs along the Appian Way were constructed of these different varieties of building materials. The sarcophagi of the Scipios were hollowed out of simple blocks of peperino stone; and the sculptor's art and the material in which he wrought were worthy of the severe simplicity of the heroic age.

But towards the close of the Republican period, Rome began to be distinguished for the magnificence of its public monuments. As its area of conquest spread, so did its luxury increase. New divinities were introduced from foreign countries, and domesticated in the Capitol; and these required more sumptuous fanes than those with which the native deities had been contented. The red tufa of the Tarpeian Rock sufficed for the rude sanctuary of Vesta, the primitive hearth-stone of ancient Rome; but in the reconstruction of the sumptuous temple of Jupiter Capitolinus, which marked the grandest period of Roman history, the most precious stones of Asia and Africa were employed. Statues, the glorious creations of Phidias or his disciples, were imported wholesale from

Greece to adorn temples and theatres, constructed after the models of Greek architecture, with pillars, friezes, and floors of precious Pentelic and Sicilian marble. During the last century of the Republic marble became a common building-stone. The tomb of Cecilia Metella, and the temples of Ceres, Juno Sospita, and Castor and Pollux, indicate the introduction of this precious and beautiful material. But it was reserved for the period of the Empire to complete the architectural glories of the city. Travertine, usually called *Lapis Tiburtinus*, a straw-coloured volcanic limestone excavated in the plain below Tivoli, which has the useful property of hardening on exposure, and becoming under an Italian sky almost indestructible, was now used as the principal building-stone instead of the former lavas and tufas; and the Colosseum, entirely constructed of travertine, which was treated in the middle ages as a quarry, out of which were built many of the palaces and churches of Rome, attests to this day the beauty and durability of this material. Quarries of crystalline marbles, admirably adapted for the purposes of the sculptor and architect, were opened in the range of the Apennines overlooking the beautiful Bay of Spezia, in the vicinity of Carrara, Massa, and Seravezza, and largely worked in the time of Augustus. This Emperor was called by Livy "templorum omnium conditor ac restitutor," and could boast that he had found Rome of brick, and left it of marble. The marbles of each new territory annexed to the Empire were brought at enormous expense into the Imperial City. A quay, to which reference has already been made, was constructed at the broadest part of the Tiber, where the vessels that transported marbles from Africa, and from the most distant parts of Eastern Europe and Western Asia, landed their cargoes. Here numerous blocks of marble were lately found, one of which was identified as that sent to Nero from a quarry in Carinthia; and another, a column of even more colossal dimensions, weighing about thirty-four tons, of valuable African marble, was meant to serve as a memorial pillar of the Council of 1870 on the Janiculum, but the intention was never carried out. So abundant was marble during the first two centuries of the Empire, that, like the silver and gold which King Solomon gathered into Jerusalem for the construction of the Temple, it was nothing accounted of. Every temple, palace, and public

edifice was built of it either in whole or in part. The tombs that lined the Appian Way on either side for fifteen miles had their brick cores covered with marble slabs ; and their magnificence must have impressed every visitor who entered the Imperial City through this avenue of architectural glory, shrouding the decays of death. It is obvious, then, that by studying the history of the conquests of Rome, the student can ascertain at what period a particular kind of marble was introduced from its native country, and the proximate date of the building in which this marble had been used.

It was a fortunate circumstance for the preservation of the precious marbles of Rome that Christianity laid its cuckoo egg in the nest of the Pagan city. When the capture of Rome by Alaric consummated the ruin of Paganism, by the dispersion of the higher classes, who alone cherished the proud memories of the ancient faith, the greater number of the temples were still standing without any one to look after the edifices or maintain the religious services. The Christians were therefore free to take possession of the deserted shrines ; and they speedily transferred to their own churches the columns and marble decorations that adorned the temples of the gods ; and the precious stones that once beautified the palaces of emperors and senators were employed to form the altars and the mosaic flooring of the memorial chapels. Almost all the early churches were constructed on or near the sites of the temples, so that the materials of the one might be transported to the other with the least difficulty and expense, just as the settler in the backwoods of America erects his log-house in the immediate vicinity of the trees that are most suitable for his purpose. And the striking contrast between the plain, mean exteriors of the oldest Roman churches—rough, time-stained, and unfinished since their erection,—and their gorgeous interiors, with their forests of columns separating the numerous aisles, and the series of richly-sculptured and brilliantly-frescoed chapels, all blazing with gold and marble,—a contrast that reminds us of the surprising difference between the outside of a common clumsy geode lying in the mud, and the sparkling crystals in the drusic cavity at the heart of it,—would lead us to infer that the outer walls were raised in extreme hurry and eagerness to secure the valuable materials on the spot,



before they should be otherwise appropriated. Marangoni, a learned Roman archæologist, in his *Cose Gentilesche e Profane*, which may be translated as "Profane and Heathen Objects applied to the Uses of the Church," mentions thirty-five churches in Rome as all raised upon the sites and out of the remains of ancient temples; and no less than six hundred and eighty-eight large columns of marble, granite, porphyry, and other valuable stones, as among the relics of heathen fanes transferred to sacred ground within the city, when the bronze Jupiter was metamorphosed into the Jew Peter,

"And Pan to Moses lent his pagan horn."

Many of these relics can be traced and identified, for it may be generally presumed, for the reason already given, that none are very far removed from their original situation. I know no more interesting pursuit in Rome than such an investigation; the objects, when their history is ascertained, acquiring a charm from association, over and above their own intrinsic beauty and interest. Most of the materials with which the three hundred and sixty-five churches of modern Rome have been constructed have been derived from the ruins of the ancient city. With the exception of a few comparatively insignificant portions brought from the modern quarries of Carrara, Siena, and Sicily, to complete subordinate details and to give a finish to the work, no marbles have been used in ecclesiastical and palatial architecture for the last fifteen hundred years, save those found conveniently on the spot; and hardly a brick has been made or a stone of travertine or tufa hewn out for domestic buildings within the same period. The construction of St. Peter's itself involved more destruction of classical monuments than all the appropriations of previous and subsequent Vandals put together. Much has been lost on account of this extraordinary transmutation and reconsecration, whose loss we can never cease to deplore; but we must not forget at the same time that much has been conserved which would otherwise have wasted away under the slow ravages of time, been consigned to the lime-kiln, or disappeared in obscure and ignoble use. Enough remains to overwhelm us with astonishment, and furnish materials for the study of years.

The white marbles of Greece were the first introduced into

Rome. Paros supplied the earliest specimens, and long held a monopoly of the trade. *Marmor Parium*, or Marmo Greco duro, as it is called by the modern Italians, is the very flower and consummation of the rocks, reminding us forcibly that the great Architect of the universe has not stopped short in His beneficence at the point where our bare wants are supplied, but has been pleased to add the charm of wonderful beauty over and above, to gratify His intelligent creatures. This material seems to have been created specially for the use of the sculptor—as that in which he can express most clearly and beautifully his ideal conceptions; and the surpassing excellence of ancient Greek sculpture was largely due to the suitability for high art of the marble of the country, which was so stainlessly pure, delicate, and uniform—so soft as to allow the sculptor to work it without force, and trace on it his finest lines, and yet so hard as never to betray the touch or moulder away beneath the chisel. Parian marble is by far the most beautiful of the Greek marbles. It is a nearly pure carbonate of lime of snowy whiteness, with a finely crystalline granular structure, doubtless due to metamorphic action. It may be readily distinguished from all other white marbles by the peculiarly bright glistening play of light from its crystalline facets on being freshly broken; and this peculiarity enables the expert at once to determine the origin of any fragment of Greek or Roman statuary. The ancient quarries in the island of Paros are still wrought, though very little marble from this source is exported to other countries. In the entablature around the tomb of Cecilia Metella, which is composed of Parian marble, we see the first example in Rome of the use of ornaments in marble upon the outside of a building; an example that was afterwards extensively followed, for all the tombs of a later age on the Appian Way had their exteriors sheathed with a veneer of marble. The beautiful sarcophagus which contained the remains of the noble lady for whom this gigantic pile was erected, and which is now in the Farnese Palace, was also formed of this material. Most beautiful examples of Parian marble may be seen in the three elegant columns of the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Roman Forum, belonging to the best period of Græco-Roman architecture; and in the nineteen fluted Corinthian pillars which

form the little circular temple of Hercules on the banks of the Tiber, long supposed to be the Temple of Vesta. By far the largest mass of this marble in Rome is the colossal fragment in front of the Colosseum that belonged to the Temple of Venus and Rome; and it helps to give one an idea of the extraordinary grandeur and magnificence of this building in its prime, whose fluted columns, six feet in diameter, and the sheathing of whose outside walls of great thickness, were all made of Parian marble.

More extensively employed in Greek and Roman statuary and architecture was the *Marmor Pentelicus*, or Marmo Greco fino of the modern Italians. The quarries which yielded inexhaustible materials for the public buildings and statues of Greece, and for the great monuments of Rome, were situated on the slopes of Mount Pentelies, near Athens; and after having been closed for ages, have recently been reopened for the restoration of some of the buildings in the Greek capital. The marble is dazzlingly white and fine-grained, but it sometimes contains little pieces of quartz or flint, which give some trouble to the workmen. The Parthenon—grandest of all human buildings—crowning like a perfect capital of human art the summit of Nature's rough workmanship in the Acropolis—was built of this marble; and the immortal sculptures of Phidias on the metopes, the frieze of the cella, and the tympana of the pediments of the temple, called the Elgin Marbles, were carved out of a material worthy of their incomparable beauty. Innumerable specimens at one time existed in Rome. The Arch of Septimius Severus and the Arch of Titus are built of it, although the rusty and weather-beaten hue of these venerable monuments hides the nature of the material. Domitian, who restored the celebrated Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, procured columns of Pentelic marble for the purpose from Athens; two of these are now in the nave of the Church of Ara Coeli, built upon the site of the temple; and portions of the others, and of the marble decorations, were presented by the magistrates to the Franciscan Friars of the neighbouring convent, and by them were wrought in 1348 into the conspicuous staircase leading to the façade of the church. Among the statues wrought of this marble may be mentioned the famous group of the Laocoon found in the Baths of Titus; the

beautiful Venus de Medici, discovered in the Villa of Hadrian, near Tivoli, and now in the Uffizi Gallery in Florence; and the well-known "Farnese Bull," sculptured out of a single block of huge dimensions, unearthed out of the ruins of the Baths of Caracalla, and now in the Museum of Naples. Massimo d'Azeglio, in his *Recollections*, gives an interesting instance of the value set upon this marble by modern Roman sculptors. Pacetti having purchased an ancient Greek statue of the best period in Pentelic marble, greatly mutilated, and wishing to repair it, could find nothing among the best products of the Carrara quarries to match the marble in purity and fineness of texture, and was therefore obliged to destroy another Greek statue of inferior merit in order to get materials for the restoration. From this combination he succeeded in producing the sleeping figure known as the Barberini Faun, whose forcible abduction by the Pontifical Government on the eve of its being sold to a German prince, so preyed upon the mind of the cruelly-wronged sculptor, that he took to his bed and died.

Very like Pentelic marble, but easily distinguishable, is the Marmor Porinum, the Marmo Grechetto duro of the Italians. It is intermediate in the quality of its grain between Parian and Pentelic marble, being finer than the former and not so fine as the latter. The column in front of the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, removed by Paul v. in 1614 from the Basilica of Constantine, is composed of this species; as well as the celebrated Torso Belvidere of the Vatican, found near the site of the Theatre of Pompey, to which Michael Angelo traced much of his inspiration, and which, as we learn from a Greek inscription at the base, was the work of the Rhodian sculptor Apollonius, who carved the group of the "Farnese Bull." Not unlike this Porine marble was the *Marmor Hymettium* of the ancients; but it was never a great favourite in Rome on account of its large grain and dingy white colour, slightly tinged with green and marked by long parallel dark grey veins of unequal breadth. The metamorphic action was not sufficiently energetic to destroy the last traces of organic matter and the original stratification of the rock; and the crystallising force was not sufficiently exercised to allow of the entire rearrangement of the whole of the particles so as to expel the included impurities. This marble was not therefore fitted for sculpture;

but it could be used for certain architectural purposes and for ornamentation. It used to be quarried extensively on Hymettus, the well-known mountain of Attica, celebrated for the quantity and excellence of its honey. The rock on which the aromatic flowers grew in such profusion for the bees, did not, however, partake of the same delightful quality. In working it a peculiar fetid odour of sulphuretted hydrogen, somewhat like that of a stale onion, was emitted, which gave rise to its modern Italian name—*Marmo Cipolla*. This repulsive quality, however, disappeared quickly on exposure. The finest specimens of this marble in Rome are the forty-six columns in the Church of St. Paul's, outside the gate, which belonged originally to the Basilica Emilia in the Forum, founded about forty-five years before Christ, and were transferred to the new building when the venerable old church, in which they had stood for more than fourteen hundred years, was destroyed by fire. Nothing too can be finer than the two rows of Ionic columns of Hymettian marble which divide the immense nave of Santa Maria Maggiore from the side aisles. There are eighteen on either side, each upwards of eight feet in circumference, and are supposed to have been taken from the Temple of Juno Lucina, whose site is assigned by antiquaries to the immediate vicinity. Similar rows of fluted Doric columns of the same marble, ten on each side, adorn the Church of St. Pietro in Vincoli. They are ancient, and belonged to some temple or basilica of the Forum. There are also five ancient pillars of Hymettian marble in the upper Church of San Clemente, taken from the same prolific source. The wall which surrounds the unique choir or presbytery of this most interesting old church, is also composed of great slabs of Hymettian marble, taken from the original subterranean church and hastily put together. Some of the ancient pillars of Hymettian marble belonging to the temples of Ceres and Proserpine adorn the Church of Santa Maria in Cosmedin, built on the foundation of these shrines; while twenty-four remarkably fine fluted Corinthian columns of the same material divide the triple nave of Santa Sabina on the Aventine, and are supposed to have belonged to the very ancient Temple of Juno Regina, erected by Camillus after the destruction of the Etruscan city of Veii. Hymettian marble was one of the first—if not actually the first—species intro-

duced into Rome. In the year of Rome 662, Lucius Crassus the orator brought to the city six columns of it, each twelve feet in length, with which he adorned his house on the Palatine Hill, receiving, on account of this circumstance, from Marcus Brutus, the nickname of the Palatine Venus. At the present day the marble is used for corner-stones in the ordinary houses of Athens.

Another livid white marble, somewhat resembling the Hymettian, is that which is known to the Italians as *Marmo Greco livido*. It was called by the ancients *Marmor Thasium*, from Thasos, now Thapso, an island in the north of the Ægean Sea, off the coast of Thrace. This island was also called *Aëria*, on account of its gold mines, and both the gold and the marble were wrought by the Phœnicians. The marble dug from the rocky sides of Mount Ipsario—a romantic hill thickly covered with fir-trees, and rising 3428 feet above the sea—enjoyed considerable reputation among the ancients. In Rome it must have been very common, if the name of Thasian is to be given to all the fragments of nondescript dusky white marble which are found among the ruins. Seneca says that the fish-ponds in his day were formed of that Thasian marble, with which at one time it was rare to adorn even temples. It was considered the least valuable of the white Greek marbles, and was used for the more ordinary purposes—Statius mentioning, in order to show the surpassing splendour of a particular building, that Thasian marble was not admitted into it. But there are not many well-defined monuments of it remaining in Rome. The chief are the bust of Euripides in the Vatican, and the outside casing of the pyramid of Caius Cestius, near the Protestant cemetery, now so weather-beaten and stained with dusky lichens that it is difficult to identify the material of which it is composed. From this marble, by a slight tinge of yellow and a little darker shade, the livid white marble of Lesbos, the *Marmor Lesbium*, or *Marmo Greco Giallognolo*, may be distinguished. It is not a beautiful material; and yet, strange to say, the statues of some of the most beautiful women of antiquity, such as those of Julia Pia in the Vatican, and of the Capitoline Venus in the Museum of the Capitol, were made of this marble, obtained from the birthplace of Sappho. More beautiful is the kind known as the *Marmor Tyrium*, or the

Greco-Turchinichio, which has a light bluish tinge. It was shipped by the ancients at the port of Tyre from some unknown quarry in Mount Lebanon, which supplied the marble used without stint in the building and decoration of Solomon's Temple and Palace. In this quarry every block was shaped and polished, before it was sent to be inserted in its place in the Temple wall, which therefore, as Heber beautifully says, sprang up like some tall palm in majestic silence. In Rome this marble was very rare. The doors in the great piers which support the dome of St. Peter's are each flanked by a pair of spirally-fluted columns of Tyrian marble, supposed to have been brought to Rome by Titus from the Temple of Jerusalem. They originally decorated the confessional of the old Basilica. The twenty-eight steps of the Scala Santa at the Lateran, said by ecclesiastical tradition to have belonged to Pilate's house in Jerusalem, and to have been the identical ones which our Saviour descended when He left the judgment-hall, are made of this marble; so that, whatever we may think of the tradition itself, there is a feature of verisimilitude in the material.

The chief supply of pure white marble in Rome was derived from the quarries in the mountains at Luna, an old Etruscan town near the Bay of Spezia, which fell to decay under the later Roman emperors. This ancient *Marmor Lunense* is called by the Italians Marmo di Carrara, because it is identical with the famous modern Carrara marble, and belongs to the same range of strata; the ruins of the ancient Luna being only a few miles from the flourishing town of Carrara, the metropolis of the marble trade. From Parian and Pentelic marble, Lunar marble, as already mentioned, can be easily distinguished by the less brilliant sparkle of its crystal facets, as shown by a fresh surface, and also by its more soapy-white colour. Its crystalline structure is the result of metamorphosis. Murchison, in his graphic description of the geology of the Etruscan Apennines, refers it, from the evidence of the characteristic fossils occurring in the associated limestones that graduate into it, to the Oolitic or Jurassic series of rocks. It was simply an ordinary Jurassic limestone altered by subsequent metamorphic action. The mountains which contain the quarries are highly picturesque, rising with serried outline to a height of upwards of 4000 feet, their flanks

scarred by deep gorges and torrent-beds, and their lower slopes clothed with olive-groves, vineyards, and forest-trees. Lunar marble was first brought to Rome in the time of Julius Cæsar; and Mamarra, so bitterly reviled by Catullus, the commander of the artificers in Cæsar's army in Gaul, lined with great slabs of this marble the outside and inside of his house on the Cælian Hill—the first recorded instance of veneering or incrusting walls with marble. The discovery of this method of cutting marble into thin slices, and decorating structures of ordinary materials with them, was stigmatised by Pliny as an unreasonable mode of extending luxury. The use of Lunar marble, on account of its easy accessibility, speedily extended to every kind of building, public and private. So vast were the quantities sent to Rome, that Ovid expressed his fear lest the mountains themselves should disappear through the digging out of this marble, and Pliny anticipated that dreadful consequences would be produced by the removal in this way of the great barriers erected by Nature for important purposes. Many fine specimens still survive the ravages of ages, among which may be mentioned the eleven massive Corinthian columns, upwards of forty-two feet high, and four and a half feet in diameter, which form the peristyle of the Temple of Neptune in the Piazza di Pietra, now well known as the Roman Custom-house. These pillars suffered severely from the action of fire, and are much worn and defaced, but there is a grandeur about them still which deeply impresses the spectator; and the blocks of marble which form the inner part of the architrave and entablature, as well as of the coffered vaulting, as seen from the inner side of the court, are so stupendous that the ruins overhang like a beetling rock of marble on a mountain peak. Grandeur still is the majestic column of Lunar marble dedicated to Marcus Aurelius, in the Piazza Colonna, which rears aloft its shaft one hundred and twenty-two feet in the air, wreathed around with spiral bands of historic reliefs, illustrating the Germania of Tacitus. Very splendid specimens of the same marble may be seen in the three fluted Corinthian columns and a pilaster belonging to the Temple of Mars Victor in the Forum of Augustus, which are the largest columns of any kind of marble in Rome, being eighteen feet in circumference, and upwards of fifty-four feet high. The two

well-known pillars of the portico of the Temple of Minerva, called *Le Colonnacce*, belonging to the adjoining Forum of Nerva, are also composed of the same material; as also the three deeply-fluted Corinthian columns that remain of the Temple of Vespasian in the Roman Forum, which still retain some traces of the purple colour with which they appear to have been painted, like the temples of Pompeii and Sicily. By far the largest single masses of Lunar marble are the two portions of a gigantic frieze and entablature, highly ornamented with sculpture, one measuring 1490 cubic feet, and weighing upwards of one hundred tons, lying in the Colonna Gardens on the slope of the Quirinal. These relics are supposed to have belonged to the splendid Temple of the Sun, which Aurelian erected after the conquest of Palmyra, and in which he deposited the rich spoils of that city. They are associated therefore with romantic memories of the famous Queen Zenobia, who spent her last days near Tivoli, after having been led captive in fetters of gold to grace the triumphal procession of her conqueror. For statuary purposes Lunar marble was extensively used in ancient Rome. It formed the material out of which the sculptor produced some of the noblest creations of his genius. Of these the Apollo Belvidere in the Vatican collection is one of the most remarkable. The evidence of its own material, as already mentioned, has dispelled the old idea that it is one of the masterpieces of the Greek school; and Canova's conjecture, based upon some peculiarities of its drapery, is in all likelihood true, viz., that it was a copy of a bronze original, made, probably at the order of Nero, for one of the baths of the imperial villa at Antium, in whose ruins it was found in the fifteenth century. From the time of the Romans, the white marble of the Montes Lunenses has been used for decorative purposes in many of the churches and public buildings of Italy. It formed the blocks out of which Michael Angelo, Canova, and Thorwaldsen chiselled their immortal works. Its quality and composition, however, vary very considerably, and small crystals of quartz and iron pyrites occasionally occur, to the annoyance of the sculptor. It becomes soon discoloured when exposed even to the smokeless air of Italy, but it is capable of resisting decay for very long periods. The opinion current in Paris, that the marbles of Carrara are

unable to withstand the effects of the climate of that city, is due to the frequent use of inferior qualities, which are known to artists as *Saloni* and *Ravaccioni*, and whose particles have but a feeble cohesion, and consequently slight durability.

All the white marbles which we have thus described were used in Rome principally for external architecture; and beautiful as a city largely built of them must have looked, it must have had, nevertheless, a garishness and artificiality which would offend the artistic eye. When newly constructed, the Roman temples in the time of the Emperors must have been oppressive, reflecting the hot sunshine from their snowy cellæ and pillared porticoes with an insufferable glare. Even the statues in their stainless purity, fresh from the sculptor's hand, though seen in the subdued light of interiors, and amid the shadows of enclosed walls, must have appeared ghastly and unreal representations of human life. Marble—unlike common stones, which are kindred to the earth and the elements, and find themselves at home in any situation, all things making friends with them, mosses, lichens, ivies, birds—is a dead, cold material, and does not harmonise with surrounding circumstances. Like the snow, which hides the warm familiar brown soil from us, with its unearthly and uncongenial whiteness, its perpetual snow chills and repels human sympathies. Nature, for a similar reason, introduces white flowers very sparingly into the landscape; and their dazzling whiteness is toned down by the greenery around them, and the balancing of coloured objects near at hand, so that they do not in reality attract more notice than other flowers. The ancient Greeks themselves, keenly sensitive as they were to all external influences, had a fine instinct for this want of harmony between white marble and the tones of nature and the feelings of man; and therefore, in many instances, they coloured not only the marble buildings exposed to view outside, but even the marble statues carefully secluded in the niches within. The Parthenon was thus tinted with vermilion, blue, and gold, which seems to us, who now see only the golden hue with which the suns of ages have dyed its pure Pentelic marble, a barbarous superfluity, but which, to the people of the time, was necessary on account of the dazzling brightness of its material, concealing the exquisite beauty of the workmanship, and the finished grace

of its proportions. Colour was used with perfect taste to relieve the sculptured details of the exterior, to articulate and ornament mouldings, and to harmonise the pure white temple with the dark blue sky of Greece and the rich warm tones of her landscape. We see many traces of bright colouring on the columns and other parts of the buildings in the Roman Forum. The bas-reliefs on the Lumachella marble of Trajan's Column were originally picked out with profuse gilding and vivid colours; the egg and arrow moulding of the capital being tinted green, red, and yellow, the abacus blue and red, the spirals yellow, the prominent figures gilt against backgrounds of different hues, and the water of the various rivers blue. Statues of the deities in Rome were nearly all coloured; and they received a fresh coat of vermilion—which, although it was the hue of divinity, was extremely fugacious—on anniversary occasions or in times of great national rejoicing. All this pleads powerfully in behalf of Gibson's colour-creed, which has had so much prejudice to overcome. The beauty and expression of ancient sculpture, whether for outside or inside decoration, were greatly heightened by this tinting. In cases where it was not employed, Nature herself became the artist, and has burnt into the marble statue or the marble pillar the warm hue of life; and the rusty, withered look of the ruins, over which ages of change have passed, touches us more, and appeals to the tenderest sympathies of beings who see in themselves, and in all around them, the tokens of death and decay, than the pure white marble structure could have done in the pride of its splendour. The graceful Corinthian pillars of the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum, the three surviving witnesses of its former grandeur, are all the dearer and more suggestive to us by reason of the russet hues with which time has stained the snowy purity of their Parian marble; and it is difficult to say how much of the touching effect which the poor drooping figure of the Dying Gladiator of the Capitol, all brown and discoloured, and wrung with an unutterable suffering, produces upon us, may be attributed to the tawny hue, and to the absence of the dainty spotlessness of the original Greek marble. That grime of ages lends a sort of warmth, and suggests flesh and blood, so that the suffering is not a cold and frosty incrustation, with which we have

nothing to do, but a real tragedy going on before our eyes, by which our sympathies are most deeply moved. In a dry, hot climate, like that of Rome, there are no tender tones of vegetable colouring, no moss or lichen touches of gold or grey or green to relieve the bare cold surface, and the rigid formal outlines of the marble; but out of the sky itself the marble gathers the soft shadows and the rich brown hues that reconcile its strange, unnatural whiteness with the homely ways of the familiar earth. That wonderful violet sky of Rome would glorify the meanest object. The common red brick glows in its translucent atmosphere like a ruby; and the russet defaced column, as it comes out against its vivid light, becomes luminous like a pillar of gold. Brick and marble are of equal æsthetic value in this magic city, in which the uncomely parts and materials have a more abundant comeliness by reason of the medium through which they are seen. Over all things lingers permanently the transfiguring glow that comes to northern lands only in the afternoon. In that land it is always afternoon; the ruins bathe as it were in a perpetual sunset. The air is constantly flooded with a radiance which seems to transfuse itself through every part of the city, making all its ruinous and hoary age bright and living, forming pictures and harmonies indescribable of the humblest objects, softening the sharp extremes of things, and causing what would look violent and sordid in any other place, either to enrich the general tone surrounding it, or to appear but as a lower note of the same key.

The white marbles hitherto described were principally for exterior use. But as Roman wealth and luxury increased coloured marbles were employed for internal decoration; and the effects which the Greeks obtained by the application of pigments, the Romans obtained by the rich hues of precious marbles incrusting their buildings, and durable as these buildings themselves. At first these rare materials were used with a degree of moderation, chiefly in the form of mosaics of small discs or cubes for the pavements of halls and courts. But at length massive pillars were constructed of them; and the vast inside brick surfaces of imperial baths and palaces were crusted over and concealed by slabs of rare and splendid marbles, the lines of which had no necessary connection with the mass

behind or beneath. Carthage from the spoils of its temples supplied Rome with many of its rarest columns; and it is probable that not a few of these survive in the Christian basilicas that occupy the sites and were built out of the materials of the old Pagan structures. With the decay of the Roman Empire the use of coloured marbles in art increased, so that even busts and statues had their faces and necks cut in white and the drapery in coloured marble. It attained its fullest development in the Byzantine style, of which, as it appeals to the senses more by colour than by form, it is a predominant characteristic, necessary to its vitality and expression. The early Christian builders contemplated this mode of decoration for their interiors only. Very rarely had they the means to apply it to the outside surface, as in St. Mark's in Venice, which is the great type of the Byzantine church, coloured within and without with the rich hues of marbles and mosaics. Our great Gothic cathedrals were the creation of one thought, the realisation of a single dream, and hence they were complete when the workmen of the architects left them, and their whole effect is dominated by one idea or one set of ideas; but the early Roman churches were the results of a general co-operation of associated art, and the large and plain surfaces of the interiors were regarded by the sculptor as a framework for the exhibition of his decorative art. Colour was lavished in veneers of rare marbles, and costly mosaics and frescoes covering the walls. There was thus less unity of purely architectural design, but there was a greater amount of general artistic wealth.

Intermediate between the white marbles used for external architecture, and the coloured marbles used for internal decoration, and forming the link between them, is the variety called by the Italians cipollino, or onion-stone. Its classical name is *Marmor Carystium*, from Carystos, a town of Eubœa, mentioned by Homer, situated on the south coast of the island at the foot of Mount Oche. This town was chiefly celebrated for its marble, which was in great request at Rome, and also for its large quantities of valuable asbestos, which received the name of Carystian stone, and was manufactured by the Romans into incombustible cloth for the preservation of the ashes of the dead in the process of cremation. The asbestos occurs in the

same quarries with this marble, just as this mineral is usually associated with talc schist, in which chlorite and mica are often present. Strabo places the quarries of cipollino at Marmorium, a place upon the coast near Carystos; but Mr. Hawkins mentions, in Walpole's *Travels*, that he found the ancient works upon Mount Oche at a distance of three miles from the sea; the place being indicated by some old half-worked columns, lying apparently on the spot where they had been quarried. This marble is very peculiar, and is at once recognised by its grey-green ground colour, and the streaks of darker green running through the calcareous substance like the coats of an onion, hence its name. These streaks belong to a different mineral formation. They are micaceous strata; and thus the true cipollino is a mixture of talcose schist with white saccharoidal marble, and may be said to form a transition link between marble and common stone. It belongs to the Dolomitic group of rocks, which forms so large a part of the romantic scenery of South-Eastern Europe, and yields all over the world some of the best and most ornamental building-stones. In this group calc-spar or dolomite wholly replaces the quartz and films of argillaceous matter of which, especially in Scotland, micaceous schist is usually composed. There are many varieties of cipollino, the most common being the typical marble, a grey-green stone, sometimes more or less white, with veins of a darker green, forming waves rippling over it like those of the sea. It occurs so often among the ruins that it must have been perhaps more frequently used in Rome than any other marble. It was also one of the first introduced, for Mamarra lined the walls of his house on the Cœlian with it, as well as with Lunar marble, in the time of Julius Cæsar; but Statius mentions that it was not very highly esteemed, especially in later times, when more valuable marbles came into use. One remarkably fine variety called *Cipollino marino* is distinguished by its minute curling veins of light green on a ground of clear white. Four very large columns in the Braccio Nuova of the Vatican, which may have belonged originally, like the two large columns of *giallo antico* in the same apartment, to some sumptuous tomb on the Appian Way, are formed of this variety, and are unique among all the other pillars of cipollino marble to be seen in Rome for the brightness of their colour

and the exquisite beauty of their venation. Nothing can be more striking and beautiful than the rich wavelike ripples of green on the cipollino marbles that encase the Baptistery of St. Mark's in Venice, as if the breakers on the Lido shore had been frost-bound before they fell, and the sea-nymphs had sculptured them into the walls of this ecclesiastical sea-cave. Indeed all the outside and inside walls of the glorious old church are cased with this marble—in the interior up to the height of the capitals of the columns, while above that, every part on the vaults and domes is incrustated with a truly Byzantine profusion of gold mosaics; fit image of the sea on which like a halcyon's nest Venice rests, and of the glowing golden sky that shines above it. Line after line of pleasant undulation ripples on the smooth polished marble as the sea ebbs and flows through the narrow streets of the city. Another variety of cipollino, called *Mandolato rosso*, has streaks of pure red on a ground of vivid green. A beautiful example of this very rare and valuable kind is to be seen in the two Corinthian columns with gilded capitals which support the portal of the Parnassian gallery in the Villa Albani near Rome. It was probably found at Hadrian's Villa near Tivoli, as was the pair of Ionic columns of *giallo antico* in the room called the Atrium of Juno in the same palace. There are also rare varieties in which white parallel streaks appear on a ground of green, or waved strips of light green on a ground of yellow or rose colour, or in which wavelike veins nearly black appear on a white ground. In the churches and palaces of Rome specimens of all these varieties may be found, taken from the old ruins, for the marble is not now worked in the ancient quarries. The largest masses of common cipollino in Rome are the eight grand old Corinthian columns which form the portico of the Temple of Antoninus Pius and Faustina in the Forum. The height of each shaft, which is composed of a single block, is forty-six feet, and the circumference fifteen feet and a half. It may be remarked in passing, that the fact of the entablatures, bases, and capitals, as well as the incrustation of the outer walls of the cella, being of white marble, shows that the coloured marbles were somewhat sparingly used at this period. The pillars look very rusty and weather-worn, and are much battered with the ill-usage which they have received; the marks

of the roofs of the houses built between them in the middle ages being still seen deeply indented in the stone. Scarcely inferior in size is the cipollino column erected in the Piazza di Spagna, opposite the Propaganda College, in honour of the Immaculate Conception. It was found unfinished, and therefore seems never to have been used, in the ground behind the Palace of Monte Citorio, formed out of the ruins of the ancient Amphitheatre of Statilius Taurus. It is forty-two feet long, by four and three quarter feet in diameter. It was sculptured, polished, and erected on its present site by Pope Pius IX. in 1857, but its noble shaft is sadly disfigured by the fantastic bronze network which covers a large part of it.

One of the most beautiful and highly-prized marbles of ancient Rome was the species which is familiar to every visitor under the name of *Giallo antico*. It must have existed in immense quantities in the time of the Emperors, for fragments of it are found almost everywhere, and it is the variety that is most frequently picked up and converted into ornamental articles. It is easily recognised by its deep brownish-yellow colour, resembling somewhat the yellow marbles of Siena and Verona, though invariably richer and brighter. All the varieties are traversed more or less by veins and blotches of a darker yellow or brownish hue, which give them a charming variety. The texture is remarkably fine and close-grained. In this respect *giallo antico* can be distinguished from every other marble by the touch. When polished it is exquisitely smooth and soft, looking like ivory that has become yellow with age. No fitter material could be employed for the internal pavements or pillars of old temples, presenting a venerable appearance, as if the suns of many centuries had stained it with their own golden hues. Where this marble came from we have no precise information. From the fact that it was called by the Romans *Marmor Numidicum*, we are led to infer that it was quarried in Numidia, and was brought into Rome when the region was made a Roman province by Julius Cæsar. It was probably known to the Romans in the time of Jugurtha; but the age of luxury had not then begun, and Marius and Sulla were more intent upon the glories of war than upon the arts of peace. The quarries on the slopes of the Atlas, worked for three hundred years to supply the enormous demand made by

the luxury of the masters of the world, were at length exhausted, and the marble can now only be found among the ruins of the Imperial City. The largest specimens of *giallo antico* existing in Rome are the eight fluted Corinthian pillars, thirty feet high and eleven feet in circumference, with capitals and bases of white marble, which stand in pairs within the niches of the Pantheon. In consequence of the fires of former generations, the marble has here and there a tinge of red on the surface. In the Church of St. John Lateran there is a splendid pair of fluted columns of *giallo antico*, which support the entablature over a portal at the northern extremity of the transept. They are thirty feet in height and nine feet in circumference, and were found in Trajan's Forum. In the Arch of Constantine are several magnificent *giallo antico* columns and pilasters, which are supposed to have belonged to the triumphal arch of Trajan, dismantled for the purpose. They are so damaged in appearance, and so discoloured by the weather, that it is not easy, without close inspection, to tell the material of which they are composed. Connected with the final and complete triumph of Christianity over Paganism, these columns, standing in a mongrel and debased structure, are strikingly illustrative of the heterogeneous elements which formed the faith of the first Christian Emperor; the grandest doctrines being associated with the vilest practices. For pavements and the sheathing of interior walls *giallo antico* was used more frequently than almost any other kind of marble; hence it is mostly found in fragments of thin slabs, with the old polish still glistening upon them.

It is difficult to describe, so as to identify it, the species of marble known as *Africano*. It has a great variety of tints, ranging from the clearest white to the deepest black, through bright green, yellow, and purple. Its texture is very compact and hard, frequently containing veins of quartz, which render it difficult to work. Its ancient name is *Marmor Chium*, for it was brought to Rome from a quarry on Pelinæus, now known as Mount Elias, the highest summit in the island of Chios—the modern Scio—which contested the honour of being the birthplace of Homer. It received its modern name of *Africano*, not from any connection with Africa, but from its dark colour. It enters pretty frequently into the decoration

of the Roman churches, though it is rare to see it in large masses, when it has a very rich appearance. It seems to have been much in fashion for pavements, of which many fragments may be seen among the ruins of Trajan's Forum. The side wall of the second chapel in the Church of Santa Maria della Pace in the Piazza Navona are sheathed with large slabs of remarkably fine Africano, with edges bevelled like a rusticated basement. In the Belvidere Cortile in the Vatican is a portion of an ancient column of this marble, which is the most beautiful specimen in Rome; and the principal portal of the portico of St. Peter's is flanked by a pair of fluted Roman Ionic columns of Africano, which are the largest in the city. Two columns of warm-tinted Africano still remain on the southern front of the Arch of Drusus; and as they are of the Roman composite order, first shown in the columns on the Arch of Titus, we must infer that they were added to the original structure when Caracalla utilised it for the aqueduct which brought water to his baths.

Closely allied to this marble is an ancient species which puzzles most visitors by its Protean appearance. Its tints are always neutral, but they vary in depth from the lightest to the darkest shade, and are never mixed but in juxtaposition. Dirty yellows, cloudy reds, dim blues and purples, but never greens, occur in the ground or in the round or waved blotches or crooked veins. It has a fine grain and a dull fracture. This variety of Africano is known by the familiar name of *Porta Santa*, from the circumstance that the jambs and lintel of the first Porta Santa—a Holy Door annexed by Boniface VIII. to St. Peter's in the year 1300—were constructed of this marble. The Porta Santa, it may be mentioned, was instituted in connection with a centenary jubilee, but afterwards the period of formally opening it was reduced to fifty years, and now it is shortened to twenty-five. On the occasion of the jubilee, on Christmas Eve, the Pope knocks three times with a silver hammer against the masonry with which it is filled up, which is then demolished, and the Holy Door remains open for a whole twelvemonth; and on the Christmas Eve of the succeeding year is closed up in the same manner as before. A similar solemnity is performed by proxy at the Lateran, the Liberian, and the Pauline Basilicas. In all these great churches, as in

St. Peter's, the jambs and lintel of the Holy Door are of Porta Santa marble. This beautiful material was brought from the mountains in the neighbourhood of Jassus—a celebrated fishing town of Caria, situated on a small island close to the north coast of the Jassian Bay. From this circumstance it was called by the ancient Romans *Marmor Jassense*. Near the quarries was a sanctuary of Hæstus, with a statue of the goddess, which, though unprotected in the open air, was believed never to be touched by rain. The marble, the most highly-prized variety of which was of a blood-red and livid white colour, was used in Greece chiefly for internal decoration. It was introduced in large quantity into Rome, and there are few churches in which the relics of it that existed in older buildings have not been adapted for ornamental purposes. Among the larger and finer masses of Porta Santa may be enumerated two columns and pilasters which belong to the monument of Clement IX., in the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, and which are remarkable for their exceedingly fine texture and the unusual predominance of white among the other hues; four splendid Corinthian pillars, considered the finest in Rome, in the nave of Sta. Agnese; the pair of half columns which support the pediment of the altar in the Capella della Presentazione in St. Peter's; and the basin of the handsome fountain in front of the Pillar of Marcus Aurelius in the Piazza Colonna, constructed by the architect Giacoma della Porta out of an enormous mass of Porta Santa found lying on the ancient wharf.

Frequent specimens of a beautiful marble known as *Fior di Persico*, from the resemblance of the colour of its bright purple veins on a white ground to that of the blossom of the peach, may be found in the Roman churches. It was much used for mouldings, sheathings, and pedestals, and also for floors. In the Villa of Hadrian large fragments of slabs of this marble may be found, which lined the walls and floors of what are called the Greek and Latin Libraries. The Portuguese Church in Rome has several columns of Fior di Persico supporting the pediments of altars in the different chapels; especially four pair of fluted ones which adorn the two altars at the extremity of the nave, which are among the largest and finest in Rome. The principal altar in the Church of San

Carlo in the Corso is adorned by two pairs of Corinthian columns of this marble, which are not much inferior in size and beauty. But the most splendid specimens of all are a pair of columns in the Palazzo Rospigliosi. The dado, eight feet in height, in the gorgeous Corsini chapel in the Church of St. John Lateran, is formed of large tablets of highly-polished Fior di Persico, and the frieze that surrounds the whole chapel is composed of the same beautiful material, whose predominance over every other marble is the peculiarity of this chapel. The ancient name of this marble was *Marmor Molossium*, from a region in Epirus—now Albania—which was a Roman province in the time of Pompey. It is associated with the celebrated campaigns in Italy of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, in which Greece was for the first time brought into contact with Rome. The region in which the quarries existed was the most ancient seat of Pelasgic religion—the worship of the Oracle of Dodona connected with the oaken grove and the Temple of Jupiter; and the kings of Molossus claimed their descent from the son of Achilles. Mythology derived from its peculiar physical features, which were largely volcanic, its legends of the infernal rivers of Acheron and Cocytus.

The infinite hues and markings of the coloured marbles have all been painted by Nature with one material only, variously proportioned and applied—the oxide of iron; the same substance which gives its crimson to the rose, and its beauty to the blush that mantles on the cheek of innocence. The varieties of marble are mainly caused by the different degrees in which this substance has pervaded them. They are variable mixtures of the metamorphous carbonates of protoxide of iron and lime. And it is an interesting fact that there is a distinct relation between deposits of magnetic iron ore and the metamorphoses of limestones into marbles; so that this substance not only gives to the marbles their colouring, but also their texture. Even the whitest saccharine or statuary marble, which it has not coloured, it has created by the crystallisation of the limestone associated with it. And the marbles of the entire province of the Aperon Apennines owe their existence to the large quantities of iron ore disseminated throughout them, which have exercised a great influence on the molecular modification they have undergone. The same changes have been

produced on the limestones of Greece and Asia Minor by veins containing iron ore running through them.

And of the marbles thus produced, one of the most beautiful is that which is known in Rome by the name of Pavonazzetto, from its peacock-like markings. The ground is a clear white, with numerous veins of a dark red or violet colour, while the grain is fine, with large shining scales. It resembles alabaster in the form and character of its veins, and in its transparent quality. It is a Phrygian marble, and was known to the ancients under various names, as Marmor Docimenum, Sinadicum, Phrygium, Mygdonium, being found at the Castle of Docimus, near the town of Sinnada in Phrygia, and in the province of Mygdonia. It was brought to Rome when Phrygia became a Roman province, after the establishment of Christianity in Asia Minor. At first the quarry yielded only small pieces of the marble, but when it came into the possession of the Romans they developed its resources to the utmost; numerous large monolithic columns being wrought on the spot, and conveyed at great expense and labour to the coast. Colonel Leake supposes that the extensive quarries on the road from Khoorukun and Bulwudun are those of the ancient Docimenum. Hamilton, in his *Researches*, says that he saw numerous blocks of marble and columns in a rough state, and others beautifully worked, lying in this locality. In an open space beside a mosque lay neglected a beautifully-finished marble bath, once intended, perhaps, for a Roman villa; and in the wall of the mosque, and of the cemetery beside it, were numerous friezes and cornices, whose elaborately-finished sculptures of the Ionic and Corinthian orders proved that they were never designed for any building on the spot, but were in all probability worked near the quarries for the purpose of easier transportation, as is done in the quarries of Carrara at the present day. Pavonazzetto is thus associated in an interesting manner with the Phrygian cities of Laodicea and Colosse. When St. Paul was preaching the gospel through this part of Asia Minor, the architects of Rome were conveying this splendid marble from the quarries of the Cadmus, to adorn the palatial buildings of the Imperial City. No marble was so highly esteemed as this, and no other species is so frequently referred to by the Latin poets :—

Horace says :

“ Quod si dolentem nec Phrygius lapis
Nec purpurarum sidere clarior
Delenit usus.”

Tibullus remarks :

“ Quidve Domus prodest Phrygiis innixa columnis.”

Ovid has written :

“ Quæ mihi Mydonii marmoris instar erant.”

While Statius notices the fable that it was coloured by the blood of Atys :

“ Sola nitet flavis nomadum decissa metallis
Purpura, sola cavo Phrygiæ quam Synnados antro
Ipse cruentavit maculis lucentibus Atys.”

Along with the marble the Romans afterwards introduced the Phrygian worship of Mithras, the Sun-god ; and in the subterranean church of San Clemente, behind the apse, a chapel was discovered dedicated to the worship of this divinity, whose statue was concealed here when that superstition was prohibited. The high altar of the subterranean church, under which the relics of St. Ignatius and St. Clement are supposed to lie, is covered by a canopy supported by elegant columns of pavonazzetto marble ; while the high altar of the upper church is similarly surmounted by a double entablature of Hymettian marble, supported by four columns of pavonazzetto. The extramural church of St. Paul's had several splendid pillars of Phrygian marble, taken by the Emperor Theodosius from the grandest of the law-courts of the Republic ; but these were unfortunately destroyed during the burning of the old basilica about sixty years ago. We see in the flat pilasters of this purple-veined marble, now erect against the transepts of the restored church, the vestiges of the magnificent Æmilian Basilica in the Forum, of whose celebrated columns Pliny says, “ Nonne, inter magnifica, basilicam Pauli columnis a Phrygibus mirabilem.” Specimens of pavonazzetto are to be seen in almost every church in Rome. In the interesting old Church of Sta. Agnese there are two columns of this marble, the flutings of which are remarkable for the cabled divisions, which amount in number to no less than one hundred and forty. The gallery above is supported on small columns, most of

which are of pavonazzetto spirally fluted. In the Church of Santa Maria degli Angeli there is also a remarkably fine specimen near the south absis; while there is a grand pair of columns in the vestibule of St. Peter's between the transept and the sacristy. Fourteen fluted columns of Phrygian marble have been dug up from the site of the Augustan Palace on the Palatine; while the one hundred and twenty employed by the Emperor Hadrian, in the Temple of Juno and Jupiter erected by him, have been distributed among several of the Roman churches. The side walls of the splendid staircase of the Bracchi Palace are sheathed with a very rare and beautiful variety, remarkable for the delicacy of its veins and its brilliant polish. It is said to be the produce of two ancient columns discovered near the Temple of Romulus Maxentius in the Forum, converted into the Church of SS. Cosmo and Damian. But the finest of all the pavonazzetto columns of Rome are the twelve large ones in the Church of San Lorenzo outside the walls. In the volute of the capital of one of them a frog has been carved, which identifies it as having formerly belonged to the Temple of Jupiter or Juno, within the area of the Portico of Octavia. Pliny tells us that both temples were built at their own expense by two wealthy Lacedæmonian artists, named Sanros and Batrakos; and, having been refused the only recompence they asked—the right to place an inscription upon the buildings,—they introduced into the capitals of the pillars, surreptitiously, the symbols of their respective names, a lizard and a frog.

The rarest and most precious of the old marbles of Rome is the *Rosso antico*. Its classical name has been lost, unless it be identical, as Corsi conjectures, with the Marmor Alabandicum, described by Pliny as black inclining much to purple. For a long time it was uncertain where it was found, but recently quarries of it have been discovered near the sea at Skantari, a village in the district of Teftion, which show traces of having been worked by the ancients. From these quarries the marble can only be extracted in slabs and in small fragments. This is the case, too, with all the red marbles of Italy, which, in spite of their compact character, scale off very readily, and are friable, vitreous, and full of cleavage planes, in addition to which they are usually only found in thin beds, which prevents

their being used for other purposes than table tops and flooring slabs. The predominance of magnetic iron ore, to which they owe their vivid colour, has thus seriously affected the molecular arrangement of the rocks. It is probable that *rosso antico*, like the Italian red marbles, belongs to one or other of the Liassic formations, which, in Italy as well as in Greece and Asia Minor, constitutes a well-marked geological horizon by its regular stratification and its characteristic ammonite fossils. Comparatively small fragments of *rosso antico* have been found among the Roman ruins; and these have been employed to ornament subordinate features in some of the grander churches. The largest specimens to be seen in Rome are the double-branched flight of seven very broad steps, leading from the nave to the high altar of Santa Prassede. Napoleon Buonaparte had ordered these slabs of *rosso antico* to be sent to Paris to ornament his throne, a few months before his fall; but fortunately the order came too late to be executed. The cornice of the present choir is also formed of this very rare marble; while large fragments of the old cornice of the same material, which ran round the whole church, are preserved in the Belvidere Cortile of the Vatican. Tradition asserts that the pieces which have been converted to these sacred uses in the church once belonged to the house of Pudens, the father of its titular saint, in which Peter is supposed to have dwelt when in Rome. The entrance to the chamber of the Rospigliosi Palace, which contains the far-famed "Aurora" of Guido Rossi on the ceiling, is flanked by a pair of Roman Ionic columns of *rosso antico*, fourteen feet high, which are the largest in Rome, although the quality of the marble is much injured by its lighter colour, and by a white streak which runs up each shaft nearly from top to bottom. In the sixth room of the Casino of the Villa Borghese the jambs of the mantelpiece are composed of *rosso antico* in the form of caryatides supporting a broad frieze of the same material wrought in bas-relief. This marble seems to have been the favourite material in which to execute statues of the Faun; for every one who has visited the Vatican Sculpture Gallery and the Museum of the Capitol will remember well the beautiful statues of this mythic being in *rosso antico*, which are among their chief treasures, and once adorned the luxurious Villa of Hadrian at Tivoli. This marble is admirably

adapted for such masterpieces of Greek sculpture, for it gives to the ideal of the artist the warm vividness of life; and it seems a fit colour 'in which to express the rich, sensuous, earthy side of nature, the happy characteristics of all wild natural things which meet and mingle in the human form and in the human soul—the Adam, the red man formed out of the red clay, in which the life of the animals and the life of the gods coalesce. In the Doria Palace there is a fine group of the Centaur partly in *rosso antico* and in *nero antico*. And in the Gabinetto of the Vatican, along with a large square tazza of *rosso antico*, is kept a most curious arm-chair of this marble, called *sedia forata*, found near the Church of St. John Lateran, upon which, in the middle ages, the Popes were obliged to sit at their coronation in the presence of the Cardinals, in order to secure the throne of St. Peter from being intruded upon by a second Pope Joan—whether there ever really was such a personage, or whatever gave rise to the curious myth. The chair is like an ordinary library chair, with solid back and sides, sculptured out of a single block, and perforated in the seat with a circular aperture. *Rosso antico* is not what might strictly be called a beautiful marble. Its colour is dusky and opaque, resembling that of a bullock's liver, marked with numerous black reticulations, so minute and faint as to be hardly visible. But the grain is extremely fine, admitting of the highest polish.

Of black marbles—in the formation of which both the animal and vegetable kingdoms have taken part, their substance being composed of the finely-ground remains of foraminifera, corals, and shells, and their colour produced by the carbonaceous deposits of ancient forests—few kinds seem to have been used by the ancient Romans. The *nero antico* was the species most esteemed, on account of its compact texture, fine grain, and deep black colour, marked occasionally with minute white short straight lines, always broken and interrupted. It is the *Marmor Tænarium* of the ancients, quarried in the Tænarian peninsula, which forms the most southerly point in Europe, now called Cape Matapan. The celebrated quarries which Pliny eloquently describes, but for which Colonel Leake inquired in vain, were under the protection of Poseidon, whose temple was at the extremity of the peninsula. They

attracted, on account of the sanctuary which the temple afforded, large numbers of criminals who fled from the pursuit of justice, and who readily found work in them. Very fine specimens of this marble may be seen in a pair of columns in the obscure Church of Santa Maria Regina Cœli, near the Convent of St. Onofrio, on the other side of the Tiber; and also in a pair in the third room of the Villa Pamphili Doria, which are extremely fine, and are probably as large as any to be met with. In consequence of the quantity used in the inscriptional tablets of monuments, for which this seems to be the favourite material, *nero antico* is extremely scarce in modern Rome. The *bigio antico* is a greyish marble, composed of white and black, sometimes in distinct stripes or waves, and sometimes mingled confusedly together. It was the *Marmor Batthium* of the ancients, and two of the large columns in the principal portal of the Church of Santa Croce in Jerusalemme are remarkably fine specimens of it, probably taken from the Villa of Heliogabalus, in whose gardens, called the Horti Variani, the church was built. Another species is the *bianco e nero antico*, the *Marmor Proconessium* of antiquity, obtained from the celebrated quarries of Proconessium, an island in the western part of the Propontis. Many of the towns of Greece were decorated with this marble. The internal part of the famous sepulchre erected by Artemisia, the widow of Mausolus, king of Caria, to her husband, and after whom all grand tombs ever since have received the name of mausoleum, was built of this marble. So celebrated were the quarries of Proconessium that the ancient name of the island was changed to Marmora, and the whole of the Propontis is now called the Sea of Marmora. Although so highly esteemed in Greece, the marble does not seem to have been extensively used in Rome, the finest relics being the four columns supporting the marble canopy, in the form of a Gothic temple, which surmounts the high altar of St. Cecilia, which is among the most ancient of all the churches of Rome. They were probably derived from some old Roman palace, and are remarkable for the clearness and brilliancy of the white blotches on a black ground. There are different varieties of this marble: one kind in which the blotches or veins are pure black on a pure white ground, and another in which the blotches or veins are pure white on

a black ground. In these varieties, however, the black and the white are more confused together, but remain quite distinct and separate, so that if the veins are white the ground is sure to be black, and *vice versa*. The ancient *Marmor Rhodium*, or the *giallo e nero*, had golden-coloured veins on a black ground, and, owing to its compact texture, was capable of receiving a high polish. It is very like the celebrated marble of Portore or Portovenere, a modern Italian species obtained from the western chain of the Gulf of Spezia, where the formation passes into that of the ammonitiferous limestones of the Lias and of the palæozoic rocks. A beautiful highly-polished specimen of Rhodian marble exists in the mask in front of the tomb of Paul III. in the tribune of St. Peter's, sculptured by Della Porta in 1547, long previous to the discovery of the quarries of Portovenere. It may be remarked that the grain of the latter species is such that it will not keep its polish without extreme care, a circumstance which distinguishes it from the Rhodian marble, whose tenacity in this respect renders it eminently adapted for the more costly class of decorative works.

The marbles we have been hitherto considering belong to the older calcareous formations of Italy, Greece, Asia Minor, and Egypt, and go down to the upper triassic and muschel-kalk limestones, and perhaps even to those of an older period. But there is a class of ancient marbles in Rome of much more recent geological origin—belonging indeed to the Miocene epoch—which are called *Lumachella*, from the Italian word signifying snail, on account of the presence in all the species of fossil shells. They vary in colour from the palest straw to the deepest purple. Some of them are exceedingly beautiful and valuable, and they are nearly all more or less rare, being found chiefly in small fragments of ancient pavements. Their substance is formed of the shells of the common oyster in bluish grey and black particles on a white ground, as in the *Lumachella d' Egitto*; of the cardium or cockle, assuming a lighter or deeper shade of yellow, as in the *Lumachella d' Astracano*; of the ammonite, as in the *L. Corno di Ammone*; of the *Anomia ampulla* in the *L. occhio di Pavone*, so called from the circular form of the fossils whichever way the section is made; of encrinites, belemnites, and starfish, showing white or red on a violet ground, as in the *L. pavonazze*; and of broken shells,

hardly discernible, together with very shining and saccharoid particles of carbonate of lime, as in the *Marmor Schistum* of the ancients—the *brocatello antico* of the Italians, so named from its various shades of yellow and purple, resembling silk brocade. The most important specimens of Lumachella marbles are the pair of very fine large columns of *L. rosea* on the ground-floor of the Schiarra Palace, the balustrade of the high altar of St. Andrea della Valle, two columns in the garden of the Corsini Palace of *L. d'Astracano*, and a pair of large pillars which support one of the arches of the Vatican Library, formed of *L. occhio di pavone*. Specimens of brocatello may be found in several churches and palaces, forming mouldings, sheathings, and pedestals. The most interesting of the Lumachella marbles is the *bianca antica*, the *Marmor Megarense* of the ancients, composed of shells so small as to be scarcely discernible, and so closely compacted that the substance takes a good polish. The well-known Column of Trajan—the first monument (*columna cochleata*) of this description ever raised in Rome, and very far superior to the Antonine Column—is composed of Lumachella marble from Megara. It presents, in twenty-three spiral bands of bas-reliefs, winding round thirty-four blocks of stone, the history of the victories of Trajan over the Dacians, and, without reckoning horses, implements of war, and walls of cities, is said to consist of no less than 2500 figures, each about two feet two inches high. It is a strikingly suggestive thought, that this majestic pillar—which produced so deep an impression upon the minds of posterity that, five centuries afterwards, Pope Gregory the Great was moved to supplicate, by means of masses in several of the Roman churches, for the liberation of him whom it commemorated from purgatory—should be composed of the relics of sea-shells.

“ Memorial pillar ! 'mid the wreck of Time,
Preserve thy charge with confidence sublime ”—

said Wordsworth ; but this sublime charge is committed to frail keeping. It is itself a sepulchre of the dead, and the tragedies of the Dacian war are inscribed upon tragedies that took place long ages before there was any human eye to witness them. The historic sculptures that so deeply move our pity for a conquered people, are based upon the immemorial sculp-

tures of creatures whose sacrifice in whole hecatombs touches us not, because it is part of the order of the world by which life forms the foundation of and minister to life. It is strange how many of the grandest monuments are wrought out of the creations of primeval molluscs. The enduring pyramids themselves are formed of the nummulitic limestone studded with its "Pharaoh's beans," the exuviae of shell-fish that perished ages before the Nile had created Egypt. And all alike are trophies of the dust!

Of the breccias there is a great variety among the relics of ancient Rome. A breccia is a rock made up of angular pebbles or fragments of other rocks. When the pebbles are rounded the conglomerate is a pudding-stone. Marble breccias are formed of angular pieces of highly crystalline limestone, united together by a siliceo-calcareous cement, containing usually an admixture of a hornblendic substance, and which is due to a particular action of adjacent masses or veins of iron ore. The hornblendic cement, with its iron or manganese base, produces the variegated appearance which may be seen in specimens from different localities. As may be imagined from their composition, these rocks are as a rule extremely unalterable by ordinary atmospheric agencies, and are susceptible of a high degree of polish, which they retain with the utmost tenacity. They were favourite materials with the ancient Roman decorators; but they do not occur in large masses in the city. A beautiful pair of Roman Ionic columns under the pediment of the altar of the third chapel in the Church of Ara Coeli are made of a valuable breccia called *B. dorata*, distinguished by its small light-golden fragments on a ground of various shades of purple. The high altar of Santa Prisca on the Aventine is supported by one column of *B. corallina* of remarkably fine quality, in which the fragments are white on a ground of light coral-red. In the second chapel of St. Andrea della Valle there are two Corinthian columns of *B. giallo e nero*, which is an aggregate mass of yellow and black fragments; the yellow in its brilliant golden hue surpassing that of all other marbles, and forming a striking contrast to the long irregular black fragments interspersed throughout it. In the first chapel of the same church there are four fluted Corinthian columns of breccia giallo, containing small and regular blotches, of which the prevailing tint is orange, each fragment

edged with a rim of deeper yellow that surrounds it like a shadow. A most beautiful variety of Breccia giallo e nero forms the basin of holy water at the entrance of the Church of St. Carlo di Catinari, in which the colours resemble a golden network spread upon a ground of black; and an exceedingly lovely urn is seen underneath the altar in one of the chapels of the Portuguese Church, in which white fragments are imbedded in a purple ground which shines through their soft transparency. Not the least attractive objects in the chamber of the Dying Gladiator in the Museum of the Capitol is a portion of a large column of very beautiful and extremely valuable Breccia tracagnina, in which golden-yellow, white, red, and blue fragments occur in very nearly equal proportions, and two large squared blocks of Breccia di Sette-Bassi—so called from the discovery of the first specimens near the ruins of the Villa of Septimius Bassus on the Appian Way—containing very small deep rose-coloured fragments of an oblong shape, which is the characteristic peculiarity of all the varieties of this species of marble. Probably the most beautiful of all the ancient breccias is that called B. della Villa Adriana, from its occasional occurrence in the ruins of Hadrian's Villa, and also B. Quintilia, from its having been found in the grounds of the magnificent Villa of Quintilius Varus, commemorated by Horace, at Tivoli, now occupied by the Church of the Madonna di Quintiliolo. The prevailing colour of the fragments is that of a rich brown intermixed with others of red, green, blue, white, purple, bright yellow, and sometimes black, all harmonising together most beautifully. The comparatively small pieces found at Tivoli now adorn the Churches of St. Andrea della Valle, famous for its rich varieties of breccias, St. Domenico e Sisto and Santa Pudenziana, where they appear among the marble sheathing of the walls. In the chapel of the Gaetani in the last-mentioned church, the wall is incrustated with the richest marbles, especially Lumachella and Brocatello, and large tablets of Hadrian's breccia setting off the splendid sarcophagus of Breccia nera e gialla dedicated to Cardinal Gaetani.

Along with the breccias which I have thus incidentally noticed, but to which a whole essay might be devoted on account of their beauty, rich variety, and great value and

rarity, should be classified a kind of "breccia dure," called Breccia d' Egitto. It is not, however, a true breccia, but a pudding-stone, composed, not of calcareous but of siliceous fragments, and these fragments are not angular, as in the true breccias, but rounded, indicating that they had been carried by water and consequently rounded by attrition. The connected pebbles must have been broken from rocks of great hardness to have withstood the effects of constant abrasion. In the Egyptian breccia are found very fine pebbles of red granite, porphyry of a darker or lighter green, and yellow quartz, held together by a cement of compact felspar. It has a special geological interest, inasmuch as it represents an ancient sea-beach flanking the crystalline rocks of Upper Egypt, where the cretaceous and nummulitic limestones end. The pebbles were derived from the central nucleus of granite from beyond Assouan to the upper end of the Red Sea, round which are folded successive zones of gneiss and schist pierced by intrusive masses of porphyry and serpentine. The pair of beautiful Grecian Ionic columns, and the large green tazza—eighteen feet in circumference—the finest specimen of Egyptian breccia to be seen in Rome, both in the Villa Albani, and the vase of the same material in the chamber of Candelabra in the Vatican, in which the prevailing green colour is crossed by several stripes of pure white quartz, may thus have been sculptured out of a portion of littoral deposit formed from the ruins of the crystalline rocks of the mountain group of Sinai. There is something extremely interesting and suggestive to the imagination in the twofold origin of these conglomerate ornaments of the palaces of Rome. Around them gather the wonderful associations of ancient human history, and the still more awe-inspiring associations of geological history. They speak to us of the conquests of Rome in the desolate tracts of Nubia and Arabia, from which the spoils that enriched its palaces and temples were derived; and of the existence of coast-lines, when Egypt was a gulf stretching from the Mediterranean to the Mountains of the Moon, which became silted up by slow accumulations. Their language, in both relations, is that of ruin. They are survivors both of the ruins of Nature and of Man, and are made up of the wrecks of both. Older far than the marbles which keep them company in the sculptor's halls and churches

of Rome, and whose human history is equally eventful, their materials were deposited along the shore of a vanished sea, when the mountains that yielded these marbles lay as calcareous mud in its profound depths.

Alabasters, of which there are numerous varieties, from pure diaphanous white to the deepest black, were favourite decorative materials with the ancient Romans. The different kinds were used for the walls of baths, vases, busts, pillars, and sepulchral lamps, in which the light shining through the transparent sides had an agreeable softness. Cornelius Nepos, as quoted by Pliny, speaks of having seen columns of alabaster thirty-two feet in length; and Pliny says that he himself had seen thirty huge pillars in the dining-hall of Callistus, the freedman of Claudius. One such column still exists in the Villa Albani, which is twenty-two and a half feet in height. The ancients obtained large blocks of alabaster from quarries in Thebes in Egypt, in the neighbourhood of Damascus, and on Mount Taurus. They imported some kinds also from Cyprus, Spain, and Northern Africa. They obtained varieties nearer home, in different parts of Italy, such as the beautiful *Alabastro di Tivoli*, employed by Hadrian in his villa, and which appears to have been brought from Terni, where it still exists in abundance. The European alabasters are accumulated masses of stalactite and stalagmite, formed by the slow dropping of water charged with sulphate of lime, to which circumstance they owe the parallel stripes or concentric circles with which they are marked, while the rich and delicate varieties of colouring are produced by the oxides of iron which the water carries with it in its infiltration through the intervening strata. They are very soft and perishable, and consequently are very rarely found among the ruins of ancient Rome. The Oriental alabasters, on the other hand, which are distinguished from the European by their superior hardness and durability, are in reality not sulphates, but carbonates of lime. Their hardness is quite equal to that of the best statuary marbles. The ancient quarries on the hill—the modern Mount St. Anthony—near the town of Alabastron, in Middle Egypt, from which the material got its name, have only recently been re-opened, but blocks of large size and perfect beauty have been obtained. Owing to the facility with which

alabaster can be reduced by fire to lime, very few large examples of it in Rome have escaped the ruthless kilns of the middle ages. The most interesting specimens of ancient alabaster are the very beautiful vase of *Alabastro cotognino*, prolate in form, and in colour white, streaked with very light pink, which contained the ashes of Augustus, found in the ruins of his mausoleum, and now in the Vatican; the bust of Julius Cæsar, made of the variety *tartaruga*, from the resemblance of its brownish-yellow markings to tortoise-shell, in the Museum of the Capitol; and the two large blocks of *alabastro* or *peccorelle*, brought from the Villa of Hadrian, in the fourth portico of the Vatican, the largest and most beautiful specimens of this very rare alabaster in Rome, distinguished by white circular blotches, like a flock of sheep huddled together, on a deep blood-red ground. In the churches there are numerous specimens of all the varieties, forming the columns and sheathings of altars, memorial chapels, and monuments; the incrustations of alabaster on the walls of the Borghese chapel, in Santa Maria Maggiore, being conspicuous for their splendid effect. The baldacchino above the high altar of St. Paul's is supported by four splendid columns of Oriental alabaster presented to Gregory XVI. by Mehemet Ali, the Viceroy of Egypt. An interesting collection of beautiful and valuable varieties of alabaster may be made in connection with the building operations still carried on in the unfinished façade of the basilica fronting the Tiber.

The well-known *Verde antico* is not a marble, but a mixture of the green precious serpentine of mineralogists and white granular limestone. It may also be called a breccia, for it is composed of black fragments, larger or smaller, derived from other rocks, whose angular shape indicates that they have not travelled far from the spots where they occur. The ancient Romans called it *Lapis Atracius*, from Atrax, a town in Thessaly, in the vicinity of which it was found. It can hardly be distinguished, except by experts, from the modern green marbles of Vasallo in Sardinia, and Luca in Piedmont. It occurs somewhat abundantly in Rome, having been a favourite material with the old Romans for sheathing walls and tables. Magnificent columns of it were introduced into the temples and triumphal arches. We find relics of these in the older

churches. Four splendid fluted Corinthian columns of Verde antico, with gilded capitals, support the pediment of the high altar in Sta. Agnese, in the Piazza Navone, which formerly belonged to the Arch of Marcus Aurelius in the Corso. A pair of very fine columns of this precious stone flank each of the niches, containing statues of the twelve apostles, in the piers which divide the middle nave from the side ones in the Church of St. John Lateran. These twenty-four columns are remarkable for the clearness of the white, green, and black colours that occur in them. They are supposed to have been taken from the Baths of Diocletian. Two of the splendid composite columns which support the pediment of the altar in the Corsini chapel of this church are of this marble, and were also taken from the Arch of Marcus Aurelius in the Corso. One most magnificent column of Verde antico has been found, along with seven others of different marbles, in the wall of the narthex of the subterranean Church of San Clemente. A small portion of it is polished to show the beauty of the material, while the rest is dimmed and incrustated with the grime of age.

Very different from this is the ancient serpentine or ophite of Sparta, called the *Lapis Lacedæmonius*, found in different hills near Krokee, or in Mount Taygetus in Lacedæmon, where the old quarry has recently been opened. It has a base of dark green with angular crystals of felspar of a lighter green imbedded in it. It is a truly eruptive rock, occurring in intrusive bosses, or in beds interstratified with gneiss and mica-schist, and owes its various shades of green to the presence of copper. Owing to its extraordinary hardness, this stone was seldom used for architectural purposes; and the lapidary will charge three times as much for working a fragment of this into a letter-weight as for making it of any other stone. A pair of fluted Roman Ionic columns, supporting the pediment of the altar of the chapel of St. John the Baptist, in the Baptistery of St. John Lateran, are the only examples of ophite pillars in Rome. Next to these the largest masses are a circular tablet, forming part of the splendid sheathing of one of the ambones in the Church of San Lorenzo; and two elliptical tablets, still larger, engrafted upon the pilasters in front of the high altar of St. Paul's. The principal use to which this stone was devoted in Rome was the construction of mosaic pave-

ments. The Emperor Alexander Severus introduced into his palaces and public buildings a kind of flooring composed of small squares of green serpentine and red porphyry, wrought into elegant patterns, which became very fashionable, and was called after himself *Opus Alexandrinum*. The infamous Heliogabalus had previously paved some of the courts of the Palatine with such intarsio work, but his cousin, Alexander Severus, following his example, adorned with it all the terraces and walks around, and the pavements within, the isolated villas called *Diætæ*, dedicated to his mother *Mammæa*, which he added to the Palatine buildings. We have examples of this beautiful kind of tessellated pavement in some of the chambers of the Baths of Caracalla; and it is highly probable that the *Opus Alexandrinum* in the transept and middle nave of the Church of Santa Maria in Trastevere is in part at least contemporaneous with Alexander Severus, who conceded the ground on which the original oratory stood to Pope Callixtus I. in 222, for the special use of the Christians. If this be so, we have in this first place of Christian worship established in Rome the first instance of the application of *Opus Alexandrinum* to the decoration of a church. In the middle ages the fashion was beautifully imitated by artists of the Cosmati family and their school; and the mosaic pavements of this kind in the mediæval churches of Rome are no older than this period. But we have reason to believe that the *Opus Alexandrinum* in two of the chapels of Santa Maria degli Angeli was taken from the Baths of Diocletian; the splendid pavement of the whole church, naves, transept, and choir of Santa Croce in Jerusalemme, formed originally part of the decorations of the Sessorian Palace of Sextus Varius, the father of Heliogabalus, after whom the church is sometimes called the Sessorian Basilica; the flooring of the whole upper church of San Clemente was transferred from the older subterranean church, which derived its pavement from some of the ruins of the Palatine or the Forum; and the serpentine fragments, which enter very largely into the composition of the curious old mosaic floor of Ara Cœli must have had a similar origin as far back as the time of its founder, Gregory the Great. The *Lapis Lacedæmonius* must have been very abundant in Rome during the time of Alexander Severus—judging from the quantities that are made up into mosaics

in the churches, and the heaps of broken fragments that are found on the Palatine and at the Marmorata. The circular space around the obelisk in the Piazza of St. Peter's to a considerable extent is paved with it, as also the steps and part of the street leading to the Ripetta Ferry, although the pieces may escape observation—unless when their colours are brightened after rain,—and specimens of it frequently occur among the ordinary road-metal in the city and neighbourhood.

Sicilian jaspers, so called, though really marbles, and purely calcareous, because of their resemblance in colour and form of the blotches to jasper, were wrought in great variety in the quarries in the neighbourhood of the celebrated Taormina, and were transported in the form of columns to Rome. Siliceous jaspers, obtained from the crystalline rocks of Asia Minor, Egypt, and Northern Italy, were also used for columns; and their brilliant red, green, and yellow hues, highly polished, contrasted beautifully with the white marbles of the interiors of palaces. One whole chamber of the Baths of Titus was paved with slabs of the finest lapis lazuli—the *Lapis Cyanus* of the ancients—derived from the spoils of the Golden House of Nero, and originally procured by order of the luxurious tyrant from Persia and the neighbourhood of Lake Baikal. We can trace fragments of this exquisite pavement in the decoration of the chapel of St. Ignatius in the Church of the Jesuits. The globe, three feet in diameter, over the altar, beneath which repose the remains of Ignatius Loyola, is sheathed with this most precious stone, whose brilliant blue, contrasting with the white marble of the group of the Trinity—one of whose members holds it in His hands—has a splendid effect. The rare and costly marbles with which the Church of Il Gesu is profusely adorned were mostly taken from the ruins of the Baths of Titus by Cardinal Farnese in 1568. From the same source came also the magnificent sarcophagus, sheathed with lapis lazuli, under the altar of St. Ignazio, which holds the body of St. Luigi Gonzaga.

But it is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to describe fully the relics of other precious and beautiful stones which may be found among the ruins of ancient Rome, or among the churches to which they have been transferred. Profuse as were the ancient Romans in their general expendi-

ture, upon no objects did they lavish their wealth so extravagantly as upon their favourite marbles and precious stones for the decoration of their public buildings and their private houses. No effort was spared that Rome might be adorned with the richest treasures of the mineral kingdom from all parts of the world. Slaves and criminals were made to minister to this luxury in the various quarries of the Roman dominions, which were the penal settlements of antiquity. The antiquary Ficoroni counted the columns in Rome in the year 1700, and he found no less than 8000 existing entire; and yet these were but a very small proportion of the number that must once have been there. The palaces and modern churches of Rome owe, as I have said, all their ornaments to this passion of the ancients. There is not a door-step nor a guard-stone at the corner of the meanest court in Rome which is not of marble, granite, or porphyry from some ancient building. The very streets in the newly-laid parts of the city are macadamised with the fragments of costly baths and pillars. I took up one day, out of mere curiosity, some of the road-metal near the Church of Santa Maria Maggiore, and I identified in the handful no less than a dozen varieties of the most beautiful marbles and porphyries from Greece, Africa, and Asia. And when we remember that all these foreign stones were brought into Rome during the interval between the end of the Republic and the time of Constantine—a period of between 300 and 400 years—we can form some idea of the extraordinary wealth and luxury of the Imperial City when it was in its prime. Where is there any modern city that can show within it a hundredth part of the same architectural splendour? Notwithstanding its unparalleled wealth and luxury, and its command of the commercial resources of the earth, were all the public buildings of London to be destroyed, they would not yield in their ruins as many columns of marble and granite, worthy of the name, as one ancient Roman palace has left behind. The study of these precious relics, gleaming among the hoary ruins of the Imperial City, or transforming the resplendent churches of the Papal City into cabinets of jewels, gives one an impressive idea of the wonderful beauty as well as strength with which the Great Architect has laid the foundations of the earth, and built up its mountain walls. He has finished His temple,

unlike man's work, in the deepest and most secret parts as perfectly, and with as costly materials, as in the most conspicuous—not more for the outside crowd than for the eyes and soul of the inner worshipper. He has laid its stones with fair colours, and its foundations with sapphires; He has made its windows of agates, its gates of carbuncles, and all its borders of pleasant stones!

HUGH MACMILLAN.

ART. III.—*Co-ordination of Grace and Duty.*

THERE is an extraordinary amount of light to be found in Philippians ii. 12, 13, as to the nature and connection of the Divine and human agencies in the sanctification, perseverance, and final salvation of the people of God. The Divine agency is asserted as a gracious and blessed fact; the human agency is enjoined as a solemn duty; and the one is made the basis of, or the ground or argument for calling forth, the other.

In the *first* place, the Divine agency is asserted. "It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure." "You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and in sins, and hath raised you up together with Christ, according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in him when he raised him from the dead." The ever-blessed God, who is the self-sufficient One—who requireth neither you nor your service, and can be profited by neither—hath been pleased, in his sovereign grace, according to the counsel of his own will, and the unprompted beneficence of his own nature, to look upon you in mercy, and in the day of *your* misery and *his* power, he said unto you, "Live." Of his good pleasure he hath begotten you again, by the resurrection of Jesus from the dead; and, by the renewing might of his Holy Spirit, he hath created you anew in Christ Jesus, as his workmanship,—a spiritual man,—a holy temple for himself. And he hath entered his intended habitation; the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you. "Ye are the temple of the living God; as God hath said, I will dwell in them, and walk in them; and I will be their God, and they shall be my

people." Infefted into the accomplishment of this promise, ye abide in God, and God in you. Christ is formed within you, and dwelleth there by faith. The Holy Spirit, whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him, hath come, according to the promise of Jesus, to abide with you for ever; and ye know him, and he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you. And the Father also is present with you, for ye are interested in the other promise of the Saviour: "If a man love me, he will keep my words; and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." It is not to be supposed that the glorious triune Godhead will spiritually and graciously inhabit a renewed and quickened soul, without manifesting the Divine presence by operations worthy of the Divine nature. The living God in a living soul is not inactive, but worketh all in all. Into his regenerated children God hath arisen as into his resting-place—"he, and the ark of his strength;" and his mighty power is put forth upon them in a manner consistent with their nature, and to an extent which takes account of all their power. Formerly naturally inclined to evil and to earthliness, their wills are now otherwise bent and directed by him who is the Father of their spirits, and hath their hearts in his keeping: they are delivered from that yoke of bondage in which they were held when sin had dominion over them, and they fell in with the will of their tyrant and destroyer, being carried captive by the devil at his will: and now moulded, strengthened, sanctified by the Spirit of God, their will is in harmony with God's: they are willing in a day of his power, for he worketh in them to WILL. And, again, naturally without strength, as was their state, when in due time Jesus died for them, they are now filled by the indwelling Spirit, with new-born power and energy; they are strengthened with all might in the inner man; and they are enabled to say, "In the Lord have I righteousness and strength." God worketh in them also to DO. For, now that they are inclined to the path of holy and heavenly aspiration and obedience, they are not left utterly without power to follow out the dictates of a renewed and regenerated will. Nor is he who hath given them a new heart left to receive at their hands merely the will for the deed; but he gives the deed also: he com-

municates the power as well as the inclination : he both persuades and enables. He gives them both a willing heart and an able hand for his service. He graciously "*worketh in them both to WILL and to DO.*" In this way the text asserts the agency of God in the preservation and perseverance of his people.

In the *second* place, the human agency is enjoined, as distinctly as the Divine agency is affirmed. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling." Think it not enough that you have found grace to enter in at the strait gate : run with patience the race set before you. Think it not enough that you have been reconciled freely by the blood and regenerated powerfully by the Spirit of Christ ; learn daily to put off the old man, to die daily unto sin, and live more and more unto righteousness. Account not your restoration to the favour and the family of God to be your full and your final salvation. You have but found the right direction and the right path,—follow on to know the Lord. Evil still dwells within you, and must be subdued and extirpated. Satan still tempts, and must be resisted and overcome ; ungodliness has a strange and magic power over the children of men, and will cast its withering spell over you again, if ye be not watchful to set the Lord always before you, and to walk humbly with him. Wrestle for the mastery : labour for the Bread of Life : grow in grace : be instant in prayer : search the Scriptures : do good as ye have opportunity : be patient in tribulation : part with every idol : do all to the glory of God : press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling in Christ Jesus : hold fast that thou hast ; look that ye lose not the things which ye have wrought, but that ye receive a full reward : endure steadfast to the end : work out and work off from your nature that sin which cleaves so closely to the inner man : make your calling and election sure : gird up all your energies for a persevering and prolonged—a life-long—conflict, if you would have an abundant entrance administered to you. The stake is great : the prize is noble : the fight is arduous ; no energy you can at all muster up and put forth can be dispensed with : stand in awe, and sin not. "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling."

In the *third* place, the two clauses which thus constitute one

text, are so united as to form an argument or step of reasoning. The one is made a ground or basis for the other. The certainty and gracious nature of the agency of God is laid as a foundation for that agency of the Christian's own to which he is here exhorted. The fact that God worketh in his people is assumed as a powerful argument, or call, or motive for them to work. "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for (because) it is God who worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure." The beautiful connection which is thus established between the effectual and gracious work of God and the solemn and persevering work of the believer himself, first demands our attention.

It will prepare us gradually for understanding the subject, if we take notice at the outset of two objections which have frequently been offered to the doctrine of a Divine and irresistible agency, as such an agency is held by us to be concerned in the salvation of sinners. We hold that men are naturally in a state of spiritual death—from which they have not power, even the least, to deliver themselves; and that all who escape from this condition, do so in virtue of an exercise of efficacious and creating energy put forth upon them by the Spirit of God, whereby the predominance of the carnal mind is destroyed, the evil principles of their nature in so far subdued, and a spiritual nature communicated to them, tending in its desires and affections to the God who gave it; insomuch that the subject of this great change infallibly chooses God now for his chief good, returns to him in repentance and faith, and cleaves to him with humble and affectionate allegiance. And the scripture before us affirms that the high place of supremacy which God, by his Spirit, has thus assumed for himself in and over the soul of his own creature, chosen as the object of redeeming love, is not abandoned after this conversion has been effected, but is still maintained by the same God who "worketh" there "to will and to do." Against this, however, it is objected:—

I. In the *first* place, that, if one being exert over another such a mastery and supremacy as is thus assigned to God over the souls of his people, whereby he certainly and invincibly works out his own purposes in them, then the subject of such an operation is not treated as a free and reasonable agent,

but as a mere machine, being made the helpless instrument of blindly accomplishing the designs of another.

A variety of answers might be given to show the unfounded and untenable nature of this objection. I shall ask your attention only to those which are afforded by the text, for this objection is in flagrant contradiction both to the *spirit* and *letter* of this passage.

(1.) It is flagrant contradiction to the *spirit* of the text, which contains a solemn exhortation to Christians to watch over and work out their own salvation, and which supports this exhortation by urging a very solemn motive to obedience. Now, it is not treating a man as a machine to urge him to the performance of a duty, and press on his attention those considerations which ought to determine his line of conduct. It takes for granted that he has an understanding, and appeals to it when his faculty of intelligently comprehending what is said to him is sought to be awakened and informed. It supposes he is possessed of a conscience, and to that spiritual power within it intrusts, or seeks to lay on, a sense of obligation in the thing enjoined. It views him as possessed of a will or power of choice, and attempts to determine it in the desired direction, by the influence of motives which, it is believed, if rightly seen and understood, would secure his concurrence in the end proposed. And it further presupposes him to be endowed with powers of action and emotion which will also come into exercise should he follow the course recommended to him. This is not to treat the man as a machine, but as a free and intelligent agent, and it is thus that he is treated when the text is addressed to him. It is further to be observed, that while this is precisely the way to deal with man regarding him as possessed of reason and of freedom, this style of treatment is so little dispensed with or set aside by the doctrine of the Spirit's agency in effectually renewing and sanctifying the believer, that, on the contrary, the consideration of that agency is just the starting-point of the apostle's address in so dealing with his readers. Instead of the effectual working of God's power superseding or dispensing with the necessity of an appeal being carried to the understanding and the will of the Christian, that effectual working is itself made the topic of exactly such an appeal to the Christian considered as dealt

with and as capable of an intelligent choice. The invincible operation of Divine grace is so far from violating the individual intelligence and power of choice which must belong to every responsible being, that it is itself presented as soliciting his intelligent consideration, and as claiming the honourable right of receiving the unconstrained homage of his unenslaved will. When we read the first clause of our text, we can reply to the objection that Scripture deals with believers not as machines, but as free and reasonable agents, notwithstanding the supremacy and infallible efficiency of the agency of God within them. But when we read the whole verse, and find in what connection and on what grounds Scripture thus exhorts and reasons with its believing readers, we can not only reply that *ALTHOUGH* omnipotent grace be within them, they are not thereby acted on formally and mechanically—but further, that they are dealt with rationally and spiritually precisely *BECAUSE* omnipotent grace worketh in them mightily. So utterly is this objection in opposition to the whole scope and spirit of the text.

(2.) But, *secondly*, it is in equally flagrant contradiction to the express *language* of the text. In describing the nature of the Divine agency, the text for ever precludes the idea of that agency operating on the believer in such a manner as to carry him blind, unconscious, or indifferent in the path of holiness. Indeed, the only possible conception we can entertain of "holiness" is itself enough to set aside any such idea as absolutely inconsistent with itself, and as really inconceivable to any mind that will pause and attempt to realise it. But however this may be, the words before us are so accurately selected with manifest design to prevent the possibility of such a misconception, that it is amazing the objection which we are considering should ever have been raised. It is declared in these words that God worketh in his people *to will*. He secures that their own free choice shall be exercised: he renews and reforms their desires: he guides and directs their inclination. In all to the performance of which he carries them, he carries their *will* also along with him. He makes them willing in a day of his power. If he wrought in them "*to do*," without working in them "*to will*," then indeed there might be some colour for the allegation that the doctrine of effectual grace

supposes man to be dealt with as a machine, for a machine has no will. But if every godly action which God worketh in the Christian is preceded by a godly desire, inclination, and will to do that action, this is exactly the condition which prevents the action from being mechanical.

If it be said that it is in renewing and differently inclining and disposing the will that the asserted violation of man's freedom as an accountable being takes place, we may confidently answer, that if when the Spirit of God in the first creation brooded on the face of the deep, he offered no violence to the nature of matter by assigning to it such weight, consistency, extension, and form as it pleased him,—there is as little violation done to the nature of mind in general, or the will in particular, when the same all-forming Agent, moving on the face of a wilder and more repulsive chaos, evolved from it a far more glorious creation, in the godly desires, dispositions, and inclinations which he impressed on the revived and regenerated will of man. For dispositions and inclinations are as much the natural attributes of will as weight and extension and form are properties of matter. And the matter of the globe is not more the creature of God and the product of his power than the human will is. If he can modify the one by changing its form, he can modify the other by altering its inclinations. To assert otherwise would be to make the human will absolutely independent of God, or, in other words, to claim for it a Divine prerogative—the self-sufficiency which belongs only to Jehovah. And if the Father of our spirits may thus mould and influence them at his gracious pleasure, as surely as the Creator of the ends of the earth gave form and substance to the solid globe—then as little is the will of man tampered with or dishonoured when grace effectually recalls and rectifies it, as the globe itself will have its material nature violated when God shall purge out the curse from it and all its emblems, and instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree, and instead of the brier shall come up the myrtle-tree. The home and the inhabitant shall alike be perfected, and perfected in fullest harmony with their respective natures,—the one by a change of outward form, the other by a change of its inward bent and inclination. And this is precisely the change which the will must undergo, in order that it may be modified in accordance

with its nature. This is actually the very thing required, in order that the objected and dreaded violation may *not* take place.

II. But again : It is further objected against the doctrine of invincible, prevailing, and controlling grace, that it is calculated to relax the diligence and energy of those who believe themselves the subjects of it. If it be true that the Almighty Spirit of God, dwelling in the Christian, infallibly and effectually secures his sanctification, nothing (it is argued) can be more natural than for the man himself to remit all his anxiety and sense of responsibility, and indolently leave to this omnipotent Agent the accomplishment of a work, for the furtherance of which any little energy of his can add nothing to that omnipotence already engaged upon it. The doctrine, it is said, will lead to indolence. In answering this objection we shall confine ourselves, as in the former case, to the considerations afforded by the text ; and we shall find this second objection also to be in direct contradiction to the scope or spirit of the text, as well as to its express terms.

(1.) In the *first* place, then, it surely cannot with any show of reason be asserted that the Divine agency is fitted to lead the believer to carelessness, when we consider the scope and object of this verse as addressed to those who are experiencing that agency. We have already seen that the whole spirit of this text overturns the objection that the prevailing power of Divine grace treats man as a machine, when we find that those who are the subjects of it are exhorted, and reasoned with, and urged to make a certain choice and follow a certain line of conduct ; and the motive addressed to them to secure their consent and concurrence as intelligent and free agents is actually the operation of that grace which is said to deal with them as inanimate matter. But we will see just as clearly that the whole spirit of this text as fully overturns the objection that the prevailing power of Divine grace is calculated to supersede the believer's own energy, when we observe the nature of the exhortation which is here pressed on his acceptance, and the source and design of the motive by which it is enforced. A man is not treated as a machine when exhortation and motives are addressed to him ; and surely as little is he tempted to indolence when exhorted and moved to "work." Such, how-

ever, is the particular exhortation of the text, and such the object intended to be gained by urging its motive on the believer's will. The call addressed to him is a call to "work;" the motive brought to bear upon him is one designed to set him a-working. And when such is the exhortation given forth, and such the motive plied in the very passage which asserts the efficacy of the grace of God in his people, it surely cannot, without the grossest irreverence, be asserted that that grace is fitted to teach them to despise the very exhortation which, on the ground of it, is addressed to them. There must at least be no inconsistency. But there is not only no inconsistency, no want of harmony; there is a very profound and positive harmony revealed, when we consider the ground on which the exhortation to work is based, and the source from which its enforcing motive is drawn. The exhortation to work is not only contained in the same text which asserts the Divine agency, but is made to rest upon the assertion of that agency. And not only is a motive to labour pressed upon the Christian *although* almighty strength is on his side, but the possession of that indwelling and almighty strength is itself made the motive which the Spirit of God urges: "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling, *for* it is God that worketh in you." And if such be the obvious construction and scope of the text, any one inclined to entertain this objection against the prevalence of Divine grace may well be alarmed to find himself in a state of mind so opposed to the mind of the Spirit speaking in the Scripture, as that the fact or truth which the living God urges as an argument to labour, he is stigmatising as a motive to indolence!

(2.) But the objection which is thus diametrically opposed to the spirit of the text, is a direct denial also of its letter. In reply to the assertion that the agency of God makes man a machine, it is enough to say that where God worketh he "worketh in you to *will*." And in like manner, in replying to the assertion that the same doctrine of God's certainly successful work of grace in his people is calculated to subdue and dispense with their own activities, it is enough to say that where God worketh he "worketh in you to *do*." The very thing which the Divine agency accomplishes is the expulsion of indolence and indifference, the replenishing of all the active

powers with spiritual life, and the directing of them in and towards spiritual action. How therefore an operation which, from its very nature, is intended and calculated to result in the production of energy—an operation which is no otherwise and no further exerted than as it gives birth to energy—how this can beget the contrary inactivity it is impossible to comprehend; and hence indeed the objection ought not so much to be styled an objection to the doctrine of Divine agency, as an utter misconception of that doctrine, and a total denial of it in the only sense in which it is affirmed in Scripture, or held by intelligent Christians. The energetic Christian working out his salvation successfully, you are aware, can take no credit to himself, because, according to the doctrine of the text, it is God that worketh in him. But as little can the slumbering Christian, *not* working out his own salvation, take any warrantable comfort, just because, according to the same doctrine, his inactivity is a proof that God is *not* working in him to will and to do. This conclusion is indeed nothing more than the statement of his actual inactivity in another form; and hence the doctrine of effectual grace as surely overturns all his consolation. That God worketh in his people effectually to will what is good and holy, and so as infallibly to secure their salvation, can minister no delight to the man who, by his conscious disinclination to Divine things, must know that the Divine Spirit has been so grieved away as to be no longer “working in him to will.” And in like manner, the fact that God worketh in his people to *do*, to act spiritually, energetically, and successfully, so that they shall ultimately overcome and gain the prize, can afford no comfort to the man whose spiritual indolence tells him that God is not working in him to do. So little is the doctrine calculated to lead to indolence, that it is the direct assertion of the text that the Divine agency energises those who are under its gracious influence; and hence the man who is giving way to indolence and inactivity in the things that pertain to his peace and holiness, ought immediately to take the alarm, being led to feel, by that very token, that the agency is not at work which alone can effectually and finally save him.

The answers which the text thus so obviously affords to the two leading objections, so often urged against the Scripture doctrine of God’s converting and sanctifying effectual grace,

obviously tend to throw light upon the text itself, and to illustrate that connection between the Divine and human agencies against which, in point of fact, these objections are levelled. 1. Which is first in order of nature? 2. Which is first in point of time? 3. Which is first in point of importance? 4. Which is first in point of extent? It may tend yet further to illustrate this subject if we now reply to this short series of questions which an intelligent and reverential inquirer might be supposed to put.

1. And, *first*, it may be asked—Whether is the Divine agency or the human agency first in the order of nature, *i.e.* of cause and effect? If man's agency is closely related to God's, and yet is, as we have seen, voluntary—which is the cause of the other? or are they, though connected, yet not bound together by the tie of cause and effect at all? To this we answer, that the Divine agency is first in action in the order of nature. It is the sole cause of the believer's own agency. The whole of the believer's agency is the issue or effect of God's action. The text, in asserting that God worketh in you to will and to do, attributes to him every godly action you perform, and every godly inclination which prompts you to the performance of it. It assigns to his agency the work of quickening, strengthening, controlling, and directing your powers of action, so that you “do” his commandments or act out his will. And it further assigns to his agency the work of quickening and spiritually energising and righteously guiding your power of choice, so that you “will” what he wills, and delight yourself in his desires. The godly deed, and the godly will from which it flows, are alike the gift, the inwrought work of God. His Spirit is the sole cause of a new heart and the sole cause of a new life. He does not assist you to work, but worketh in you the whole work of doing. He does not assist the will, but forms it afresh; frames a new will, bestows a clean heart, and renews a right spirit within you. This is creative work; this is quickening and raising up the dead. And hence the Divine agency which accomplishes it is assuredly first in the order of nature. God doth prevent or anticipate his people with his mercy and gracious power.

2. But, *secondly*, it may be asked—Whether is the Divine agency or the human agency first in point of time? And to

this I answer, that neither of them precedes the other in point of time. Though the agency of God precedes the agency of the believer in the order of nature, yet in respect of time they are simultaneous. For, consider what it is that the Divine agency accomplishes as soon as it comes into operation. God worketh in you to do. He actually works that; not merely proposes and attempts that; but does it. It is not only the intention of God's working that you *should* work. But the certain effect of God's working is that you *do* work. Your working is the immediate and inevitable product—yea, the very essence or substance—of God's work. The Divine agency cannot operate for a moment without operating human energy; for such, by the very terms of the text, is the nature of effectual grace. It works in you to will and to do. Take an instance or two. When the Spirit of supplications descends on the believer, working according to the meaning of that name which he hath been graciously pleased to assume, the immediate result is that the believer prays in the Spirit. The Spirit maketh intercession for him, and how but by prompting the desires of his heart, which in their existence and necessary heavenward tendency constitute the very essence of prayer? Again, when the Spirit of wisdom and of revelation is poured out and acts as an enlightening agent, "shining in the heart," the very meaning of this act implies that immediately the believer, with open face, beholds the glory of the Lord, and in the Spirit's light doth he see light. When the same Spirit comes in another aspect of his gracious character, even as a Spirit of adoption sent forth into the believer's heart, instantly the Lord hears the cry, "Abba, Father." And exactly so with the general relation between the human agency and the Divine: the same thing is true which we behold in these particular cases alluded to. There is no interval of time between them. Their nature is such as to preclude this. If at any moment God is working in you, then at that very moment you are willing and doing. Your present godly will or work is not the result of God's past, but of God's present working in you. And God's present working in you is not the cause of any future godly will and deed, unless God shall work in you then as well as now. Your work and his are simultaneous. Neither of them is first in point of time.

3. But, *thirdly*, it may further be asked—Whether is the Divine agency or the human agency first in point of importance? If by this be meant, Whether could God's agency or the believer's be more easily dispensed with? I reply that neither of them exceeds the other in importance, but that they are each alike indispensable. The Divine agency is indispensable, for we are not sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God. And evidently also the human agency is equally indispensable, for if we are not thinking, willing, acting after a godly manner, it is clear that nought of God's sufficiency has been communicated to us, and nothing has been accomplished. Keeping in remembrance the answer to our first question, namely, that God's agency is the cause of man's, and hence that the Lord is not obstructed in the sense of needing to wait ere he put forth his power on a soul on the ground that it is not yet willing or doing, and that no such idea is meant to be conveyed when we say that the human agency is absolutely necessary, we may now, without any disparagement to that which is the cause of the other, affirm that the one is just as indispensable as the other. "Without me," said Jesus, "ye can do nothing." And so without irreverence may we suppose him saying, "Without you I can do nothing." "He did not many mighty acts there because of their unbelief." The fact is—and it is to this that all our thoughts and reasonings on this subject are tending—the fact is that the agency of God in and through the believer, and the believer's own voluntary and energetic godly agency in and under God, are inextricably united and intertwined with each other—so much so, indeed, that in strict propriety they are not to be regarded as two things ultimately distinct, but when viewed more closely resolvable into one, called at one time human agency, and at another time Divine agency, according to the point at which we stop in our inquiry into its nature, and especially its origin. In the one case, when I am working out my salvation, and a spectator sees only me working, he traces my work to my will; and attributing the work to me, which is perfectly correct, he denominates the work mine, or the agency human. But if that spectator is a spiritual man, and so is led to trace the matter a step or two further, or could he see into the ongoings of the spiritual world in

some such way as Elisha's servant had his eyes opened to behold the cause of his master's courage and safety, he would in like manner behold a now hidden cause of my spiritual power; he would now attribute my spiritual actions, and the very will which prompts them, to the God who gave them by working in me to will and to do. And what he formerly and rightly called human agency, he will now, and as correctly, call the agency of God. And most properly and beneficially may this alternating view be taken of the great work whereby a converted man is ultimately freed from all the power and wiles of Satan, all the vestiges of inward corruptions and all the corruption and temptation that are in the world. At one time, and for certain purposes, he is to look upon the work as his own. And at another time, and for other ends, he must feel and acknowledge that the work is God's. For deepening my sense of responsibility, I must bear in remembrance that I and not another have to do this work; that I myself, and no other, must work out my salvation with fear and trembling; and then for bearing me up under the overwhelming impression that I have such a work to do, and in order to encourage myself in the Lord, I am to call to mind that it is God who performeth all things for me, and of his gracious pleasure worketh in me to will and to do. For purposes of duty, I must never forget that the work is strictly mine,—my *own* work, as truly as my *own* salvation. For purposes of praise, I must joyfully acknowledge that all the work is his, that no flesh should glory. And is not this the full explanation of those passages in which the apostle appears so often, as it were, to correct himself, and substitute another statement for the one which he apparently condemns and parts from, but to which he again returns as being quite defensible and accurate after all? He is only alternating between two expressions or assertions, both of them true, but which would indeed be contradictory were it not that they are to be resolved into one. "I live, yet not I, Christ liveth in me; and yet I live a life of faith on the Son of God." "By the grace of God I am what I am." "I labour, striving according to *his* working that worketh in me mightily." "I laboured more abundantly than they all,—yet not I, but the grace of God that was with me." "I can do all things through Christ that

strengtheneth me." It is thus also we are to harmonise those numerous passages in which the very same work is attributed in one to the agency of God, in another to the believer himself. For on this principle it is at one time said that God purifies his people's hearts, and at another that they have purified their own souls by obeying the truth; at one time they give praise to God because he alone has cleansed them, and at another there is laid on them the duty of cleansing themselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit; at one time that God keeps every regenerated disciple through his own name, and at another that every one who is begotten of God keepeth himself.

4. There is yet another question which may be put on this subject, viz, Whether the Divine agency or the human agency is first in point of extent? Whether does God's agency or man's accomplish most in this great undertaking in which they are so intimately united? The answer to this is, that neither of them exceeds the other in extent, but they are co-extensive. Man does as much when he works out his salvation as God does when he works in him to will and to do. They are mutually the measures of each other. This must be obvious from the views already taken of the relation which subsists between them, involving, as that relation does, a deep and ultimate identity. The Spirit of supplication is operating in me, just so far as I pray in the Spirit; the Spirit of wisdom is enlightening me to that extent, and no more, to which in his light I behold light; the Spirit of adoption is given me up to the measure of that filial confidence with which I can say, "Abba, Father;" the Spirit who worketh all in all is given me so far as I labour according to his working; and the Spirit of the fear of the Lord is mine, so far as, working with fear and trembling, I stand in awe and sin not. It is God alone who energises the Christian; and so God does all. But he energises the Christian for the whole Christian life, and so the Christian himself does all. He cannot take a single step in advance of the efficacious grace of God, for that grace alone is sufficient for him, and Divine strength only can be perfected in his weakness; but to the full extent of that strength he is strong when he is weak, for grace does not take a single step beyond *him*, or without carrying his will and his work along

with it. It is because men have not chosen to observe, or understand, that the Divine and the human agencies in man's sanctification are exactly co-extensive, that the two objections which we formerly noticed were ever raised, or have so often been revived. The one supposes the action of God to go beyond the action of the believer's will; to that extent it would be dealing with him as a machine. The other supposes the Divine agency in like manner to go beyond the quickening and forthputting of the believer's energy, and to that extent leaving and encouraging him to be indolent. But these things are not so; neither let any be deceived, for to what extent God is working in you to will and to do, to that same extent will ye willingly and cordially work out your salvation with fear and trembling. And the conscious reality and measure of *will* with which you are working out your salvation is the only and the sure index of the measure or reality of that grace wherewith ye may infer that God is working in you. "And the God of peace make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ, to whom be glory for ever and ever."

Having now considered the great principles involved in and bearing on the harmony and mutual relations of the Divine and human agencies in the believer's sanctification, we shall devote a portion of our space to the simpler work of applying and enforcing the exhortation.

The exhortation calls upon the Christian to "work out his own salvation with fear and trembling." The motive by which the exhortation is enforced is the gracious fact that "it is God who worketh in him, both to will and to do of his good pleasure."

It is taken for granted that the individuals addressed are regenerated persons—already brought by grace into the Divine family, and partakers of the Divine favour. Those whom Holy Scripture urges to work out their own salvation are in such a spiritual state as results from the fact that God is already working in them. They are quickened from their death in trespasses and in sins; and the Spirit of God, who hath caused them to pass from death to life, dwelleth in them, and fills

them with spiritual energy. Directly, and at first-hand, such an exhortation cannot be, and is not, addressed to the unconverted, for of them it cannot be said that "God is working in them to will and to do;" neither does it give any countenance to the idea that such a man, by working, can secure his own salvation. Such a man must first be justified by faith without works. And being also renewed without works by the Spirit of God, he, not a workman in that matter, but himself the workmanship created again unto good works, which God hath ordained that he should walk in them, is then to become, in all new-born and Heaven-given energy, a fellow-worker with God, not receiving the grace of God in vain, but securing by Divine grace, through the forthputting of his own will and action, his daily progress in holiness, without which no man shall see the Lord.

For this is the great difference between justification and sanctification. In the former God does all and man nothing. In the latter God does all and man does all. In justification God can do nothing unless man absolutely and entirely abstain from putting his hand to the work, leaving the Lord to justify him freely and fully by grace without the deeds of the law. In sanctification God can do nothing except in so far as the believer cordially and devotedly puts his hand to the whole work, permitting God to sanctify him wholly by his grace in and by his own thorough obedience to the truth. These are the two great mysteries—yet practical mysteries—of the gospel, hidden from the wise and prudent, but revealed to babes—to the meek and lowly, the humble in heart, to whom God giveth grace, and more grace. In the matter of justification the great difficulty is to prevent men from seeking to co-operate with God, their desire, while not yet fully humbled, being, at least partly, to justify themselves. In the matter of sanctification, on the other hand, the great difficulty is to persuade men to co-operate with God, or even to convince them of the reasonableness or possibility of such a thing. And it is a melancholy, yet instructive, view of human nature, in its unrenewed condition, to behold the mind of man thus not only misunderstanding the great scheme of God's sovereign grace in Christ Jesus, but, as it were, ingeniously and perseveringly contradicting and reversing it throughout,—insisting

on works where God has excluded them, restraining them where God has called for them. But be not deceived. If you are to work for justification, God can never justify you. If you are not to work unto sanctification, God can never sanctify you.

The exhortation, it is very obvious, addresses itself to believers, and it is accordingly to them we would now speak in applying and enforcing the doctrine.

You have entered into the household of God; and both as sons and as servants you have to walk by the rules laid down for you by your Lord and Master, your heavenly Father. You are freely forgiven all trespasses in the blood of Jesus, you are frankly reconciled to the Lord, you are fully accepted in the Beloved, you are fairly entered into the friendship of God. And ye shall not come into condemnation, for never will God recall his forgiveness: the grace from which it flows, the freeness with which it is conveyed, forbid the idea of its being retracted. Ye received it without any worthiness in you, ye received it in all your unworthiness, and the gifts and calling of God are without repentance. Ye are entered into a family from which ye shall never be expelled—into a state of safety and salvation which never can be shaken. But ye are far from being perfected in your nature, though blessed beyond measure in your prospects. Ye are not as the angels of God, or as the spirits of just men made perfect. Ye bear about with you a body of death—the old man with his affections and lusts, which, though put off, is not utterly put out—which rather strives continually for the mastery, and reinforces his strength from various quarters. The world that lieth in wickedness is on his side. Satan's wiles and rage inflame and direct the corruption that is within you, and your soul, you well know, unless guarded by prayer and watching, tends downwards continually, cleaving to the dust. Refreshing ordinances are great means of quickening, elevating, and controlling aright the desires of your heart. You have your seasons of precious and close intercourse with God; and, then, it is a marvel to you that you should ever lose the spirituality of heart and heavenly-mindedness which at these times you are privileged to attain. Yet heavenliness of affection wears down, and wellnigh wears out in contact with the world. Spirituality

of mind in converse with unseen things becomes difficult to maintain amid the bright glare and pressing urgency of the things that are seen and temporal. Self-denial for Jesus' sake and the gospel's, easily and willingly pledged and promised in the hour of high Christian privilege and enjoyment, looks rough and stern and hard when, in the hour of worldly care or worldly interest, the actual claim is made, and the call and opportunity for fulfilment comes. Provocations come—forbearance and forgiveness are needed; afflictions come—patience and resignation are required; temptations come—prayer, watchings, strivings, faithfulness, incorruptible integrity, are called for. And, in a multitude of constantly-recurring incidents in your daily life, you feel, while by entering into God's family and friendship freely, by the blood of Jesus, all your despair has been for ever dispelled, yet your anxieties and labours, instead of being set aside, are now only truly begun. You have a great work on hand, and you can give it up only with your expiring breath. You cannot enter on your rest, with any possibility of fitness or capacity of enjoying it, till your work is done. Till you are made meet for the inheritance which has freely and fully been given over to you in Jesus, you cannot be infested into the actual possession of it; nor, though you could, would you be qualified to derive from it the blessedness which it is designed to yield. Your salvation is indeed completed, if by "salvation" you mean only your escape from condemnation, and the wrath of God, and the danger of falling into hell. But if by "salvation" be meant the entire blessedness of your immortal soul in all the powers and faculties of your intellectual and moral nature, as these are assimilated to the glorious holiness of God, and exercised in unbounded love and admiration and enjoyment of God as their portion, purged of all that interrupts, darkens, distresses, or checks and limits you in fellowship with them, and that shades from you the full beauty of his strength and majesty, or restrains the full exercise of that surpassing honour or supreme esteem in which we ought ever to regard the Holy One of Israel—then your salvation is but begun, and the high course on which you are entered is that of completing it—of "working out your salvation with fear and trembling."

And what can possibly stimulate you in this high and holy

accomplishment more than the thought that "it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure"?

1. For, in the *first* place, this is an argument which addresses itself to your sense of awe. If you have any sense of the awful and the solemn, here is a consideration fitted deeply to awe and solemnise you. "Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? If any man defile the temple of God, him will God destroy: for the temple of God is holy, which temple ye are." Well may the apostle enjoin fear and trembling, and urge the propriety of such emotions, when he can adduce for them a call so truly urgent. God worketh in you, brethren! Ye are "the dwelling-place of God." "Know ye not that Christ is in you, except ye be reprobate?" And the Spirit abideth with you, for hereby ye know that ye are Christ's, by the Spirit, the Comforter, whom he hath sent to make his abode with you. What an aspect of solemn grandeur this fact imparts to the youngest or humblest of Christians! To a spiritual eye there are few things more solemnising than the contemplation of a large crowd of fellow-creatures congregated by some common interest—whether of piety or of pleasure. We behold a multitude of immortal beings, who have every one of them to stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, and to confront the great Judge of the quick and the dead. We look forward a few years, and every one of them is gone—some of them to lie down in everlasting burnings, some to wear a crown of glory. Ah! how solemnly they seem to stand out to the thoughtful mind in the light of the advancing eternity. Their future and fast-coming destiny makes them awfully important. But the *present* state of some of them, if rightly considered, is also fitted to solemnise, apart even from the thought of the prospects that lie before them. The Christians that are among them—in *them* God is even now dwelling! And what a value does *this* give them, not only in the anticipation of the coming solemnities through which they have to pass, but even in the view of their immediate condition! We look at them again in this light. They are temples of the living God, and he hath said, "I will dwell in them, and will walk in them, and I will be their God." The great God hath taken up his special residence in their hearts. Do you ask. "Will God in very deed dwell with men, on the earth?"

We point you to these Christians in the crowd for a reply; and of them we say, These are creatures in whom God is willing to dwell. And ah! with what an altered state of feelings may you regard the concourse of immortals! Even the wicked, in whom, for aught you know, God *may* yet dwell in grace and love and glory: even *they* become valuable, precious, in your estimation. And the godly, in whom God dwells already,—is there not something sublime, awful, and overpoweringly important now in your view of *them*? And if a spectator, in looking abroad upon his fellow-men, may well be solemnised when he regards the believer in the light in which this thought presents him, surely it may be expected that a yet more thrilling sense of awe and holy fear will pervade the mind of the believer himself, when he realises the truth that “God worketh in him.” When his mental eye is bent inwardly on himself, and the thought is brought home that if he indeed be the Lord’s, and since he became the Lord’s, the High and Holy One hath not disdained nor abhorred the home of his heart, but hath dwelt there in fatherly favour, and sovereign grace, and sanctifying power, and is even now (now, while he is meditating the matter), dwelling there by the gracious and peculiar presence of his Holy Spirit—can there be imagined a more constraining argument for solemn ponderings of heart, for standing in awe and sinning not, for watching unto prayer—for purifying himself from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of the Lord? Consider what God is; what God hath said; what God hath done; and then think—that God dwelleth and worketh in you; contemplate the character of God as revealed in creation, in providence, in Scripture, and in the cross of Christ; and then think—that this God dwelleth and worketh in you! He who by stupendous power created this globe and hung it upon nothing, and gathered its waters in the hollow of his hand, and weighed its mountains in scales and its hills in a balance; who powdered with shining brilliants the deep blue heaven above—lighting there ten thousand fires; who “rounded in his great palm” these spacious orbs, and “bowled them flaming through the dark profound;” who can, at his sovereign will, put check to all their motions, and fold the whole heavens as a vesture;—this same God dwelleth

within you! He who cursed the serpent, and promised the Messiah; who called Abraham, and wrestled with Jacob; who protected Joseph and gave him honour; who raised up Moses, and made his glory appear to him in the gleam of fire in the bush; whose mighty hand divided the sea for Israel, and who spoke to them in darkness and lightning from Mount Sinai; who gave them their own land, having slain kings for their sakes, and rebuked great kings; who established his law and his testimony in Judah for many generations, and whose glory dwelt between the cherubim; who smote the armies of the Assyrian with death, and rolled back from Israel the tide of battle while they were faithful, but gave them captive to the oppressor when they proved disobedient, and hath now peeled and scattered them through all the nations;—*this* God dwelleth in you! He who spared not his own Son; who laid sin, and curse, and death, and woe upon him—and for sin was pleased in unchanging holiness to bruise him whom he loveth evermore and heareth always; who hid all favour from his eyes, and left him to bear the burden of a world's atonement discountenanced, and avenged upon by the Judge of all the earth; he who hath given this last and crowning demonstration, that he cannot dwell with iniquity, is pleased to dwell in you! And as you realise the amazing fact—as your mind rises to the majesty of this great truth, that your very soul hath been constituted the guest-chamber and the banqueting-house of the King of Glory—oh! how should you be filled with fear and trembling! When Jehovah took possession of Moriah's temple in the day when Solomon gave it up in holy dedication to his father's God, God was pleased to accept the offering and consecrate it for his resting-place by solemn symbol of his glory. For "when Solomon had made an end of praying, the fire came down from heaven and consumed the burnt-offering and the sacrifices, and the glory of the Lord filled the house. And when all the children of Israel saw how the fire came down, and the glory of the Lord upon the house, they bowed themselves with their faces to the ground upon the pavement and worshipped." "Now, ye are the temple of the Lord; and what agreement hath the temple of the Lord with idols?" Well may ye stand in awe and sin not. "Ye are not your own." If God had been pleased to put

any seal upon you, marking you as his property, then there would have been sufficient ground for the declaration, "Ye are not your own;" and sufficient ground for the call, "Glorify God in your bodies and your spirits, which are his." But how much more so now that he hath sealed you by the indwelling of his own Spirit, who is in you, and shall be in you! Did Christians always rise to the height of their position—their awfully exalted position in the sight of him who hath chosen them as his rest—would they not be, like Israel of old, "a people separated from all people," a "peculiar people," a "holy nation," a "kingdom of priests" ministering to the God of the temple, the God of the whole earth—the God of their own heart, a sanctified and consecrated home? And should any one conceive of this as a species of solemnity fitted to quell all action, and inspire with terror, then let it be remembered that though God is a "consuming fire," yet he dwells in his people's souls as he dwelt in the bush, which "burned yet was not consumed."

2. This will be more evident if we consider the argument advanced in another view, as addressing itself to the Christian's hope, and fitted to inspire him with energy and courage. Great is the achievement which you have to accomplish, and mighty is the stake at issue,—your eternity, to wit, and your right preparation for it. Numerous and active, and violent and sagacious and combined, are your enemies in the unceasing task to rob you of your integrity, your grace, your Christian character, your heavenly rest. Great is the ardour, courage, energy, dauntless perseverance, and deathless hope by which you must fight your way to the crown. It is through much tribulation that you will enter into the joy of your Lord. A slothful world fancy they may sleep into heaven at last, but ye know that it is otherwise, and that the girding up of the loins of your minds, and the girding on of all heaven-proved armour, are needed for the contest. And as you survey your ground, and the multitude that are come out against you, the principalities and powers of darkness, and the spiritual wickednesses in high places, your heart may be well-nigh ready to give way. "But when thou goest out to battle against thine enemies, and seest horses and chariots, and a people more than thou, be not afraid of them: for the Lord thy

God is with thee, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt. Hear, O Israel, ye approach this day unto battle against your enemies : let not your hearts faint ; fear not, and do not tremble, neither be ye terrified because of them : for the Lord your God is he that goeth with you, to fight for you against your enemies, to save you." Imposing as the undertaking may be, and momentous the issues, yet work ye hopefully, for the Lord worketh in you. This is your unfailing guarantee for ultimate and abounding success. If called to it in your own strength, nothing could argue greater temerity than to answer the call with one single ray of hope or the least expectation of coming off as conquerors. But if the Lord is with you, ye shall be more than conquerors, doing all things through Christ strengthening you. When once the faith of Gideon was established in the trustworthy nature of the vision which he had beside his father's threshing-floor, he must have become altogether a new man through the force of the salutation addressed to him, "The Lord is with thee, thou mighty man of valour." What thrilling hope, what perpetual buoyancy of spirits, what energy of action, what quenchless perseverance, what holy heroism, must that single assurance have inspired into him who so lately quailed before the Midianites, and stole out from his concealment only under covert of the dusk ! Strung to deeds of highest courage, bearing about with him in the body a charmed life, and a conviction, more sure than fate, that no evil could befall him till the work of liberating his country from the tyrant was accomplished, he could see his little band successively diminished, because still the Lord was on his side, and the oath by which God ordained him to the work fell perpetually as heaven's own music on his ear—"The Lord is with thee, thou mighty man of valour." And similar in spirit to the conquering Gideon was Asa, king of Judah, who, with little more than half his enemy's force, encountered a million of Ethiopians in the valley of Zephtah. *His* courage also sprang from the fact that God was with him, and his battle prayer has been put on record for all generations : "And Asa cried unto the Lord his God, and said—Lord, it is nothing with thee to help, whether with many, or with them that have no power : help us, O Lord God, for we rest on thee, and in thy name we go against this multitude.

O Lord, thou art our God ; let not man prevail against *thee*." So Jahaziel and Jehoshaphat, "The battle is not yours, but God's" (2 Chron. xx. 15). It is precisely in the same spirit, believer, that *you* are warranted and bound to entertain unshaken confidence in the favourable issue of the work in which you are engaged. The fear and trembling which is here enjoined—and, as we have already seen, no wonder that fear and trembling should thus have been enjoined—are not the fear of terror, or the trembling of dismay. Such a thought is at once excluded by the full assurance afforded for ultimate success, arising, as that assurance does, from the same indwelling of the Spirit of God, which is so fitted to fill the soul with solemn awe. For if God is working in you, then you cannot fail of a triumphant issue, unless Omnipotence itself shall fail. "If God be for you, who can be against you?" The Lord is on your side, you need not fear. Rebel not against the Lord, neither fear the people of the enemies' land : their defence is departed from them, and the Lord is with us : fear them not. It is no scanty measure of strength that is allotted to you. You shall be strengthened with all might, according to his glorious power : you cannot exhaust this source of strength, your own strength. For "hast thou not known, hast thou not heard, that the Creator of the ends of the earth fainteth not, neither is weary ? He giveth power to the faint, and to them that have no might he increaseth strength. And they that wait upon him shall renew their strength." "Fear not, for I am with thee : be not dismayed, for I am thy God : I will strengthen thee : yea, I will help thee : yea, I will uphold thee with the right hand of my righteousness." If this power is working in you, you can put no bounds, no measure to its action. He is able to do "exceeding abundantly above all that you can ask or think, according to his power that worketh in you." Did ever any Christian, in the hour of temptation, find himself incapable of overcoming, when he realised himself as the dwelling-place of God's power—and God's power in pledge to him for wielding it against his foes ? No ; it is impossible. No man ever did humbly and on right grounds realise that God was "working in him to will and to do," without feeling that the thought was an inspiring one, and that it nerved with a might and power to quell temptation, to scatter the fanciful allurements of sin,

to burst the nets and snares of worldly compromise as cobweb-nets and nothing better, and to rescue him from the contact of that evil which was, perhaps, wellnigh obtaining the mastery over him. And so will you find it on every fresh occasion an exhaustless fountain of hope and of encouragement, a perpetual spring of nervous energy and undying perseverance, an endless source of conquest and of triumph. Work, then, believer, while it is called to-day; whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might. Work the work of him who sent thee into the world, as the Father sent Him into the world, who will never leave you alone, but will be with you himself, as the Father was ever with him. Work out your salvation solemnly, yet cheerfully, with awe, yet with hope; with an overpowering sense of a fearful responsibility, yet with the exulting assurance that you are enabled to meet and to discharge it. God *dwell*eth in you—let your soul be filled with holy fear and humble tremblings at his presence. God *work*eth in you—let your soul return unto her rest, convinced that he will perform all things for you most faithfully and well. Engage in every duty, resist every temptation, undertake every task, set out on a higher range of spiritual attainment, strive for a higher and a rising level of Christian character, impelled by the well-formed belief that nothing which God hateth can long withstand you, and nothing which God approves can long evade your prayers and labours to attain it. God himself “worketh in you to will and to do of his good pleasure.” You have only to acquiesce in this wonderful arrangement—to yield yourselves the willing, active instruments whereby God shall work out his own will—yourselves the living, willing agents who shall work out God’s will,—and the work shall as surely be done as God is the agent of it,—and, ultimately, as well done as to suit the agency employed on it. “Fear not, thou worm Jacob: thou shalt thresh the mountains. Who art thou, O great mountain? before Zerubabel thou shalt become a plain.” For God in his people assuredly shall triumph, or his people in him shall be conquerors and more, just as the work which you propose to yourselves to accomplish cannot be accomplished unless God does it.

The fact that God worketh in you to will and to do should

urge you to work out your salvation in another way, viz., by the consideration that the work which God proposes to himself to accomplish cannot be accomplished unless you do it. We might here bring under your notice again the views formerly brought forward of the ultimate identity subsisting between God's work and yours. But passing from these, we may present the subject in another light. God hath set himself to the work of glorifying himself in you; but this cannot be done, unless you set yourselves to the work of glorifying him. Without your intelligent and active co-operation the purpose of God must fail; and are you prepared to counteract the gracious object which he has in view? That object cannot be attained, that glory cannot be reaped, unless you devote yourselves to promote and secure it. And what, then, is your duty? Consider what it is that God means to do; and how you are concerned in its accomplishment. Consider both the subject in whom he works to his own glory, and the special glory which he designs to secure, and you cannot fail to see the call which is made upon you to work out your salvation.

1. The subject wrought upon is such that it cannot receive the manifestation of Divine glory, intended to be exhibited, in any other way than by active co-operation. In the work of Creation God may glorify himself by simply laying down upon his creatures the proofs of his glory without any action on the part of the creatures in receiving them. He can show his power and wisdom and unparalleled skilfulness in garnishing the heavens, without the myriads of stars being his fellow-workers. He can paint the watery clouds with all the glories of the transient rainbow, without the action of any other will than his own. He can clothe the lily with more than Solomon's glory without the little flower agreeing to put on its robe of beauty. But when he deals with living souls, and seeks in them to reveal his glory, it is impossible the work can proceed, unless through the action of their own moral nature, through the exercise of conscience, and understanding, and will, and the active powers with which he has endowed them. Your very nature is such that unless you willingly fall in with God's design, and put to your helping hand, the work stands still and cannot possibly proceed. And then—

2. In the *second* place, the same thing is evident from the con-

sideration of the particular glory which is to be exhibited. The special elements of his glory, the attributes or perfections or views of Divine character and nature to be revealed, are precisely such as can only be revealed in and through a living, intelligent, responsible, and active agent, once righteously condemned and spiritually dead, but now graciously accepted and powerfully quickened to newness of life and holiness of action. On inanimate creation God may lay down and lavish, and glorify his power and wisdom, and much of his goodness or beneficence. But manifest the power and freeness of his grace and its operations, reveal his pardoning love and mercy and its effects—this he cannot do; this is a glory which cannot be revealed, a work that cannot be accomplished, except in and by an agent who gives proof of his pardon and acceptance by love and liberty, and energy and joy; who gives proof of quickening grace, by life and action, of a gracious, and spiritual, and holy nature,—a life and action corresponding to the quickening and energising power which the Lord purposes to display. It appears, then, that if you would not utterly foreclose and counteract the divine design, you must devote yourselves with zeal and energy to be fellow-workers with God, not receiving the grace of God in vain. The fact is, you are put upon your honour with God, and you may be assured that he will stand upon his honour with you.

(1.) You are put upon your honour with him. God has put you upon your honour. He is here, in this world, in an enemy's country, and he hath generously committed himself to you: he hath committed his honour to yours, he hath given you large credit for loyalty and faithfulness. He hath wrought in you a new heart, and now he hath fearlessly given himself into its keeping. He hath taken you at your word, when in the day you found him knocking at the door you opened unto him, that the King of Glory might enter. He hath not distrusted the promise and the pledge you made when you gave him entrance and welcome into the soul which is his own. He hath come in to dwell with you and sup with you; and with his coming, as in the dawning of the morning, darkness fled away and the light of life and joy and bounding hope came with him, and in his holy presence the extinguished lamp of your darkened mind is

fed with the light of everlasting life. He hath not abhorred the offered dwelling-place. He hath arisen at your request, and, according to your faith, into his resting-place, "he and the ark of his strength"! And now, therefore, what is your duty, but to shield the ark of God, and protect it with your life, to cover its sacredness and honour at the price of your very soul which holdeth it? Betray not the King! Deliver not his strength into captivity, nor his glory into the enemies' hand! Adventure not the ark into the arena of worldly war; carry it not rashly into the field among the Philistines; ward off, in sensitive and holy apprehension, every touch that would pollute it, and let all temple service, every work that is in keeping with its holiness, and every vigil which should be maintained where it dwelleth, be most carefully observed. And as all thine honour in the sight of God is derived from its presence, and is imperilled on its safety, see that ye stand upon your honour with the King of kings.

(2.) And all the more that he hath put himself upon his honour to you, and permits you to put him on his honour. For as it is now yours to defend the ark at the price of your soul, which holdeth it, it is his, in like manner, to defend your soul, its dwelling-place, with all the shielding care and protection with which he would defend the ark, which is enshrined, and dwells within it.

"The Lord shall keep thy soul; he shall
Preserve thee from all ill.
Henceforth thy going out and in
God keep for ever will."

This is your safety—that now, sacred in the eye of God in all the sacredness of the symbol of his presence—nay, not the symbol of his presence, but his real presence—you are now safe in the safety of the ark itself, of the Lord himself. For this is the blessed exchange—*your honour for his*; yours in pledge to him; his to you. You are permitted now to plead with him on this high and holy ground, that, dwelling and working as he dwells and works in you, real evil befalling you befalls your God, and that honour and glory of his own that he has lodged and imperilled in you. It was thus that Asa knew his high position, and his heart pleaded to heaven as from the very summit of his vantage-ground. Realising

God in Israel, he prayed no longer that man might be preserved from conquering *Asa* and his little band, but "O Lord, let not man prevail against THEE." Ah! how well Moses, the servant of God, knew how to wield this mighty argument, which overcometh even the Mighty One of Jacob. For when God threatened rebellious Israel and said, "I will smite them with the pestilence and disinherit them; and will make of thee a greater nation and mightier than they"—instantly the quick-eyed spiritual man saw that his only weapon was the honour of the Lord, his only appeal was to put the Lord upon his honour. "And Moses said unto the Lord, Then the Egyptians will hear of it (for thou broughtest up this people in thy might from among them). And they will tell it to the inhabitants of this land: for they have heard that thou, Lord, art among this people; that thou, Lord, art seen face to face; and that thy cloud standeth over them, and that thou goest before them by daytime in a pillar of cloud, and in a pillar of fire by night. Now, if thou shalt kill all this people as one man, then the nations which have heard the fame of thee will speak, saying, Because the Lord was not able to bring his people into the land which he swore unto them, therefore he hath slain them in the wilderness." Ah! how nobly he thus intertwined God's honour with Israel's forgiveness! Surely, too, his mantle fell on Joshua, and a double portion of his spirit, when, the men of *Ai* having smitten Israel, their leader now, like his heroic forerunner, proceeded to put God upon his honour: "O Lord, what shall I say when Israel turneth their backs before their enemies? For the Canaanites and all the inhabitants of the land shall hear of it, and shall environ us round and cut off our name from the earth." "Our name!"—ah, that was little! "And what wilt thou do unto THY great name?" Oh that we knew this Divine art of so making our calling and election sure, as to know of a truth that God is in us and with us, and then improving his presence, and putting him fully on his honour! ourselves standing on our honour, guilelessly, uprightly, with openness of heart, and integrity of soul—with all aboveboard, and fully understood between our God and us,—and then, claiming his faithfulness, seeking his glory dutifully, clinging with the instinct of spiritual life to Jesus as all our desire

and plea, and recognised, acknowledged safety; interchanging our worthless yet upright sense of honour with *his* all-worthy and unfailling; guarding his honour as dwelling in our souls, and he guarding our souls from evil as its dwelling-place: he working in us, and we working in and by him and his mighty power. Oh what progress, what protection, what bliss might we not enjoy! The Lord is his people's portion. Jacob is the lot of his inheritance. He found him in a desert land, and in the waste howling wilderness; he led him about, he instructed him, he kept him as the apple of his eye. As an eagle stirreth up her nest, fluttereth over her young, spreadeth abroad her wings, taketh them, beareth them on her wings; so there was no strange god with them. They that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run, and not be weary; they shall walk, and not faint. A great work to do, but a great God to do it. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God which worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure."

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ART. IV.—*Moravian Missions.*

IN his *Institutes of Ecclesiastical History*, when giving a brief sketch of the eighteenth century, the historian Mosheim indulges in some ill-natured remarks upon those whom he calls "Herrnhuters." "They tell us," he says, "they are descended of those Bohemian and Moravian brethren who, in the fifteenth century, were excited by the preaching and example of John Huss to cast off the Romish yoke. They might more correctly call themselves imitators of those brethren, for it is conceded by all that only a very small part of the new fraternity consists of Bohemians and Moravians; and it is very uncertain, also, whether those of them who are Bohemians by descent are the posterity of those ancient Bohemian brethren."

For the insinuations of this ungracious paragraph there is not the slightest foundation. Even Mosheim would have been conscious of this had he known, or, knowing, had he carefully

studied, the *Acta Fratrum Unitatis in Angliæ*, published in 1749. In that valuable collection of documents he would have found the report of the committee to whom the petition of the deputies of the United Moravian Churches addressed to the British Government had been referred, and an Act passed in the reign of George II., by the Parliament of 1747, "for encouraging the people known by the name of *Unitas Fratrum* or United Brethren to settle in his Majesty's Colonies in America." In the appendix to the committee's report are printed some of the most material vouchers and papers produced by the deputies in support of their claims. They claimed for "the United Brethren at Herrnhuth" that they are an ancient Church, universally known to be such, and that they have a right to be denominated the Protestant Episcopal Church of the *Unitas Fratrum*. In support of these claims they adduced documentary evidence at great length, and backed it up with the testimony of those competent to adjudicate in such a matter. Thus they were able to show that the question, "Whether the Moravian Church at Herrnhuth, retaining their three-hundred-years' old and well-known Constitution and Church discipline, may and ought at the same time to maintain their connection with the Lutheran Church?" having been propounded to the divines of Tübingen in 1733, elicited from them an unhesitating affirmative; and they could produce sermons and letters of English divines containing statements similar to this: "'Tis well known and universally acknowledged that these our brethren are descended from those persons who forsook [“or, never admitted of,” interpolate the deputies] the corruptions of the Church of Rome by the influence of those eminent saints and martyrs, *John Huss* and *Jerom of Prague*, who received their doctrine (in a good measure) from our truly famous countryman *John Wickliff*, to whom we are obliged for the first dawnings of that Reformation, the first glimmerings of that pure gospel-light, which (blessed be God for it!) does now shine so brightly in this land."

When the claim of the Herrnhut brethren to be the hereditary descendants and historical representatives of the Fraternal Unity of the fifteenth century is admitted to be valid, what an interesting field opens up to view! The wife of Richard II. of England was a Bohemian princess, and through her agency the

writings of the proto-reformer Wickliffe were introduced into Bohemia and translated into the Bohemian tongue. The English reformer's words became good seed in the heart when they fell into the hands of two men—Huss and Jerome,—both belonging to Prague, and the former being an eminent pastor in one of the churches of that city, and also rector of the University there. The teacher Huss and the disciple Jerome were declared to be heretics by the Council of Constance, and both suffered martyrdom in the flames, one on the 6th of July 1415, and the other on the 30th May 1416.

Although only forty-two years of age when burned alive, John Huss left a large number of followers in Bohemia and Moravia, and these, before a century had run its course, were found to have spread to not a few districts of Poland. In addition to the general name of Hussites, these followers of the Bohemian martyr came to be known by two names, that of Calixtines, from their distinguishing tenet, which was pleading for the use of the chalice in the Lord's Supper, which a decree of Charles IV. had attempted to withhold from the laity, and that of Taborites, the origin of which name, inaccurately given by Mosheim and L'Enfant, is thus correctly stated by the historian of the wars of the Hussites: "The Communion under both kinds met with great opposition in the district of Bechin. The vicars and curates drove all who befriended it out of their churches. Being deprived of divine service, some of the pastors conducted their flocks to a neighbouring mountain. There they erected a tent, in the form of a chapel, in which they performed divine service, and administered the Communion to the people in both elements. The service being ended, they took down the tent, returned to their houses, and called the mountain Tabor." When the Calixtines, under the pressure of terrible sufferings, resolved to have recourse to the sword in self-defence, a minority of their number disapproved of the step, withdrew from their fellowship, and, in 1457, retired to the barony of Lititz, in the north-east of Bohemia. Here they were ministered to in Word and Sacrament by pastors who had seceded from the Church of Rome or from the Calixtines, and here they formed congregations and established a Consistory. In the preface to a document laid before the States-General, and which has become one of the subordinate standards of the

renewed Unity,¹ an explanation is given of the reason why they took to themselves the name which has since become historical. "With respect," say they, "to the name of the *Fraternity*, it was derived from the circumstances of the case. These men were in truth the genuine offspring of the holy martyr Huss; yet the Calixtines had forestalled the denomination of *Hussites*; and moreover, our people would not venture to take their title from men contrary to the prohibition of the Holy Spirit. They therefore called themselves by the most commendable name of *Brethren and Sisters*, an appellation most suitable for Christians. But in their public apologies, and in their books, they termed themselves *Brethren of the Law* (or rule) *of Christ*, with reference to the leading principle of Huss, 'that the law of Christ is sufficient for the government of the Church militant, without the addition of human laws,' and being anxious to guard against a departure from this principle either by themselves or their posterity. And because they had established a settled order among themselves for the preservation of unanimity in faith and charity, they designated their entire body, THE UNITY OF THE BRETHREN, as it is applied at the present day. And as the churches were everywhere occupied by the Romanists, or by the pseudo-Hussites, the brethren were under the necessity of erecting oratories of their own in different towns; and their pastors having no regular incomes, had to support themselves by the labour of their own hands."

The history of the Fraternal Unity, thus formed, was for two long and dreary centuries a history of hardship and suffering. The brethren and sisters resembled the Scripture worthies in that they had "trials of mockings and scourgings, yea, moreover, of bonds and imprisonments. . . . They were tempted, they were slain with the sword, being destitute, afflicted, evil-entreated." What privations they were subjected to by Austrian tyranny and priestly bigotry is recorded in a narrative drawn up for the information of friends in England, and published at London in 1650, from which it will suffice to make one extract: "Many being dispersed among the woods and mountains, did

¹ *Ratio disciplinæ ordinis ecclesiastici in unitate Fratrum Bohemorum*. drawn up in 1616, but not published till 1632, when it was printed at Lissa in Poland.

dwelt in caves, where they were scarce secure enough ; wherefore they dressed not their meat, nor made any fire, but in the night only, for fear the smoke ascending should betray them ; and in the extremity of the cold in winter nights, sitting near the fire, they gave themselves to reading of the Bible and holy discourses. When, in the depth of the snow, they went forth to provide themselves necessities, they went close together, lest they should be discovered by their footsteps, and the hindermost did draw behind him a great bough of beech to cover the print which their feet had made in the snow."

Notwithstanding its being in so marked a degree a Church of confessors, sufferers, and martyrs, the Unity was careful to be an active, light-diffusing Church. The Brethren claim to be the first who applied the art of printing to the publication of the Bible in the vernacular tongue. Before the Reformation movement was fairly launched they had established three printing-offices,—two in Bohemia, and one in Moravia. These were for some time almost entirely employed in printing Bohemian Bibles, and three editions of what had hitherto been a sealed treasure were issued. The sufferings of the Bohemian brethren reached their height under the exterminating policy of Cardinal Dietrichstein, in the reign of the bigoted Ferdinand II. of Austria. Before that monarch of evil notoriety died, in 1637, the adherents of evangelical truth in the Austrian provinces had been compelled to leave the country. Jan Amos Komensky, better known as John Amos Comenius—a Moravian by birth, driven in 1621 from Fulneck, where he was teacher and pastor, escaping in 1656 from Lissa, on the confines of Silesia, in a state of nudity,—found for himself a place of refuge in Amsterdam, where he ended his active, shifting life in 1671. Regarding himself as the last bishop of the Bohemian branch of the Fraternal Unity, Comenius published in 1660 *A Brief History of the Slavonian Church*. The history is formally dedicated to Charles II., with an address to the brethren of the English Church, the strain and style of which may be judged from the following sentences : "I now close the doors of their remaining churches before your very eyes, the last among the outlasting, for nearly the whole of their ministers, bishops, and patrons have ended their course. As in such cases it is customary to make a will, we hereby bequeath to our enemies the things of which they can dispossess us, our churches, schools,

goods, and property, together, if it be the will of the Lord, with the lives, too, of the remnant of our people. But to you, our friends, we bequeath our mother, the Church of the Brethren. Take her in charge. It may be God will again awaken her in our country, or raise her up elsewhere if she be dead there. You ought to love the expiring Church which has given you, the living, an example of faith and faithfulness, even from the third century of our era."

For half a century after the death of the last bishop of the old Bohemian Unity, the Church of Christly confessors and martyrs was the Church of God's hidden ones—hidden in cellars, in dens and caves of the earth, carefully hiding while diligently reading the Word of life. It was the renewed persecution of a merciless priesthood that brought the hidden Church to light, and caused the Unity of the Brethren to start upon her new era of existence—a Missionary Church. In 1722 a remnant of the Moravian Church were constrained to look out for a place where they could enjoy fellowship and Protestant liberty of worship. Through one of their number, Christian David, a journeyman mechanic, they were directed to an estate situated about forty miles to the east of Dresden, in the kingdom of Saxony, and proceeded to solicit the protection and assistance of the owner of that estate, with whose name the history of the renewed Unity and its missions will never cease to be associated—Count Zinzendorf.

Nicholas Louis, Count and Lord of Zinzendorf and Pottendorf, was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable actors and propelling forces in the religious life and activity of the eighteenth century.

Various circumstances have conspired to make him less known and less appreciated in Great Britain than he ought to be. For one thing, justice has never been done in the English language to his remarkable and chequered career. The learned but dry and prolix Bishop of the Unity, A. G. Spangenberg, may be said to have buried the life in a biography of eight ponderous volumes, which appeared at intervals between the years 1772 and 1775. Of this work an abridged translation in English was brought out in 1838, but in a form far from attractive; while the *Encyclopædia* notices are meagre and untrustworthy. Then, unfortunately, Zinzendorf's doctrinal tenets and ecclesiastical organisation failed to commend them-

selves to several theologian and Church statesmen of his own century, with a far wider repute than his own, so that he does not appear to advantage in the biographies of these men of light and leading. This holds good in the case of the distinguished scholar, John Albert Bengel in Germany, of the two Wesleys, Whitfield, and the Countess of Huntingdon in England, and of David Brainerd and President Dickinson in America. And, so far from being concealed, it ought to be frankly admitted that there was much in the doings and writings of the Christian nobleman fitted to give an impression of wrongheadedness, eccentricity, and love of domination. But much of this disappears when allowance is made for the emotional and impulsive temperament of the man, and for the exceptional relation in which the aristocratic landowner stood to the poor expatriated artisans who found a home and a sanctuary upon his estate. There must have been something attractive in a controversialist of whom Bengel could write, "I love that good nobleman from my heart, and think often about him;" and John Wesley must have felt strongly drawn to the head-centre of the community, when, after spending a fortnight in the society of the Count, he said, on leaving Herrnhut, "I would gladly have spent my life here."

No doubt there was much that was *outré* and extravagant in the doings of Zinzendorf. The childlike in him approached the childish; the extreme of simplicity occasionally touched the confines of absurdity. He laid himself open to the charge of being a mystic, a believer in the inspiration of epilepsy, and in the revelations of second sight. It was dangerous to trust him on a journey by himself, as all the money he carried with him would be given away at the very outset to any one applying for it; but when, after borrowing supplies, or being indebted to the hospitality of strangers, he did reach his destination, he would probably tell of a delightful conversation held with Jesus Christ on the way, and how his soul had been bathed in love to the Saviour all the time. He consorted with strange people, as, for example, with John Rock the saddler, who was subject to violent convulsions, during the continuance of which he claimed to exercise the gift of prophecy, of whom Spangenberg was not at all sure, but from whose intercourse the Count declared he derived much benefit, entreating the saddler to use no ceremony in conversing with

him, and requesting him to stand sponsor to a newly-born daughter. He advocated the introduction of practices which neither the Lutheran nor the Reformed Churches would sanction. Thus, from the words of the Saviour, recorded in the seventeenth of St. John, he argued that feet-washing ought not to be omitted from the practice of a true Church; it was from his kitchen that the Love Feasts of the primitive Church were revived in Herrnhut, for, on a Sacrament Sunday in 1727, not wishing the companies to break up their fellowship after returning from Communion, he sent a dinner to each company, requesting them to eat together in love; he believed in the manifestation of supernatural gifts in the church at Herrnhut, especially in the gift of miraculous healings (although he estimated submission to the will and love to the person of Christ far higher than such endowments); and, in common with all the brethren of his day, even until now, his appeal in all cases of perplexity or dubiety was to the decision of the lot.¹

But when every abatement that can reasonably be demanded has been made, the character and the labours of Nicholas Louis remain truly noble, altogether Christly. The entirety of his devotion to his Master's service is something wonderful. Accustomed from his birth to move in courtly circles of society, the favourite of statesmen, titled dignitaries and sovereigns, with every prospect before him which the world would count brilliant, and marks of distinguishing regard conferred upon him fitted to dazzle a young man's vision, his highest ambition in life was to enter the gospel ministry, and be ordained to the charge of souls. When that

¹ An instance of the use of the lot may interest our readers; it explains the mode of procedure, and it throws light upon the character of Zinzendorf. At one time the Count was exceedingly anxious to get the elders at Herrnhut to abandon their old Moravian Constitution, and become more avowedly Lutheran in polity; the brethren, on their part, warmly resisted all his efforts in that direction. As neither party would yield to the other it was resolved to commit the matter to the decision of the lot. Accordingly, two texts of Scripture were written on separate slips of paper—one being 1 Cor. ix. 21, the other 2 Thess. ii. 15—the understanding being, that if the first were drawn that would be evidence of the Lord's will that the Lutheran Constitution be accepted; but if the second, that the old historical standing be retained. Fervent prayer having been offered, Christian Renatus, the Count's son, not quite four years of age, put his hand into the box containing the slips, and drew forth that which contained the Thessalonian text: "Stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye have been taught." After this decision, adverse to his views and wishes, the Count was requested to address the congregation, which he did, says his biographer, "with unusual effect."

wish could no longer be withstood, he resigned his office of Government Councillor, and renounced all prospects of worldly advancement, made over his estates to his wife, and joyfully laid aside his sword, with the determination never to wear it again. Once identified with his beloved brethren, no sacrifice was too great for him to make in the prosecution of the work he and they had at heart. He was oftentimes wounded in the house of his friends, being bitterly opposed, calumniated, and traduced by a party among those who found shelter on his lands and bread at his table; and he suffered persecution at the hands of the civil power, being ordered by his Government to sell his estates, and, when that could not be carried out in consequence of what he had already done, being banished, the cancelling of the sentence being only procurable at the price of his signature to a bond, rather than sign which he submitted to a voluntary exile from Saxony, which lasted ten years. With his like-minded wife he passed through poverty of such a depth that one year the family lived chiefly upon the proceeds of the sale of gold and silver ornaments. And yet Nicholas Louis, the Moravian pastor, was one of the happiest and most sunny-minded of Christ's servants. Once free from the incumbrance of property, he delighted to regard himself as a stranger upon the earth, the Lord's pilgrim in the world; he was jubilant in the renunciation of all things; he deemed no service beneath him, nothing too difficult in his endeavours to promote the temporal and spiritual welfare of the poor brethren and sisters in Christ Jesus. He experienced, as few men have ever done, "the happiness of being everywhere at home," of "parting with everything for Jesus," and of being ready "at His beck to go to any part of the world."

One of the remarkable things connected with this remarkable man is the very early period of life at which he came under religious impressions, and gave evidence of an attachment to the Saviour. If his biographer can be depended upon, the child had apprehended the chief points of Christian doctrine, specially the truths bearing upon the brotherhood and sacrifice of Christ, *before he was four years old*. And he himself, in an address to little children, given at Geneva, told them how, "when still very little," he spoke for hours together to the Lord, like one friend to another, and many times paced up and down the room absorbed in meditation; and how, on

one day in particular, he was so much affected with a sense of what his Creator had suffered for him that he shed tears abundantly, and attached himself still more closely and tenderly to the Saviour. When only a boy he employed writing materials in composing little notes to the Saviour, and, in the hope that the Person to whom they were addressed would find them, he threw them out at the window; and, when no more appreciative auditors of what he had to say about his dear Lord could be found, he gathered the chairs of the room in a circle, and spoke to them of that with which his heart was full to overflowing. On his going, in his eleventh year, to the Royal School at Halle, the interest and attachment of childhood showed no sign of abatement. Loving the Saviour himself, he sought to bring others to participate in the grace he had received, and, with this in view, began to hold little meetings for prayer with school-companions in retired places. The step met, as it was certain to do, with ridicule and opposition, but the meetings were continued for nearly six years with manifest signs of blessing. Out of these schoolboy gatherings there sprang two things which exercised a potent influence upon the religious life of Europe, and even the world, the full amount of which it would be difficult to estimate. From among the Halle boys that attended the Count's prayer-meetings there was formed an association, the members of which sought, by closer connection with each other, to increase in the knowledge of God and in the desire for the salvation of souls. For years the existence of such a union was unknown to the outside world, but the members of it, though subsequently dispersed among various countries, continued, through correspondence, to maintain friendly and helpful intercourse. And then, it was during the Halle days, which came to a close when he was sixteen years of age, that Count Zinzendorf entered into a covenant with his most intimate and like-minded school-companion, Baron Fredrick Von Wattewille. The matter of the covenant was the conversion of the heathen; the desire of the youthful covenant-makers was that, if not allowed to labour personally in this cause, God would direct them to suitable agents for such blessed work. How nobly that covenant was kept by both the transacting parties, and what splendid fruit resulted from it, can best be realised by those who are most intimately acquainted with the story of

missionary enterprise, with which the names of Zinzendorf and Wattewille will ever be associated.

From the slight sketch now given of Zinzendorf's childhood and boyhood, it can be imagined with what interest he heard, in the summer of 1722, that a company of exiles had arrived in Upper Lusatia from Moravia, and were desirous of finding on his estate a place where they might found a colony, and build for themselves dwelling-places and a church. At that time the Count was twenty-two years of age, held a Government appointment, and had quite recently been married to the Countess Erdmuth Dorothea, but the determination was at once formed to throw up all secular pursuits and to consecrate himself entirely to the glory of God and the good of others. Permission having been forwarded from Dresden, and Heitz the major-domo instructed to give the refugees a cordial welcome, Christian David the carpenter cut down the first tree, exclaiming, as he did so, "Here hath the sparrow found a house, and the swallow a nest for herself, even thine altars, O Lord of hosts!" On the 17th of June 1722 the brethren entered their new home, and on that day the worthy major-domo reported proceedings to his master, using the following words, which have now an historical significance: "May God bless the work according to His loving-kindness, and grant that your Excellency may build a city on the *Hutberg* [Watch-hill], which may not only stand under the Lord's guardianship, but where all the inhabitants may stand upon the *Herrnhut* [Watch of the Lord]." Thus arose Herrnhut, the home of the renewed Unity of the Brethren, whose name is "as ointment poured forth," whose missions have elicited the admiration of Christendom, whose is the unique distinction of enrolling the majority of communicants from the fields of heathendom which they have Christianised.¹

¹ The following tabular statements may serve to confirm the above statement, and at the same time to bring out a proportion between the Home and Foreign statistics to which no other Church in Christendom can lay claim:—

<i>Home.</i>		<i>Foreign.</i>	
Ministers,	312	Missionaries, . . .	150
		Female Helpers, . .	100
		Native Workers, . .	1504
			1754
Communicants, . . .	19,328	Communicants, . . .	25,298
Year's Increase, . .	611	Year's Increase, . .	859

The Renewed Unity stands before the world the Missionary Church of Christ. Repeatedly since she entered upon the revived period of her existence has the General Synod given forth the noble declaration: There never will be a Unity of the Brethren without a mission to the heathen, or a mission of the brethren which is not the affair of the whole Church. In respect of priority, of progress, and of diffusion, palmary honours can be claimed for the little missionary Church. For among Missionary Societies and the missions of individual Churches she can vindicate her right to be regarded among the earliest in the field. In 1882 she celebrated the third jubilee of missions which were started in 1732. But 1732 is sixty years prior to the formation of the *Baptist Missionary Society*, sixty-three years before the *London Missionary Society* started on its noble career, sixty-seven before the *Church Missionary Society* and the *Religious Tract Society* were organised, and ninety-seven before the Church of Scotland, awakened from the long sleep of Moderatism, sent out Alexander Duff to India.¹

As regards the progress made in these hundred and fifty years, it may be questioned if any agency can produce statistics to equal those given in the "Retrospect of the Missionary Work of the Moravian Church," published last year, on the occasion of the third jubilee. Taking the three jubilees, with their periods of fifty years, this is how the matter stands. The first period started with the departure from Herrnhut of two men for St. Thomas, in the Danish West Indies; and it closed with 165 brethren and sisters, occupying 27 stations.

¹ The claim put forward by the Rev. B. La Trobe on behalf of Moravian Missions to be regarded as "the first in the field," cannot be allowed to pass without exception being taken to its accuracy. In the year 1559 Gustavus Vasa, king of Sweden, sent a missionary to evangelise the Laplanders, and in 1611 Gustavus Adolphus caused religious books to be translated into the Lapponeese language. In 1646 John Eliot preached to the American Indians in the neighbourhood of Boston. In 1705 Ziegenbalg and Plutschow sailed for India; and, in 1721, Hans Egede, having had the conversion of the Greenlanders a burden upon his heart for thirteen years, sailed for Greenland with his wife, four children, and a number of Danish settlers.

Then as regards Missionary Societies, the *Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge* was founded in 1698, and if its claim to be considered a missionary agency be called in question, that cannot be done in the case of the *Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts*, which was incorporated by royal charter in June 1701, and which instructed its first agents to do what they could for the education and religious instruction of the slaves in the American colonies.

All these enterprises were thus prior to the Moravian date, 1732.

The centenary jubilee called the Unity to thank God for 40,000 converts, at 41 stations, under the direction of 209 brethren and sisters. The jubilee of August 1882 shows the work to have nearly doubled in the half-century, for the latest returns tell of 99 stations and 16 out-stations, making 115 centres of evangelistic labour, of 312 missionaries (male and female), and of 76,646 under pastoral superintendence, of whom 26,000 are in full communion with the Church.

Such, so far as figures can express it, is the missionary work which the Lord of the white fields of harvest permits the brethren's Church to carry on. And the work is so diffused over the surface of the earth that there is no continent on which the Fraternal Unity has not unfurled the banner of the Cross. The map which shows the stations of the Moravian missions is literally a map of the world.

In Europe, Central Asia, South Africa, and the continent of Australasia; in North, Central, and South America; along the ice-bound coasts of Greenland and Labrador; among the Indian reserves of Canada and the United States; under the tropic sun of the West Indian Islands and British and Dutch Guiana; and amid the solitude of the lofty valleys of the Himalayas, is the Watch of the Lord being kept. In no spirit of boastfulness, rather in that of prophecy, as a cosmopolitan Christian giving expression to the spirit that has breathed through the renewed Church in all stages of her history, did Zinzendorf utter the memorable words, "My parish is the whole world."

To take even a brief survey of the fields of evangelistic labour under Moravian cultivation would be a formidable undertaking, in the carrying out of which writer and readers might become wearied with statistics and bewildered in details. It may, therefore, be more interesting, as it will certainly be more easy, to state some of the salient features in Moravian Missions, which give them a unique position in the annals of doing and suffering for the extension of Christ's kingdom.

I. And first there falls to be noted the splendid spirit of consecration in which the missionaries of the Unity have ever given themselves to this work.

It would not be reasonable to expect that all the 2171 who

have gone out during the past hundred and fifty years should prove equally worthy of their high calling, and be completely possessed of the high qualifications it demands; it is only what might be looked for when it is found that some have been lacking in the needed gifts and graces of head and heart, that some have given evidence that they never had a true call to engage in such work, and so, after putting their hand to the plough, have been seen looking back, and thereafter drawing back. Let it be also admitted that, as a body, the Moravian missionaries do not stand high in respect of intellectual force, scholarly attainments, or wide culture. Up to a date so recent as the year 1869 the Unity had no institute for the training of missionary candidates, and such a thing as a curriculum of study was unknown to, and would probably not have been highly esteemed by, the veterans of the force. As one glances down the long lists of names that constitute the muster-roll of the regiment, the eye rests on no names that can take their place alongside of the Triumvirate of the Serampore Mission, or that would be mentioned as those of the compeers of Wilson of Bombay, Selwyn of New Zealand, or Patteson of Melanesia. For the most part, the recruits and volunteers in the service have been drawn from the humbler ranks of life. Moravian peasants, weavers, and carpenters have furnished a large contingent. Of the two with whom the work started in 1732, one was a potter, the other a carpenter. John Christian Erhardt, the first to commence a mission among the Eskimos of Labrador, was a common sailor; and Schmidt, selected to be the pioneer among the Hottentots, was a poor man, earning his living as a day-labourer, and returning to his manual toil when the mission was abandoned. Many others have followed callings equally lowly, the very mention of which would have excited the ridicule of the witty Dean of St. Paul's, who expended so much of his humour upon the absurdity of a consecrated cobbler converting the people of India. With these things admitted—and the admission is most readily made by the brethren themselves—it remains incontrovertible that for entire consecration of self, absolute surrender of will, and inclination to the Master, the missionaries of the Unity have never been surpassed, if indeed they have ever been equalled.

The beginnings of two missions, one to the West Indies,

the other to Greenland, will furnish ample corroboration and illustration of this statement.

In 1731 a baptized negro from St. Thomas, called Anton, whom Ziuzendorf had previously met at Copenhagen, had an opportunity of placing the condition of his enslaved countrymen before the congregation at Herrnhut. His description of the spiritual destitution and the physical hardships of the negroes powerfully affected two of his hearers, who, when they talked the matter over in the field they were then cultivating, found to their surprise that a strong impulse to go to St. Thomas had simultaneously taken possession of their minds. By the majority of their brethren the thought was treated as "a pretty imagination of young officious minds in a matter that would better bear good wishes than execution." It was represented to them that before they could gain access to the slaves they would require to be themselves in the slave condition; but that did not move them from their purpose; they would willingly enter servitude in order to make known Christ, the Liberator of the bound, the Consoler of the oppressed. The enterprise was then, in the case of one of the volunteers, referred to the decision of the Lord through the lot, and the conclusion came to was that he should not go. When his companion, Leonhard Dober, was asked if he would submit the matter to the same arbitrament, his reply was, that so far as his own conviction was concerned there was no necessity, but for the satisfaction of the brethren they might do as they pleased. The process being repeated, out of a number of slips there was drawn one with this writing, "Let the youth go, for the Lord is with him." This put an end to all hesitation and all delay. Asked by Dober to be his companion, David Nitschman left his wife and three children, and went with him, "not knowing whither he went." On the 21st of August 1732 they left Herrnhut for the island of St. Thomas, taking with them the blessing of the little church, a few shillings in their pockets, the clothes on their backs, and as their instructions this one direction, that they were "in all things to seek the guidance of God's Holy Spirit." That was the beginning of a work in the Danish islands of the West Indies which, when its centenary was reached in 1832, could tell of between 9000 and 10,000 converts, with stations in St. Thomas, St. Croix

(the largest of the group, often called the garden of the West Indies), and the mountainous island of St. Jan. Of late years, as is well known, the Danish West Indies have lost much of their commercial importance, and have suffered greatly from drought, hurricane, repeated shocks of earthquake, the ravages of cholera, and insurrectionary movements. And yet the most recent statistics of the mission are as follows : Eight stations, fourteen missionaries, 625 communicants ; total in charge, 4314 persons.

The mission to Greenland was entered upon about five months after the departure of Dober and Nitschman for St. Thomas, and in this case also two of the brethren, on conversing " with simplicity," found an impulse in each other's heart to go to Greenland. They were at that time working with the spade at the formation of the burying-ground at the Hutberg, and, retiring to a wood near at hand, they kneeled down and begged the Lord to clear up their minds and indicate to them His leadings. Having done this, their hearts were filled with an uncommon joy, and they at once proceeded to place themselves at the disposal of the congregation, indicating, in writing, a readiness to go to any part of heathendom, with a preference, however, on their part, for Greenland. No encouragement was given to them at first, no reply being made to their communication, and no brother speaking to them of their project. Efforts were even made to dissuade them from entering upon the work, on the part of some who could speak from personal knowledge regarding the difficulties they would encounter in a country where Hans Egede had been labouring for upwards of ten years with no apparent spiritual fruit. But the volunteers were not to be shaken in their resolve, and ultimately the Church gave its sanction to the attempt. One of the labourers in the churchyard being away on a long journey at the time the favourable decision was given, Christian David, whose axe had felled the first tree for the building of Herrnhut, offered to take his place alongside of Matthew Stach, the other missionary-designate, and a cousin of the same, Christian Stach by name, having been asked to accompany them, " accepted the call with joy, and made himself ready in haste." Solemnly set apart for the work to which they had given themselves through the laying on of hands and

prayer, they set out, January 19, 1733, "accompanied with innumerable wishes of blessing by the congregation." These wishes constituted a large part of their outfit, for of clothes they had nothing but what was on their backs; of money, a congregation of exiles could not be expected to give much; while of information as to how they were to get to Greenland, and how they were to live when once there, the supply was the scantiest. "Nobody knew anything to tell us," says M. Stachman, "and we did not trouble our heads."

Reaching their destination after a seven weeks' voyage, they built their sod hut, and set about the acquiring of the Greenland language. But these uneducated men had probably never seen a grammar, and the only person who could be their instructor was Egede the Dane; and so it was necessary for them to set about the acquiring of Danish before they could understand their teacher, and be drilled in the complex and uncouth speech of the country, which has often as many as ten words for one thing. Such was the founding of a mission to which we may afterwards have occasion to return, regarding which we have only at present to state, that for patient, persevering, self-denying labour, and for strong, simple, and triumphant faith, the story of the brethren's Greenland mission stands unsurpassed in the missionary records of any Church.

The only other field of the brethren's mission-work to which we invite attention, as illustrating the spirit of perfect consecration characterising the workers, is that which lay among the hunting-fields of the North American Indians. While such names as those of Count Zinzendorf, Spangenberg, Christian Henry Rauch, Gottlob, Buettner, and Martin Meek will always be honourably associated by the brethren with the commencement of the enterprise, they justly regard David Zeisberger as the leading spirit of the Indian mission. The son of parents who, for conscience' sake, had abandoned their possessions in Moravia, and found a welcome refuge at Herrnhut, David had, when but a boy, given his heart to the Lord Jesus Christ, and followed up that surrender by giving himself wholly to the Lord's work among the heathen. For more than sixty years he shared with those gathered from the red tribes, the wanderings, trials, and injustices of their hard lot, and then

died in their midst at the advanced age of eighty-seven, quite blind, wasted, and feeble in body, but with a heart glowing to the last with ardent love for the Indians whom he had watched over with the solicitude of a parent, and cared for with the tenderness of a nurse. No fewer than thirteen stations were formed by him in the Indian settlements; the number of toilsome, dangerous journeys undertaken by him in the interests of his spiritual children is literally beyond enumeration. During the last forty years of his life he was never more than six months absent from them. At Gnadenhutten (Tents of Grace), at Friedenshutten (Tents of Peace), at Schonbrun (Beautiful Spring), in the country of the Shawanose—most savage of all the Indian tribes,—at Lichtenau, at Pilgerruh (Pilgrim's Rest), at New Salem, at Fairfield, and, finally, at Goshen, the short but well-proportioned figure of Zeisberger is the first to be seen, bearing his own share upon his back, or wielding the axe with which he helps to clear a space in the new settlement. And as he was "in journeyings often," so also was he frequently "in perils." Upon one occasion a chief of the Shawanose, although permitting him to continue his visit, gave him to understand that he might expect some day or other to have his brains beat out—an intimation that had no intimidating effect upon the missionary, who went quietly on his way, sowing the Word "with glad loving aim." When the War of Independence was coming to a close, the Moravian mission fell under the suspicion of the English Governor of Detroit, who groundlessly accused the brethren of being spies, simply because they refused to take up arms themselves, or use influence with the Indians to do so. Resolved to rid himself of the Indian congregation, he communicated with the great council of the Iroquois at Niagara, and the Iroquois sent a message to the Chippewas and Ottawas intimating that they made a present of the Indian congregation to these tribes "to make soup of." This culinary offer having been declined by those to whom it was first made, a similar proposal was sent to the Hurons, and was by them accepted. On Sabbath, Sept. 3, 1781, Zeisberger, who, with other two brethren, had been ordered to report himself at Gnadenhutten, preached to the congregation, discoursing on the great love of God towards men, and the pains He takes to

bring sinners to repentance. In the afternoon the three white men were seized by a party of wild Hurons, and marched off to the camp of the Delawares, where the death-song was sung over them, and they were stripped of nearly all their clothing. Secured in two huts, which were nothing more than roofs of bark raised on poles, leaving the sides and ends open, they sat through that long and anxious night listening to the scalp-whoops of the parties who had gone to Salem and Schonbrun to bring in such missionaries and their wives as they might find there. First three yells, which drew forth three in reply from the camp, announced that three persons had fallen into the hands of the raiders at Salem, at which place Zeisberger had left his wife on coming to Gnadenhutten; but whether the victims of the midnight surprise were still alive, or had been murdered, could not be known until the return of the party. Then, as the first glimmerings of morning light became visible, the sound of the scalp-whoop was again heard by those lying on the bare, damp soil, first faintly, but soon with painful distinctness, as it sounded and resounded in the close, calm air of that autumn morning. This time the capture was of four persons,—a missionary and three women. One of the women had an infant at the breast only three days' old. She had been hurried out of bed, and forced into the boat, on a dark night, thankful to do as directed, as instant death to mother and child would have been the sequel to either unwillingness or inability to obey the bidding of their captors. For four days the brethren and sisters were confined in the wretched sheds, and were only released on the understanding that they would emigrate with their people to the river Sandusky, where, after a weary journey of four weeks, they found themselves, a bleak sterile wilderness stretching all around them, which they set themselves to cultivate as best they could.

All through his chequered, wandering life, Zeisberger encountered more opposition, suffered more ill treatment, at the hands of the French, the British, and the Americans, than he did at those of the Indians for whom he laboured, among whom he lived and died. How he was regarded and treated by the red men can be gathered from the reply of some Cajuga Indians when asked if they knew him. So soon as his name was uttered they expressed much joy, and, placing two

fingers together, said, "We are one. Are you also one with him?" the answer being, "We are brethren." Then, before he was seized at Gnadenhutten, a Delaware Indian told him in private, that, being adopted as one of their nation, and so flesh and bone with them, the Delaware warriors were willing to protect him; only when Zeisberger refused an offer which did not include his companions, was he declared a prisoner of war. And touching in the extreme must have been the scene in the hut at Goshen, when, as the veteran of nearly fourscore years lay dying, he welcomed with closed eyes, but open arms, the very Huron chief who had, a quarter of a century before, dragged him away as a prisoner, but who now, as an earnest seeker after salvation, bowed humbly before the venerable servant of Christ; and when, on Nov. 17, 1808, his Indians stood round his deathbed weeping, and gave him the assurance in response to his last words of loving exhortation: "Father, we will cleave to the Saviour, and live for Him alone."¹

II. A second feature of Moravian missions, from the first until now, can best be summed up and expressed in the word Heroism. It is the heroism that appears in the Zinzendorf and Wattewille covenant for the conversion of the heathen, "*but only of such as others would not trouble themselves with.*" To that provision of the covenant of 1715 the brethren have been loyally true. They have always led the forlorn hope in missionary enterprise. Leaving to a large extent the more cultivated and civilised nations to be evangelised by Churches and Societies having at command a wider culture and finer scholarship, the Unity has bestowed labour upon fields most unpromising, upon races most sunken, upon classes most degraded. For proof of this we point to the work among lepers carried on by brethren and sisters of the Unity, in South

¹ In view of what has been stated on page 348, it is only an act of justice to the Moravian missionaries, and to the memory of Zeisberger, to state that, notwithstanding the nomadic life he led, the Indians' friend made himself master of two of the Indian languages; that of one of these he composed two grammars,—one in German, the other in English,—while of the Delaware or Lenape language he compiled a dictionary, and left behind him a grammar in German, which has since been translated into English for the *American Philosophical Society*. In addition to these larger and scientific works, Zeisberger prepared a spelling-book, which has passed through two editions, a volume of sermons to children, and a hymn-book, containing upwards of five hundred hymns from the English and German hymn-books in use in the brethren's worship—all these being in the Lenape language.

Africa and in Jerusalem. For forty years, impelled by love to Christ and compassion for men, Moravian missionaries and their wives were found willing to undertake self-denying work among the wretched Hottentots stricken with this loathsome disease. In the year 1818 the Colonial Government, fearing the spread of leprosy, erected a temporary asylum in the valley of Hemel en Aarde (Heaven and Earth), so called because far removed from human habitation, and hemmed in by rocks with only a strip of sky above, and then made application to the Mission Board of the brethren for some one to instruct the unhappy inmates in the Christian faith. In response to the appeal brother Leitner and his English wife relinquished an attractive field of labour, and the fellowship of congenial fellow-labourers, to enter upon work depressing and repulsive in the extreme. This was in June 1822. For some time Mr. Leitner preached in the open air, thereafter in a temporary chapel constructed of stakes and unburnt bricks—the work of the patients,—and ultimately in a substantial church built at the expense of Government. The fruit of his efforts for the social and sanitary improvement of the afflicted people who formed his charge was soon visible. Diligence superseded idleness; tidiness and cleanliness displaced slovenliness and filthiness; the hospital was ere long surrounded by neat gardens; a large space of ground was brought under cultivation; and an aqueduct constructed to supply the shut-in colony with water for domestic use and garden irrigation. And fruit of a directly spiritual nature was not wanting to cheer the lonely brave-hearted couple. Not a few whom the world counted helpless and hopeless were led to Christ the Healer, and a house of living stones, resting on the living Foundation, was gradually reared to the glory of God in the lonely valley. One after another of the poor lepers came to ask of Mr. Leitner the one question of urgency for an unpardoned sinner: What must I do to be saved? Many a wild and depraved outcast received power to become a son of God by faith in Christ, and was brought to submit with patient resignation, and even joy, to the rod that chastened him for his profit. During his six years of service among the lepers Leitner was privileged to baptize 95 adults. Well might the patients regard him and his devoted wife as their father and

mother; bereaved indeed must all have felt on that Easter-Day 1829, when their spiritual parent was suddenly removed by death in the act of baptizing a newly-gathered convert. In 1846 the hospital was removed from Hemel en Aarde to Robben Island, a low sandy islet surrounded by dangerous rocks, near the entrance of Table Bay, seven miles from Cape-Town, where Government completed its range of buildings by erecting a lunatic asylum and an infirmary for the poor. Thither the missionary Lehman and his wife joyfully repaired, when the last company of forty patients left their old quarters for the new home, and to that island of lepers and lunatics brother John Wilson, leaving a widowed mother, friends, and home comforts, betook himself, when a teacher was wanted to take charge of the schools. For five years the devoted teacher occupied the post for which he volunteered, till called to his eternal rest in 1866, all that is mortal of him lying amid the shadows of the little church in Robben Island.

Only in 1867, when the Colonial Government resolved to appoint a chaplain of the English Church, did the brethren and sisters of the Unity sorrowfully retire from work among the lepers, earnestly praying for a blessing on their successors. Leprosy still lingers in its most aggravated form among the inhabitants of Palestine, and when the door of usefulness was shut in Africa the Lord opened a field in His own land. For, in May 1867, the Rev. F. Tappe and his wife, who had been thirteen years in the Labrador Mission, arrived in Jerusalem to become House Parents of the Leper Hospital built outside the Jaffa Gate. When the Home was consecrated and formally opened, no lepers attended the service, owing to national prejudice and Mohammedan misrepresentation, but by the time it had been a year in existence there were twelve patients, and the Home was filled. In 1875 the building was enlarged by the addition of two rooms; and in 1876 a new wing was opened. At the dedication service in connection with the opening, brother Tappe was able to state: "Since the opening of the Home in September 1867, 48 patients have been admitted. Of these, 11 have died, 19 have left us, some of whom, after enjoying the benefits of our asylum for years, have preferred to go back to their former miserable life of begging and filth." Mr. Tappe still occupies his post, and at the close

of 1881 there were in the Home 13 male and 6 female patients. The prayer of the late Bishop Gobat, who from the first took a deep interest in the heroic work, will evoke an Amen from every Christian heart: "O let us pray that the Lord may so bless His Word, and the arduous work of dear brother Tappe, that many of those poor sufferers may at last find the health and blessedness in the kingdom of God, which they cannot enjoy on earth!"

In that branch of the negro race forming the aborigines of Australia, called Austral negroes or Papoos, humanity would seem to have touched the bottom of degradation. These savages had no object to live for except to sustain animal life, and indulge their sensual and cruel instincts. The unmarried women were beasts of burden, and the married were slaves; the children, if troublesome, were speared, and, when let alone, were left to shift for themselves; the clothing was at best an opossum skin, generally a bit of grass matting; the home a hut of branches, affording only nominal shelter; the food the flesh of kangaroo, wild-dog, lizards, snakes, rats, with that of a human foe for festival dainty. In February 1850 the brethren Taeger and Spieske reached Melbourne to enter upon a work which various Churches and Societies had retired from in consequence of the toilsome nature of the field and the lack of results to register. After six years of hard and fruitless work, rendered all the harder, from 1851 to 1854, by the rush to the gold-fields of Victoria, the mission was abandoned, and the missionaries, three in number, returned home. But the withdrawal did not meet with the approval of the Directing Board at home, and in May 1858 three Moravian missionaries appeared at Melbourne. In 1860 first-fruit was reaped in the conversion of a Papoo, who came to the white men with an anxious inquiry touching the pardon of his sins, and who was baptized on the same day that the little church of the mission station was opened for public worship. Slowly, and with much to try the faith and steadfastness of the pioneers, did the work advance. So encouraging did the aspect and the outlook become, that, in 1864, four brethren were sent from Germany to penetrate the interior of the continent in search of four or five tribes, which exploring parties reported to number about 1200 souls. The journey of these devoted men,

after they left Adelaide, was one of adventure and hardship. At every stage of advance the dangers and the difficulties increased and intensified. The country was barren and desolate in the extreme; hills of loose sand alternated with rough stony plains; water was so scarce that the travellers were often glad to slake their thirst in shallow, dirty pools surrounded by carcasses of animals in various stages of decay, while a burning sun, and blinding sand-storms, aggravated the crave for water, and rendered further exertion well-nigh impossible. Undaunted by the difficulties encountered, they pressed on until they were able to establish a first station at Lake Kopperamanna, where the vegetation and a supply of fish promised the means of subsistence. There, and in a still more marked degree at the older station, social, moral, and spiritual progress has been made greater than was deemed possible at the outset. But the work has been from the first, as the brethren knew it to be, one that will in the course of a few years come to an end. The contact of black with white, so fatal to the former, the inevitable results of vicious habits maintained through successive generations,—these are working to the dwindling away of the aboriginal race of Australia, slowly at the mission-stations, rapidly everywhere else. Moravian statistics for the year 1881 give the number of converts at that date to be 118, of whom 23 are communicants. Deprived of the stimulus that comes from increase and extension, the brethren of this forlorn-hope movement have cheerfully and bravely persevered, knowing that, humanly speaking, the end cannot now be distant. When that is reached, and the last Papoo has passed away in death, it will be in the power of the Church of the Unity to say: "Our mission in Australia was the visit of Christianity to the death-bed of a nation, with this result that now and again the gloom of death has given place to the radiance of heavenly glory, and from the dying one there has been heard the victorious song of a sinner pardoned and cleansed."

III. Yet another distinctive feature of Moravian missions is to be found in the method of work most largely followed. That method is PROPAGATION. Much and valuable mission-work has been accomplished by proclaiming, promulgating, preaching the gospel. European and American missionaries,

after receiving a special home training for the work, have been sent out as the messengers of the Churches, have lived within the compound of mission buildings, have gone out upon the heathenism around in educational and evangelistic effort, and then, after a longer or shorter period of service, have returned to the home country on furlough or for good. Such a method suits admirably in certain cases ; among the more cultivated races of India and China it is probably the only method that can be followed, so long as the missions are in the hands of foreigners, and the staff of native workers is not sufficiently strong to meet the requirements of the field. But, with the brethren, preaching Christianity has ever been subordinate to propagating it. In floriculture propagation is a process of multiplying plants by fastening twigs into the ground, thus causing them to take root in the soil, and become in turn centres of vegetation. It is thus the brethren have endeavoured to naturalise the "plant of renown" under all climates, and in all soils, in order that its renown may go forth among the heathen. They have not contented themselves with going to the heathen and speaking to them as outsiders might do, keeping all the time aloof from the life, unaffected by the habits, of the people whose well-being and welfare they seek to further ; they have alienated themselves from kindred and from fatherland, become part of the people to whom they have been sent, and have sought in every possible way to naturalise Christianity in the lands of their adoption.

This would seem to be the Biblical method set before the Church when called upon to give herself to her Lord and His service, for then the summons reaches her, "Forget also thine own people and thy father's house;" it was certainly the method practised by the great missionary of primitive Christianity, as his own statement to the Corinthian brethren clearly shows : "To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain Jews ; to them that are under the law, as under the law, not being myself under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law ; to them that are without law, as without law, not being without law to God, but under law to Christ, that I might gain them that are without law ; to the weak I became weak, that I might gain the weak ; I am become all things to all men, that I may by all means save some." That, we take

it, is Church extension by propagation. And for the brethren it is all the easier to adopt and practise this method, seeing the missionaries that have gone forth from them have been and still are men of simple habits and few wants, men accustomed to manual toil and inured to hardships, a large proportion of them being artisans, husbandmen, and tradesmen. The earlier missionaries of the renewed Church were almost all of this order; and to such men, with a few shillings in their pockets and the clothes on their backs for outfit, it gave little concern whether the journey to be undertaken was long or short, by land or sea, to torrid or to frigid zone, and whether, on reaching their destination, they would require to wield the axe, handle the spade, or cut sods, and so provide for themselves a dwelling. They were ready to do anything, as well as suffer anything, if only they could win souls for Christ, pluck brands from the burning. It was thus a natural thing for such men to speak about the propagating of the gospel. They were not the first to do so, for the thought must have been present to the minds of those members of the Church of England who, in 1701, founded the *Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts*; but the brethren have always shown a partiality for the term as descriptive of their operations. And so the first Society established in America by the brethren bore the term in its title. The first meeting was held on the 21st of September 1787, at Bethlehem in Pennsylvania, when it was resolved, "in the name of God," that it should be known by the name of *The Society of the United Brethren for Propagating of the Gospel among the Heathen*.

In one of the tables appended to a publication to which reference has already been made, a column will be found which gives the number of missionaries who have died in the mission or on the journey. From that column it appears that out of 1201 brethren who have been in missions attempted, suspended, abandoned, or presently occupied, 469 have died at their posts; and that, out of 970 sisters, 313 have been removed by death; making, out of 2171 whose labours are finished, a total of 782 who have died in foreign service and in foreign lands.

In the absence of similar statistics from other Churches, it would not be wise to do more than hazard a conjecture; but

if we may be allowed to do that, our conjecture is that more Moravian missionaries have naturalised themselves in foreign lands, and have died abroad, than is the case with any other Church or with any Missionary Society, regard being had to relative numerical strength and duration of existence. It is not needful to magnify one mode of work by depreciating every other method, and it is far from our thoughts to affirm that the preaching of foreign missionaries, who continue to be foreigners even to the close of their lives, ought not to have a place among the evangelistic appliances of the Churches; but so far as one's vision carries him in the matter, it would seem as if by propagation rather than by promulgation, by the life and work of Christian brethren and sisters rather than by the lips and words of aliens, will the nations of earth be won for Christ. A new gospel is not needed. For a new method men do not need to look out. The gospel and the method are both to hand, for the gospel is that of the grace of God bringing salvation, and the method is the Moravian one of propagation.

IV. Our enumeration of the distinctive features of Moravian missions would be unpardonably incomplete did we not make room in it for this—the prominence ever given in all the teaching and preaching of the United Brethren to the atoning sufferings and death of the Lord Jesus Christ. Among them there has never been a Christianity which, while passing itself off as evangelical and claiming to be catholic, is found on examination to be Christianity without Christ, because Christianity without the Cross. The source and spring of Moravian zeal for missions will be found to be in the region of close clinging to the Lamb of God, to the Cross of Christ, to salvation through the blood of the Lamb shed upon the cross.

By the brethren themselves this is readily recognised, emphatically proclaimed. Thus, in an address drawn up by a member of the Directing Board for the jubilee celebration in August 1882, it is claimed that the Head of the Church has stamped the Unity with some special fitness for missionary service, and when it is inquired what constitutes such fitness, the answer is given in these words: "Our leading characteristic feature is to preach the Word of the Cross, the good tidings of a Saviour for sinners, with simplicity and affectionate earnestness. For we are convinced, and experience has proved it,

that this is the best and surest way to save men and make them holy."

In this connection an outstanding page in the history of modern missions is one that occurs in the annals of the brethren's work for the Greenlanders, and as that page has been sometimes incorrectly transcribed, it may be well to make a faithful transcript of what in itself must be ever memorable. The difficulties and hardships with which the first Greenland missionaries from Herrnhut were called to contend were of no common order. They were often face to face with absolute starvation. For one whole year their stores consisted of a barrel and a half of oatmeal, half a barrel of pease, and a small quantity of ship-biscuits. Old tallow candles, seals' flesh, train-oil, shell-fish, and raw sea-weed were among the articles of diet to which they were forced to accustom themselves. They were frequently in danger of their lives, now owing to the unseaworthiness of the only boat they had—an old, decayed hulk, the very sight of which made them shudder,—and now from the knives of the natives who gathered round their tent. Sometimes they were without a tent, and then for bedroom and bed they made a hole in the snow, where they lay till the driving snow and intolerable cold forced them to rise and seek warmth by running about. But Matthew Stach and his comrades would have borne all these things cheerfully had another discouragement not been added. And that was the heart-breaking, spirit-sinking one of seeing no fruit of their labours. Year after year they found few open ears and no opened hearts. The Greenlanders did everything they could think of to annoy, thwart, and discourage them. They mocked, they mimicked, they taunted, and they howled; they pelted them with stones, climbed upon their shoulders, stole their property, and drove their rickety boat out to sea. And let it not be thought that this persistent unwillingness of the natives to listen to the Christian message and accept the Christian faith was owing to the missionaries failing to proclaim a full gospel, and to point to the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world. That is an impression which the story, as it is sometimes told, is apt to create, but it is a mistaken one. In the first letter to the Herrnhut congregation the missionaries wrote in this strain: "As to our own

persons, we are very happy, but our desire is to win souls, and we cannot gratify it yet. Yet by God's grace we will not despond, but keep the Lord's watch. When He puts Himself in motion we will move on with Him, and will not swerve from His presence. Let but the time for the heathen come, and the darkness in Greenland must give way to the light, the frigid zone itself must kindle into a flame, and the ice-cold hearts of the people must burn and melt. Jesus, whose heart is replete with faithful love toward us and the poor heathen, knows all our ways, and knew them before we were born. Our substance, life, and blood are at His service. O that the death of our Lord Jesus might bring all men to life, and that all might follow this faithful Shepherd!" Then, at a later stage, we find the brethren in Greenland, during one of their "hours of examination," which they instituted for the invigorating and confirming of their faith, binding themselves in a covenant of service, and of that covenant the second matter of agreement is thus expressed: "The knowledge of Christ, how He effected on the cross the purification of our sins, through His blood, and is the cause and source of eternal salvation to all them that believe, *shall be the principal doctrine among us*, which we will confirm by our word and walk, according to the ability God shall be pleased to give us, *and by this we will endeavour to bring the heathen to the obedience of faith.*" Once more, when bringing the third year of fruitless toil and unrequited sufferings to an end, these servants of Christ give expression to the wish: "May only Jesus Christ, who is yesterday and to-day the same, never withhold His grace from His poor and helpless creatures, but keep us through His strength willing to serve the heathen at His beck, and then in time all will issue to His praise."

Surely these are not the words of men who would, in their dealings with the hearts and consciences of those whose conversion they desired, keep Christ in the background, and content themselves with descanting upon the perfections of God, the constitution of the Godhead, or the truths of natural religion. If, for a series of years, the labours of such devoted Christians seemed productive of no effect, we may well believe the explanation is to be found, not in any lack of gospel fulness in the presentation of the message, but simply in the fact that

the Saviour's "set time" to favour Greenland was not yet come. And when that time did come, we see the brethren quite ready to meet its requirements. In the fourth year of their labours, on the 7th of May 1736, as they were fishing for cat-fish with a prong, a Greenlander, who was a perfect stranger to them, arrived at their tent, and indicated a desire to get information regarding One called God who had made heaven and earth, and of whom he had heard something from the Danish missionary Egede. Deeply impressed with the significance of such a request, this is what the missionaries proceeded to do, as narrated by themselves: "We told him, as well as we could, of the creation of man and the intent thereof; of the fall and corruption of nature; of the redemption effected by Christ; of the resurrection of all men, and eternal happiness or damnation. He listened very attentively to all that was said, stayed at our evening meeting, and slept all night in our tent. Now, dear brethren, this is the first Greenlander that has come to inquire of us concerning God and divine things. Therefore bring your offerings and prayers before the Lord, that He may arise and build His Zion even in this desert."

That was the first streak of light in the dark night of Greenland; but two years passed before it was permitted these faithful labourers to gather in their sheaf. For June 22, 1738, the word¹ was Isaiah lxx. 23: "They shall not labour in vain, nor bring forth for trouble: for they are the seed of the blessed of the Lord, and their offspring with them." In the course of that day, as John Beck was engaged alone in writing out a fair copy of a translation the missionaries were then making of the Gospels, he was visited by a company of Southlanders, who manifested considerable interest in his occupation. Availing

¹ *The Text-Book* of the U. F. is an interesting feature in the religious life of the brethren. It was first issued in 1731, and so appears in 1883 for the 153d time. It consists of an Old Testament and a New Testament text for each day of the year, with an appropriate verse from the hymn-book under each text. The watchwords from the Old Testament are drawn by lot from a selection of about 2000 passages. This takes place in the Unity's Elders' Conference at Berthelsdorf, and is preceded by prayer. The doctrinal texts are freely chosen, not drawn, from the New Testament. The Text-Book is printed to the extent of about 50,000 copies in the German language, 4000 in English, and 8000 in French, besides a number in Spanish, Bohemian, Dutch, Negro-English, and Eskimo. It takes special notice of the peculiar festivals and memorial days of the Brethren's Unity.

himself of their willingness to listen, the delighted brother spoke to them of the Saviour of sinners, and read out of the New Testament that lay on the table the story of the Garden Agony and the Golgotha Crucifixion, the tears running down his cheeks as he did so. Then the Lord opened the heart of one of his hearers, Kajarnak by name. Stepping up to the table he said, with a voice unsteady with the tremor of agitation and anxiety, "How was that? Tell me that once more, for I would fain be saved too." Subsequent intercourse with him gave the brethren reason to hope that "he had got a hook in his heart," to use their own expression, that would hold him fast. And they were not disappointed. The startled inquirer became a diligent catechumen, and he that had been led by a way that he knew not, was the means of bringing the other members of his family into the life and light of the Christian's faith. On Easter Day 1739, six years from the date of commencement, the first-fruits of the Greenland mission were sealed to Christ in the persons of Kajarnak, his wife, son, and daughter, to whom were given the baptismal names of Samuel, Anna, Matthew, and Ann. Their "beloved firstling," as the missionaries were in the habit of calling Samuel, proved in his after bright, though brief, career, all that they could desire. His walk was consistent;¹ his endeavours to tell the story of the Cross were unwearied; his death-bed testimony to his Saviour was touching and thrilling. To the natives, accustomed to regard death with terror, unaccustomed to witness respect paid to the dead, it must have been an impressive spectacle when the body, dressed in white, was carried to the burying-ground by four Greenland boys, the favourite hymns of the deceased being sung on the way from the mission-house, and when, on the coffin being lowered into its place, the brethren kneeled down on the snow and gave thanks to the Saviour for the grace bestowed upon the first-fruits of their labour, now given up to the Lord of the harvest.

The stimulus imparted, and the direction thus given to the evangelical labours of the Greenland missionaries, have proved of an abiding nature. The device upon the snow-white

¹ Invited on one occasion to be present at a sun-dance he declined, saying, "I have now another kind of joy, for another Sun, Jesus, has arisen in my heart."

banner with the red cross has ever since been, in the words of the brethren themselves :—

“Lo, through ice and snow we press,
One poor soul for Christ to gain ;
Glad we bear want and distress,
To set forth the Lamb once slain.”

And the influence of that memorable experience can be traced in the operations of many a missionary agency outside the Unity—the conviction being borne in upon all the Churches that the effectual method of winning souls is to tell the old, old story of God’s love to sinners outflowing in the person and mission of His Son, who emptied Himself, humbled Himself, and sacrificed Himself in order to remove our sins, renovate our natures, and restore us to God. That influence is, we doubt not, the one of all others which the brethren give warmest thanks to God on account of.

Moravianism exercised a deep influence upon Methodism, as is well known to all who have any acquaintance with the intercourse of John Wesley, first with Spangenberg, the biographer of Zinzendorf, and then with Peter Böhler.

In the ship that carried John and Charles Wesley to Georgia in 1735 were twenty-six Moravians, with David Nitschman, their bishop. The bearing of these brethren and sisters made a powerful impression upon John Wesley. On one occasion, divine service having been commenced with a hymn, a storm of such severity arose as created alarm and wild outcry among the English passengers, but the Moravians calmly sung on. Wesley asked one of them, “Were you not afraid?” He answered, “I thank God, no.” “But were not your women and children afraid?” “No,” he mildly replied; “our women and children are not afraid to die.” Immediately upon landing at Savannah, John Wesley had an interview with the Moravian bishop Spanzenberg, in the course of which the following remarkable conversation took place. Wishing to profit by the experience of his senior, Wesley invited suggestions regarding plans and methods of ministerial labour. “My brother,” interposed the Moravian, “I must first ask you one or two questions. Have you the witness in yourself—does the Spirit of God bear witness with your spirit that you are a child of God?” Observing the embarrassment his question had caused,

he then asked, "Do you know Jesus Christ?" "I know He is the Saviour of the world," was the evasive reply. "True," rejoined the Moravian, "but do you know that He has saved you?" "I hope," was the answer, "He has died to save me." "Do you know yourself?" was the last home-thrust, which elicited an "I do" from Wesley, who, however, has the candour to add in his journal, when recording the dialogue—"I fear they were vain words." Then in 1738, soon after his return to England, John Wesley met with the Moravian missionary Peter Böhler, then on his way to the slaves in South Carolina, and the entries in his journal, which record his conversations with the young German missionary, make it abundantly clear that in his judgment Böhler was the instrument of bringing light and peace both to his own mind and that of his brother Charles. It is true that subsequent to this, Wesley separated himself from the London Moravian Society in Fetter Lane, and formed a Wesleyan Methodist Society at the Foundery in Moorfields; but in the very act of doing so, and ever afterwards, he spoke of the brethren in terms of respect and affection. To have thus influenced the founder of English Methodism, which has been such a potent factor in the religious life of the world, is a matter which the Unity may well make one of thankfulness, while very certain not to make it one of boasting.

And Moravian piety has influenced some of the currents of theological thought and religious tendency in Scotland, a country never supposed to be peculiarly sensitive to emotional or devotional influences from without. Readers of the *Reminiscences and Reflections* and the *Memorials of John M'Leod Campbell* will remember some of the frequently-occurring references to and quotations from the hymns of John Gambold, but all who do so may not know that "dear Gambold," as Campbell styles him, was a Moravian bishop. Admitted to holy orders by the Bishop of Oxford while yet under age, Gambold was instituted to the vicarage of Stanton Harcourt in May 1737. He also came under the influence of Peter Böhler, and thereafter was brought into contact with Count Zinzendorf. The result was that in 1742 he resigned his living in the Church of England, and was publicly received into the Fraternal Unity in London. Shortly afterwards he

became minister of the brethren's congregation in the metropolis, and served in that capacity for twenty-four years. In 1752 he was chosen to be bishop of the English branch of the Unity, and was consecrated by Bishop Johannes de Wattewille. Seldom have ecclesiastical honours been so meekly borne as by the Moravian bishop in England, of whom it was said, "One was even scarcely aware that he was a bishop," and who, in accepting an invitation to attend a General Synod of the brethren, addresses his answer to his "very dear brother Joseph," and signs himself, "Your sincerely-minded and loving poor child, J. Gambold." He died on the 13th of September 1771, in the sixty-fourth year of his age, first bishop of the brethren in England. Of this saintly man's works an edition was published at Glasgow, by Chalmers and Collins, in 1822, with an introductory essay by Thomas Erskine, and it was a copy of this issue which fell into the hands of the minister of Row. To what extent the very subjective and shadowy theology of John M'Leod Campbell was influenced by the writings of Gambold we do not profess ability to determine; but when the brethren know that of him Dr. Norman Macleod testified he "was the best man without exception I have ever known; his character was the most perfect embodiment I have ever seen of the character of Jesus," they may deem it no small honour to have it on record that with that man their Gambold was the favourite hymn-writer, and that of the hymn beginning with the lines:—

"That I am Thine, my Lord and God!
 Sprinkled and ransom'd by Thy blood:
 Repeat that word once more!"

John M'Leod Campbell declared it to be "one that I have found often welling up in me as living water."¹

¹ There is one poetical composition of Gambold, some of the lines of which are well known to many who know nothing of their author. It begins with the words,

"O tell me no more
 Of this world's vain store;
 The time for such trifles with me is now o'er,"

and contains these two oft-quoted verses:

"And when I'm to die,
 'Receive me,' I'll cry,
 For Jesus hath loved me; I cannot tell why.

For the Church of the Unity, the "little sister" among the Churches, so small in numbers, so limited in resources, so largely recruited from the ranks of peasants and artisans, to have given direction to Methodism in England, and to have contributed to a new departure in Scottish theology, is something not to be omitted when ecclesiastical honours are distributed and counted. But our reading of Moravian character and in Moravian literature has been to little purpose if we are not correct in the surmise that dearer to the brethren than all other honours they can rightfully claim is the honour spontaneously paid them when Cowper, in his poem *Hope*, pronounced his noble panegyric upon the brethren's mission, and told his readers how—

"Fired with a zeal peculiar, *they* defy
The rage and rigour of a Polar sky,
And plant successfully sweet Sharon's Rose
On icy plains, and in eternal snows."

CHARLES G. M'CRIE.

ART. V.—"*Luke, the Beloved Physician.*"¹

WHEN our Lord spoke of the Spirit who was to succeed Him, and to carry on the work among His disciples, He said, "Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth: for HE SHALL NOT SPEAK OF HIMSELF; but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak: and he will

But this I do find
We two are so join'd
He'll not live in glory and leave me behind."

It is curiously indicative of the existence of a fashion in hymnology, as in everything else, that not one hymn of Gambold has been inserted in Sir Roundel Palmer's *Book of Praise*, nor, so far as our examination of them enables us to certify, in any of the collections of hymns in use among the Presbyterian Churches of Great Britain.

¹ *The Medical Language of St. Luke: a Proof from Internal Evidence that "The Gospel according to St. Luke" and "The Acts of the Apostles" were written by the same person, and that the writer was a medical man.* By the Rev. William Kirk Hobart, LL.D., ex-Scholar Trinity College, Dublin. Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, & Co. 1882. Pp. i-xxxvi, 305.

show you things to come. He shall glorify me; for he shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you" (John xvi. 13, 14). We are here introduced to a very beautiful trait in the character of the Godhead, which, for want of a better term, and with all reverence, we shall call freedom from egotism and self-assertion. The trinity of persons in the unity of the Godhead secures this. Hence we find that in Old Testament times the Father did not glorify Himself, but His Son, who, as the coming one, was celebrated down the centuries of Messianic prophecy. Again, when the Son appeared in the person of Jesus Christ, it was not to glorify Himself, but the Father who had sent Him. Hence He took up the dependent position, asserting that He could as the Son do nothing of Himself, but simply did and said what the Father directed (John v. 19, 30). Much may be written on Christ bearing witness to Himself, and it is a very interesting field of investigation,¹ but His witness-bearing to Himself was incidental, since His prime and disinterested purpose always was to bear witness to the Father. When, finally, we pass from our Lord's life on earth to the dispensation of the Spirit, we find, as already noticed, the same freedom from self-assertion, the same beautiful desire on the part of the Spirit to make another Person His hero. Thus, to put this characteristic of the Godhead briefly—the Son is the hero of the Father, the Father is the hero of the Son, and the Son again, as self-dedicated to the Father's glory, becomes the hero of the Holy Spirit and the centre of the present dispensation. Hence a thoughtful writer has said of the Holy Spirit: "He is not a revealer of new truths, nor an exhibitor of His own personality. When He visits the pious mind, He does not lead that mind to think of Himself, but of Jesus. He takes of the manifestations of the Divine character, made by Christ, and gives them efficacy by power and love in the human soul. He comes to us through the Son, baptized in His humanities, as a ray of light takes the hue of the medium through which it passes, and thus becomes to the soul the spirit of both the divine and the human, as it was in Christ Jesus."²

¹ Cf. W. F. Gess's beautiful work, *Christi Zeugnis von seiner Person und seinem Werk*; also Dr. Chadwick's *Christ bearing Witness to Himself*.

² Walker's *Philosophy of the Divine Operation in the Redemption of Man*, pp. 21, 22.

Now we naturally expect that writings inspired by such a Spirit will partake of this characteristic, and be peculiarly free from the taint of egotism. And so we find it. No collection of writings in the world is so free from self-assertion. For instance, the scriptural references to the Holy Spirit are mainly of an incidental character. The writers make very few references to their own inspiration, so few, in fact, that some apologists think that the battle of the faith can be best fought out apart from all question of the inspiration of Scripture.¹ But it is to their freedom from references to themselves as authors that we would now particularly refer. There is an impersonality about their work which constitutes them "voices," and little more. The words used by the brave Baptist might be adopted by them all: "I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord" (John i. 23). Hence the discussions which have arisen about the authorship of many of the books of Scripture. Had the authors been a little more egotistical, had they been less inclined to anonymous publication, what a world of trouble and debate we should have escaped! but, at the same time, what an inferior Bible should we have had! For the noble self-forgetfulness of the writers of Holy Scripture we should hold them in everlasting honour.

This trait is nowhere more beautifully illustrated than in the two works which go commonly by the names of "The Gospel according to Luke" and "The Acts of the Apostles." We assume that they are from the same pen. Since the careful investigations of Zeller and Lekebusch,² whose works, as M. Sabatier has well said, have exhausted the philological and literary aspect of the book, no one is inclined to question the accuracy of the claim of identity of authorship which the prologue of the "Acts" makes. The Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles are from the one pen, and constitute substantially two parts of a single work. And yet when we examine these works, how little trace have we of personal reference on the part of the author! He certainly has no intention of

¹ Cf. Dr. Hermann Schultz's *Die Stellung des Christlichen Glaubens zur heiligen Schrift*.

² Cf. Zeller's *Die Apostelgeschichte nach ihrem Inhalt und Ursprung kritisch untersucht*, and Lekebusch's *Die Composition und Entstehung der Apostelgeschichte*.

making himself prominent. His prefaces only throw light upon his methods, but they throw almost none upon himself (Luke i. 1-4; Acts i. 1-4). The hero of the Gospel is Jesus in His capacity of *Saviour of the world*; the hero of the Acts of the Apostles is this same Jesus in His position of Prince as well as Saviour (Luke ii. 10, 11; Acts ii. 33, 36, 47; v. 31, etc.). And then the author has his minor heroes. In the Gospel, notably, he makes a hero of the Baptist, and of the Roman centurion, and heroines of the ministering women, of Mary the sister of Martha, and of the large-hearted though poor widow, while he attributes heroism of no ordinary kind to the mother of the Lord (Luke iii., vii. 2-10; viii. 1-3; x. 38-42; xxi. 1-4; i. 38, etc.). And in the "Acts" we find him making heroes of St. Peter and of St. Paul. In fact, since Schneckenburger in 1841 published his book *Ueber den Zweck der Apostelgeschichte*, a parallelism has been recognised between the author's treatment of Peter and of Paul. This critic showed that to a miracle and a discourse attributed to the one in the first part of the work, there always correspond a miracle and a discourse of the other in the second part. Hence we conclude that the author meant to make minor heroes of both these eminent apostles, and that the spirit of conciliation pervaded all the work.¹ So emphatic is his testimony to the work and worth of the apostle to the Gentiles that it has been made the foundation of Paley's most interesting *Horæ Paulinæ*, not to speak of the works of Conybeare and Howson, of Lewin, and of Farrar, upon St. Paul. The author had thus as his peerless hero, the Prince and Saviour of the world, and as his minor heroes and heroines, Peter, Paul, and the ministering and holy women; but to himself we find hardly a reference. Truly this author has drunk deeply at the well-spring of inspiration, and imbibed that sublime characteristic of the Holy Spirit, "He shall not speak of himself."

Must we then give up the investigation as fruitless, and allow this author his incognito? Or is there some way of getting at his personality so as to have some conception of who and what he was? It is in Irenæus and in the Canon de Mura-

¹ Cf. Reuss's *Histoire de la Théologie Chrétienne*, tome ii. pp. 327-43; also, M. Sabatier's article on *Actes des Apôtres* in Lichtenberger's *Encyclopédie des Sciences Religieuses*.

tori that we have the earliest mention of Luke as the author of the works in question; and subsequent investigation has established the tradition as the most probable account of the authorship. But as M. Sabatier has observed, "From the perusal of the two volumes by Luke, much better than from all these doubtful traditions, may the features (*physionomie*) of the first historian of Christianity be made out."¹ It is this careful investigation of the volumes which Dr. Hobart has undertaken. As a philologist he has taken up the terms employed by the historian in his works. He has most laboriously compared these with their use in the Greek medical writers, and upon his induction has founded the conclusion that the author of the Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles must have been a medical man, as the tradition asserts. "It is remarkable," says our author, "that with the exception of Hippocrates, all the extant Greek medical writers were Asiatic Greeks. Galen was a native of Pergamus in Mysia; Dioscorides, of Anazarba in Cilicia; Aretæus was surnamed the Cappadocian, from his native land; and Hippocrates, though not an Asiatic Greek, yet was born and lived in close proximity to the coast of Asia Minor, being a native of Cos, an island off the coast of Caria. Hence it is natural that a similarity of diction should occur in writers who were trained in the Medical Schools of Asia Minor. St. Luke, too, was in all probability an Asiatic Greek" (p. xxxi). Hence he takes Kühn's edition of Hippocrates, Aretæus, Galen, and Dioscorides, and by a most patient citation of passages he establishes his conclusion about the medical character of the writer. Sometimes, we confess, the argument seems pressed beyond what is needful, and intimations of the author's professional bent found where, perhaps, another writer would have used no other phraseology; but with this little proviso, we have nothing but commendation to bestow upon this careful and patient performance. And in these days of unseemly haste, when criticism is becoming rash and reckless in many quarters, through the superficiality which speed induces, it is a comfort to find a work of patient and quiet research, such as the volume before us, conveying its assurance with a modest dignity worthy of the high subject of which it treats.

¹ Cf. M. Sabatier's article on *Luc* in Lichtenberger's *Encyclopédie*, *ut supra*.

We purpose, in the remainder of this article, to avail ourselves of Dr. Hobart's volume and such other helps as lie to our hand, to get and to convey some conception of what "Luke, the beloved physician," must have been. The evidence of style seems distinctly to show that he was a Gentile. Principal Campbell thinks that his Gospel is just as Hebraistic as the others, and that he may have been a convert from Judaism.¹ But in this the learned author is admittedly mistaken. Luke is careful *not* to quote Aramæan words as the other evangelists do, and it is inferred, from his constant quotation of the Septuagint, that he knew little, if anything, of Hebrew.² When we add to this what Bishop Ellicott has called "the impress of Greek thought and culture," which the works of this writer exhibit, we are justified in discerning "in its well-ordered and often flowing periods the hand of the Greek proselyte."³ We have reason to believe that he had received his medical education before his conversion to Christianity. As slaves were sometimes manumitted when they had shown aptitude in acquiring the healing art, it has been conjectured that Luke may have been originally a slave in the household of Theophilus, and in gratitude for his freedom may have dedicated his works to his old master, now a Christian like himself.⁴ However this may be, it seems certain that in acquiring his medical knowledge he must have got a wider culture than the fishermen of Galilee. While, therefore, it may be held that Mark's Gospel, for example, is more picturesque and original in its treatment of some of the facts of Christ's life than Luke's, still the flowing periods and deliberate historical method pursued by the latter entitle us to attribute to the physician a vastly larger culture. "It is impossible," says M. Sabatier, "not to compare Luke with Josephus, the historian of Judaism. That which the one wished to attempt for the Jewish people—to organise their annals and to make them enter into universal history,—the other has tried for the new religion; he has wished to attach the principal events to the grand contemporary dates. The prologues of Luke by the turn of their style recall those of

¹ Cf. *Campbell on the Gospels*, vol. ii. p. 129.

² Cf. Renan's *Les Apôtres*, p. xviii.

³ Ellicott's *Historical Lectures on the Life of our Lord*, n. p. 14.

⁴ Cf. Godet's *Commentaire*, tome i. p. 38.

Josephus; his chronology seems calculated upon his own. One would say, perhaps, that he imitates him in certain literary forms, and, I believe, one gives a just idea of him by naming him the Josephus of nascent Christianity."¹

Now one of the richest minds we can possibly meet is that of a medical man who has got some culture. He has ways of looking at facts which other people have not, and has a large-hearted sympathy, on which the utmost reliance may be placed. Luke was consequently a most desirable acquisition to the Christian cause. It is surely not far-fetched to suppose that Christianity attracted the attention of this physician through its relation to men's diseases, whether bodily or mental. The Founder of the faith had appeared, he learned, as a physician whom no disease and no infirmity had ever baffled; Jesus had cured many of their infirmities and plagues, and of evil spirits; to many of the blind He had given sight; He had made the lame to walk, He had cleansed the lepers, had made the deaf to hear, and had raised the dead (cf. Luke vii. 21, 22); no wonder, therefore, that such a life as that of Jesus had an attraction for this medical mind. Christianity had its medical side, so to speak. And so Luke became a convert to the new faith, most probably at Antioch. A physician who embraces Christianity becomes all the more a philanthropist, and therefore there can be little doubt that Luke, after his conversion, became a still more kindly and useful man than he had been before it. We have no account of his first becoming known to St. Paul; all that seems certain is that Luke met Paul at Troas when the apostle was passing from Galatia to Macedonia. This is inferred from the use of the first person plural in Acts xvi. 10, and throughout the subsequent verses, narrating what happened at Philippi.

We must now consider Paul's condition before reaching Troas. We learn from Galatians iv. 13-15, that during his visit to Galatia he had been suffering from sickness. The 13th verse, as Dr. Hobart rightly informs us, should be translated, "Ye know that it was on account of bodily weakness that I preached the gospel to you on my first visit." And from the peculiar way in which Paul declares the Galatians were ready to show their devotion to him, by plucking out their own eyes,

¹ M. Sabatier on *Luc* in Lichtenberger's *Encyclopédie, ut supra*.

if it had been possible, and giving them to him, it has been further inferred that Paul's trouble at this time was some affection of the eyes. To quote from a most able paper upon *St. Paul's Thorn in the Flesh* :—

“The last words of this passage, ‘Ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them to me,’ have usually been taken in a hyperbolic or proverbial sense, as if a merely general meaning was conveyed, amounting simply to—‘There was no sacrifice, however great, which ye would not have made for me.’ But it is plainly open to inquiry, whether the sense is not of a more special kind ; whether (viz.) St. Paul does not here, as in the preceding verse, intend to remind the Galatians of pure matter of fact—to recall to them, not in mere general terms, the depth and warmth of their feelings and professions of regard for him, but to repeat to them, perhaps, the very words they had used, and to revive in their memories the actual and express import of their desires and anxieties. If this be the case, if it really was a common and habitual thing with them to express a wish that it were possible for them to pluck out their own eyes, and to transfer them to the apostle, the only way of reasonably accounting for so strange and *outré* a proceeding, is to suppose that St. Paul actually laboured either under entire deprivation of vision, or under some severely painful and vexatious disease of the eyes ; the meaning being that so keenly did the Galatians sympathise with the apostle in his affliction, that they would willingly have become his substitutes by taking all his suffering upon themselves, if only it were possible by doing so to relieve him.”¹

Now it is extremely probable that, having heard of Luke's conversion to Christianity, and of his medical skill, St. Paul was anxious at once to have the benefit of his advice, and to have his aid in the prosecution of his mission. He had sought miraculous deliverance from the thorn in the flesh over and over again by prayer to God, but had received as answer the promise of sustaining and all-sufficient grace rather than the removal of the infirmity ; consequently, it was but natural, when his trouble was not to be miraculously removed, he should obtain the kindest medical attention he could get (2 Cor. xii. 7-9).

And here an interesting question arises. St. Paul has it made plain to his own experience that miracle is not to come in to make life less of a sacrifice and burden to God's servants. Just as Jesus had never used His miraculous power to make life easier for Himself, so such servants as Paul were to follow the same rule. This was the temptation which Satan used in the wilderness with Christ, and again with Paul about the

¹ Cf. Dr. John Brown's *Horæ Subsecivæ*, First Series, pp. 108, 109.

thorn in the flesh. Medical skill, consequently, must have its place in connection with the Christian system; and so it would seem to have occurred to St. Paul that Luke's services might be extremely valuable, not only to himself personally, but also to others, in commendation of the gospel, that, in a word, Luke would do great service as a "medical missionary." We are disposed to regard Luke, therefore, in this light. He was not only the medical adviser of St. Paul at this juncture, and, as we shall see, afterwards, but he seems to have been left by St. Paul at Philippi for some seven years. It was a medical missionary placed in charge of the infant Philippian church. Christianity, in its earlier stages, used miracle to confirm as well as embody its message of mercy to mankind; but in later stages it uses medical skill and devotedness to win its way among the diseased and suffering. "The beloved physician," as he lingered in the capital of Macedonia, was really inaugurating the grand enterprise of "medical missions." Neander long ago noticed the purchase which Luke's medical skill would give to him upon the heathen around him. "His skill would be very useful in securing many an opportunity for publishing the gospel among the heathen."¹

Where and how Luke spent these seven years we may conjecture. He lodged at first with Paul and Silas at the house of Lydia, and seems as a Gentile to have remained in charge when the apostle and Silas, after their imprisonment, because they were Jews, had departed (Acts xvi. 15, 40). Lewin is of opinion that it was here he composed the Gospel.² Conybeare and Howson, on the other hand, suppose that he undertook this work at a later period, when he was two years sojourning with St. Paul at Cæsarea.³ We may as well give here some account of this first work of the medical missionary, and how distinctly it bears traces of the medical hand.

As a medical man with some culture, he seems to have set himself to a careful examination of the *facts* which were delivered to him by eye-witnesses and ministers of the Word (i. 2). Reuss admits that Luke, just as well as Matthew, gives

¹ Neander's *Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der Christlichen Kirche*, Erster Band, s. 218.

² Lewin's *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. i. p. 221.

³ *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, vol. ii. p. 354.

in the Gospel facts rather than theories.¹ In the quiet leisure of Philippi or of Cæsarea he seems to have gathered and digested his materials. No historian ever more carefully collated or verified his authorities. And it was surely important to secure, as the historian of the miraculous conception and birth of Jesus Christ, a medical man! As a Greek, and as a man abreast of the science of his day, he would approach the subject in a very different spirit from a Jew, and it must have been because the evidence was resistless that he wrote with such fulness and yet with such delicacy of touch about the all-important incarnation. The details of the introduction of Luke, the annunciation, the conception, and the birth of Jesus, as well as of the Baptist, down to the reference about the swaddling-clothes (*ἐσπαργάνωσεν αὐτόν*), are just such as could be best handled by a medical mind, and it must be allowed that he has done the work with admirable skill and grace.

It is "the beloved physician," again, who gives us the details about the child Jesus in the temple. One special study with medical men is *child-life*; every attitude of children is to a medical mind interesting; and so we find the precious "Gospel of the Childhood," as some one has called it, given to us by St. Luke.

But as we pass onwards we come across Luke's first direct reference to his profession in the account of Christ's sermon at Nazareth (Luke iv. 23). There our Lord had used the words of the proverb, "Physician, heal thyself," to describe the sceptical attitude of His audience, and what they were saying in their hearts to Him. And Dr. Hobart mentions a parallel case from Galen, who speaks of a physician who should have cured himself before attempting to attend patients. But it is surely significant that it is this relation of a physician unto men which Luke places in the forefront of the Galilean ministry. The idea recurs in chap. v. 31, where our Lord is represented as saying that the sick and not the whole need a physician. To "the beloved physician" it must have been delightful to contemplate his Lord and Master as the physician of all sick or sin-sick men.

And now, from the general title, we pass to the accounts of

¹ Cf. *Histoire de la Théologie Chrétienne*, tome ii. p. 357.

the miraculous cures performed by Jesus, and here again, as Dr. Hobart has carefully shown, we have in Luke's accounts such minute details given, as, when contrasted with the accounts of the other evangelists, would lead us to recognise the hand of the medical man in them. For example, in the healing of Simon's wife's mother, Matthew merely says she was "sick of a fever" (*πυρέσσουσιν*), and Mark has the same word (Matt. viii. 14; Mark i. 30), while Luke (iv. 38, 39) says she was "taken with a great fever" (*πυρετῶ μεγάλῃ*). Dr. Hobart shows that both the "taking" of the fever (*συνεχομένη*) and the division of fevers into "great" and "small" are medical expressions which can be paralleled from Hippocrates and Galen.

Again, in the account of the healing of the leper, Matthew and Mark mention merely that he was a leper (Matt. viii. 2; Mark i. 40), while Luke (v. 12) observes that he was "full of leprosy" (*πλήρης λέπρας*), and here again our author shows that Luke's expression is the medical one.

Again, in the narrative of the cure of the palsy we have in St. Luke such modifications as seem to indicate the medical hand. While Matthew and Mark (Matt. ix. 2; Mark ii. 3) use the simpler term *paralytic* (*παραλυτικόν*), Luke (v. 18) uses the participle *παραλελυμένος*, for which we have parallel expressions in Hippocrates, Aretæus, Galen, and Dioscorides. Further, while Matthew and Mark use *κλίνη* and *κράββατος*—the former the general word for "bed" or "couch," the latter the "pallet of the poor"—Luke uses in addition the word *κλινίδιον*, which is the well-known term to denote "a litter for carrying the sick." His professional eye enables him in his "study of imagination" to take in the scene more accurately than the other evangelists, and he modifies his phraseology accordingly.

Again, while Matthew and Mark merely mention a man with a withered hand, Luke tells us that it was his *right* hand which was withered (Matt. xii. 10; Mark iii. 1; Luke vi. 6), just such an additional detail, Dr. Hobart thinks, as a physician would inquire about and record.

Again, while Matthew and Mark refer to the cures wrought by Jesus in such terms as *δiesōthēsan* (Matt. xiv. 36) and *ēsōzonto* (Mark vi. 56), Luke, in an analogous passage (vi. 19)

uses the strictly medical term *ἰάτο*. Medical writers, Dr. Hobart shows, would use *σώζειν* and *διασώζειν* in the sense of escaping from a severe illness or epidemic, getting through it even with damage, but not in the sense of *ἰασθαι*, "to be healed."

Again, when we compare the account in Matthew of the healing of the centurion's servant (viii. 5-13) with that in Luke (vii. 1-10) we find that "the beloved physician" represents the servant as being made whole (*ὑγιαίνοντα*), while Matthew simply states that he was healed (*ἰώθη*). The former word is the medical one for the enjoyment of good health, as Dr. Hobart's quotations from the medical writers show.

Again, the hand of the physician appears in Luke vii. 21, where it is said, that "in the same hour he cured many of their infirmities (*νόσων*) and plagues (*μαστιγῶν*), and of evil spirits," for this was the recognised division of diseases into *chronic* and *acute*, while from both demoniacal possession is carefully distinguished.

Again, a comparison of the accounts of the demoniac at Gadara will confirm our assurance of Luke's being a medical hand. For he mentions that the patient had been ill for a long time: *πολλοῖς γὰρ χρόνοις σινηπάκει αὐτόν*; that he wore no clothes, which was, and is still, a sign of mania; and makes more emphatic than either Matthew or Mark does the fact that the poor man made his dwelling among the tombs (Matt. viii. 24-34; Mark v. 1-21; Luke viii. 26-40).

We may also discern a touch of fuller knowledge when Luke speaks about the woman's issue of blood being stanchd (*ἔστη*, Luke viii. 44; cf. Matt. ix. 22 and Mark v. 29). It appears that *ἰστάναι* is the usual medical word for the stoppage of the discharges which are here referred to.

Another interesting suggestion has been made about Luke's notice of this miracle, although it has escaped Dr. Hobart's observation, and this is the *professional etiquette* which he here exhibits as contrasted with the account in Mark. Mark declares that the poor patient "had suffered many things of many physicians, and had spent all that she had, and was nothing bettered, but rather grew worse"—a very serious indictment against the doctors! Mark's idea evidently was, that she had spent her money and got less than

nothing in return. Luke puts it with professional delicacy when he says that she "had spent all her living upon physicians, neither could be healed of any." He gives his brethren credit for having done their best, and though they had not healed her, he does not say that they had harmed her. This is indeed one of the most striking evidences of Luke's professional turn, and the etiquette which should characterise the members of such a noble profession.

A comparison of the accounts of the healing of the demoniac child (Matt. xvii. 14-21; Mark ix. 14-29; and Luke ix. 37-43) will lead us to the same conclusion. Of the three, Mark's account is the most vigorous and lengthy, while Luke's is the shortest. But it is the calm account of the practised hand, who uses the exact terms to describe the case. Luke represents the father as asking the Lord to *look upon* his child (*ἐπίβλεψον*)—the technical term for a medical examination; he represents the patient as suddenly crying out (*ἐξαίφνης κράζει*), the medical term for describing such a paroxysm; and that the spasm only very gradually subsided (*μόγισ ἀποχωρεῖ*—"with difficulty departeth"). Hence we see the professional hand in the short but pithy account of the case.

In the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke x. 29-37), moreover, we have such an account as a physician would have written. His description of the poor man as "half-dead" (*ἡμιθανή*), and of the Samaritan as "binding up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine," and of "taking care of him at the inn," contains just such terms as the medical writers in such cases employ. "This parable," says Dr. Hobart, "is peculiar to St. Luke, and from the incidents described in it, was one most likely to be recorded by him; he may himself have attended in his professional practice on travellers in a similar case, for we find from a passage in Galen that it was not unusual for persons when seized with illness on a journey to take refuge in inns." It has in fact all the aspect of a case carefully reported by a professional man.

Passing onwards we find in chap. xiii. 11-13 the account of an interesting case of healing, which "the beloved physician" relates in technical language. The patient had evidently "curvature of the spine," as Luke uses the term *ἀνακύψαι*, about her inability to lift up herself, which is employed by

Galen in speaking of straightening the vertebræ of the spine. Luke also uses the technical term ἀπολύειν to indicate her release from the infirmity. And as Dr. Hobart says: "In addition to the medical words used in describing this miracle, there are traces of medical writing. After mentioning the length of time the woman laboured under this infirmity, St. Luke states the several stages in the process of recovery—first, the relaxing of the contracted muscles of the chest (ἀπολέλυσαι); and as this of itself would not have been sufficient to give her an erect posture, on account of the stiffening of the muscles through so many years, the second part of the operation is described by (ἀνορθώθη) the removal of the curvature, and strength to stand erect.

We find again in Luke xvi. 21 regular medical terms employed in the expressions about poor Lazarus, that he was "full of sores" (ἡλκωμένος), and that the dogs "licked his sores" (τὰ ἔλκη αὐτοῦ); in chap. xvii. 11-19, again, about the cleansing and healing of the ten lepers, we have the recognised terms ἐκαθαρίσθησαν and ἰάθη employed.

In the command of Jesus that Bartimeus should be brought unto him (ἀχθῆναι πρὸς αὐτόν, Luke xviii. 40) may also be found traces of medical usage.

We have also indications of the medical mind in what Luke relates about our Lord's agony in Gethsemane, how "his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground," a fact which "the beloved physician" alone records. He is also singular in his story about the healing of Malchus' ear by the touch of Jesus (xxii. 50), a fact which must have appeared most extraordinary to a medical mind. As Dr. Hobart suggests, "St. Luke in his medical practice had never seen the restorative of an amputated member of the body." It is Luke again who gives us our Lord's address to Jerusalem's weeping daughters, with the reference which a physician could handle so well (xxiii. 28, 29). It is he again who gives us such a hopeful account of the conversion of the dying robber, lingering so tenderly, as a loving physician would, over the facts about the last moments of the dead (xxiii. 40-43). It is he also who gives us the last words of Jesus, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit" (xxiii. 46); and tells us of the *post-mortem* preparations by the women of the spices and ointments

(xxiii. 56). It is again "the beloved physician" who gives us the proofs of our Lord's resurrection in the most striking fashion, speaking expressly of His "flesh and bones" as resumed again in the resurrection body (xxiv. 39).¹

We may also mention another characteristic of the third evangelist. He is the *psychologist* of the group. Now the close affinity between the knowledge of medicine and the knowledge of mind has been often observed. In his beautiful paper upon *Locke and Sydenham*, Dr. John Brown emphasizes this fact, and reminds us that "Hartley, Mackintosh, and Brown were physicians; and we know that medicine was a favourite subject with Socrates, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Berkeley, and Sir William Hamilton."¹ Now we find psychological traits in several of Luke's characters. To quote from Bishop Alexander upon this point:—

"The most delicate psychological skill St. Luke certainly possessed. I might refer you to the perplexity of Herod about our Lord; to the exquisite penetrating satire in those touches preserved by this evangelist—'He that shewed mercy on him,' because the lawyer would not pronounce the Samaritan's hated name, and 'The Pharisee prayed thus with himself' when there was no prayer; to the delineation of Zaccheus; to Pilate and Herod making friends together; to the disciples believing not for joy, and wondering, and returning to Jerusalem with great joy after their Lord had left them. I might refer to the way in which he binds his materials together by an idea, as in the incident about Mary and Martha, which immediately follows the parable of the Good Samaritan, for the purpose of completing the picture of the Christian life; and in the passage at the close of the ninth chapter, where we have three different natures dealt with by Jesus. He loves, too, to tell what women did for Jesus. I need only mention the names of Elisabeth, of the Virgin Mother, of the woman who was a sinner, of Mary Magdalene and others who ministered unto Him of their substance, of Martha and Mary, of the weeping daughters of Jerusalem. Perhaps it may be said, without irreverence, that this psychological skill finds its highest application in writing of the sacred humanity of our Lord," etc.²

¹ Dr. Westcott, in his work upon the Gospels, brings out the fact that the only miracle of healing omitted by Luke, and recorded by Matthew and Mark, is the cure of the Syrophenician woman's daughter, while he gives in addition the raising of the widow's son at Nain, the cure of the woman with the spirit of infirmity, the cure of the man with the dropsy, the cleansing of the ten lepers, and the healing of Malchus. In Acts he gives an additional series. He is therefore the historian of the healings of Christianity *par excellence*.

² *Horæ Subsecivæ*, ut *supra*, p. 7.

³ *The Leading Ideas of the Gospels*, pp. 95, 96.

Such was the work undertaken by "the beloved physician" during his leisure at Philippi or Cæsarea. If the work was undertaken at Cæsarea, he would, M. Sabatier suggests, have deacon Philip and his four daughters to consult upon the whole subject, in addition to facilities of other kinds. And it is a noble production, done with care and literary beauty, beginning with songs and ending with praises; the Gospel of widest sympathies and of most conciliatory spirit. Jesus as *Saviour of the world* has had his most beautiful portrait painted by Luke, in words such as we might expect from a tender-hearted physician.

But after his seven years' sojourn at Philippi, Luke receives a visit from the apostle. It is clear, from statements in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, that before this Paul had been on the very verge of the grave. Thus he says, "For we would not, brethren, have you ignorant of our trouble (*ὑπὲρ τῆς θλίψεως ἡμῶν*) which came to us in Asia, that we were pressed out of measure, above strength, insomuch that we despaired even of life (*ὥστε ἐξαπορηθῆναι ἡμᾶς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν*); but we had the sentence of death in ourselves (*ἀλλὰ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὸ ἀπόκριμα τοῦ θανάτου ἐσχέκαμεν*), that we should not trust in ourselves, but in God, who raiseth the dead: who delivered us from so great a death, and doth deliver; in whom we trust that he will yet deliver us" (2 Cor. i. 8-10). After this most serious sickness, then, he seeks "the beloved physician" once again, and, as far as we know, they kept together to the last. The apostle's health seems to have been so uncertain, and Luke's attachment to him so great, that the apostle is waited on by this Christian physician during all the vicissitudes of the coming years, and has the benefit of his advice. When Demas, who is mentioned along with Luke among the "fellow-workers" (*συνεργοί*) with Paul (Phile. 24), forsakes the apostle through love of this present world, "Luke, the beloved physician," remains true to his trust, and is ready to wait with him to the end (2 Tim. iv. 10, 11).

Now we can understand that these true yoke-fellows, Paul and Luke, in their long sojourn together at Jerusalem, at Cæsarea, and at Rome, must have fallen into similar literary habits. Luke, we may be sure, was not idle while Paul was engaged upon his Epistles. He may have been his penman during some of his dictations. The literary instinct, at all

events, dwelt in both the learned Jew and the able Greek. And now we must try briefly to estimate the second work of "the beloved physician," composed while he was in the society of the apostle, and perhaps at intervals, as the materials accumulated.

The Acts of the Apostles constitute, as we have seen, the second volume of a continuous work. The Gospel contained an account of all that Jesus BEGAN both to do and teach; and this book of the Acts of the Apostles contains an account of the continuation of the Lord's work. In it the "Saviour" has become the "Prince," and, as risen and reigning Lord, He does everything worth doing in the Church. It is the Lord who heals diseases; it is the Lord who adds members daily to His Church (cf. Acts ii. 36, 47, etc.). But while Jesus, as already observed, is the great hero, Peter and Paul are his minor heroes. We can easily understand how agreeable to Paul must have been Luke's generous treatment of Peter. In both the Gospel and the Acts Peter's faults fall into the shade, and his virtues are duly exalted.

Now, in glancing over this history, we find such facts as the following narrated, all of which would necessarily have great interest for a medical mind:—the healing of the lame man at the gate of the temple (iii. 1-8); the death of Ananias and Sapphira (v. 5, 6); the restoration of Saul's sight (ix. 17-19); the healing of palsied Eneas (ix. 33); the raising of Tabitha to life (ix. 40, 41); the trance of Peter (x. 10); the death of Herod (xii. 21, 23); the striking of Elymas the sorcerer blind (xiii. 11); the healing of the lame man at Lystra (xiv. 8-10); the cure of diseases at Ephesus (xix. 11, 12); the raising of Eutychus to life (xx. 8, 9); the shaking off of the viper from the hand of Paul (xxviii. 3-6); and the healing of the father of Publius (xxviii. 8). Now, in every one of these cases, as Dr. Hobart shows with admirable patience, the writer uses just such terms as we would expect from a medical man. We cannot refer *seriatim* to all these instances, but will content ourselves with taking the one referring to his patient, Paul himself. We have already stated how likely the view is that Paul's "thorn in the flesh" consisted in weak eyes. Luke, in his narrative in chap. ix., gives to us just such full details as we would expect from a physician interested in the results professionally. He tells

us of the dazzling, blinding light which overwhelmed the persecutor; he tells us how he became conscious of his blindness; then of his solitude and fasting and prayer in his lodging in the street called Straight; then of the visit of Ananias; and then he tells us most minutely how, immediately on Ananias pronouncing the message of Jesus, "there fell (*ἀπέπεσον*) from his eyes as it had been scales (*ὡσεὶ λεπίδες*), and he received sight forthwith, and arose, and was baptized. And when he had received meat, he was strengthened (*ἐνίσχυσεν*)."

Dr. Hobart says of this account:—

"We have two other accounts of his conversion from St. Paul himself, in one of which (ch. xxvi.) he does not mention his blindness; in the other (ch. xxii.) he mentions the blindness and his recovery of sight, but not the particular circumstances attending it recorded here. He merely says: 'And one Ananias came unto me, and stood, and said unto me, Brother Saul, receive thy sight. And the same hour I looked up upon him.' St. Luke, however, records in addition the circumstances which would obviously interest a physician; and in doing so he uses strictly medical terms. *ἀποπίπτειν* is used of the falling off of scales from the cuticle and particles from diseased parts of the body or bones, etc.; and in one instance, by Hippocrates, of the scab, caused by burning, in a medical operation, from the eyelid; and *λεπίς* is the medical term for the particles or scaly substances thrown off from the body; it and *ἀποπίπτειν* are met with in conjunction."

And he follows this up by appropriate quotations from his medical authorities.

Two additional instances of an incidental character may be culled from Dr. Hobart's book. The first is where Luke relates the words of Festus to Agrippa, and uses the word *διάγνωσιν* (Acts xxv. 21): "But when Paul had appealed to be reserved to the hearing of Augustus, I commanded him to be kept till I might send him to Cæsar." Our author says: "St Luke alone uses the words *διάγνωσις* and *διαγινώσκειν*, both of which were technical medical terms, implying, the former, the art of distinguishing disease; the latter, to make this diagnosis." The second instance is from the next chapter (xxvi. 5): "Which knew me from the beginning" (*προγινώσκοντές με ἄνωθεν*), where we have *prognosis* brought under our notice. "By medical prognosis," says our author, "was understood the power of foreseeing and foretelling what will take place in the course of a disease. The greatest attention was paid to this part of medicine by ancient physicians. Hippocrates has

written two works on the subject—*Κωακαὶ προγνώσεις* and *προγνωστικόν*. Galen has a commentary on the latter, and has also written works, *περὶ προγνώσεως—προγνωστικὰ περὶ κατακλίσεως—πρόγνωσις πεπειραμένη καὶ παναληθής—περὶ τοῦ προγινώσκειν* and *περὶ προγνώσεως σφυγμῶν*, as well as *περὶ διαγνώσεως σφυγμῶν*—and, from the importance attached to this branch of medical science, the words themselves must have been in constant use with medical men.”

But we should do injustice to “the beloved physician” were we not to present some *résumé* of the theological bearings of his second book. Reuss, among others, has done this well in his *Histoire*, already cited. But we prefer to give an extract from the excellent book of Bernard upon *The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament*. Nowhere known to us is the significance of the Acts of the Apostles put more pointedly.

“It begins at Jerusalem, it ends at Rome. Between these two points questions have been settled, principles carried out, and divinely implanted tendencies disclosed. Especially have the relations of the gospel to Jew and Gentile been fixed for ever. We see how all the story progressively ministers to this result. First Peter presents the gospel as the fulfilment of prophecy and completion of the covenant made with the fathers. Then the Hellenist element seems to eclipse the Hebrew, and Stephen rises to reason and to die. A large space is therefore given to the speech, which sets forth the progressive nature of the dealings of God with Israel, and shows the drift of that current of thought on which we are launched. The death of Stephen is not only an individual martyrdom, like that of James, so briefly mentioned afterwards; it is a great crisis, and stands as such in the narrative, with a clear intimation of the position which was assumed on the one side and rejected on the other. Straightway the gospel spreads. First Hebrew, then Hellenist, by the ministry of Philip it soon becomes Samaritan, and at the next step by that of Peter goes in to men uncircumcised. In the story of Cornelius we have a detailed statement of the means by which the Lord manifested His will that the Gentiles should hear the word and believe. Then we pass from the side of Peter to that of the new Apostle, to whom the carrying out of this principle is committed. Antioch becomes our starting-point, where the disciples are first called Christians. We follow the steps of the traveller, and see far and wide that God hath also to the Gentiles granted repentance unto life. Then an opposing power is felt within the Church, and Christian Judaism asserts that there is departure from the original scheme. The Council meets, and by testimonies of Scripture and of fact infers the verdict of God, and issues the high decision: ‘It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us.’ Then, and not till then, Europe is entered, and the great centres of Greek life are occupied; but still in every place does the Apostle address himself first to the Jews, and everywhere they reject and persecute him. Finally, he returns to the

headquarters of the nation, and presents himself there with every circumstance of conciliation, but claiming his place in the covenant and as a preacher of the *hope of Israel*. The scenes and speeches of that crisis are given with fulness, because they define the position of the Christianity which St. Paul represents towards the Jewish system, and its final and furious rejection by the Jewish people. 'Believing all things which are written in the Law and in the Prophets, and having committed nothing against the people or customs of his fathers,' he and his creed are forced from their proper home. On it as well as on him the Temple doors are shut. Lastly, before the Jews at Rome he closes the long struggle with the peroration furnished him by prophecy: 'Well spake the Holy Ghost by *Isaiah* the prophet unto our fathers, saying, Go unto this people, and say, Hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see, and not perceive: for the heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed; lest they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them. Be it known therefore unto you, that the salvation of God is sent unto the Gentiles, and that they will hear it.' Now, let no man think that the rejection of Jews and admission of Gentiles were the only result of this long history. Another result has been involved in it: Christianity itself has been finally drawn out of Judaism, the delicate and intricate relations of the two systems being dealt with in such a way, that (so to speak) the texture of living fibre has been lifted unimpaired out of its former covering, leaving behind only a residuum of what was temporary, preparatory, and carnal. In fact, the doctrine of the Gospel has been cleared and formed; cleared of the false element which the existing Judaism would have infused into it, and formed of the true elements which the old covenant had been intended to prepare for its use."¹

It would appear, consequently, that "the beloved physician," the Josephus of Christianity, has performed most important service in the kingdom of God. The only author in the New Testament who was not a Jew, he has contributed to the emancipation of Christian truth from Judaism, as only a pupil and companion of St. Paul could have done. In a large-hearted philanthropic spirit he has performed his part and earned the gratitude of all generations.

It has been thought strange that he should break off his history so abruptly. Why not tell us about the end of the great apostle? Would not the martyrdom of Paul or of Peter have been as hallowed in his history as that of James and Stephen? But it would not have suited so well the position which the work now occupies in the New Testament canon. It has been

¹ Rev. T. D. Bernard's *Progress of Doctrine*, Third Edition, pp. 120-2.

thought by some that St. Luke meditated a third volume, in which the additional details our curiosity craves would have been given. As the case now stands, the historical introduction to the Pauline and Petrine Epistles is simply perfect. Both Peter and Paul are left by Luke alive, so to speak, and busy. The last glimpse we have of Peter is when his escape from the hands of Herod causes "no small stir among the soldiers" (xii. 18). The brave apostle is fleeing to some wider field of usefulness from the very jaws of death. The last glimpse we get of Paul is as he preaches with all freedom in his own hired house in Rome (xxviii. 31). This prepares us for the Epistles of Peter from Babylon, and of Paul from so many chief cities, including Rome. Luke, as historian, is a most worthy forerunner of the apostolic band who, by their Epistles and Apocalypse, were to do so much to edify the Church.

And we cannot conclude without suggesting that this "beloved physician" must have endeared himself to many beside the apostle. He was a living link between religion and science. His position in the *entourage* of the apostle prevented any false reliance upon miracle as if it were ever intended to minister to selfishness, or conflict with the ordinary use of means. He had not the appliances, and consequently could not have the insight, which scientific men now possess; but we have reason to believe, from his two important literary works, that he was a man of culture, and abreast of the best thought of his time. His analysis of the evidence and verdict in favour of Christianity ought to have some weight with scientific men now. His relation to the Christian faith showed that it courted then, just as it courts now, the most thorough investigation. Such a work as that we have had under review is well calculated to show that the Christian faith bore critical analysis on the part of a man of science at the first, and that it can still bear the most searching criticism which either sceptical or sympathetic minds can bring to it.

ROB. M'CHEYNE EDGAR.

ART. VI.—*The New Hebrides Mission and the Polynesian Labour Traffic.*

AT the Pan-Presbyterian Council in Edinburgh in 1877, the Chairman received a letter from Dr. Duff, recommending, as a practical outcome of the meeting, that a foreign mission should be established under the auspices of the Alliance. After adverting to certain places as suitable fields for such operations, especially Central Africa, he named the New Hebrides, as the locality where such a mission might be established with the greatest likelihood of success; all the more as a Presbyterian Mission existed there at that time. No action was taken on Dr. Duff's proposal, and perhaps the work is carried on as well, according to present arrangements, as if that idea had been taken up, seeing Dr. Duff did not live to work it out himself. Had life and health been continued to Dr. Duff, and had his inspiring genius been the guiding influence of the movement, success would have been certain. But, although the New Hebrides Mission is not carried on according to Dr. Duff's suggestion, it comes the nearest to his idea of a Catholic Presbyterian Mission anywhere to be found. It was very small in its beginnings, and did not promise to assume any great dimensions. Thirty-five years ago it was commenced by the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia, originally a mission from the Secession Church in Scotland. Four years later they were joined in this work by the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland. Thus two of the least of the thousands of Judah led the way in this Mission. But, in the good providence of God, without any ecclesiastical diplomacy, without any special efforts, it has come to take a conspicuous place among the great Protestant missions in the South Seas. The two Presbyterian Churches in New Zealand, the six Presbyterian Churches in Australia, the large Presbyterian Church in the Dominion of Canada, and the Free Church of Scotland, comprising in all no fewer than two thousand congregations, have adopted the New Hebrides Mission as their own. There has been a singular conjunction of favourable circumstances in connection with this Mission: an appeal for a mission vessel, at a very opportune

time, enlisted the sympathy and support, on its behalf, of all the Presbyterian Churches in New Zealand and Australia. Eight years ago, when the union took place among the Presbyterian Churches of the Dominion, when the larger Churches in Canada united with the smaller Churches in Nova Scotia interested in the support of the New Hebrides Mission, the United Churches cheerfully and heartily adopted the Mission as their own; and seven years ago, when the Free Church of Scotland and the Reformed Presbyterian Church amalgamated, the United Churches resolved, with the utmost cordiality, to adopt the New Hebrides Mission as their own. These indications of God's providence we regard as in the highest degree reassuring, as pointing out that God has great purposes of mercy for the poor degraded natives.

The New Hebrides forms a large group of islands in Western Polynesia, extending from 300 to 400 miles in a north-west direction, from 20° to 15° S. lat. They lie about 1000 miles north of New Zealand, about the same distance east of Queensland, about 400 miles west of Fiji, and about 160 miles north-east of New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands. The population is estimated at from 70,000 to 100,000. The two great races inhabiting the South Seas are the Malay Polynesian and the Papuan; the former of Asiatic origin, the latter of African. The natives of the New Hebrides, with few exceptions, are Papuans, and belong to the Negro or African type.

Missionary work was first commenced in the New Hebrides by the agents of the London Missionary Society. In their first operations John Williams "fell a sacrifice, with his friend Mr. Harris, on the island of Eromanga, to the cruelty of the deluded heathen inhabitants, November 20th, 1839." Our Presbyterian Mission was commenced by the Rev. John Geddie in '1848. The London Missionary Society afterwards transferred their interest in the New Hebrides to us. We began with one ordained missionary and his wife. Our staff now consists of fifteen missionaries and their wives (one of the number is a medical missionary), and we are doing our utmost to raise it to twenty. For the last twenty years we have had a mission vessel, the *Dayspring*, of 160 tons burden. We are expending annually from £5000 to £6000 in carrying on missionary operations on this group of islands; and we have spent, in all, up-

wards of £120,000. The field presents many difficulties. The climate is unhealthy; ague is more or less prevalent on all the islands; the natives are low and degraded; society is largely disintegrated; there is no national life; the tribes are small, and the chiefs have little power; every tribe is at war with its neighbour, and they are all cannibals. Their speech is polyglot. Some twenty languages are spoken in the group; every one as different from every other as Latin is from Greek, or as German is from English. But we are steadily advancing. We have rendered life and property comparatively safe over one half of the group, and our missionaries have mastered, more or less fully, one half of the languages. We have given the natives the whole Bible in one language, viz. that of Aneityum, as well as some other books, for which they have paid £1400, all of this sum being derived from the sale of arrowroot, which they prepared, and which was sold by the missionaries for this purpose. We have given them an alphabet and the elements of a literature in other nine of those languages. Our missionaries have translated, and the British and Foreign Bible Society have printed, several of the books of the Bible in seven of those nine languages, thus bringing them so far within the comity of Christianised and civilised communities; and they also are paying for the Scriptures as fast as they receive them. We are virtually pledged to the other great Societies for the evangelisation of the New Hebrides. By common consent this field has been assigned to us, and we have undertaken, the Lord helping us, to accomplish the work; and it seems quite practicable, supported heartily as we are by 2000 Presbyterian congregations. The men and the means which these are able to supply could accomplish tasks tenfold more formidable than this. If only let alone, we feel confident that, with the blessing of God, we could, within a reasonable time, evangelise the entire population, and render life and property secure over the whole group. But we are confronted with two formidable antagonists,—the French Government and the so-called Labour Traffic. The attitude of the French is menacing. It has been so for many years; but it is specially menacing at the present time. They are threatening to annex the New Hebrides to their penal settlement of New Caledonia. We dread to think of our simple-minded converts being brought into close and constant contact

with the criminal classes of France. We know the history of the French in Tahiti for the last forty years, and in New Caledonia and the Loyalty Islands for the last twenty. No sooner had they taken possession of the Loyalty Islands than they laid such restrictions on the missionaries, and sanctioned such persecutions against the Protestant converts, as all but ruined the Mission. Letters written by those on the spot to friends in England, giving details of that persecution, found their way into Germany during the Franco-German war; translations of these letters were largely published in the German newspapers, and supplied unmistakeable warning to German Protestantism as to what they might expect from French Popery, if the tide of war should turn against them, and thus supplied a telling motive to the Protestant soldiery. We have no reason to think that the French would deal better with us, if they annexed the New Hebrides, than they did with our brethren of the London Missionary Society. This is an evil we have good grounds for fearing. But there is another evil as real that we have long felt. For twenty years we have been harassed with the Labour Traffic. In 1862 a fleet of slavers from Peru commenced a raid among the eastern islands, and especially among the small islands lying along the line, and carried off some thousands of the natives to work in the Peruvian mines. But this was at once stamped out; the Australian colonists raised their voices against it as one man. The French men-of-war on the Tahitian station gave chase to the nefarious slavers, and they disappeared once and for ever. In 1863 this labour traffic began. For twenty years or so before that time it had been carried on to a limited extent. Mr. B. Boyd had taken a number of natives from the New Hebrides to Boyd Town near Table Bay, and Captain Paddon and others had employed parties of natives to collect sandalwood on Eromanga, but it was not till the American war raised the value of cotton to such fabulous prices, that Fiji, Queensland, and New Caledonia became cotton-growing countries, and the demand for labour became enormous. When peace was restored, and the price of cotton fell, the planters began to cultivate sugar instead of cotton, and so the demand for labour continued. In 1863 Mr. Robert Towns of Sydney, the father and founder of the Queensland labour traffic, sent down his first vessel to the New Hebrides,

to deport natives to his cotton plantations. At this point of its history, the traffic was all meekness; its voice was that of a lamb, mild and gentle; the labourers were engaged for six months only; if they were unwilling to return home at the end of that period, they would be allowed to remain six months longer. By and by the term of service was extended from one year to three years, and subsequently to five; and numbers were kept much longer. When Fiji became a Crown colony, Sir Arthur Gordon, always a true friend to the native races, sent home hundreds of natives, many of whom had been detained long beyond the period of their engagement. Year after year the traffic increased; all the rowdyism of the colonies was afloat on those seas, and busily employed in this traffic. If it was objected that the white men could not speak to the natives, and the natives could not understand the terms of the agreement they were said to have made, every vessel was at once provided with an interpreter,—a “Tanna man.” Tanna was the great emporium for interpreters. One would have supposed that every Tanna man was another “Admirable Crichton,” that he could speak his way to the wall of China, or that he knew every one of the twenty languages spoken in the New Hebrides. Nothing could show more clearly the fraudulent character of the system than the sham of the “Tanna man” interpreter. Force and fraud became more and more frequent, outrages on the one hand, and retaliation on the other, rapidly increased, till the one culminated in the horrible tragedy on board the *Carl*, and the other in the lamented death of Bishop Patteson. Roused by those atrocities, the Imperial Parliament passed an Act, not to *suppress* such a traffic, but to *regulate* it,—this Act to be quoted as the “Kidnapping Act,” the title clearly indicating the character of the evil it was intended to remedy. It was not intended, of course, to regulate the kidnapping, but it was expected to transmute these kidnappers into humane, honest, and honourable emigration agents. Yet, strange to say, all this time the Queensland authorities were pronouncing the traffic to be immaculate; everything was being done according to Act of Parliament. If anything was wrong, you must look in the direction of Fiji or New Caledonia, and when a charge of the same kind was hinted at in those quarters, a cry was imme-

diately heard, loud and indignant, as that of injured innocence. From the very beginning our missionaries and our Mission Synod, year after year, proclaimed the character and the doings of the traffic to the Presbyterian Churches supporting the Mission, and to the Colonial and Imperial Governments. A letter from one of our missionaries, the Rev. James M'Nair of Eromanga, having fallen into the hands of Mr. F. A. Taylor, M.P., was the cause of the evil being first brought to the notice of the British Parliament. By the Act above referred to, the Government and Parliament of Great Britain stamped the Polynesian labour traffic, during the first ten years of its existence, as being largely a system of kidnapping, and this Act was passed with the view of eliminating that element from the traffic. To secure this object vessels were to be licensed, a Government agent was to be placed on board of every vessel to see that all the immigrants came willingly, and that they all understood fully the terms of agreement, and that every regulation was carried out as appointed by Government. In addition to this, a small man-of-war has been stationed on every group, as an ocean police, to watch the doings of the traffic. We have had another ten years of the traffic under this reformed phase, and what has been the result? The outrageous buccaneering character of the traffic has disappeared, but there is a very wide consensus of opinion to the effect that the spirit of the Kidnapping Act has been largely evaded. In the mission field, in the colonies, and in the public press at home, a strong belief is expressed that the essence of slavery and the slave-trade is still to be found in this labour traffic; that the natives are taken away, as Lord Derby has formulated the expression, either by force or by representations that actually amount to fraud.

Our Mission urges, not the further regulation of the traffic, which twenty years' experience has shown to be thoroughly vicious in principle, but its *complete suppression*. We urge this on three grounds:—1st, The injury it is doing to missions; 2d, The evil results to the natives in the depopulation of the islands; and 3d, The loss of life by violence, both native and European, to which it is continually leading. We hear much, in these times of vested interests, of their sacred and inalienable character, of the right of compensation when they are

invaded or affected in any way. Now, if there are any vested rights our Mission certainly possesses them in the New Hebrides. We have invested £120,000 to begin with. Our claims go back for more than forty years. But we have invested life as well as money. Let us take the history of Eromanga, an island that unhappily has a world-wide reputation. On the second day after missionary operations had been commenced on the New Hebrides, John Williams and Mr. Harris, as we have said, laid down their lives as martyrs on Eromanga. Twenty-two years later the Rev. G. N. Gordon and his wife were martyred, and ten years afterwards his brother, the Rev. J. D. Gordon, fell beneath the tomahawk of the savage. Before this last martyrdom, the Rev. James M'Nair, a man of an eminently missionary spirit, succumbed to fever and ague, the disease of the island, and died. At this juncture the Rev. H. A. Robertson, with his beautiful, accomplished, excellent, and heroic young wife, arrived from Nova Scotia, and, of their own free choice, they were settled on blood-stained Eromanga, in 1871. They took their lives in their hand. Often were they in imminent peril from the savage heathen. Often for weeks the Christian natives watched their house day and night, lest they should be murdered by the heathen; but they wrought on till Eromanga has become virtually Christian. Mr. Robertson entered fully into the spirit and aims of his martyred predecessors; he gathered up and utilised the result of their labours, he followed out their plans, and worked upon their lines; from Dillon's Bay as a centre he opened up stations and sent out native agents on both sides of the island, till, about four years ago, these agencies met at Cook's Bay, on the other end of the island, forty miles distant. His heart was delighted when, after years of danger and difficulty, he had completed his organisation, and placed a chain of schools, stations, and native agents round the island. But what was his disappointment when, some months afterwards, he returned to Cook's Bay, one of his most important stations, and found the school closed and worship discontinued. A labour vessel had called in, and both the teacher and every young and able-bodied man had been induced to go on board, to proceed to Queensland, or Fiji, or wherever else the vessel was going, to be sold for £6 sterling a head, ostensibly as passage-

money for the immigrants. No doubt in this case both captain and agent would present a clean bill at the Immigration Office; the agent would testify that the immigrants had all shipped of their own free will, and had all perfectly understood the terms of the contract, although neither captain nor agent understood a word of Eromangan. A few words of pigeon-English picked up by some one of the natives was a sufficient medium for settling all the terms of engagement! But let us see how the matter was looked at by the missionary. Happily we have not here to draw upon our imagination, we have it expressed in his own words, in a letter published in *The Presbyterian Record for the Dominion of Canada* for April 1880:—

“To many of those young men, especially to those who were brought out of heathen darkness by means of our labours, I am deeply attached; and were it not for those wretched slavers our hearts would be greatly cheered among them. But, oh! these so-called *labour vessels* (?) are an immense curse and drawback. May this miserable traffic soon be abolished! Within the past four months these *fishers of men* have taken away more than a hundred of my promising young men and lads, including one TEACHER!!! That is, they have bought them with muskets, axes, knives, calico, etc., paid for them on the spot! Christian friends, this is a vile traffic, and I am henceforward its decided and open enemy. What use, so far as I can see, is there in my Church paying me a salary simply to bring this people out of heathen darkness, if it is *only* for this world?—only to make them better servants—for whom?—for those who have *no* interest in them beyond what they can get out of them.”

Those words are the utterances of a heart, as we can see, rent with anguish. But this is not a solitary case. It is within our own knowledge that similar things have been done again, and again, and again, on Eromanga. Furthermore, there is not a mission station on the New Hebrides from which some, in many cases a large number, of their most promising natives have not been taken away in a similar manner. None can deny that we have invested a large amount of blood and treasure on Eromanga; we have acquired a vast amount of valuable knowledge, we have gained a great amount of important influence, and we have obtained a great deal of useful experience, all of which we are turning to account for the Christianising, the enlightening, and the civilising of the poor degraded natives. But we have no Act of Parliament to protect

our vested interests. We cannot sell those investments, and unless we are allowed to utilise them, and work them out in our own way, they are lost to us and to the world for ever. We are providing for the natives religious and secular instruction, but when they are taken away, their seats in the churches and in the schools are left empty, and, so far as they are concerned, our agencies become a needless expenditure: the natives go where nobody can speak to them, and they can speak to nobody, and henceforward their progress ceases. We are quietly and peacefully carrying on our work; we are molesting nobody in Queensland or elsewhere; and what moral right has the Government of Fiji or Queensland to license the rowdyism of their respective populations to come down and prowl about and plunder our Mission of its most valued property, and carry into captivity the poor defenceless inhabitants of those islands, in order that their thews and sinews may be transmuted into Colonial gold, careless as to the fate of their aged parents or their young and helpless children left behind on the islands? I shall give just another example of the way in which recruiting for labourers is carried on in the New Hebrides. It is supplied by the journal of one of our missionaries, written about the middle of last year. He saw it from the deck of the *Dayspring*. The labour vessel was lying in the offing, and two boats were sent into the bay. One of them, manned chiefly by natives, it may be from Tanna or the Loyalty Islands, goes close in to the shore to engage natives, the other lies some distance off, so as to cover the other boat, and so as to be able to sweep the beach, if necessary, with rifles, or shoot down any troublesome native. The natives, knowing these arrangements, are in general on their good behaviour; but at times misunderstandings occur and collisions take place. At this very island, not long ago, an old man, the chief of the place, interfered to prevent his son, a young man, from going away in a labour vessel, and was shot dead by those in charge of the boats; and this, as was to be expected, was followed by a massacre. Is this free emigration? In this country there are Government agents to see that every emigrant gets fair play, and as soon as he lands in Canada, or elsewhere, he is met by another, to see that all contracts have been fulfilled; and even this is not considered

sufficient, for it is now proposed to have Government agents on board ship, as well as at both ends of the voyage, to see that full justice is done to the emigrants during the few days or the few weeks occupied by the voyage. And all this for emigrants who know every word that is spoken to them, who know what their rights are, and, if wronged, or supposed to be wronged, know how, and where, and when to apply for redress. It is totally different with our native emigrants. In Queensland, it is true, there is a Government agent to look after them, but he does not know a word of their language, and they do not know a word of his. On board the vessels at the islands there is another Government agent, who is equally ignorant of their language, and they of his, and as this agent is under the strongest temptation to make matters smooth for the captain and the owners, the poor natives have no security against either force or fraud.

But although the natives were ever so willing to go to Queensland and other places, we urge the complete suppression of the labour traffic, because it is fast depopulating the islands and exterminating the natives. Let the present state of things go on, and in a comparatively short period of time those lovely islands will be uninhabited wastes. In Tasmania the native race is extinct. In Victoria there are only a few hundreds left. In New South Wales they are now only a remnant. Over the whole of the South Seas the native population is diminishing. But all the causes put together are not so destructive of native life as the labour traffic. At the present time there is a fleet of thirty labour vessels afloat among those islands, each one on an average deporting eighty emigrants; the *Roderick Dhu* took 103 into Maryborough the other day. These vessels will make on an average four or five voyages annually. We have known them make a voyage once a month from the New Hebrides to New Caledonia. This makes 10,000 or 12,000 of a drain on the able-bodied male population annually. The engagements are never less than for three years, but often for five. This involves the constant absence from the labour recruiting districts of say 40,000 able-bodied men. Allowing these to be a fifth of the population, we have 200,000 people deprived of their principal bread-winners. How society must be deranged by such a process! On the islands, how much the

birth-rate must be reduced ; and how much the mortality of the young, the aged, and the helpless, must be augmented, while the death-rate on the plantations is amazingly increased ! In Queensland, instead of the normal mortality of 9 annually in the 1000 among men from 18 to 45, it ranges from 70 to 110 in the 1000, or about *ten times* as much as it ought to be. If this, or anything approaching to this, be true, of which there is scarcely a doubt, what are we to say of the traffic ? It has been regulated for twenty long years, and such are the results. Let us have a trial of suppression for as long a time. But when we urge the *suppression* of the traffic, immediately a meaning is imported into our words which they were never meant to convey. We are supposed to wish the natives to be forcibly prevented from leaving their own islands. Every one, of course, consents to the suppression of kidnapping and the deporting of natives under false pretences. But they cannot agree, they say, to put a stop to free voluntary emigration. We do not ask them. Free emigration ! where is it ? For the first ten years of this traffic it was nearly out and out kidnapping ; and for the last ten years there is abundant proof to show that it is still little better. If the natives wish to emigrate, let them do so as much as they choose, and as they best can. But let us no longer have a licensed, legalised system, of which force and fraud are the outstanding characteristics. It is this that we wish to see suppressed,—the system that has existed hitherto. We have no wish to see the natives cooped up as prisoners ; simply let them alone. When the African slave-trade was suppressed, nobody understood that to mean the compulsory putting down of free emigration. But how many of the Africans have since that time emigrated to Brazil, Cuba, or the Southern States ? So will it be with the natives of the New Hebrides and the Solomon Islands. The number will be few indeed who will emigrate to Queensland, Fiji, or New Caledonia. And why should they ? Every native is a landowner ; why should he go abroad and simply sell his *labour* ? Is it not much better for him to stay at home and cultivate his own paternal acres, and then sell his labour and the produce of his land together, which he can always do, and at the same time live at home with his own family ?

This labour traffic is looked upon by some as a fine outlet for the surplus population of the islands. Surplus population! Was ever ignorance so crass? Where is it to be found? Everywhere the population is scanty. There is not an island on the New Hebrides which could not maintain ten times its present population, even with their rude and primitive modes of agriculture. The problem is how to preserve, and if possible increase, the population, not to reduce it by emigration. It is certainly not necessary to colonise Queensland by depopulating the New Hebrides. Leave the labour on the islands for the islands. During the present century all the Malay Polynesians, and a portion of the Papuans in Eastern Polynesia, have been Christianised and civilised, and life and property are everywhere secure; and as soon as that was the case, skill and capital found their way to these islands, and utilised the labour lying ready to their hand. Let our Missions alone for another century, and the whole of the Papuans in Western Polynesia, still savage, will be then civilised; they will be good Christians and peaceful citizens.

The space at my command permits me simply to refer to, without insisting or enlarging upon, the many and murderous attacks made upon white men by natives—attacks which are apparently on the increase, and which led to the lamentable death of Bishop Patteson, Commodore Goodenough, and scores, if not hundreds, of others, many of them as innocent as those two distinguished men, and for which the labour traffic is largely responsible. In these circumstances, as British subjects, we have appealed to Her Majesty's Government to protect us in our philanthropic efforts, and to protect the poor helpless natives from the ambition of a foreign power and the cupidity of our own countrymen; and we further appeal to our fellow-Christians in all the Churches for their sympathy, and for their prayers that the evils which we feel may be removed, and the evils which we fear may be averted.

JOHN INGLIS.

ART. VII.—*Current Literature.*

IN our last number a recent volume of sermons by the great University preacher Steinmeyer was briefly reviewed. It may interest some of our readers to know that a second edition is just appearing of the venerable preacher's most characteristic production, his now classical sermons on the *Passion of the Lord in the Light of Modern Criticism* (1).

The *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum* (2) of the Cæsarian Academy of Vienna has been increased by the publication of a further volume, containing all the extant works of Salvianus, the presbyter of the church at Marseilles in the fifth century. Most of the writings of this elegant and spiritual author have perished, but the treatise "On the Government of God," and some of the letters, deserve to be better known. We would again commend this handy and inexpensive edition, especially for the clearness of its type and the carefulness of the investigations upon which its text is based.

The author of *Das Leben Jesu* (3) is already well known as a learned theologian and lucid writer by his valuable contributions to Dogmatic and Exegesis. His *Lehrbuch der biblischen Theologie des neuen Testaments*, which has reached a third edition, is a work of remarkable grasp, insight, and accuracy. His articles in the *Theol. Studien und Kritiken* and in the *Jahrbucher für deutsche Theologie* (1864-5) on the origin of the Gospels and their mutual relation, were followed by a fuller exposition and minute analytical development in his Commentaries on Mark and Matthew, and in his editions of Meyer's *Handbuch* on Mark and Luke, and on the Gospel of John.

(1) *Die Geschichte der Passion des Herrn in Abwehr des kritischen Angriffs betrachtet*, von F. L. Steinmeyer. Zweite neu bearbeitete Auflage. Berlin, 1882. London: Williams & Norgate.

(2) *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum, editum consilio et impensis Academiae Litterarum Cæsareæ Vindobonensis*; vol. viii.: *Salviani Presbyteri Massiliensis Opera quæ supersunt ex recensione Francisci Pauly*. Vienna: Gerold's Sohn. London: Williams & Norgate.

(3) *Das Leben Jesu*, von Dr. Bernhard Weiss, Professor der Theologie zu Berlin. In 2 Bänden. Erster Band, 1882.

Having devoted many years to the critical study of the Gospels, and with a full mastery of the whole range of the modern literature of the question, the author gives us in the present work the results of his profound labour in language of remarkable simplicity and clearness. This is an eminently readable book, and every page breathes the atmosphere of calm conviction, and deep and loving reverence.

As the work is yet incomplete, we shall limit ourselves to a mere statement of its aim and structure. Dr. Weiss seeks to combine the freest exercise of the modern critical method of historical investigation with loyalty and faith in the fundamental supernatural facts of Christianity. In the preface the author speaks freely and fully of his theological standpoint. He is not able to identify himself with any of the present theological parties; but at the same time refuses to be ranked with the "Mediating Theology." As he says:—

"No scientific reconciliation is possible between Supernaturalism, which believes in the objective reality of Revelation and in Miracle, in the strict sense of the word, and the standpoint which denies the possibility of either; between the view of Christ which regards Him as mere man, although the highest, and of an excellence unattainable by all others, a teacher of purer conceptions of God and of Divine things, and a type of a new religious life, and the Christ whom the Church has from the beginning adored as her Divine Mediator and Redeemer."

Equally important is the confession which immediately follows: "I have never attempted to mediate between these opposite views, as I know the ultimate principles on which they rest, and because my critical studies have only confirmed me in the joyous assurance of that faith, which I have not gained by them, and which none can gain by scientific demonstration." These words are clear and decided. The author anticipates, however, from the orthodox theologians objections to his strict and logical application of the critical method to the Gospel records, and to his freedom from a dogmatic construction of the theory of inspiration. The remarks (p. 441) on Christ's relation to the Old Testament are excellent and spiritual; they show a deep appreciation of its Divine character and organic unity; but we do not think that they bring out adequately the perfect and all-comprehensive knowledge possessed by Him who alone was able to "open" the Scripture.

The first volume consists of three books. In the first,

entitled *The Sources*, the author gives a comprehensive statement of his view of the origin of the Gospels,—the original mother Gospel, the memorabilia of the apostle Peter, the Gospel of the Jewish Christians, the Gospel of the Gentile Christians, the Gospel of John, with full but concise discussion of the various modern theories. The second book (*The Period of Preparation*) contains the history of the birth, childhood, and youth of Jesus, to the commencement of his public life. The third book (*The Seed-Time*), treats of the first period of the Lord's ministry, characterised by hope, especially in Galilee. The second volume, which is to appear shortly, will comprise the period of the first conflicts, the crisis, the last events in Jerusalem, the Passion, and the days after the Resurrection.

The author expresses the fear that some of his readers will not feel satisfied with his picture of Christ, because it is from the standpoint of His earthly historical life, and not from that of believing adoration, with which the Church regards her exalted Saviour. We think that the feeling of disappointment described in these words is produced on many minds by most modern works on the history of our Lord, in whom, as the Word made flesh, disciples always behold the glory of the Only Begotten, and who in His humanity declares, No man knoweth the Son, but the Father. Nor can this feeling be attributed exclusively to a deficient realisation of the true humanity of Christ, and the historical development of His earthly life and work. The author himself is fully and reverently conscious of the unique character of the Gospel history, as is evident from the beautiful words with which we conclude this brief notice of his learned and suggestive book :—

"The (gospel) history itself can be understood only by the person and work of Him who is its subject. It is a history which, like every other biography, begins with the birth of a child, but which concludes with the reign of One exalted to Heaven, in whom even at the present all Christian faith finds strength and consolation. Hence this history cannot be narrated in the way in which history which belongs absolutely to the past is told. We feel this day the life which pulsates in this history ; it is the life from which Christendom, consciously or unconsciously, derives its life. Here is the centre of man's history, in so far as it rests on an eternal counsel of Divine love. The effects of this life reach to the final consummation, which we await ; and it follows necessarily that its fundamental beginnings must be rooted somehow in the depths of eternity. It is a history which must be viewed in the light of that which is beyond all history, past and future."

It cannot be said that there is any decline of interest in the study of prophetic truth. There are on our table no less than six recent books devoted to the interpretation of the predictions contained in Scripture. From America we have *A Series of Special Lectures on the Revelation of Jesus Christ* (4) in three goodly volumes. The author is a futurist, and, of course, seeks mainly to direct attention to coming events, which he evidently thinks are not far distant. The various sections of the book are replete with interest, and bear ample testimony to the earnestness and devoutness of the writer. Apart altogether from his specific treatment of the subject, there are abundant suggestive expositions of Scripture which have an independent value. We would call special attention to two lectures on the "Epistles to the Seven Churches," which no one can read without enlargement of thought and substantial profit. The whole work is a real contribution to Biblical literature.

The Messiah King (5) is more fragmentary, though not without a definite purpose. It is designed to supplement the common conception of the salvation of God by an emphatic statement of the sovereignty which He claims and purposes soon to assert and manifest in regal rule. The lines of this book are also futurist, and the author seems specially anxious to commend even now the "peacefulness" which is eventually to characterise the reign of Him who is to rule in righteousness.

The next volume (6) belongs to the *historical* school of interpretation, and derives its main interest from a full acquaintance with the best available illustrations, both from the past and the present. It contains some severe strictures on Anglo-Israelitism, and on rash speculations which, notwithstanding frequent proved failures, still attempt to fix within the next ten or twenty years the date for the fulfilment of the events connected with the Second Advent. We may also add that the author contends earnestly for the identification of Papal Rome with the "Antichrist" and "Man of Sin."

(4) *The Apocalypse*. By Joseph A. Seiss, D.D., Pastor of the Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia, U.S. London: James Nisbet & Co.

(5) *The Messiah King*. By James Withers. London: Partridge & Co.

(6) *Fulfilled Prophecy, in proof of the Truth of Scripture*. By Rev. B. W. Savile, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

Another volume limits itself to the eighth and ninth chapters of the Apocalypse (7). Accepting also the *historical* method, which the author calls the "general English interpretation," it is contended, as the title of the book implies, that the Roman sun is *eclipsed*, not extinguished: "In close connection with this *eclipse* comes our view—strictly historical, however far from being 'English'—of the Fifth and Sixth Trumpets, the one as accompanying, and the other as following that great event."

Professor Murphy has produced a very succinct and useful commentary on *The Book of Revelation* (8), similar in treatment and character to the best of "Bible-Class Handbook" series. It is at once scholarly and popular.

The last volume before us, bearing the suggestive title, *The Approaching Day* (9), is a second edition of *A View of the Prophecies of Daniel, Zechariah, and the Revelation*. It is written with remarkable clearness and definiteness, and may be commended as one of the best books for any who desire to become acquainted with the methods and conclusions of the Futurist school of interpretation.

"Why is right right?" is the question which Dr. Stanley Leathes proceeds to consider in his treatise on *The Foundations of Morality* (10). At the present time there are few questions more urgent or more important. Unless there be laws having Divine authority, and enforced with Divine sanctions, our social relationships are threatened with a revolution of the most destructive character. Morality and the supernatural are more closely associated than many of our speculative thinkers seem to think. If it were possible to eliminate faith in God from the community, the consequences would far outstrip their calculations and their wishes. It is needful to face the facts which modern infidelity involves, and which it un-

(7) *The Great Roman Eclipse*. London: Elliot Stock.

(8) *The Book of Revelation*. Translated and briefly expounded by Jas. G. Murphy, LL.D. and D.D., T.C.D., Professor of Hebrew. London: James Nisbet & Co.

(9) *The Approaching Day*. With a Map. London: John F. Shaw & Co.

(10) *The Foundations of Morality: being Discourses on the Ten Commandments, with special reference to their origin and authority*. By Stanley Leathes, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

questionably has begun to contemplate. For Atheism, now-a-days, means to take the sphere of practical politics, and to apply its negations to the law of the land no less than to the law of God. It designs to reconstruct society on a new basis, although at the present moment we are unaware that any new basis has been discovered.

We cannot explain Dr. Leathes' purpose better than by the quotation of his own words: "I have tried in these discourses to estimate the kind of natural and inherent testimony that is borne by the Mosaic Decalogue to its own authority and origin. We find the Ten Commandments accepted as the basis of moral and social life in the most civilised nations of the world. Why is this? Why do their enactments and prohibitions receive the common consent and acquiescence of mankind? Is there any reason why they should continue to do so? Is there any reason why they should not be repealed? Can we be sure that this common consent and acquiescence will not be withheld from them after a time? And if it will not, why will it not?"

To these questions this volume is an answer. Both in its statement of the problem and in its solution it is eminently seasonable and satisfactory.

Homiletic aids are rarely found serviceable by the honest student. They are either too full or too empty. The volumes (11) just issued by the able editors of the *Pulpit Commentary*, however, are chargeable neither with excess nor defect. They have evidently been prepared with a careful regard to the purpose they are intended to serve, by scholars who have at once the peculiar information required, and competent skill to make it available in the most fitting form. We have seen no books of this class comparable with these in promise and performance. The outlines are suggestive without being exhaustive; they are in every case original; and the preacher who cannot gain hint or help from them must have mistaken his vocation.

(11) *The Homiletical Library*, edited by Rev. Canon Spence, M.A., and the Rev. Joseph S. Exell, M.A. Vols. I. II. and III. London: James Nisbet and Co.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Notices meanwhile delayed for want of space.

Religious Encyclopædia: or Dictionary of Biblical, Historical, Doctrinal, and Practical Theology. Based on the Real-Encyclopædie of Herzog, Plitt, and Hauck. Edited by Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D. Vol. I. A-FOT. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

The City of God: A series of Discussions in Religion. By A. M. Fairbairn, D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

The Epic of Kings: Stories retold from Firdusi. By Helen Zimmern. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

A History of the Councils of the Church, from the Original Documents. By the Right Rev. C. J. Hefele, D.D. Volume III. A.D. 431-A.D. 451. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

The Theological and Philosophical Works of Hermes Trismegistus, Christian Neoplatonist. Translated from the original Greek. By John David Chambers, M.A., F.S.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

Egypt, Palestine, and Phœnicia. A Visit to Sacred Lands. By Felix Bovet. Translated by W. H. Lyttelton, M.A. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Prophecy: its Nature and Evidence. By Professor Redford. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

A History of the Jews in Rome, B.C. 160-A.D. 604. By E. H. Hudson. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

The Hebrew Psalter. A new Metrical Translation. By W. Digby Seymour, Q.C., LL.D., Recorder of Newcastle-on-Tyne. London: Longmans, Green, & Co.

Parables of the Spring. By Professor Gaussen of Geneva. London: Religious Tract Society.

A Noble Vine: or Practical Thoughts on Our Lord's Last Parable. By J. Jackson Wray. London: James Nisbet & Co.

The Government of God: embracing Agnosticism, Evolution, and Christianity. By W. Woods Smyth. London: Elliot Stock.

The Lamb of God. By W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace.

The Galilean Gospel. By Alexander Balmain Bruce, D.D. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace.

Memorials of the Life and Ministry of Thomas Main, D.D. By his Widow. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace.

Wells of Water. By M. S. Simpson. London: Nisbet & Co.

The Book of Psalms in English Blank Verse. By Ben-Tehillim. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot.

The Life-Education and Wider Culture of the Christian Ministry. By J. S. Wilson, M.A. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY 1883.

ART. I.—*Bibliography of Archbishop Leighton.*¹

IT is rather singular that Scotland has no monument in honour of Robert Leighton, who, if not born on Scottish soil, was of good Scottish gentle blood, educated in the University of Edinburgh, moulded by the Scottish theology, and whose public life is inseparable from the stirring events of nearly forty years of the Scottish ecclesiastical life of the seventeenth century. Not a few inferior men have had some recognition of their

¹ 1. *The Whole Works (as yet recovered) of the Most Reverend Father in God, Robert Leighton, D.D.*, Bishop of Dunblane and Archbishop (Com-mendator) of Glasgow: containing the corrected text of the pieces previously published, and including many letters, sermons, and other pieces never before published: the whole carefully edited and furnished with illustrative notes and with indexes. To which is prefixed A Life of the Author and of his father. By William West, B.A., Incumbent of S. Columba's, Nairn. In six volumes. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1869.

2. *Archbishop Leighton*. By the Very Rev. John Tulloch, D.D., LL.D., Principal of S. Mary's College, St. Andrews; Dean of the Order of the Thistle, and one of Her Majesty's Chaplains. *St. Giles' Lectures*. Third Series. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace, 1883.

3. *Archbishop Leighton*. By W. G. Blaikie, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Apologetics and of Pastoral Theology, New College, Edinburgh. *Evangelical Succession Lectures*. Second Series. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace, 1883.

4. *Selections from the Writings of Archbishop Leighton*. Edited with a Memoir and Notes by William Blair, M.A., D.D., Dunblane. Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace, 1883.

names either in the capital or elsewhere. Very recently a brass tablet has been affixed to one of the pillars in the nave of St. Giles's Cathedral,¹ Edinburgh, in commemoration of Dr. James Hannay, the Dean of the Church, who read Laud's Liturgy to unwelcome ears on the 23d of July 1637. For two hundred years the monumental marble has been representing in the transept of Trinity Church, St. Andrews, the well-known tragedy of *Magus Moor*, which terminated the career of Archbishop Sharp. But neither tablet, nor mural monument, nor memorial window, as far as we know, has been erected in memory of Leighton, either at Newbattle Kirk on the Esk, where he ministered as a Presbyterian for eleven years; nor in Edinburgh, where for about ten years he was Principal of the University; nor at Dunblane, "on the banks of Allan Water," with its grand old cathedral, imperishably linked with the memory of his name, as that of a Bishop after the primitive model, for eleven or twelve years; nor at Glasgow, no less rich in having its ancient cathedral as a poem in stone complete and entire, and now with its windows all bedight with glowing colours and bold figures, yet none of them commemorative of Leighton's archbishopric, which extended over four or five years. We have no cause to regret the absence of such monumental pomp in connection with Leighton's name, a name synonymous with sweetness and light, and needing "no storied urn nor animated bust" to prevent it from sinking into oblivion; for

"Build low, build high,
The great name cannot die."

Had Leighton been a Roman Catholic, as some of his enemies suspected, his splendid virtues would have procured for him an easy admission into the Calendar of Saints. Bishop Burnet, who knew him intimately, says that "he had the reputation of a saint;" and such men as Nairn, Charteris, Aird, Andrew Gray, sat at his feet as disciples, and imbibed much of his sanctified spirit. And when we consider the fact that he

¹ This Church or Cathedral, so rich in historic memories, having recently been restored by Dr. William Chambers, Her Majesty expressed her desire to confer a baronetcy on Dr. Chambers, which he signified his willingness to accept. Dr. Chambers, full of days and honours, departed this life on the 20th of May, just three days before the ceremonial of opening the Church by the representative of the Queen.

published nothing in his lifetime, by which we could estimate the lofty virtues ascribed to him, we are led gratefully to recall and acknowledge the service which Dr. Fall and Leighton's nephew rendered to his memory in giving us those works which so amply confirm the testimony of his contemporaries. Instead of destroying the pile of ms. which Leighton had written, as he directed them to do, they wisely and charitably otherwise construed his instruction, and thereby enriched our sacred literature, and at the same time brought us sensibly nearer to the saintly man whose hand had gathered these precious treasures. The full light which Leighton's character and genius reflected on his contemporaries comes to us from them like moonlight in its clearness, without the force and warmth of the sun's rays; but now that we have his own writings, we are permitted to walk amid the beauty and spiritual tenderness of the after-glow that lingers when the sun has set. Milton represents a book as the precious life-blood of its author, preserved for a life beyond life. It is like the rose of Jericho (*Anastatica hierochuntica*), which grows near the Dead Sea and the Jordan, on a stem of five or six inches high, and sends out small white flowers, having the remarkable property of being preserved for years, if taken up entire before it begins to wither, and kept in a dry room, so that whenever the root is placed in water the flower-buds swell out and open as if newly transplanted. Nay, such is the force of its suspended animation, that when the tiny root gets detached from the sandy soil which it delights in, and growth ceases, the plant is content to bide its time, till a favouring breeze comes to waft it away to a little pool, and though "the root wax old and the stock thereof seem to die, yet through the scent of water it will bud and bring forth like a plant." For many years Leighton's mss. lay, like the rose of Jericho, waiting for the impulse that was to quicken them into life, which was first imparted when Dr. Fall, in 1692, published a volume of sermons "at the desire of his friends, after his death, from his papers, written with his own hand." Leighton's fame was no longer traditional,—the echo of the voices of friends on whom the serene purity of his life and elevation of his character had acted like a magnetic charm; but was the spontaneous tribute of innumerable minds that had been kindled by the heavenly fire

of his discourses, illustrating that old saying, "Now we believe, for we have heard him ourselves."

In glancing at the bibliography of Leighton, of which we have marked the latest outcome at the beginning of this paper, it is noteworthy that three of the books are issued from one publishing house, this present year. Such a circumstance sends us back to 1692, the year in which the first of Leighton's works was issued. The stream which then began to flow for the spiritual enrichment of successive generations has been somewhat constant ever since. Leighton's first editor was Dr. James Fall, who was made Principal of Glasgow University in 1684, the year of Leighton's death, but who, being deprived at the Revolution, afterwards became a Canon of York Minster. Beginning with a volume of *Eighteen Sermons*, which is now lying before us, he proceeded with the *Commentary on First Peter*, the *Praelectiones* and *Paraeneses*, and *Meditationes in Psalmos* which had been given in Edinburgh University, and afterwards with *The Exposition of the Creed*, *The Lord's Prayer*, and *The Ten Commandments*, *A Catechism for Children*, and *Rules for a Holy Life*. These various works, printed at the expense of Edward Lightmaker, the loving nephew of Leighton, appeared at irregular intervals between 1692 and 1708. We do not enter on the merits of Dr. Fall as an editor further than to say, that while he shows a reverent regard rising into enthusiasm for his author, and a scrupulous concern for the *ipsissima verba* of Leighton's ms., his method of punctuation is often so faulty as to obscure the sense of the author.

Nearly forty years elapsed before a re-issue of Leighton was made. In 1745 a reprint of the *Sermons* appeared, "wherein all obvious errors of the press are amended, some notes added for the sake of the common reader, and an account of his life prefixed." No name of editor is given, but Mr. West gives the name of William Wogan, that gentleman having acknowledged the book as his. The account of the life of Leighton is simply an extract from Burnet. In his introduction, the editor speaks of the volume of sermons "as having grown so very scarce, and having always borne a high character among all good men who had ever read it, especially as it is chiefly levelled to oppose some unsound doctrines now reviving amongst us."¹

¹ Mr. West says, "this refers to the Wealeyana."—Leighton's *Works*, vol. vii. p. 304.

By the time Wogan's volume was in type, an enterprising Edinburgh bookseller, named David Wilson, had prepared a volume entitled *Select Works of Archbishop Leighton, some of which were never before printed—to which is prefixed an Account of the Author's Life and Character*, which he published in March, 1746. In addition to the discourses given by Dr. Fall, Wilson printed ten sermons which had not been previously printed, nine of which he had from a gentleman who said, "as far as he remembers, he copied them with his own hand from the Bishop's originals above 60 years ago." The tenth he received from one "who had it in his possession, taken from the Bishop as he delivered it."¹ The volume was printed by subscription, and the publisher while thanking the ladies and gentlemen who had been the encouragers of his undertaking, says, "I would have printed a list of subscribers, but I thought it was a piece of ostentation few are fond of." As it turned out, this goodly volume, well printed, with the text corrected by "two worthy, learned, and judicious ministers," was the pioneer of a larger undertaking. He informs his readers that he has got in his possession "some more writings of this valuable author, which never were printed, and has a view of procuring some others, which probably may be communicated to the public along with that very deserving and justly esteemed work, his *Commentary on Peter*, which is now become very scarce and seldom to be met with." Mr. West, from a letter he had from Mr. David Laing, written from Northampton to Wilson, December 1746, has cleared up the secret of Wilson's engaging Dr. Doddridge to edit Leighton's works. It appears that James Robertson,¹ a native of Cromarty, was acting as tutor in the Northampton Academy, and at Wilson's request, proposed to Doddridge to edit the works and prepare

¹ It would appear that our forefathers were more abundant in writing out copies of sermons than the present generation. Wogan tells of "a religious person who had been at the expense of a ms. copy of most of Leighton's sermons." We have in our possession a fair copy of the sermons of Andrew Gray, of 1661, which must have been taken down verbatim. Wilson refers above to Leighton's sermon on John xxi. 22, preached before Parliament in 1669, which had however been published from Leighton's ms. in 1708.

² Dr. James Robertson was Professor of Hebrew in the University of Edinburgh from 1751 to 1792. He studied Oriental languages under the Schultens at Leyden, and was a great defender of the Hebrew points. He became quite a pundit, as his *Clavis Pentateuchi* and *Hebrew Grammar* bear witness.

a life of Leighton. Doddridge agreed to do so, though the preparation of the life was left over, and Doddridge's ill-health, ending in his death about three years later, prevented the fulfilment of his promise. Wilson spared no pains to render his work thorough and complete; writing letters to Dr. Henry Miles of London, the Trustees of the *Bibliotheca Leightoniana* at Dunblane, and others, for assistance in his undertaking.¹ With Doddridge, the editing was a pure labour of love, and must have involved much self-denial amid other pressing duties, but his noble preface sets before us the exceeding great reward which the editor had received in his own soul from his patient study of every word and letter of Leighton. He says, "The delight and edification which I have found in the writings of this WONDERFUL man, for such I must deliberately call him, would have been a full equivalent for my pains, separate from all prospect of that effect which they might have upon others; for truly I know not that I have ever spent a quarter of an hour in reviewing any of them, but, even amidst that interruption which a critical examination of the copy would naturally give, I have felt some impressions which I could wish always to retain."² The work appeared in two volumes in 1748, and was the standard edition for half a century.

Ten years after this edition was issued, we find Wilson, now established in London, republishing his favourite author with such additional portions of the good Bishop's scattered writings³ as he could collect. Among other pieces he mentions *Nineteen*

¹ Wilson says that the Latin work on the Psalms "was translated by a good hand." We think we may venture the conjecture that Robertson was the "hand," as it was through him Doddridge was enlisted as editor, and as Bower says of him, "He was an excellent Latin scholar, and had the ready command of a good Latin style." His *Hebrew Grammar* is in Latin, and bears out what Bower states. Besides, Doddridge says of the *Meditationes*, "I have taken care they should be faithfully translated, and have revised the version with as much accuracy as my other engagements would allow," words which might fitly apply to Robertson, who was then tutor in his academy.

² Wilson acknowledges the favour done him by the Rev. Robert Hamilton, who revised the sheets as they came from the press, and made many judicious corrections. Dr. Robert Hamilton was then minister of the Old Greyfriars, and afterwards a Professor of Divinity, 1754-79. It is interesting to find Robertson and Hamilton connected with Leighton's works, both of them being Professors in the University of which Leighton was Principal.

³ Wilson mentions that he was endeavouring to recover Leighton's *Discourses on the Epistle to the Ephesians*, of which Dr. Fall spoke in 1694 as "at the press;" but, strange to say, neither the MS. nor any printed copy of these discourses has ever since been seen.

Letters taken from the Originals in my possession, doubtless part of the large collection of which Doddridge spoke. So late as 1763, we find the old Edinburgh bibliopole, now for some years ensconced "at Plato's Head in the Strand, London," sending forth a translation of Leighton's *Praelectiones and Paraenesis*, to which are added *Rules and Instructions for a Holy Life, and other remains of the same excellent Author*. Posterity owes a debt of gratitude to David Wilson for his unwearied diligence in collecting the writings of Leighton, some of which were in danger of being lost; for his fidelity in securing their careful editing by competent men, and for reproducing those that had during half a century gone out of print; and for his action as one of the loving hands that aided in the transmission of a great name across the tide of two centuries.

We do not pause to speak of a reprint of Wilson's *Leighton* in 1777, by the Rev. Henry Forster, A.M., London. Nor should we notice an edition published by Baynes in 1805, and afterwards with a so-called life of Leighton by the Rev. Erasmus Middleton, were it not for the discreditable way in which it was forced into print. The story tells that some London booksellers, in concert with booksellers in Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Aberdeen, projected an edition of Leighton in six volumes octavo, with a Life of Leighton by the Rev. George Jerment (afterwards Dr. Jerment), a Secession minister in London. This work was to extend over three years, two volumes being issued annually. The prospectus caught the eye of Baynes, who forthwith published a four-volume edition in hot haste with the pretentious title of *The Whole Genuine Works of Robert Leighton*, so as to pick up buyers who might have taken the Jerment edition. We were struck, on examining this work, with the spurious character of the Life, which is an ill-disguised plagiarism from Wilson; and it was only from Mr. West's extract from the advertisement to the Jerment edition of 1820, that we discovered the unscrupulous means that had been used in its production. Of Jerment's edition, 1805-1808, we are disposed to think more favourably than Mr. West. He says of the memoir, "It does not contain much information, but is written in a quaint and genial style, and the writer, though he regards the elder Leighton as a saint and a martyr, is evidently a good and amiable man." The memoir, along with several pieces not

previously printed, such as *Lectures on the first nine Chapters of Matthew's Gospel*, was reprinted in 1814 in a separate volume entitled *The Remains of Archbishop Leighton : consisting of all the unpublished pieces found in Manuscript in the Library left by him to the Diocese of Dunblane*. A perusal of the memoir leads to the conclusion that Dr. Jerment not only utilised the fragments of Burnet and others, but drew materials from fresh sources, and was the first after Doddridge to give a critical estimate of the writings of Leighton. He was also the first to give "appropriate titles to the several discourses." The negative praise bestowed on Dr. Jerment by Mr. West, as being "evidently a good and amiable man," notwithstanding his committing the mistake of "regarding the elder Leighton as a saint and a martyr," is quite of a piece with many other things Mr. West has written. He reserves his commendation for the edition that came after that of Jerment, and which is better known to the present generation, namely that of John Norman Pearson, a beautiful four-volume edition issued in 1825, and which has undergone numerous reprints. So far, we agree with Mr. West that Pearson's memoir "is the first that deserves the name of a Life," in its freshness, elaboration, and sifting of facts, but it is marked with tinges of scornful churchliness and reprobation of everything Presbyterian, which, however, are not blemishes in the opinion of Mr. West. It is but just to Mr. Pearson to say that he is not responsible for the state of the text in the edition with which his name is associated.

In 1831 an Edinburgh firm published *The Works of Robert Leighton, D.D., Archbishop of Glasgow; with a Life of the Author* by James Aikman, Esq., in one volume. Mr. West says, "The *Life* is not of a kind to call for any special notice." Following in the wake of Pearson, Mr. Aikman traverses some of Pearson's allegations, and credits Dr. Jerment as "the first regular biographer to whose labours succeeding writers of Leighton's life have been under great, though rather unacknowledged, obligations." This edition, in 1839, was published by Thomas Nelson, whose "List of Standard Works" of that year in divinity, history, and general literature shows how judicious a caterer of general and religious knowledge that gentleman was, as, indeed, is the eminent firm of which he

was the founder. We pass over the edition of Leighton's Latin works, edited by Professor Scholefield, A.M., of Cambridge, and published in 1828, and afterwards; the *Selections* from Leighton's works which have from time to time appeared, and the various translations in German, French, and Dutch noticed by Mr. West.¹ Nor can we afford space for a reference to a well-written biography by Dr. Thomas Murray, in 1828. We may give a passing word on two works, consisting of selections, with a memoir of Leighton. One is entitled *The Wisdom of our Fathers: Selections from the Miscellaneous Works of Archbishop Leighton*, which was published some years ago by the Religious Tract Society, London, with a brief memoir drawn up by Dr. S. Manning. The other is entitled *Spirit of the Old Divines*, second series, published by W. P. Nimmo, Edinburgh, 1864, a large space being devoted to Leighton. Such works as these, and the fourth of the works at the head of this article, serve to advertise the larger works of Leighton by presenting portions of his writings before such readers as have not made acquaintance with the author, just as Coleridge in his *Aids to Reflection* gave impulse to the study of Leighton by the choice aphorisms he culled from Leighton's pages.

The first of the works named above is the last complete edition of Leighton, though as yet the work is in itself incomplete. Like old authors, the editor fills his title-page with a full programme of his intended work, which is announced to be "in six volumes." But as he promises "a life of the author and of his father," as "prefixed," the series begins with volume second and proceeds to volume sixth, reserving volume first for the memoir. Volume ii. has an introduction on "the author and his works," which is dated from "the Parsonage, Nairn, N.B., Christmas Eve, 1868," and volume vi. bears to be from the same place, "Lammas Day, 1870." Expectation naturally waited for the appearance of the first volume, which was to consist of "a few short papers connected with the Accommodation and Indulgence, to be printed along with the life and letters." A new volume appeared in 1875 entitled *Remains*, and numbered "volume vii.," but, as the preface tells, it had been printed for "The Leighton Club" only. In that volume

¹ *Remains*, 1875, pp. 373-376.

Mr. West states the case of the "Life and Letters" as on the way to completion, and his "feeling hopeful that he would be enabled to publish it when it was ready for the press." He says that "it is the *memoir* that general readers care for, and I frequently get letters from different parts of the world inquiring after it. On the other hand I must confess it is the *Works* that I have all along had most at heart; the *Life* has seemed a secondary matter, though I have spared no pains in making researches and collecting materials for it" (p. 338). We fear that the memoir, which has now lingered so long by the way, notwithstanding all the expenditure of toil and means in collecting materials for it, is in danger of collapse. Dr. Tulloch in his lecture says he has for many years been awaiting "the complete collection of the materials of Leighton's life, in its earliest and latest portion, in order to present on an extended scale a full review, not only of his work, but of the formative influences under which his character was moulded, and the lessons of enduring value which sum up his great career." We join Dr. Tulloch in his expression of regret that the promise given by Mr. West is still unfulfilled, in part at least, in consequence of Mr. West's ill-health. Mr. West has devoted a quarter of a century to the task of commentator of Leighton, and has achieved noble success in tracing thoughts and allusions in Leighton's writings to the spring-heads whence they came. He has built up a chronology of Leighton's works, and brought to light some unpublished writings, besides endeavouring to establish a standard text. It is sad to be weakened in the effort to crown his labours with the success which such patient toil demanded—to have built so high and yet be unable to bring out the cope-stone. Though we are unable to concur in much Mr. West has written by way of annotation, especially in his pronounced sectarianism, so far removed from the beautiful catholic spirit of his author, in his finding needless occasion to magnify his own Church and to brand Presbyterians as fanatics and unchurch them, and, above all, in his type of theology, so different from Leighton's that he must needs boldly contest ground with Leighton and administer a corrective to him, yet we willingly accord to Mr. West the praise of having exceeded all that have gone before him in minute investigation of the structure of Leighton's works, and of placing side-lights along

Leighton's pages to enhance the value and reflect the beauty of his thoughts.

Dr. Tulloch's lecture furnishes us with a rapid sketch of the life and times of Leighton, or, as he describes it, "a summary of the salient points of his history, and the chief conclusions of interest they suggest." It presents a condensed account of Leighton's father, disposing of the surmises that have passed current for facts regarding his education and profession in Scotland. Dr. Tulloch says of Alexander Leighton's book, *Sion's Plea against the Prelacie*: "Of the nature of this book I cannot speak, as I have not seen a copy of it; but it has been described as very scurrilous and inflammatory in its character." So, too, Dr. Blaikie, in his lecture, characterises the *Plea* as "written in the bitter style of controversy that we often meet with, steeped in a scornful spirit, and in other ways irritating and offensive." We have the original editions of *An Appeal to the Parliament, or, Sion's Plea against the Prelacie*, and of Leighton's earlier book, *The Mirror of the Holy War*, which ran in the same line as the *Plea*; and, while admitting the tone of severity of the former, we cannot charge it with more of the offensive or coarse spirit of controversy than pertained to the polemical literature of the time, or even long afterwards. We think we could adduce from Milton's *Eikonoklastes*, in answer to the *Eikon Basilike*, passages as highly charged with bitter invective as any that Alexander Leighton wrote. Dr. Tulloch speaks of Principal Adamson of Edinburgh, and his *Catechetical Method of the Christian Religion*, as giving some cast to the theology of Leighton: "Leighton would, no doubt, get such good as could be got from him, and any other theological instructor in the University." In the *Bibliotheca Leightoniana* at Dunblane the quaint old Syllabus of Divinity mentioned by Principal Tulloch is still extant.¹ It was printed,

¹ The full title of this Latin Catechism is ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΩΣ ΕΛΟQVΙΟΡVΜ ΔΕΙ; Sive Methodus Religionis Christianæ Catechetica. In usum Academicæ Iacobi Regis, et Scholarum Edinburgensium Conscrip̃ta ab Ioanne Adamsono Academicæ Moderatore Primario. Edinburgi, excudebunt Haeredes Andree Hart. Cum gratia et privilegio. 1627.

The dedication is to David Aikinhead, Provost of Edinburgh, whom Leighton, as a student, celebrated in a witty epigram, and other city dignitaries. The Reverend Principal mentions in his *Epistola Dedicatoria* that he had first of all drawn up the substance of the Catechism at the command of the "National Synod of Aberdeen, along with Patrick Galloway and John

at the expense of the Town Council of Edinburgh, for the benefit of the youths attending the University, but it was not the only text-book of divinity, nor was Adamson the only teacher of theology. Of Adamson's sound Protestantism there is a striking illustration given, we think, in *Lamont's Diary* :— "On the 3d of August 1640, Principal Adamson was one of a Committee, who came to Machar Kirk, and ordained our blessed Lord Jesus his armes to be hewn out of the forefront of the pulpit thereof, and to take down the portrait of our blessed Virgin Mary and her Son, babie Jesus in her armes, that had stood since the up putting thereof, in curious work, under the syling, at the west end of the pend whereon the great staple stands unmoved while now." There was another theological master in Edinburgh University in Leighton's student days, who was afterwards a co-presbyter, namely, James Fairlie, for many years a Regent, then Professor of Divinity. By the year 1637 he had climbed up into the bishopric of the Isles, and preached in Greyfriars and read Laud's Liturgy on the same day that Dean Hannay was reading the collects in St. Giles'. He was unfrocked by the Glasgow Assembly, but made his submission, and became a probationer under the strong rule of Presbytery; and, after weariful importunity, succeeded in becoming parish minister of Lasswade—the church of William Drummond of Hawthornden—and the neighbour-minister and friend of Leighton in Newbattle.

Dr. Tulloch's lecture sparkles with many fine things, cut like crystal, as when, describing Leighton as a preacher, he says: "There is a savour of heavenly-mindedness in all his

Hall" [1616], and though "he was the junior, these [Court favourites] had devolved the task upon him; that it had gone forth, as a child snatched from a parent's bosom, crude and immature; that he had now revised and enlarged it, and given it a Latin garb for the use of church and schools." In some respects this Catechism runs very close to our *Shorter Catechism*. The three Creeds, the Decalogue, the Lord's Prayer, with poetical versions of them by Patrick Adamson, along with several prayers for young persons, and directions for the observance of the Lord's Supper, make up the second half of the book. The copy before us has Leighton's initials written at the end, and bears evidence of having been much in use by him. Professor Mitchell thinks that Dr. John Sharp, who was appointed Professor of Theology in Edinburgh in 1630, "was in all probability the chief theological teacher of Robert Leighton, whose father's opinions in his early life he had shared."—*The Westminster Assembly: its History and Standards* (London: Nisbet & Co., 1883), pp. 351-2.

sermons, an upper air, serene and calm, as if breathed from the Eternal." Dr. Blaikie, too, has produced a well-balanced estimate of Leighton as a theologian, though the sketch of the life is less minute than that of the Principal. He says :—

"The most remarkable feature of Leighton's writings is his magnificent conception of the true spirit of Christianity, and the charm with which that spirit is developed and commended. Leighton is both a doctrinal and a practical writer, and he is most careful both as an expounder of truth and a pleader for duty. . . . I know not where you will find a writer that infuses so much of the spirit of Christ into his expositions and exhortations. We feel as if his works had been written in the ivory palaces, amid the aroma of myrrh and aloes and cassia, or as if he had been in the lodging of Jesus at Bethabara, with Andrew and John, and had beheld His glory, and heard the words that dropped from His lips like the honeycomb. . . . If he calls you to an obedience that never halts, to a trust that never fails, to a hope that is never dimmed, to an ardour that is never chilled, you do not find him delineating such high things as if he had already attained, or were already perfect. But you do find him, amid the consciousness of much infirmity and shortcoming, stretching forth his hands to God, viewing with longing eyes the heights that are yet afar off, and thinking with holy delight, 'What will it be to be there?'"

He repeats a remark of Wodrow to the effect that Leighton's "clergy of the diocese of Dunblane were a most ignorant and scandalous set, and that Leighton never attempted to turn any of them out." The Records of the Synod of Dunblane from 1662 to 1688 are now in print, so that Leighton's dealings with his clergy are openly known. We have also perused the Records of Dunblane Presbytery during the same period, and from careful study of both have come to the conclusion that Wodrow's charge is utterly unfounded. Had the clergy been "curates," like the indiscriminate herd which Archbishop Burnet drafted into the parishes of the western shires, after extruding three or four hundred good ministers, Wodrow's charge of ignorance and scandal might have had some weight. But, with two or three exceptions, all the Presbyterian ministers of the Presbyteries of Dunblane and Auchterarder, which constituted the See of Dunblane, conformed, so that Wodrow's charge, if well founded, must be levelled at the existing order of things before Leighton's accession as a bishop, and not at the men he made priests. Not a few of them were M.A.'s of St. Andrews and Edinburgh. One of them, Mr. Robert Kirk of Aberfoyle, was author of the first *Gaelic Psalter*,

superintended the edition of Bedell's *Irish Bible for the use of the Highland Population*, and was author of a work called *The Secret Commonwealth, or, An Essay on the Nature and Actions of Elves, etc.* One of the nonconformists was Alexander Pitcairn, minister of Dron, who was restored at the Revolution, and was afterwards Principal of the University of St. Andrews. As to the scandals affecting the character of Leighton's clergy, there is one case of drunkenness and corresponding impropriety of conduct, which Leighton and his synod prosecuted and visited with sharp discipline. We cannot, therefore, ascribe Wodrow's charge to aught else than the envious gossip of the time.

Till within a recent period very little was known of the earlier part of Leighton's career as a Presbyterian minister, and what was known rested almost entirely on the authority of Burnet. He has done ample justice to Leighton's reputation as a great preacher whose sacred eloquence arrested every hearer, and oftentimes dimmed the eyes of whole congregations with tears. A student and ripe scholar, he had gathered around him a splendid library, and in the assiduous reading of his books and devout meditation he found pure delight. But he was not altogether the recluse whose back is turned to the sun, who shuns human society, and "bids, for cloistered cell, his neighbour and his friend farewell." Certainly there was in him a powerful impulse towards the monastic type of Christian life, which was born of a natural temper that leaned to the ascetic side, indulged in the study of mystic divinity, and imposed rigid restraints on the spirit, as if he had taken the vow and habit of a religious order. We are indebted to Burnet for many facts regarding Leighton's ways, both as a Presbyterian minister and as a bishop. But though, as he says, "he laid open the good and bad of all sides and parties, as clearly and impartially as he himself understood it, concealing nothing that he thought fit to be known, and representing things in their natural colours, without art or disguise, without any regard to kindred or friends, to parties or interests," yet, as he warns his readers to take what he says of clergymen, "with some grains of allowance," we accept the caution in reading his account of Leighton's ministry at Newbattle :—

"He soon came to see into the follies of the Presbyterians, and to dislike their Covenant, particularly the imposing it, and their fury against all who differed from them. He found they were not capable of large thoughts; theirs were narrow as their tempers were sour, so he grew weary of mixing with them. He scarce ever went to their meetings, and lived in great retirement, minding only the care of his own parish at Newbattle, near Edinburgh. Yet all the opposition that he made to them was, that he preached up a more exact rule of life than seemed to them consistent with human nature; but his own practice did even outshine his doctrine."¹

The disproof of three-fourths of the above paragraph, notwithstanding the frequent repetitions it has had at the hands of all the biographers of Leighton, is very simple. A few years ago Dr. Gordon, the esteemed minister of Newbattle, copied out the minutes of the Presbytery of Dalkeith from 1639 to 1653, along with "Extracts from the Session Records of Newbattle during the Incumbency of Mr. Robert Leighton," and communicated both to David Laing, LL.D., V.-P. of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. Dr. Laing edited these quaint memorials with illustrations from his own unique stores of antiquarian lore, and they are now to be found in the *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries*, vol. iv. pp. 459-489. Documents such as these, while far from being interesting to most readers, are yet highly valuable for the dry light they shed on matters of fact such as transpired in the Presbytery of which Leighton was a member, and any Dryasdust who may hap to light on them will be able to read between the lines of Burnet's story.

Leighton's ordination took place "at Newbotle" on 16th December 1641;² and it is curious to note that the Clerk of

¹ Burnet's *History of his own Time*, Edinburgh, 1753, vol. i. p. 194. Burnet was born in 1643, two years after Leighton's ordination; became minister of Salton, 1665; translated to Glasgow as Professor of Divinity, 1669; resigned his chair, and left for London, 1674, the same year as Leighton resigned the Archdiocese of Glasgow. "It cannot be supposed," says Principal Tulloch, "that Burnet invented the statements which he makes. . . . But so far clearly Burnet's impressions are wrong and his alleged facts erroneous." It appears that Leighton was in his grave when Burnet began to write his recollections and impressions of Leighton in his History.

² The Records bring Leighton before the Presbytery on 15th July, as "appointed to adde, and bring a testimoniall from Edinburgh the next day." On the 22d July "Mr. Robert Lichtone exercised, and again on 29th July, on Rom. ii. 1-4, doctrine approven." He was then appointed to preach at "Newbotle," which he did in the beginning of August. And on 23d September his presentation from the Earl of Lothian was produced. His "tryalls" before the Presbytery extended from September 30th to November 25, and his ordination took place on 16th December 1641.

Presbytery was instructed to write to the Presbyteries of Edinburgh and Haddington "for their concurrence to the said action." These Presbyteries accordingly sent commissioners to the ordination, one of the representatives from Edinburgh being Robert Douglas, a man of splendid powers, who had, as Wodrow says, "a singular way of preaching without doctrines, which some called *scumming the text*," a trusty leader of the Resolutions, "who has left behind him a reputation of greatness, of wise and enlightened sagacity, and yet has left nothing else by which we can clearly judge or estimate him."¹ The Moderator of Dalkeith Presbytery was John Knox, "who posed Mr. Robert Lichtone and the parochineers of Newbottle with sundry questions competent to the occasion, and with imposition of hands and solemn prayers admitted him Minister at Newbottle." The Presbytery met again on the 30th December, "quhilk day, the brethren subscrivit Mr. Robert Lichtone's collatione and took his oath of alledgiance, and that he hath maid no privat pactione to the prejudice of the Kirk." We have detailed thus minutely the account of Leighton's settlement to show that he took orders as a Presbyterian minister *ex animo*, and with no undertone of misgiving or latent prejudice. What may have been "the follies of the Presbyterians," which he soon came to discover, Burnet leaves us to conjecture.² Dr. Tulloch says that "before the close of his life, Leighton had ample experience of what he might call 'the follies of the Presbyterians,' and his later experience may have reflected a

¹ Principal Tulloch's *Lecture*, p. 123. Robert Douglas preached the Coronation Sermon of Charles II. at Scone, 1st January 1651. This is the only specimen we have of his preaching; and, so far from showing a *scumming of the text*, it is thoroughly expository, with a masculine grip and force in it. Dr. Mitchell terms him "the silent, sagacious, masterful man."—*The Westminster Assembly*, p. 126.

² As illustrations of the esteem in which his services were held, we find him in 1642 one of the Commissioners of Assembly "to promote unity in religion and uniformity in church-government in the three kingdoms." And again, in June 1646, when the Assembly appointed a committee of the ablest men of the Church, including Professors of the four Universities, to examine complaints made against Dr. John Strang of Errol (afterwards Principal of Glasgow), in reference to his work entitled *De concursu et influxu Divino cum actionibus Creaturarum*, the following is the list of the great names:—"Alexander Henderson, John Sharp (author of *Cursus Theologicus*, a Professor of Divinity in Edinburgh before Leighton had completed his studies there), Robert Douglas, George Gillespie, Robert Blair, Samuel Rutherford, James Wood, Wm. Strachan, David Dickson, Robert Baillie, John Neave, Edward Calderwood, and ROBERT LEIGHTON." The Committee reported in 1647 they were satisfied with Dr. Strang's orthodoxy.

tinge of bitterness upon some of the recollections of his early ministry." There is much probability in that supposition; and we incline to the opinion that Burnet antedates Leighton's divergence from his brethren in what he calls their "follies," as well as in his statement of his "dislike of their Covenant." It is an incontrovertible fact that Leighton espoused the Covenant, the evidence of which can be seen at any time in the Museum of the Society of Antiquaries at Edinburgh, where there is a printed copy of "The Solemn League and Covenant, 1643," with Leighton's signature appended.¹ The Presbytery records have frequent reference to Leighton's administration of the Covenant, an instance of which occurred so late as June 27, 1650: "This day, Robert Ker, having been 12 years in Germany, and having come to the country within thirteen dayes, and having his fathir dwelling in Newbotle, was ordained to be received to the Covenant by Mr. Robert Leightoun, after triall." There is this to be said in vindication of Burnet, that Leighton, after he became a bishop, not only expressed his dissatisfaction with the Covenant, but also with its being "violently imposed upon all ranks of men, thereby engaging such droves of poor ignorant persons to they knew not what, . . . as far off from the reach of poor country people's understanding as from the true interest of their souls, and yet to tie them by a religious oath either to know all, or to contend for them blindfold without knowing of them." But the fact remains in all its stubbornness, that he complied, apparently without protest, with the prevailing orders of the Church as a Covenanter, both as minister of Newbattle, and afterwards as Principal of Edinburgh University.

That some of his brethren "were not capable of large thoughts" was a misfortune by no means peculiar to his Presbytery or time. Leighton, doubtless, with all his humility, had self-consciousness enough of his learning and masterly qualities as a minister of the gospel. Ruskin says he believes "the first test of a truly great man is his humility; a curious under-sense of powerlessness, feeling that the greatness is *not*

¹ This interesting relic is in book form, with white leaves after the letterpress for signatures. From the Kirk-Session Accounts of Newbattle, it appears that the cost of the Covenant to the parish was 4s. The Earl of Lothian, Sir John Murray, and other heritors and parishioners subscribed along with Leighton.

in him but *through* him, that he could not do or be anything else than God made him ; and he sees something divine and God-made in every other man he meets, and is endlessly, foolishly, incredibly merciful." Leighton had this "under-sense" in him all through, as Burnet elsewhere testifies "that while he had a cure he was ready to employ all others, and when he was a bishop he chose to preach to small auditories, and would never give notice beforehand ; he had, indeed, a very low voice, and so could not be heard by a great crowd." At the same time he knew quite well that his preaching was highly appreciated, and when he accepted a bishopric, he stated, in a letter to a friend, that he expected that his new departure would break the idol of popularity, of which he was heartily weary. But we cannot suppose that the disparagement cast on his co-presbyters—with whom he lived on the most cordial terms—that they were incapable of large thoughts, was uttered by Leighton's lips, unless as expressive of his own breadth of view on some of the politico-ecclesiastical questions of the day. And as to the charge made against the tempers of the presbyters of Dalkeith as being "sour," we must not take the epithet for more than a general term descriptive of a disbeliever in Episcopacy, as we find Burnet invariably characterising Presbyterians as such. Unamiable tempers, in his idea, were the exclusive property of men that prayed extempore and preached long sermons, and contrived to keep religion alive without the aid of a bishop. Leighton, being of a gentle, loveable disposition, must have disrelished men of austere, morose, ill-natured habits, and Burnet forthwith draws the conclusion that Leighton "grew weary of mixing with them." Now, the records of Leighton's Presbytery, while they do not reveal the tone of mind in which he was, when waiting on the meetings of Presbytery, at all events plainly tell that he "mixed" with his co-presbyters, and was the most exemplary member of Presbytery in his attendance : a fact which entirely displaces another statement to the same effect, "that he scarce ever went to their meetings." Had the Bishop of Sarum, who in his early days was Presbytery Clerk of Haddington, taken the trouble to correspond with the Clerk of the Presbytery of Dalkeith regarding Leighton's relations to his Presbytery, he would not only have saved himself the trouble of penning statements not

in accordance with fact, but also prevented every writer of Leighton's earlier life retailing his erroneous statements.

Without dwelling at length on other misrepresentations of Burnet, we may briefly notice two things in which the "Presbytery Records" join issue with the Bishop: (1.) Leighton's favouring the Engagement; and (2.) the resignation of his ministry at Newbattle. The evidence on both these points is against Burnet's view of the case. Dr. Tulloch has gone so fully into the merits of both questions, that we may refer our readers to his Lecture.¹ If Leighton stood out for the Engagement, how does it happen that he was appointed a member of the tribunal for dealing with those who had been "active promoters of the sinful Engagement," unless on the absurd theory that he had turned "approver" as we have seen to be the case with promoters of more "sinful" engagements so recently? That he retained the confidence of his brethren so late as the year in which he offered to demit his charge is evident from the choice they made of him as their commissioner to repair to London "for negotiating the enlargement and freedom of brethren" who had been taken prisoners at Worcester and were detained in the Tower of London. And with regard to his demission, it is not the fact that he "withdrew from his cure in a silent manner," and that he "some time after" became Principal of Edinburgh College. The records of Edinburgh Town Council, and those of the Presbytery of Dalkeith, show that Leighton was regularly translated from the one charge to the other. It is true that Leighton tendered his demission to his Presbytery on the 16th December 1652, and a fortnight later sent a letter to the same effect, both of which the Presbytery refused to accept; and in order to induce him to change his purpose the Moderator was instructed to write to Leighton desiring him to return to his charge. At the Presbytery meeting, on the 13th January 1653, one of the ministers was "appointed to preach in Neubottle and to speik to the Earle of Lauthian about Mr. Lichtone." Negotiations had meanwhile been going on in Edinburgh for filling up the vacancy caused by the death of John Adamson, Leighton's old Principal. The Town Council had elected William Colville, who was at

¹ In the Memoir prefixed to the *Selections*, named above, the editor travels over the same ground with the Very Rev. Principal.

the time a Scots minister at Utrecht, in Holland; and Colville accepted the appointment and prepared for his return to Scotland. Some "obstructions," supposed to be connected with Colville's Royalist principles, having arisen, the Council, on the 17th January 1653, "declared the place vacant," and on the same day elected Leighton.¹ The following day the ministers of Edinburgh appeared and "declared that they could not give their votes because they were not clear on the manner of the call;" and on the 20th of that month appointed Andrew Bryson, then treasurer, "to go to Newbottle" and announce the call. The Presbytery met on the 27th, when

"Mr. Robert Lichtone compeared and desyred to be lowsed from his charge. Compeared Andro Brysone, in name of the towne of Edinburgh, shewing that the Councell of Edinburgh had given Mr. Lichtone a call to be Principall of the Colledge; and his Commissione being requyred, he undertook to produce it at the nixt meeting. Appoints the nixt meeting to be this day eight dayes,—and then to give ane answer to both."

The meeting took place on 3d February; the Commissioner produced a letter from the Council and also an Act of Council presenting Leighton to be Principal of Edinburgh College. Leighton, being "posed, if he would embrace the foresaid charge, answered that he was not yet fully resolved." Notwithstanding this hesitancy, the Presbytery translated, or, as the word then used was, "transported," him to that charge.² The Council Records bear that on the 30th March he was inducted as Principal and took the oath *de fidei*. He was elected one of

¹ In *Lamont's Diary*, under February 1653, the influence of the Protectorate on the Council in the appointment of Leighton is thus indicated: "Mr. Lighton, Minister of Newbottle in Lothian, was admitted by the English to be Principall of the Colledge of Edenburghe (he did succeed to Mr. Johne Adamsons)."

² Curiously enough, Colville, whom Leighton superseded in 1653, became Principal after Leighton's elevation as a bishop. The Council Records of 31st July 1661 speak of "a letter to be written to the Principal, presently in London." On 6th December, "the Council being informed that the Principal is to be advanced by His Majesty to some other place, they think fit to preserve their privileges as patrons over the College to elect leets in the meantime." On the 9th December, the Council pass "an Act delaying election of a Principal till it is known for certain that the Principal is to be removed." Leighton was consecrated in Westminster Abbey, on 15th December. On the 21st March 1662 the Council pass an Act electing William Colville, minister in Perth, to be Primar of the College of the Burgh, and names a committee to give him the call—their expenses to be paid." Colville accepted the call on 28th March, and "compeared on 3d September, and accepted the charge."

the Commissioners to the General Assembly of 1653 on the 14th July; but was not present when that Assembly was dispersed by one of Cromwell's colonels.¹

We have already exceeded the limits we had intended to occupy with this paper, and therefore reserve for another occasion the consideration of several questions raised by Drs. Tulloch and Blaikie with reference to Leighton's accession to Prelacy, and his bearing and posture as one of the Caroline bishops.² The attribution of low motive was unsparingly used against him by the Protesters and others, as may be read in the *Autobiography of Robert Blair*, Wodrow's *Analecta*, *The Coltness Collections*, and Brown's *Apologetical Narration*. Neither Dr. Tulloch nor Dr. Blaikie sympathises with the supporters of that charge. The truth seems to be that Leighton had gradually got disheartened by the wrangling and party strife that divided the Presbyterian camp; and when the Government declared for Episcopacy and invited him to be a bishop, he reluctantly yielded, in the hope that he might prove aidful in stanching the bleeding artery from which the rich religious life of Scotland was so fast ebbing away. He believed that Ussher's Modified Episcopacy might prove a scheme of comprehension that would gather the dispersed into one. It was the golden side of the shield that fascinated his wistful gaze, and he dreamt not that there was another side. Scarcely had the oil of consecration been poured over him than he awoke to a sense of helplessness in presence of ill-assorted colleagues, and gathering tokens of those "cross characters of an angry Providence, that seemed as if God was against them."

WILLIAM BLAIR.

¹ The Council passed an Act, 19th July 1653, "granting warrant to Professors of Divinity and others to elect in their name a Commissioner for the General Assembly, in place of Robert Leighton, who is at present in England."

² He was "the only one of the prelates of the seventeenth century who gained a name and fame for himself as a theologian, and passed his happiest days as a minister of the Presbyterian Church. Most of those discourses which charm us still, and which were treasured in many a humble Presbyterian household ere yet they had come to be so generally valued elsewhere, were preached from the pulpits, or delivered from the Chair of Divinity, in our Covenanting Church."—Dr. Mitchell's *Westminster Assembly*, p. 393: London, 1883.

ART. II.—*The Three Temptations.*

AT Jordan Jesus had received the special anointing of the Holy Spirit whereby He was prepared to enter on the work of His public ministry. He had been baptized with water and with the Spirit: with water by His forerunner and herald—with the Spirit by the Father who sent Him. He had been baptized with water in order to fulfil all righteousness; He had been baptized or anointed with the Spirit that "He might preach good tidings unto the meek; bind up the broken-hearted; proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God; to comfort all that mourn; to appoint unto them that mourn in Zion, to give unto them beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness; that they might be called Trees of righteousness, The planting of the Lord, that He might be glorified" (Isa. xi. 1, 2).

God had accredited Him as His Son. A voice from heaven had declared, as He came up out of the water and saw the opening heavens and the descending Spirit in dove-like form: "Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased."

One would have thought that now He might have entered on His work and begun to preach and teach, to heal and bless. But no; essential as the qualification was which He had received at Jordan, a further and different kind of qualification was needed. It was necessary that He should be subjected to temptation, to special and peculiar temptation; hence we read that "the Spirit drave Him into the wilderness." That Spirit who had just rested upon Him in a visible form, by whom He was now anointed, and with whom He was filled—who was on Him and in Him in a sense in which He had not been on Him and in Him before,—that Spirit drave Him into the wilderness.

It was not by the impulse of His human spirit merely that Jesus went into the wilderness. It was not simply that He might have a season of retirement, and that He might meditate on the mighty work which He had undertaken, and on which

He was about to enter, that He thus withdrew into solitude. It was by the impulse, the drawing, the driving of the Holy Spirit, and in order to be tempted of the devil. He was the Second Adam, the federal Head of redeemed humanity, and it was necessary that He should be put on trial as the first Adam—the first head—had been put. It was necessary that He should be tempted by the same agent who tempted and overcame the first Adam, and who had accomplished the ruin of the race in him. It was necessary that He should be put to the severest test possible. To this end He was led or driven by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the devil. The Spirit led or drove Him into the place where the temptation was to take place. He had no part in the temptation. He did not tempt the Saviour, nor instigate the devil to tempt Him. The temptation was purely and absolutely from Satan. Satan was moved to tempt the Saviour by his own malignity and pride, which blinded him to the hopelessness and folly of the attempt. This concurrence of action on the part of the Spirit of God and Satan, which took place in the temptation of the Saviour, often takes place in the temptation of the saints. God leads His saints into circumstances which expose them in a peculiar degree to the assaults of Satan, that they may be proved, or He allows Satan to tempt them. He sometimes gives them up to their own hearts' lusts, permitting them to fall into temptation, because they will not hearken unto Him. In the one case the strength and reality of their faith are manifested, and God is glorified. In the other case their weakness and folly are manifested, and they are humbled and made acquainted with their own hearts, and led to self-distrust and to a simpler faith in God Himself.

The devil came to the first Adam in a garden, the garden of Eden, where everything was in favour of the tempted and everything against the tempter. The devil came to the Second Adam in a wilderness, where everything was against the Tempted and in favour of the tempter. By his fall the first Adam turned the garden into a wilderness and threw the lower creation into a state of revolt. By His victory the Second Adam was to restore the wilderness into a garden, and bring back the rebel creatures to their allegiance to their lord and master, man. The ultimate result of His victory is to be the

absolute and universal subjection of all things to redeemed man. The prophet describes it thus: "The wilderness and the solitary place shall be glad for them; and the desert shall rejoice, and blossom as the rose. It shall blossom abundantly, and rejoice even with joy and singing;" and in another place: "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice' den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain: for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the LORD, as the waters cover the sea" (Isa. xxxv. 1; xi. 6-9).

In St. Mark's account of our Lord's temptation we see the wild beasts at peace with Him whose victory is to issue in the blessedness described by the prophet: "He was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan; and He was with the wild beasts" (Mark i. 13). What a picture is presented to us in the brief record—the *wilderness*, the *devil*, the *wild beasts*! That is the pass to which things have been brought. The fair creation has been marred, the creatures have been thrown into a state of revolt, Satan is supreme in the ruined world! The rightful Lord is come to undo the mischief of the Fall, and the usurper meets Him to dispute His demand—if possible, thwart Him in His work. It is in vain. Victory is sure to the Second Adam, but the temptation is none the less real. Let us now look at the assault on the Saviour by Satan, at the victory gained by the Saviour, at the help which He received, and the result.

St. Mark tells us that "the Spirit driveth Him into the wilderness," and that "He was there in the wilderness forty days tempted of Satan." He does not tell us the particulars of the temptation. He simply notes the fact and the duration of the temptation. We might infer from his words that the temptation lasted the whole time, and so also St. Luke's narrative might lead us to suppose. From the Gospel of St. Matthew, however, we might conclude that the tempter came to Him at the end of the forty days. The truth probably is that He was exposed to the assaults of Satan more or less during the whole time, but that, at the close of the days, Satan concentrated all

his skill and resources for a last onslaught, and that the particulars of this onslaught are recorded by St. Matthew and St. Luke. St. Luke's narrative seems to harmonise St. Matthew's and St. Mark's accounts. He first speaks generally of the Saviour's being tempted for forty days, and then of what the devil said unto Him when they were ended and the Saviour was an-hungered. Satan may not have continuously tempted the Saviour all these forty days. He may have come and gone, and thus St. Matthew's words, "And when the tempter came to Him, he said," etc., may be literally true although it was not the first coming to Him.

The tempter came to Him in outward visible form, and spake to the Saviour in an audible voice. He came in his own proper person, and tempted the Saviour immediately, and not mediately. We have here no allegorical representation of a merely inward experience of the Saviour; we have no account of the experience merely as it appeared to Him, although it had no corresponding outward embodiment. We have an account of an objective, and not merely of a subjective, reality. The narrative is strictly historical. What form Satan assumed we are not told. It was doubtless some disguise, probably a human form. He has power to assume, when permitted to do so, a visible appearance, to disguise himself. He appeared as a serpent in Eden. He can assume the guise of an angel of light.

How the tempter approached the Saviour we cannot tell. How he drew Him into conversation we are not told. We have only the particulars of the last onslaught, the contents of the last temptations at the close of the forty days, during which the Saviour had eaten absolutely nothing, and at the end of which He experienced all the pangs of hunger. He had been sustained during all the previous days naturally or supernaturally, either by the "moral and spiritual tension," the "intense and overwhelming excitement" of the time, which made Him insensible to His bodily wants, or by the power of God, or by the co-operation of both. At the close of them all the pangs of excessive hunger came upon Him, and Satan took advantage of His state to make his last great onslaught.

It was threefold.

It was addressed to His bodily needs. It was addressed to

His faith in God's promises. It was addressed to His desire to attain the end of His mission—universal dominion. It has been regarded as corresponding to the temptations from the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life, to which we are exposed. Satan's first attempt was to induce the Saviour to use His Divine power to appease His bodily appetite in a forbidden way. His second attempt was to induce the Saviour to place presumptuous confidence in the promises of God, and to expose Himself to needless danger, relying on God to avert the consequences of the self-made risk. His last attempt was to induce the Saviour to grasp the crown and sceptre destined for Him without enduring the cross,—to reach the glory without undergoing the sufferings, to take the kingdom from himself and not from God.

All these temptations were peculiarly subtle, marvellously adapted to the Saviour's circumstances, to His character and hopes. His intense bodily hunger was on the side of the first. His simple, unswerving faith was on the side of the second. His natural shrinking from pain and shame, His natural fitness for rule and desire to attain possession of the power to which He was destined, were on the side of the third. But in each case there was an element that forbade Him entertaining the suggestions of Satan.

In the first case, acceptance of Satan's challenge would have been to acknowledge that man does live by bread alone, that bread is the chief end of man, that life does consist in the abundance of material possessions. It would have been to place the lower nature above the higher in importance.

In the second case, to have done what Satan wished would have been to divorce the promises from the precepts, to rely on the fulfilment of the promises while practically disregarding the precepts. It would have been to court danger without due cause, and expect the help promised only to those who are exposed to danger in the path appointed for them to tread.

In the third case, to have accepted the kingdoms of the world from Satan would have been to renounce allegiance to the one living and true God, and to acknowledge the claim of Satan to be the god of this world. It seems to have been in this third temptation that the Saviour perceived who His tempter was, and addressed him by name, and dismissed

him. It is St. Matthew who probably gives the temptations in the order in which they actually occurred. In this third temptation Satan laid aside all disguise, and came out in his true character : " All these things will I GIVE THEE if Thou wilt fall down and worship ME." Satan saw that he could not work on the Saviour through His bodily appetites, and betray Him into the paths of distrust ; he saw that he could not work on the Saviour's trust, and betray him into presumption ; he saw that he could not ensnare the Saviour by skilful but mutilated quotations and misapplications of Holy Writ ; so, staking everything on a cast of the die, as it were, he threw off disguise, spake in his true character, and offered the Saviour the kingdoms of the world on condition of receiving worship from Him. The kingdoms of the world were Satan's in point of fact, but not in point of right. He was and is a usurper, but he was and is, in a very real sense, the god of this world. He was and is the prince of the power of the air, the spirit who now energises the children of disobedience. Had the Saviour consented to Satan's terms, Satan could have fulfilled his promise by leading men to accept Christ as King. He could have done for Christ what he will do for Antichrist, whose coming is to be after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish. The infatuation and folly of Satan, notwithstanding his skill and subtlety, appear in his entertaining the idea for a moment, as he doubtless did, that he could induce the Saviour to accept his terms. The attempt of Satan was as real as the temptation of the Saviour. The vision of the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them would offer a powerful attraction to His human mind. The thought of entering into all this power at once, without having first to fulfil all righteousness, to endure the cross, and all the contradiction of sinners against Himself, without having to tread the pathway of humiliation and rejection, and wait the Father's time, long centuries yet, before it could otherwise be actually His, must have been one which cost Christ's human heart a bitter pang to reject,—a pang the pain of which we can never fully enter into or conceive. The thought never could be entertained by Him for a moment, but all the charm of it, all the fascination of it, all the advantages

of it, humanly speaking, all that was involved in rejecting it, —all this would be clearly seen and keenly felt by Him. And in this, as in every temptation, *He suffered*, suffered more than heart can think or tongue can tell.

In subjecting the Saviour to those temptations Satan was permitted to have power over His body to remove Him from place to place, and over His bodily vision to extend its range, so that He saw all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them, in a very real sense. How this was effected we know not, but that it was so is clearly implied. The bodily eye with its unaided vision, or with any aid the wit of man could discover or devise, could not see all the kingdoms of the world from any mountain summit however lofty. Into these matters we cannot go deeply; but we must not explain away the historical narrative. We must receive it in simplicity. We have generally, I believe, very inadequate conceptions of the extent of Satan's power, or of his actual working in the world, of his ceaseless and widespread activity, of his activity in all the spheres of human life.

Such was the threefold assault on the Saviour made by Satan, and such the clear vision which the Saviour had of the inadmissibility of the suggestions made to Him; of the path which it became Him to tread; of the limits within which it was lawful for Him to put forth His Divine power; of the circumstances in which He was entitled to rely on His Father's promises, and the method by which He was destined to reach and obtain the kingdom.

Reduced, as He must have been, by hunger and weariness, His mental balance and clearness under these specious assaults were marvellous: so also was the readiness with which He remembered the appropriate portions of the Word with which to foil the tempter. They welled out of His heart to His lips just as they were wanted. The written Word was dwelling in Him richly; He was full of it. He had pondered it deeply and understood it perfectly. With the shield of faith, with the sword of the Spirit, He foiled the tempter and won the victory. The fiery darts of the devil were quenched by the shield of faith. The attacks of the devil were warded off by the sword of the Spirit. With these simple weapons, which are accessible to the humblest believer, the Saviour fought this fearful battle,

and won this great victory in the wilderness. He did not draw on His Divine knowledge or power or resources in any way. As man, and in the power of faith alone, He met and overcame the tempter. It is interesting to notice that all the quotations which the Saviour used for His own defence were drawn from the Book of Deuteronomy, and had reference in the first instance to the children of Israel in their wilderness journeyings.

The first was from a passage reminding Israel of the reason of God's dealings with them during the forty years He kept them in the wilderness, that it was to humble them, to prove them, to know what was in their heart, and whether they would keep His commandments or no; and reminding them of the reason why He suffered them to hunger, and fed them with manna, which neither they nor their fathers knew,—"that it was to make them know that man did not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." Remembering this, Jesus preferred hunger to distrust. The result of Israel's temptation in the wilderness was to bring the unbelief, the worldliness, the rebellion of their hearts to light. The result of the temptation of the Hope of Israel in the wilderness was to bring to light His immoveable trust in God and submission to Him.

The second was a precept founded on the conduct of Israel at Massah, where the people, suffering from thirst, chode with Moses and said, "Is the Lord among us or not?" and thus tempted the Lord. Had the Saviour complied with Satan's suggestion to cast Himself from the pinnacle of the temple, He would have been tempting God. Remembering how Israel had tempted the Lord at Massah, and how they were warned not to do so again, the Lord quoted the prohibition. The circumstances of Israel at Rephidim, and of the Saviour on the pinnacle of the temple, were wholly different, but the principle of their conduct would have been the same had the Saviour acted on Satan's suggestion. Israel did doubt whether God was among them, on account of the privations which they were suffering, and put God to the proof. The Saviour would have acted on a doubt whether He were really the Son of God had He cast Himself from the pinnacle of the temple at Satan's suggestion. He would have been putting God to the

proof in a presumptuous way. Thus, warned by the conduct of Israel in the wilderness, and obeying God's precept, He would not "tempt the Lord his God."

The third was the essence of precepts given to Israel on account of the danger they were in of forgetting the Lord and going after other gods of the people who were around them—a danger into which they often actually fell. He who was the ultimate object of all idolatrous worship offered the Saviour a magnificent bribe in order to win His homage. Seeing that this was in essence the temptation to which Israel was exposed, and into which Israel fell, the Lord foiled it by quoting the command given to Israel, to worship and serve the Lord their God only.

Thus the Saviour won the victory over Satan by the shield of faith and by the sword of the Spirit. Thus He taught us how to meet Satan, how to use Scripture, and thus we see the necessity of the most profound study of the Scriptures of the Old as well as the New Testament, so that we may acquire a thorough, intelligent, and spiritual perception of their meaning. Such a knowledge and perception of the contents and meaning of the Bible can only be acquired by much prolonged, solitary, prayerful communing with our own hearts as well as with God in His Word. From such preparation alone can the highest kind and greatest degree of fitness for fruitful service result. Our Lord spent thirty years in seclusion at Nazareth, and only three years, or three years and a half, in public service in Israel. During those long years (although at twelve years of age He might have come out as a successful boy-preacher), a whole generation of men—spent in private life, He was fulfilling all righteousness, but He was also acquiring this fitness for His work of which we have such striking proof in this passage of His history in the wilderness. If there be any lesson which we, who believe in Christ and bear witness to Him to-day, need perhaps as much or even more than any other to learn, it is that the true and abiding extension of Christian work will be in proportion to the intensity of the workers, or, to use the words of one of our wisest and most gifted spiritual teachers to-day, that "concentration is the secret of expansion." Israel's history was written, the Apostle Paul teaches us, "for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come."

From the Saviour's example we learn how to understand and apply it practically.

This was the first great victory which the Captain of our salvation gained for us, as well as for Himself, over His and our great enemy. It was not the last. Satan left Him only for a season. It was only through death that Christ destroyed him that had the power of death. Only when the heel of the seed of the woman was bruised, was the head of the serpent broken. The conflict still continues, and will continue till the God of peace bruises Satan under the feet of Christ's people, which He will shortly do. The Head is out of the reach of Satan's assaults now, but the body is not, or at least those members of the body who are still in the flesh are not. The Head above affords succour to the tempted members below. One purpose of the temptation which He endured in the wilderness was that He might be fitted to be the Captain of salvation, and to succour the tempted.

"For it became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings. For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. For in that he himself suffered being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted" (Heb. ii. 10, 16-18). "We have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore come boldly to the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need" (Heb. iv. 15, 16).

He was tempted in *all* points like as we are; He endured the sum of all temptation in the threefold assault in the wilderness. Every kind of temptation to which we are exposed may be reduced to one or other of the kinds of temptation to which He was then exposed, and by His experience He was qualified to sympathise with us and succour us. Knowing what He endured, and that He overcame temptations not only in the wilderness but in all His life, we can come with boldness,

without any reserve, with outspokenness, to Him, assured of His sympathy and help. His victory is ours. Ours is the appropriation of His victory by faith. "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith." In the strength derived from the Word of God abiding in us by the Spirit, we, as He did, and in Him, overcome the wicked one.

One or two points more remain to be noticed. St. Mark tells us that "angels ministered unto him." St. Matthew tells us that after Jesus had said, "Get thee behind me, Satan," then the devil leaveth Him, and, behold, angels came and ministered unto Him. They were doubtless awe-stricken, interested spectators of the scene, but were not permitted to render any help during the progress of the temptations. When these were over they hastened to His side and ministered. We know not how they ministered to Him. We are not told. They would doubtless strengthen Him. He came out of the ordeal victorious, but exhausted, and would need strengthening. What relief He would experience! We can only very faintly realise the feelings of Jesus at this time from analogous experiences in the Christian life. How far short, however, the experience of the holiest and most tried Christian falls of the experience of Jesus. He was so exhausted mentally, and physically, after His temptations, that He needed angelic ministry to sustain and revive Him, but out of these temptations He came immeasurably stronger, and entered, fully qualified, personally as well as officially, on the work given Him to do. His training for it was long and varied. Under the parental roof, and at the carpenter's bench, by subjection to His parents, by working at a trade, by meditation on the Word of God and prayer, by all the experiences of human life in different relationships, by His religious training in a pious home, in synagogue and temple, during thirty years, then by His baptism with water and the Spirit, and finally, by temptations, was He prepared for His public work, which lasted, as before remarked, only three years or three years and a half. His temptations completed His training. He was in no hurry to enter on His work. God took plenty of time to train Him, and the abundance and fruitfulness of His labours were proportioned to the thoroughness of His preparation. So will it ever be. No length of time that is needful to fit a man thoroughly for his work is too

great to devote to preparation. When the fitness is acquired no delay is needful. Well enough is soon enough. We see from the Saviour's case that the most important qualifications for service are acquired in solitude, and are bestowed by God Himself. "*Meditation, prayer, temptation*, make a man a minister," said Luther, and we may add that they make the best Christian workers of every kind. They had a chief place in the preparation of Jesus Christ for His ministry. In God's school of preparation they are ever the chief lessons taught, the chief discipline employed. We all need to be taught these lessons in that school whatever our place in the ONE BODY may be, if we would serve our generation according to the will of God.

JOHN KELLY.

ART. III.—*The Site of Emmaus.*

THE interesting narrative of our Lord's journey to Emmaus, in company with two of His disciples, on the day of His resurrection from the dead, has attracted much attention to a village which is not otherwise associated with sacred history. On first reading the narrative which has been presented by Luke, we are apt to suppose that the site of the village must have been well known all through the Christian era; and that all the localities connected with the journey must be described in the numerous books which have been published by tourists who have been careful to note what they saw in Palestine. The journey was from Jerusalem and back to the city, embracing only a few miles in extent, so that it was performed, not in some remote corner of the country, but in the best-known part of the whole land. It is, therefore, somewhat disappointing to find on further inquiry that the opinion has long been held that no certainty is attainable as to the site of Emmaus, and that it is only quite recently that explorations have been made which afford reasonable ground to believe that the site has at last been discovered.

Four places have been named as the site of Emmaus, each having its advocates—Amwās Nicopolis, Kubeibeh, Kolonia, and Urtās. The only fact stated by Luke in his narrative

serving to guide our inquiry as to the locality, is that the place was sixty furlongs, that is, seven and a half miles, distant from Jerusalem. Josephus mentions a village of the same name, and at the same distance of sixty furlongs from the Holy City, and of another Emmaus he says that the name denotes a place of baths. These conditions are all fulfilled in only one of the four places we have named.

Much importance has been justly attached to the words of the Jewish historian as bearing on this inquiry. He says, "Cæsar sent a letter to Bassus and to Liberius Maximus, who was the procurator [of Judea], and gave order that all Judea should be exposed to sale; for he did not found any city there, but reserved the country for himself. However, he assigned a place for eight hundred men only, whom he had dismissed from his army, which he gave them for their habitation; it is called Emmaus, and is distant from Jerusalem threescore furlongs."—(*Wars of the Jews*, vii. 66.) Josephus refers also to another Emmaus, near the Sea of Galilee, of which place he says: "Vespasian removed from Emmaus, where he had last pitched his camp before the city Tiberius (now, Emmaus, if it be interpreted, may be rendered a warm bath (θερμά), for therein is a spring of warm water (πηγή θερμῶν ὑδάτων), useful for healing)."—(*Wars*, iv. 1. 3.) The Hebrew form of Emmaus is Hammath, and this is the name given in the Book of Joshua (xix. 35) to the town near Tiberias to which Josephus refers. Gesenius says that the radical idea of the word is "to be hot," and Tregelles defines the name as "warm baths," referring to the interpretation of Josephus. Pliny alludes to the same springs, near Tiberias, which was "salubrious on account of its hot waters" (aquis callidis salubri).—(*Nat. Hist.* l. v. c. 15.) The true Emmaus of Luke, then, must be a place where there was abundance of water for baths, and at a distance of sixty furlongs from Jerusalem.

We may have some idea of the extensive baths at Emmaus when we consider the descriptions given of the large establishments used for the same purpose at that period by the Romans. Professor William Ramsay, in his *Roman Antiquities*, has given an elaborate description of them. A complete bathing establishment had a room not warmed artificially, one with a cold plunge-bath large enough for swimming in, one heated

artificially, and a *caldarium* under the pavement, similar to our Turkish bath. "Some persons, however, in addition to, or as a substitute for, the vapour-bath, took the hot-water bath, in which case they proceeded into the room which was called *Balneum* (in a restricted sense), and here they might bathe in hot water, in two ways—either standing in a large tub called *Labrum*, in which case, probably, the hot water was thrown over them, or immersing themselves in a tank of hot water called *Alveus*, sunk below the level of the floor. The *Balneum* is heated with flues like the *Caldarium*, so that those who entered it would enjoy at once a hot-water bath and a hot-vapour bath, the vapour here being moist, while in the *Caldarium* it would be dry. The mode of bathing differed according to individual taste. Some persons took the cold bath alone; some, after taking the hot-air bath, or the hot-water bath, or both, cooled themselves in the *Tepidarium*; some, on leaving the hot chambers, plunged at once into the cold *Piscina*, just as the Russians, after enduring for a time the intense heat of their vapour-baths, roll themselves in the snow."—(*Rom. Antiq.* pp. 434-5).

Professor Robinson, whose *Biblical Researches in Palestine* are second in importance only to the publications of the Palestine Exploration Fund, in throwing light on all subjects relating to the topography of Scripture, contends for Amwâs·Nicopolis as the true Emmaus of Luke and Josephus. It is a fatal objection to this view that Amwâs·Nicopolis is one hundred and sixty stadia distant from the Holy City. The Professor's attempt to get over this difficulty shows a remarkable departure from his usual caution and candour. He starts with the unqualified assertion—"that Amwâs represents the ancient Emmaus, twenty-two Roman miles distant from Jerusalem, I believe no one doubts."¹ The truth is just about the opposite of this, for hardly any one now entertains such an idea. Dr. Robinson proposes to alter the text of both Luke and Josephus, in order to obtain support for his theory, but he has not sufficient manuscript authority for the former, and none at all for the latter. Besides, the distance is much too great for other circumstances mentioned in Luke. It was an afternoon journey, and it was "toward evening"

¹ *Biblical Researches*, vol. iii. p. 147.

when the three travellers reached the village ; and that evening the two disciples returned to Jerusalem, and found the disciples in the city at their evening meal. The journey from Nicopolis is rugged and dreary, as every traveller knows. It is marvellous that Dr. Robinson, after himself riding over it, could suppose that the disciples might walk over it in five hours. Besides, Nicopolis was a fortified town, while Luke says that Emmaus was a village. Nicopolis is an interesting place, quite near to the public road, between Jaffa and Jerusalem. It is mentioned as early as the time of the Maccabees (1 Macc. iii. 40). In the third century after Christ it received the name of Nicopolis, in commemoration of the victories of Titus, and during the Christian period it was an episcopal See. A little to the south of the village is a famous spring, to which sanatory properties were once attributed. But it is an erring tradition which identifies this place with the Emmaus of Luke. Dr. W. M. Thomson, in his new and much enlarged edition of *The Land and the Book*, is favourable to the opinion of Dr. Robinson, but he admits that there are "grave objections" to it. In his former edition he called them "almost insurmountable objections"—he might have suppressed the qualification. He cites Eusebius and Jerome in its favour, and adds that, if it be not at Nicopolis, the true site of Emmaus is yet to be found. Canon Tristram rejects Nicopolis as too far from Jerusalem, and thinks it probable that Emmaus was north of that city, but he contents himself with the remark that "Lieutenant Conder holds that the Emmaus of the Gospel is to be found at Khamasa, with some very remarkable ruins, not far from the Roman road which passes by Solomon's Pools, south of Jerusalem."—(*Bible Places*, p. 78.) Wherever Emmaus might be, it could not be at Nicopolis. This place has had more supporters than any of the others usually named, but otherwise it is the most unlikely of them all.

An early tradition identifies Kubeibeh with the Emmaus of the New Testament, and a similar claim has been made on behalf of Kuryet el Enab, the city of the grape. Each is about the proper distance from Jerusalem, both being west of Neby Samwil—the former being a little north-west, and the latter south-west ; but very little can be said in favour of either. Dr. Robinson says, that it was only in the beginning of the fourteenth

century, when traces began to appear of the "idea which fixed an Emmaus at Kubeibeh; a transfer of which there is no earlier vestige, and for which there was no possible ground, except to find an Emmaus at about sixty stadia from the Holy City." Dr. Thomson thinks that "Kuryet el Enab may be both Kirjath-jearim and Emmaus, and that it renders this site more interesting to find it, not only the resting-place of the ark, but, long after, the place where He who was infinitely greater than the ark revealed Himself in the breaking of bread to the wondering disciples." Dean Alford (on Luke xxiv. 13) says that there were two other places of the same name, but that "our Emmaus is now called Cubeibi (?)" The good Dean makes a positive assertion, but he appends a note of interrogation, to intimate that, after all, he has not been able to attain certainty on the point. Kubeibeh contains many ruins, and the situation is beautiful. Some of the walls are ancient, and antiquities have been turned up by the spade. The church is said to cover the spot where Christ broke bread with the two disciples.

Kulonieh, or Kolonieh, has also been claimed for Emmaus, but it is little more than half the proper distance from Jerusalem in the direction of Kuryet el Enab. The name is derived by Sepp from Colonia, and the village is supposed by him to be identical with the Emmaus of the New Testament. The Wady Kulonieh contains beautiful olive-groves, and presents a green and refreshing appearance, but the steep descent to it was felt by the party with whom I travelled in Palestine to be long and wearisome—the steepness of the descent rendering it necessary that the road should be zigzag. And the road from Kulonieh to Jerusalem is bleak and uninteresting. Dr. Robinson says of it: "I have travelled in my day many dreary roads, but none more uninteresting and desolate than this, the great avenue to the Holy City."

Having thus noticed several places which have been named as the Emmaus of the New Testament, and set aside their claims to that distinction, there remains only the village of Urtâs, in the valley of Etam, near Bethlehem; and there is now good reason to regard this village as the true site of Emmaus. We owe the discovery of this site to Mrs. Finn, widow of the late James Finn, British Consul for Jerusalem and Palestine from 1845 till 1863. Mrs. Finn's long residence

in Jerusalem gave her great facilities for prosecuting her investigations in search of Emmaus; and when at length diggings were commenced at Urtâs in 1861, she had the able assistance of Mr. Cyril C. Graham, who had previously made discoveries east of the Jordan, which have thrown much light on Holy Scripture. In a valuable paper contributed to the "Quarterly Statement of the Palestine Exploration Fund,"¹ for January of this year, Mrs. Finn narrates the steps by which she was led to the discovery of this site. As her narrative cannot fail to be interesting to the reader, we present it in an abridged form. She says:—

"Among the many questions of interest that occupied our attention while living in Jerusalem, there was none more attractive than this: Where was the Emmaus of St. Luke's Gospel? During the first ten years after our arrival in Palestine, we had sought the reply, but had found none that could be considered satisfactory. In considering the matter on the spot, it appeared to us that very serious difficulties present themselves against the attempt to apply the narrative in the Gospel to any place so far from Jerusalem as the Nicopolis-Emmaus. Emmaus must have been a country village within easy reach of Jerusalem, the walk to which would in no way interfere with the due observance of the great Paschal Festival. These considerations led us to continue our search for Emmaus within a circle of 60 furlongs around Jerusalem. The etymology of the name Emmaus led us to the conclusion that wherever the Emmaus of St. Luke might be, there must also have existed hot baths, and the modern Arabic use of the term Hammâm, as applied to baths generally, whether of natural hot springs, or of water artificially heated, led us further to the idea that St. Luke's Emmaus need not be a place of hot springs, but that it might possibly be a place where abundance of water had caused the establishment of artificial baths of some importance. We convinced ourselves before long that there is but one place within the circuit of 60 furlongs from Jerusalem where there is a sufficiently copious spring of water for the supply of baths. That place is the pretty valley of Urtas, which is about $7\frac{1}{2}$ Roman miles or 60 furlongs from Jerusalem, south of Bethlehem. The valley descends from the ancient Etham (the fountain of which still bears that name), and passes round the base of the Herodium (or Frank Mountain, called by the natives Jebel el Furaidis) on its way towards the Dead Sea. These two places, Etham and Herodium, are among those whose distance from Jerusalem is specified by Josephus. He tells us that Etham was 50 furlongs off (*Ant.* viii. 7. 3), and that Herodium was 60 furlongs off (*Ant.* xiv. 13. 9). Urtas, village and spring, lies between the two.

"Nothing is more delightful on a spring afternoon than the seven miles' walk across the Plain of Rephaim, past Rachel's tomb and Bethlehem, to

¹ "Emmaus Identified."—Quarterly Statement for 1883, pp. 53-64.

this charming spot, the most charming and the most accessible from Jerusalem in the whole district. The village is small, but there are remains of ancient buildings, and, indeed, it is easy to see that a village must always have existed here on account of the beautiful spring of water, which never fails, but runs with a strong stream in summer as well as winter; and it is altogether distinct from the spring at Etham, and from the other springs that supply the pools in the valley above. The name Urtas has no meaning in modern Syro-Arabic, nor in Hebrew, but is believed to be comparatively modern, and only a corruption of the Latin *Hortus* (garden), given to it at a period when Latin was much used and spoken in and around Bethlehem. This carries us back at least to the days of St. Jerome, whose memory is still fresh among the Christians of Bethlehem. We know that Jerome and the Latin-speaking Christians of his day regarded Urtas as the site of the "garden enclosed" of Solomon (Song of Sol. iv. 12). Josephus tells us that the gardens of Solomon were at Etham; the name Etham survives to this day as the name of a spring of water at the head of the valley, Ain Aitân. The Song of Solomon is full of allusions to this garden, with its waters, its fragrant hills, its vineyards, its paradise (ch. iv. 13, rendered 'orchard') of pomegranates and pleasant fruits. The word Paradise lingers in the valley of Etham below Urtas, as the native name for the Herodium, Jebel el Furaidis, 'Mount of the Little Paradise.' There can be no doubt that the 'Little Paradise,' which gave the name thus traditionally preserved, was the Paradise which Josephus says Herod the Great formed around the newly-built fortress tomb, where the Edomite king was afterwards buried. This Paradise of Herod was but a revival by him of the Royal Paradise belonging to the Great Solomon, whom it was his constant ambition to rival and to outdo in his kingdom. Josephus tells us that Cæsar ordered the lands of Judea to be put up for sale, *all but one place*, which he 'ordered to be reserved' for 800 men, whom he had dismissed from his army, which he gave them for habitation; it is called Emmaus, and is distant from Jerusalem three-score furlongs. This place then must have combined advantages for colonial settlement with those of a central position among the mountain fastnesses, where the Arabian and other tribes might be held in check, as well as the Jewish garrison at Musada. What place so likely to attract the sagacious Romans as Urtas? The name Hirtus may possibly date from the occupation by these Roman soldiers. Like Nablous (Neapolis) for Shechem, Urtas for Hirtus would be one more instance of similar change where an occupation of foreigners came between the ancient and the present possessors. Not only are the position and character of the Urtas valley suitable for a Roman settlement, but in the village there are actual remains of a strong stone building, possibly a small fort. The character of the masonry points to the Roman age."

The following circumstances led to the recovery of the missing links in Mrs. Finn's search,—the name Emmaus and the baths. In 1847 John Meshullum, a British subject of Jewish birth, sought and obtained the protection and assistance of the then British Consul, Mr. Finn, in establishing

himself in the Urtâs valley upon lands leased from the Fellah proprietors. By the year 1856 a considerable part of the valley had been planted and restored to a condition of fertility and beauty. In that year Mrs. Finn joined him in taking under cultivation a fresh tract farther down the valley. At one part progress was arrested, and the ground could not be cleared for planting. Beneath the surface, remains of buildings were now found which had been previously concealed by about twenty inches of soil. Mrs. Finn's observant eye had previously noticed that when the stream of water reached this spot it disappeared as if into a chamber of some kind. "Early in 1857," Mrs. Finn adds, "in digging for the foundations of a retaining-wall for a garden plot, we once more came upon these remains, and found excellent hewn stone lying loose from some former building, also a fragment of cornice, pieces of a stone door with a place for the bolt, a few copper coins (one of Constantine, the rest Cufic), and a small bit of glass mosaic. What was our delight when, as we stood there watching the Fellah workmen, we caught from their lips the word 'Hammâm' (baths). 'Hammâm!' we cried, 'where is the Hammâm?' 'Oh!' replied one standing by, 'the Fellâheen here *always* call this spot the place of the Hammâm, and yon rock jutting out into the path they call *Leeyet al Hammâm*, 'the promontory of the baths.'" At last, then, here was the missing link,—the name Emmaus. But where were the baths? Several years passed before funds for making excavations were forthcoming. But one thing became clearer each succeeding year, that in no other place within 60 furlongs of Jerusalem was water sufficient for maintaining baths to be found excepting at Urtas only. At last, in 1861, Mr. Cyril Graham, whose discoveries east of Jordan had already cast so much light upon the literal accuracy of Holy Scripture, joined us in commencing diggings at the so-called Hammâm in Urtas. Just before we began, there were dug up in a field adjoining that spot two Corinthian capitals of extremely pure style, and a fragment of cornice, all of native limestone. This quickened our zeal. We set to work, and the very first thing that came to light, only a few feet below the surface, was a *bath*! lined with purest white marble, in perfect preservation, 4 feet long by 3

feet 7 inches wide, and 3 feet 9 inches deep, having in it a step or seat for convenience of the bather."

We congratulate Mrs. Finn on this most interesting discovery, and she deserves great praise for the perseverance with which she prosecuted her search till her skilful and indomitable energy was crowned with success. We must refer to her elaborate paper for a detailed account of further excavations, all tending to establish the fact that the Emmaus sixty furlongs from Jerusalem has been identified with Urtâs by the ruins of Herod's costly baths. Besides, "the site of the royal gardens is still marked by trees bearing fruit in their season, nourished by refreshing streams, the mountains still breathe the fragrance of aromatic plants, the vineyards yield clusters of rich grapes, and pure waters are still carried by the ancient aqueduct from the fountain-head to Bethlehem, and even sometimes to the temple courts on Moriah. But the highest and most sacred interest of all that cleaves to this valley, this royal heritage, is for ever bound up with our Lord's visit to Emmaus on the day of His resurrection with His two disciples."

The delightful journey from Jerusalem to Bethlehem and the Pools of Solomon, which was previously full of interest to the tourist, will now receive an additional charm in the thought that he is treading the same ground on which the risen Redeemer entered into conversation with His two disciples as they walked and were sad; and he can hardly fail to remember the exquisite description of their mutual experience which they gave, as they said to one another, "Did not our hearts burn within us while He talked with us by the way, and while He opened to us the Scriptures?"

P. MEARNS.

ART. IV.—*The Dogmatic Aspect of Pentateuchal Criticism.*¹

THIS article is the last of a series devoted to the discussion of problems in the Higher Criticism bearing upon the Pentateuch.² The first article was by Dr. A. A. Hodge and Dr. B. B. Warfield, and contained a clear, temperate, discriminating, and masterly statement of the doctrine of Inspiration. The subsequent articles have been written by professed students of Old Testament Literature, who have brought to the performance of their respective tasks ripe Hebrew scholarship, minute acquaintance with current forms of thought in Old Testament matters, fine powers of expository statement, great wealth of historical material, and, in one instance at least, an unanswerable dialectic.

It was not to be expected that these articles would all evince equal ability or afford equal pleasure to the same readers; and it is not to be wondered at if some writers, by their concessive spirit, have given pain to the friends of conservative opinion even when engaged in honest warfare against naturalistic criticism. It is no part of our purpose to institute invidious comparisons between the several papers that have been contributed to this series, or to refer in one way or another to the strictures to which some of them have been subjected. Blind to facts, however, men ought not to be, whatever disagreement there may be between themselves and the writers to whom reference has been made. And it should be kept in mind that in the case of every writer the purpose for which this series was planned has been realised. In every case there

¹ From the *Presbyterian Review*.

² This article also contains allusions to two papers which appeared in the *New York Independent*, specially directed to the questions raised in connection with our Lord's references to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. Notwithstanding the attempts made, with more or less plausibility, to invalidate the testimony of Christ, it will be seen that Professor Patton unhesitatingly attaches to His testimony the fullest value.—ED. B. and F. *Evang. Review*.

has been a prompt and decided repudiation and refutation of naturalistic criticism. No support has been given either to Kuenen or Wellhausen or Robertson Smith. These articles may be fairly taken to represent the *status* of the Higher Criticism in our Theological Seminaries. That there is a difference of view among our Old Testament scholars is abundantly apparent, but if in our Church there is any acceptance of the doctrines taught by the last-named critics it has not come to light in the articles to which reference is here made.

The present writer has no qualifications that fit him for speaking as a professed Hebrew scholar; and, though dealing with the dogmatic side of the question, he does not write as a professed dogmatician. Like a great many others whose special studies are not in the line of Old Testament Criticism or of Dogmatic Theology, he feels that since the results of Pentateuchal Criticism sustain, of necessity, a logical relation to certain dogmatic faiths, he has an interest in these results. And, since he will not go blindly with Robertson Smith, and does not prefer to live blindly in possession of what is called a traditional theology, he has been obliged to ask himself to "show cause" why he continues to believe as he was taught to believe respecting the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. It would be presumptuous to suppose that anything to be said here can add to the strength of the argument presented in Dr. Green's admirable paper. In fact our purpose is not so much argument as statement. If we shall succeed in separating the elements that enter into this complicated question, and in showing the relations of the parts to each other and to the whole, so as to aid any who are still perplexed, in their desire to understand the question, and, by understanding it, to appreciate the force of arguments which others have already presented, our purpose will have been accomplished. We are to speak, then, of the Dogmatic Aspect of Pentateuchal Criticism. Whether this be Higher or Lower Criticism it matters not. It is criticism applied specifically to the Pentateuch. As it happens, it is the Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch which constitutes the field of controversy. We use the terms Higher and Lower Criticism in their accepted sense; that is to say, according to the *usus loquendi* of scholars and under the recognised limitations of Theological Cyclopædia. Used even in this sense

they are not exclusively theological terms. They are technical expressions that denote two well-known departments of Literary Science. They are applicable to the study of Shakespeare as well as to the study of the Bible, and to the one as much as to the other.

As Christians, and particularly as ministers and elders of the Presbyterian Church, many of us find ourselves in possession of certain definite dogmatic convictions. Apart altogether from the question whether critics like Kuenen and Wellhausen are right in what they say, it is important for us to know how far, supposing they were correct, their conclusions would affect our creed. For there may be Biblical questions of a purely literary character, which, however interesting to specialists, really need give the dogmatic theologian no great concern. One part of our work in the present article will be a direct comparison of the results of the Higher Criticism with the dogmatic content of the Westminster Symbols. This, however, is only a part, though it is a very important part, of what is involved in a study of the dogmatic aspect of Pentateuchal criticism. For it is quite possible that we shall differ with some of the critics, not only in regard to the conclusions they reach, but also in regard to some of the principles by which they guide their discussions.

I.

Before taking a single step in Criticism the important question emerges respecting "The Right, Duty, and Limits of Biblical Criticism." The critics must deal with this question, and Dr. Briggs has accordingly made it the subject of a very thoughtful article. But we must all deal with it; for it is a far-reaching question: it is a question that bears upon the whole matter of inductive investigation, upon the relation of reason to faith, upon the rights of the individual conscience, upon the ethics of creed-subscription, and upon the scope of ecclesiastical authority. We do not know how we can better present our views upon this subject than by comparing them with those of other writers.

CRITICISM AND REASON.

Behind the special question regarding the rights of Biblical Criticism there is the general question respecting the rights of

Reason. The word "reason" is not used here in any special and peculiar sense. *We have no reference to the distinction which some make between the Reason and the Understanding; and the common antithesis of Reason and Revelation is not in our mind. We are thinking how far it is necessary that our religious beliefs should be rational. And since we are intelligent beings this is a matter that cannot admit of any doubt: the rationality or rather the reasonableness of a belief is the condition of its credibility. By this it is not meant that a belief must be capable of proof apart from Revelation, but that it is rational to believe in what is taught by Revelation. Nor yet again is it meant that every Christian is able to prove that the Bible is a Revelation, but that he has some reason for believing it to be a revelation, which may be the self-evidencing power of the Bible, or only the conviction that rational proof of his belief can be given by others if not by himself. A man believes rationally or irrationally. No man is called upon to believe irrationally, and no one would be willing to confess that he did so believe. Even the Roman Catholic, who professes to subordinate Reason to Authority, has to settle the question what authority he will submit to, and when he submits to the authority of the Pope he does so because he supposes that this is a rational thing to do. In this way, as Sir George Cornwall Lewis has so aptly shown, he is obliged in spite of himself to exercise the right of private judgment. We, however, are Protestants. The right of private judgment is part of our inheritance. It is not for us to abridge the franchises of any man, even though he should use his liberty to his own destruction. Whenever we accept a church or a man or a book as infallible authority it is entirely reasonable for us to believe what we are told on such authority, even though we are told some things which we do not understand or which otherwise would never have occurred to us. But we certainly are not required to submit to any authority when adequate reasons for so doing cannot be given. Since, therefore, we believe that the Bible is the Word of God it is safe to assume that we believe for reasons. These reasons are either good or bad. If they are good we need not be afraid of Criticism, and if they are bad it is well for us to know it. Dr. Briggs seems anxious to protect Biblical

Criticism against the interference of Dogmatic Theology. But nothing need be apprehended from that quarter. The right of Criticism is given in one of the great formal principles of Protestantism. When, therefore, Professor H. P. Smith virtually says that we must treat the Bible just like any other writings, he is entirely right. That is to say, we are to treat the Bible as we treat other writings. But we are not to treat the Bible as if it were like other writings, for it is not like them. We shall go as far as the critics in defending the rights of Criticism. In fact, any fetters that Criticism is now wearing have been forged, as we shall see, by the friends of Criticism themselves. For in answer to our statement that the reasonableness of Christianity is essential to its credibility, two objections would in all likelihood be made. It would be said, in the first place, that a faith resting on rational grounds, that is to say, on reasons which address themselves to the intellect, is only a human faith and is a very different thing from *fides divina*; and in the second place, that it is not possible to give rational proof of the inspiration of the Scriptures. Let us notice these points briefly, considering first what Dr. Briggs has to say:—

“For unless these books have given us their own testimony that they are divine, and therefore canonical, we do not receive them with our hearts; we do not rest our faith and life upon them as the very Word of God; we give merely intellectual assent, we receive them on authority, tacitly and without opposition and possibly with the dogmatism which not unfrequently accompanies incipient doubt, but also without true interest and true faith and assurance of their divine contents.”

Dr. Briggs might have quoted from John Owen in support of his position; but had he done so, our respect for the great Puritan would not have made us accept this statement. In our belief of the Scriptures, as indeed in all the processes of grace, the dependence of the soul upon the Holy Ghost is, of course, to be fully acknowledged. But we are not authorised to draw a line of distinction between faith which is due to reason and faith that is caused by the Spirit, in such terms as to make the former worthless. We address arguments to the intellect, desiring to produce conviction, and we recognise the need of the Spirit's co-operation in order to the securing of this result. But it is one thing to say that the result cannot

be secured without the Spirit, and another thing to say that if secured without the Spirit it is of no value. The Bible calls for faith, but it does not require the man who has it to give an account of its genesis. There are men who believe the Scriptures to be the Word of God, because the structure and contents of Scripture force this conviction upon their minds. We may know that, but for God's help, they would never have had this belief, but we have no right to say that such belief, supposing it could have been secured without God's help, would be of no avail. And if a man may have "a mere intellectual assent" respecting the canonicity of Scripture, and be without "true faith and assurance of their divine contents" as the result of inquiry; if, notwithstanding the most positive belief based on evidence, it is still necessary that the canonicity and inspiration of the Scriptures be revealed to the individual heart by the witness of the Spirit, might it not be better to abandon Criticism altogether, and surrender ourselves without argument to the proofs of canonicity thus presented? In this way mysticism might be an apology for indolence. Or, if the immediate testimony of Scripture to its inspiration be independent of Criticism, might we not continue to believe in its inspiration on the ground of the immediate witness of the Spirit, even when our critical studies had left us without any "intellectual assent," or, it may be, even in a state of intellectual dissent? Mysticism would in this way aid faith and license criticism at the same time. We could say with Tertullian, *credo quia impossibile*, and stand with Hegel in affirming the truth of contradictory propositions. For ourselves we say frankly we cannot occupy this position. A religion shown to be irrational is no longer a religion for us. On this account we bid criticism do its worst; and if we find a man who, after knowing all that has been said against the truth as it is in Jesus, is able still to say that he has unabated confidence in the argumentative resources of Christianity:—whatever others may do, we shall not speak disparagingly of that faith by calling it a *fides humana* while we reserve the higher epithet of *fides Divina* to describe the mental state of the man who applies subjective tests to the canon of Scripture, and is satisfied to say with Coleridge that the Bible "finds" him.

Again, we have been reminded very frequently of late re-

specting the positions of the Reformed theologians and the Westminster divines in regard to the possibility of proving the inspiration of the Scriptures. The discussions in regard to Old Testament questions have given an undue prominence to a single clause in our Confession of Faith, and the authority of the Confession has been invoked in support of very erroneous views. Thus Dr. Robertson Smith remarks :—

“The persuasion that in the Bible God himself speaks words of love and life to the soul is the essence of the Christian's conviction as to the truth and authority of Scripture. This persuasion is not, and cannot be, derived from external testimony. No tradition as to the worth of Scripture, no assurance transmitted from our fathers, or from any who in past time heard God's revealing voice, can make the revelation to which they bear witness a personal voice of God to us. The element of personal conviction, which lifts faith out of the region of probable evidence into the sphere of Divine certainty, is given only by the Holy Spirit still bearing witness in and with the Word. But then the Word to which this spiritual testimony applies is a written word, which has a history, which has to be read and explained like other ancient books. . . .

“The first condition of a sound understanding of Scripture is to give full recognition to the human side, to master the whole situation and character and feelings of each human interlocutor who has a part in the drama of Revelation. *Nay, the whole business of scholarly exegesis lies with this human side.* All that earthly study and research can do for the reader of Scripture is to put him in the position of the man to whose heart God first spoke. What is more than this lies beyond our wisdom. It is only the Spirit of God which can make the Word a living word to our hearts, as it was a living word to him who first received it. This is the truth which the Westminster Confession expresses when it teaches, in harmony with all the Reformed Symbols, that our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority of Scripture is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.”

There is a sense in which what is said here is substantially true : though we do not sympathise with the opinions expressed regarding the worth of external testimony and the value of argument on behalf of Inspiration. And it does not tend in the slightest to reconcile us to these opinions to say that the Reformers entertained them. It would not be strange if in their opposition to the claims of the Church of Rome, they went to the opposite extreme and were in danger of falling into the errors of the Mystics. Luther did not fail to see that there was some analogy between the extravagant claims of the Mystics and the position taken by himself. Dr.

Charteris tells us that their extreme position led the Reformer to withdraw some of his strong statements, though it did not affect him to an extent sufficient to make him recede from his strongly asserted subjective principle. But it is a mistake to class Calvin with Luther in this particular. It is true, as Dr. Briggs states, that "Calvin denied the Pauline authorship of Hebrews, and doubted the Petrine authorship of 2 Peter," but if one will turn to his commentary on these books he will find that the historic doubts regarding these books were an important element in Calvin's judgment; and "free from traditional bias" though he may have been, he did not decide respecting the authorship and canonicity (in the case of 2 Peter, Calvin said that authorship and canonicity went together) of these books without regard to antecedent opinions. It is also true, as Dr. Briggs remarks, that Calvin believed that "those persons betray great folly who wish it to be demonstrated to infidels, that the Scripture is the word of God, which cannot be known without faith." This statement is made at the close of the 8th chapter of the first book of the Institutes, the whole of which, nevertheless, is devoted to an exhibition of the arguments in proof of the inspiration of the Scriptures. We repeat, however, that our views would not be affected though it were shown that the Reformers held the extreme opinions which are sometimes imputed to them. Those, too, who protest so earnestly against traditionalism will pardon us if we seem to see a slight trace of inconsistency in the authoritative way in which they appeal to Protestant Patristics. Calvin does, indeed, emphasise the fact that faith is a product of Divine grace, and that argument unaccompanied by the help of the Holy Spirit will not produce conviction. This we all believe. But Calvin was very far from saying that it is impossible to support the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures by abundant evidence. Nor does the Westminster Confession teach that Inspiration cannot be proved by argument. If it did, we should not believe it. Let us, however, quote its words:—

"We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scriptures; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the concert of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many

other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God ; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts" (Chap. i. sect. 6).

The Confession gives no support to the statement of Dr. Robertson Smith, that "persuasion that the Bible is God's word cannot be derived from external testimony." On the contrary, it makes distinct mention of external testimony, and puts it first in a list of arguments in support of inspiration, all of which are employed to-day by dogmatic theologians. And it is furthermore stated in the Confession that by means of these arguments the Bible "doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God." It is true that these arguments will not carry us beyond probability : but this will not lessen their value for those who understand the meaning of terms, and know the limits of inductive logic. Nor is it a sufficient reason for disparaging these arguments, because, as Dr. Robertson Smith so truly says, it is the witness of the Spirit which alone can "lift faith out of the region of probable evidence into the sphere of Divine certainty." It is very natural for us to look for something that will bridge the chasm between probability and certitude. Cardinal Newman finds it in what he calls an "illative sense." We are taught to find it in the witness of the Spirit. But the witness of the Spirit cannot be a common measure between minds. The man who has it feels certain, but he cannot expect his certitude to have argumentative value with another man. If, then, we are to continue in the endeavour to convince men that the Bible is the word of God, it is clear that we must do it by means of arguments addressed to the understanding. This, however, is not our only reason for attaching great importance to the proofs of Inspiration, for while it might seem unnecessary to make use of inductive arguments which result in probability when the Christian has the witness of the Spirit which gives certitude, we are clearly of the opinion that the doctrine of Inspiration would not survive the destruction of the arguments that support it. We believe that the argument for the inspiration of the Scripture can be made in the terms of the highest probability—that is to say, in the terms of moral certainty. But our confidence

in this argument would be greatly weakened if we thought that it were based upon a partial survey of the facts, or that those interested in the construction of it had studiously disregarded anything that was supposed to bear adversely upon it. Our confidence in the argumentative strength of the doctrine of Inspiration must of necessity, therefore, make us welcome the most scrutinising criticism.

CRITICISM AND INSPIRATION.

It is easy to see how critics like Dr. Robertson Smith should emphasise the subjective tests of Inspiration. Their object is, as far as possible, to make Inspiration independent of Criticism. If it could be shown that the doctrine of Inspiration cannot, in the nature of the case, be affected by the results of criticism, the fears which so many have been entertaining on account of these results would be taken away. The argument in support of this position is often made in a way that seems so honouring to the Spirit, and in such close accord with the teaching of the Confession, and, withal, to have such an evangelical flavour about it, that it is to be feared a great many have been deceived by it, and have failed to see that it is a plea, not for the rights of criticism, but for the toleration of opinions that are the results of criticism, and that are, to say the least, unsettling in the extreme. Professor Candlish has defended the position that the authority of the Bible is independent of criticism, in a pamphlet devoted to that purpose. The views of Dr. Briggs may be gathered from the following passage :—

“We are convinced that the Church has not been deceived with regard to its inspiration. Esther, Ecclesiastes, the Song of Songs, the Apocalypse, will more and more establish themselves in the hearts of those who study them. But we claim that it is illegitimate first to attempt to prove their canonicity, and then their inspiration, or to rely upon Jewish rabbinical tradition any more than Roman Catholic tradition, or to anathematise all who doubt some of them in the spirit of Rabbi Akiba and the Council of Trent. The only legitimate method is that of our fathers, the Reformers, and Puritans : First, prove their inspiration from their own internal divine testimony, and then accept them as canonical because our hearts rest upon them as the veritable Divine Word.”

It is not essential to our present inquiry to ask here what is meant by proving Canonicity, though this is a very important question, and one about which writers are not agreed.

When we say that a book is canonical, do we mean that *we* ought to regard it as authoritative, or, that, as a simple matter of fact, the early Church so regarded it? If, irrespective of tradition, we are to decide on the canonicity of a book, that is to say, its authoritativeness for us, the proof of Canonicity would not differ much, if at all, from the proof of Inspiration. If, however, Canonicity be, as we believe it is, a purely historical question, it is only in a very limited way that subjective tests can be employed in determining it. For however the formation of the New Testament Canon was effected—whether by a selection from inspired writings, whether apostolic authorship was the criterion of Canonicity, or whether an inspired community recognised and set the seal of authority on inspired books—it is clear that when we ask the question whether this epistle, say Second Peter, is canonical, we cannot avoid the necessity of a direct appeal to external testimony. It would be very difficult, we imagine, for any one to take an epistle like the one just named, and, considering it without reference to its historic relations, pronounce dogmatically upon its inspiration. And though he could do this, it would still be necessary to know that all inspired books were known to the apostolic church, and held by them to be canonical, before one could prove Canonicity from Inspiration. But the attempt to prove Inspiration even, without appeal to external testimony, has great difficulties. Dr. Briggs, however, tells us we are to prove the inspiration of the Scriptures by recognising “their own internal Divine testimony,” and the context shows that, according to Dr. Briggs, the authoritative value of a book in the Canon, in fact its right to be there, is conditioned by this internal Divine testimony. By means of the witness of the Spirit, then, we are to discover, let us suppose, whether Esther is inspired. How shall we reach a decision? To whom will the witness be given? Not to any organisation of Christians, for we have rejected the doctrine of corporate infallibility; not to the general body of Christians, for we could not know what the general body of Christians believe except by tradition and external testimony, and we are told that tradition and external testimony do not enter into the question. The witness must be given, then, to the individual; and, as no one can make his own experience of Divine

guidance the rule of another man's faith, it must come to this : that every Christian makes his own Bible, or, rather, that he is to judge for himself what books he will treat as authoritative.

Let us inquire, however, more particularly respecting the relation of Criticism to Inspiration. It cannot be denied that there would be obvious advantages attending the belief that Criticism cannot affect Inspiration ; for then we might feel assured, no matter what may come, that the Bible is inspired. Our comfort in reading it would be no more affected in that case, by the theories of Kuenen and Wellhausen, than our enjoyment of the Iliad is spoiled by the Homeric controversy. It is not possible, however, to take such a comfortable view of the subject. Suppose, for example, we were satisfied that the Holy Spirit bore witness in our hearts to the inspiration of John's Gospel. How under these circumstances would we stand related to the questions in the Higher Criticism pertaining to this Gospel ? It is conceivable, in the first place, that Historical Criticism might show that the fourth Gospel was not written until long after John was in his grave. We should then have a book inspired, indeed, but false. What good in that case would Inspiration do us ? Or we might affirm *a priori* that the authorship of John's Gospel could not be set aside by Criticism. But then we should be simply begging the question. Or we might stay the hand of the critic, and say that he must not enter upon any examination of fact respecting matters decided already by implication through the witness of the Spirit. But then we should be allowing a foregone conclusion to determine the limits of historical inquiry. We should fall into the vice which we condemn in the naturalistic critics who enter upon inquiry with the postulate that miracles are impossible. Or lastly, we may admit that, possibly, what is believed to be inspired may be proved to be uninspired by being proved to be untrue. This is the only logical position. Then Criticism may affect Inspiration ; and it follows that to have an interest in Inspiration is of necessity to have an interest in Criticism.

But, it will be asked, How can mere human reason overthrow the witness of the Spirit ? It cannot, of course ; but it may show us that what we supposed to be the witness of the Spirit must be accounted for in some other way. This is

a matter that need not give us serious difficulty, though it may be necessary for us to seek a more discriminating mode of dealing with it. Let us interpret our belief in the doctrine of Inspiration. There is a certain body of facts constituting an inductive basis for this belief. Besides these facts, and standing by itself as an experience which all Christians may alike participate in, is a certain mental state of conviction respecting the Divine authority of the Bible. How we account for this mental state is another question. Suppose then that our faith in Inspiration were made up of these two elements: the argumentative or inductive element *plus* the feeling of certitude just described. And suppose now that the argumentative element were to drop away—would the certitude remain? Would it be possible for a man to retain his certitude regarding Inspiration after he had seen the insufficiency of every argument in support of Inspiration? We cannot think so. Would it help to make the certitude remain to say that it was produced by the Holy Ghost? Hardly; for should we not ask then whether we were not mistaken when we imputed our certitude to the witness of the Spirit? Should we not say that since it was the Bible which taught us to interpret our subjective state in this way, the loss of argumentative support for the truth of the Bible carries with it the loss of confidence in the interpretation we had been accustomed to put upon our subjective state? This is the way it looks to us, and if we are right it follows that we cannot take refuge in mysticism when pressed hard by the foes of our faith; and that the doctrine of Inspiration stands or falls with the results of critical investigation. Dr. Robertson Smith is certainly right, however much the statement may make against his own position, when he says that "all sound apologetic admits that the proof that a book is credible must precede belief that it is inspired."

CRITICISM AND TRADITION.

It is of some importance to have a clear understanding as to the meaning of Tradition and the place it holds in this discussion. In the articles contributed by Dr. Briggs to this series, very frequent reference is made to "traditional" opinions, and, though it is not expressed in so many words,

the idea is nevertheless conveyed that there is some necessary or natural antagonism between critical conclusions and traditional beliefs. Thus it is said : " It will not do to antagonise critical theories of the Bible with traditional theories of the Bible, for the critic appeals to history against tradition." We are told that the vast majority of professional Biblical scholars "demand a revision of traditional theories of the Bible." When it is asked what peril critical study is attended with, the answer is : "The peril is to scholastic dogmas and to tradition." Throughout the pages of Dr. Robertson Smith's *Old Testament in the Jewish Church* there is the same antithesis between criticism and tradition ; and, accustomed as our Protestant ears have become to the association of Tradition and Romanism, it is quite likely that this earnest repudiation of tradition by Dr. Robertson Smith and others may be taken by some as a mark of fidelity to Protestantism. Much that Dr. Briggs has said upon the subject is undoubtedly true, though he has failed to distinguish between the different senses in which, even in his own articles, the word " tradition " is employed. Yet it is of the utmost importance that the distinction should be made, for the place that Tradition should be allowed in this controversy depends altogether upon the meaning of the word. By Tradition we may mean, (a.) the supposed teachings of our Lord and His apostles, perpetuated orally for a time though subsequently reduced to writing, but which are extra-Biblical. Traditional statements of this kind we reject as not binding the conscience, even though possibly true ; and as untrue when inconsistent with the known teachings of Scripture. (b.) By traditional doctrines we may mean the opinions entertained by theologians and church doctors (whether they have been professedly derived from the Word of God or not) as distinguished from the direct words of the Bible or the formulated statements of Church confessions and catechisms. We most certainly agree with Dr. Briggs in saying that the individual beliefs of theologians do not constitute our standard of orthodoxy. There is no room for a difference of opinion on that point. (c.) By traditional belief we may mean an unreasoned as distinguished from a reasoned belief. Thus the popular belief in the facts of geology and astronomy as well as of theology is of this kind. The fact that it is

traditional is not an argument one way or another respecting its truth. Of course, if the reasoned convictions of men change, the unreasoned or traditional convictions of men (so far as they pertain to the same things) will also undergo change. If astronomers should give up the accepted theories of their science by proving them to be false, the popular belief in them would soon die out. In the nature of the case a large element in the beliefs of men, whether in science or theology, must be of this unreasoned or traditional kind. But in the sense here used the word tradition has no place in this discussion. (d.) By traditional belief is sometimes meant belief which, however perpetuated—it is generally perpetuated orally,—has no historic warrant. It is not correct usage, but it is common, nevertheless, to use tradition as the antithesis of History; and in this sense, again, it has no place in this controversy. (e.) Tradition is sometimes used, without embodying any judgment as to truth or falsehood, to denote anything that has been orally transmitted as distinguished from something that has been committed to writing. So used, the word may have a place in Pentateuchal investigation. (f.) But Tradition is also another word for History, and in this sense it has an important bearing on the matter in hand. As history it may record an occurrence, or a current belief. In doing this it places us alongside of those who saw the one, and introduces to the company of those who entertained the other. On the authority of tradition, then—meaning by this not a floating rumour, a statement orally perpetuated, but history—we know that the Jews in the time of Christ believed that the law came by Moses. That is a very important element in this question. It may be that the direct railway line of History will not avail us in our further journey, and that we shall have to make use of other appliances in working up the stream; it is of no small moment, however, to have reached this point, and the critics are bound to give proper weight to the facts just referred to, which come indeed through tradition, but through tradition in the sense of History. If, moreover, there has come down by an oral transmission, from the times before Christ, a belief in the Mosaic authorship of the law which the Jews in Christ's day fully entertained, this fact cannot be overlooked by the critics, even though they may not agree

respecting the value they assign to it. We are compelled, therefore, to differ with Dr. Briggs respecting the method which he thinks should be followed in these inquiries. The evangelical spirit, he says, would apply the critical tests thus :—

“(1) Inquire what the Scriptures teach about themselves, and separate this Divine authority from all other authority ; (2) apply the Principles of the *Higher Criticism* to decide questions not decided by Divine authority ; (3) use *Tradition* in order to determine as far as possible questions not settled by the previous methods.”

The objections to this method are very obvious. As to (1), it is evident that this begs the whole question. No critic who did not expect to put himself outside the pale of argument would be willing to say that the doctrine of Inspiration was the postulate with which he began his labours in the Higher Criticism. This method may breathe an evangelical spirit, but it is unscientific, and, therefore, unsatisfactory. We rejoice in the conviction that the doctrine of Inspiration can stand every critical test ; but if the critic who proposed to apply these tests should tell us that he assumed the doctrine of Inspiration at the outset, his assurances would not give us much comfort. And a similar objection lies against (2). It is the Divine authority of Scripture that constitutes the question in debate. The rationalistic critics are bringing forward arguments to invalidate this Divine authority. The evangelical critics must meet the rationalists on their own ground. We do not wish them to assume the points in issue. It requires no learning to do that. We do not wish them to erect a wall of stolid dogmatism as a barrier to rationalistic criticism. We do not mean by this that dogma has no place in the defence of the Pentateuch. We believe it has. We mean only that evangelical critics must not be satisfied with certain subjective warrants for the inspiration of the Pentateuch, and go into a controversy which hinges upon this doctrine with the doctrine itself a foregone conclusion. And so far as (3) is concerned, there seems to be no room for it on the programme, for if Divine authority settles some questions, and Criticism settles the rest, what is there left for Tradition to do ?

Instead of adopting this threefold division of labour, we prefer to say that every man has the right, and that it is the

duty of some men, to investigate the problem that deals with the historical significance of Old Testament literature. We ask only that those who engage in this work shall have the necessary equipments of scholarship, that they take full cognisance of all the facts, and that they govern themselves by the recognised canons of inductive investigation. The parties in the controversy, should the inquiry take a controversial form, must be fair. It will be insisted on the one side that the critic shall not assume the impossibility of miracles, and with equal fairness it will be demanded, on the other side, that evangelical critics shall not postulate plenary Inspiration. All pertinent facts should be considered. Questions regarding text and style, archaisms, anachronisms or what seem to be such, historical allusions or the lack of such allusions—these are all to be considered. But so must the claims of Scripture be considered as well as their coherency, the harmony of their facts, and their unique position. It must be remembered, too, that the Pentateuch was currently believed among the Jews in the time of Christ to be Mosaic: and that, apart altogether from the Pentateuchal question, there is the highest possible reason for regarding the words of Christ, when their precise meaning has been ascertained, as conclusive in the case. If it be the function of the Higher Criticism to determine the historical place and significance of a given book in a national literature, it is its function also to make use of all the facts that bear upon the question. Some of these facts will be found in the sphere of the Lower Criticism. The student of the Higher Criticism must use these facts. Some of them will be furnished by tradition. He must likewise make use of tradition. And it is evident that the older the tradition, the better it is. The nearer we can get to the head-waters of this stream the better; and whether our pilot be a Christian or a Jew does not affect the question. Dr. Robertson Smith did not do full justice to his undoubted power as a dialectician, when, in the following passage, under the guise of an *a fortiori* argument, he undertook to heap contempt upon the Jewish tradition respecting the Old Testament. He says:—

“But it would be absurd to suppose that a man who refused to accept the authority of *Christian* tradition as to the number of books in the Canon, the best text of the Old Testament, or the principles upon which that text

is to be translated, adopted it as a principle of faith that the *Jewish* tradition, the unchristian tradition, upon all these points is final. Luther again and again showed that he submitted to no such authority; and if the Reformers and their first successors did practically accept the results of Jewish scholarship upon all these questions, they did so merely because these results were in accordance with the best light then attainable."

Dr. Smith is including different forms of Jewish tradition under one general sentiment of disparagement; and in this he is singularly inconsistent with himself. There would be good reason for not accepting Rabbinical interpretations of the Old Testament like those of Rashi and Kimchi. But Dr. Smith bears testimony to the accuracy with which an unchanged text has been perpetuated by Jewish tradition from the days of our Lord. And though he believes that before Christ there were variations in the versions of the Old Testament, he also says that there is "no doubt that the Law which was in Ezra's hand was practically identical with our Hebrew Pentateuch." This is a high compliment to the trustworthiness of Hebrew tradition as to the Old Testament text, and though even this might not be a "final" authority—that is to say, though we would not hesitate to criticise the traditional text if there were materials to serve the purpose of comparison, we could not say that it would be "absurd" for a man to prefer a Jewish to a Christian tradition in a matter of this sort. And since critics like Dr. Robertson Smith are fond of reminding us that the Old Testament is to be regarded as a national literature, they cannot blame us if we give the preference to Jewish tradition over Gentile tradition in regard to questions pertaining to the authorship of that literature. So far, however, as the Pentateuch is concerned, there are two questions which the critics are bound to consider. Is it true that the Jewish mind at the time of Christ, and before His time, was pervaded with the belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch? And supposing it to be true, how far should this fact be taken into account in solving the Pentateuch problem?

CRITICISM AND SYMBOL.

In affirming the rights of Reason, and, therefore, of Criticism under the general Protestant principle of the right of private judgment, it is not forgotten that these rights are held by

ministers and elders of the Presbyterian Church subject to the qualifications implied in subscription to a Confession of Faith. In other words, a voluntary surrender of rights that belong to a Christian *quod* Christian is involved in holding office as a minister or an elder in a Church that has adopted a particular symbol. It is not easy to set forth the relation of creed-subscription to individual liberty, and it is particularly difficult to state the bearings of existing problems in the Higher Criticism upon the Westminster Confession: yet this is too important a matter to pass over without any notice at all. With what Dr. Briggs has said on this point we are in full accord. He says that "Biblical critics cannot afford to carry the load of school theology into the conflicts of the nineteenth century, but must strip to the symbols for a conflict with rationalism and materialism." Ministers and elders of the Presbyterian Church accept the Bible, in the first place, as the Word of God, and the only infallible rule of faith and practice: and they accept, in the second place, a certain confessional and authoritative interpretation of that Word. There may be an area of belief not covered by the Confession, and within that area differences of opinion may be freely entertained, and they most certainly exist. If any one were to say that there are not different types of theology and different theological tendencies in the Presbyterian Church, he would betray great ignorance of the prevalent currents of opinion. Extra-confessional belief cannot, however, be heretical belief; or in other words, a heresy must, in the nature of the case, under our confessional system, be something that is contrary to confessional statement. We say *Heresy*, for we are not speaking of those practices which are in violation of the law and usage of the Church, and which belong to the sphere of government rather than of doctrine. In making the Symbol the norm of orthodoxy, we do not put it above the Bible. The Bible is the rule of faith; the symbol is the authoritative interpretation of the Bible. By the word "authoritative," again, we make no concessions in favour of the right of the Church to give an infallible interpretation of the Bible. It is the implicit doctrine of our Confession that confessions of faith are not infallible. The Confession of Faith is not imposed upon any one. It is authoritative and obligatory only after it has been voluntarily

accepted. It is clear, moreover, that the meaning of the Symbol would be vacated the moment it ceased to be the norm of measurement in regard to heresy. For why should a man be required to subscribe to a creed if such subscription does not place him under specific obligations, and if, moreover, he is equally liable to be called to account for his views touching other questions respecting which the Confession is silent and he has given no pledge? And hence, too, it will appear that while the Confession may, in a sense, limit a man's freedom, it is also a great protection against tyranny. A man may very reasonably avow his acceptance of a certain doctrinal system set forth in a creed statement, who would be slow to accept the exegesis of particular passages of Scripture for which the approval of past or future General Assemblies may be quoted. Our belief upon this subject has been very well expressed by Dr. Briggs :—

“The symbols have been accepted and subscribed by honest and faithful men for their *face value*, for all that is fairly contained therein, and not for certain unknown and undiscovered consequences, which may have a chance majority, or the most authoritative teachers. Symbols of faith are the expression of the faith of those who constructed them, and of those who subsequently adopted them as far as they give expression to Christian doctrine ; but with regard to those questions not covered by their statements, which may have been held in abeyance, or purposely omitted on account of disagreement, and in order to liberty, or because they were not suited for a *national* confession or a *child's* catechism, or because they had not yet arisen on the field of controversy—to bring these in by the plea of logical deduction, is to elaborate and enlarge the creed against the judgment of those who framed it, is to usurp the constitutional methods of revision, is to dogmatise and obstruct those active, energetic scholars, who, having accepted them for their face value as a genuine expression of their faith, push forth into the unexplored fields of theology, in order, by the inductive method, and the generalisation of facts, rather than by deductions from symbolic or scholastic statements, to win new triumphs for their Divine Master.”

The relation of the Biblical critic to the Standards is the same as that of the dogmatic theologian. He is free to investigate, but he is not free to teach contrary to the Confession of Faith. This is not a great hardship, though it may be true that men who have not been called to engage in special theological work, or who are conscious of no centrifugal tendencies in their own experience, may sometimes fail to deal

judicially with the real difficulties of the case. Of course we have no right to say *a priori* that our Confession of Faith or any other instrument drawn up by fallible men, is incapable of improvement. It is not heresy to propose a revision of the creed. Happily it is a very difficult thing to accomplish such a revision constitutionally, and a proposition to revise would not and ought not to be favourably entertained. But if a man must utter himself in terms that contradict the Confession, the Church may prefer to part with him rather than jeopard her own peace or purity; and in such a judgment the Church would undoubtedly be right. We say the Church *may* prefer, for while it is true that no extra-confessional belief is heretical, it is also true, that every contra-confessional belief is not to be dealt with as heresy; for in order that it should be so dealt with, it should be shown to "impair the integrity of the Calvinistic system," or to "strike at the vitals of religion." Whenever, therefore, any alleged heresy is brought to the judicial notice of the Church two questions are to be determined: first, Has there been any contradiction of the Confession of Faith, or other doctrinal symbol? and, secondly, Is it of sufficient gravity to be made the subject of a judicial process? It may be a great deal easier sometimes to determine the first question than to settle the second. And here we see the difficulties that beset the General Assembly, clothed as it is with the double function of pronouncing in a declaratory way against error, and of sitting in appellate jurisdiction as a court of last resort. It is not to be wondered at that when rumours are in the air respecting erroneous teachings or tendencies in the Church, the General Assembly should feel called upon to utter a warning against these errors. But it is hard to do this in any effective way without danger of doing harm. It would be a great mistake to discourage study and thorough investigation, and to suppose that by putting a premium on ignorance the cause of truth would be promoted. It would be a great wrong for the highest judicatory in the Church to fasten suspicion upon one Seminary by naming it, or upon all Seminaries by not naming any, without a particle of technical evidence to support the charge of doctrinal unsoundness. It would be very unjudicial to decide a great question by adopting a set of resolutions under the impulse of an orthodox sentiment,

which ought to be decided only after a full, patient hearing of a concrete case, and under the provisions of the Book of Discipline applicable to appellate jurisdiction. And it is surely not too much to say that a committee of the General Assembly, however scholarly and wise, can hardly be expected, in the short time allowed them during its sessions, and without having previously given special attention to the subject, to deal in a satisfactory way with a new and complicated theological problem. Therefore while we are in fullest sympathy with the spirit that actuates the General Assembly in these matters, we are nevertheless of the opinion that it would contribute to the peace of the Church, and to the influence of the General Assembly, if deliverances on doctrinal questions were more sparingly made, and the mind of the Court of last resort were revealed through "sentences" given in accordance with the solemn and patient methods of appellate jurisdiction. Having said so much, we, of course, shall not undertake to express any opinion respecting the ecclesiastical aspect of certain alleged departures from the Confession of Faith. We shall confine ourselves altogether to the theological aspect, and shall accordingly compare certain results of Pentateuchal investigation with the statements of the Westminster Symbols.

II.

The results of the Higher Criticism in regard to Pentateuchal investigation are so various that it is not safe to undertake any estimate of their dogmatic import until they have been very clearly distinguished. For while there are critics whose conclusions result in an entire abandonment of all supernaturalism in Christianity, there are also those who not only hold the traditional view respecting the origin of the Pentateuch, but are likewise in sympathy with our whole confessional system. Between these extremes are to be found representatives of various shades of what Kuenen calls the "ecclesiastical theory" of religion, including those whose divergence from traditionalism is definitely avowed as well as those who profess to accept the traditional theory with slight modifications. There is room, therefore, for some such distinction as that which Dr. Briggs makes between Rationalistic

and Evangelical Criticism, though we have no partiality for either of these misleading epithets.

Kuenen may be taken as a type of the rationalistic critics. His theory of religion is naturalistic from beginning to end. As interpreted by him, there is nothing supernatural in either Christianity or Judaism. All religion is the manifestation of the religious feeling, and all religious history a process of development. It is not necessary to compare Kuenen's theory of religion with the Confession of Faith, for, as interpreted by Kuenen, and, indeed, by all who adopt his naturalistic postulates, Christianity means ethical monotheism, and it means nothing more. It is possible, however, to separate the postulates from the so-called historical facts, and it is important to do so; for, while we do not believe the facts to be as alleged, neither are we willing to concede that if they were as alleged they would justify Kuenen's conclusions. Dr. Robertson Smith, it is true, has not been successful in the attempt to hold Kuenen's view as to the history of Israel while rejecting his conclusions as to Christianity; but it does not follow from this that the reconstruction of Jewish history as proposed by Kuenen and Wellhausen would necessitate the downfall of Christianity. It has been common, we know, for the theological controversialist to defend orthodoxy by giving his antagonist the choice between atheism and his own view; and to the superficial reader this has the appearance of a crushing refutation. To those, however, who look below the surface, it is evident that in the act of sharpening these dilemma-horns, he has in reality been unconsciously surrendering positions which are of great advantage to Christianity. We shall not follow these unwise precedents, but, on the contrary, shall maintain, that though Kuenen's interpretation of the Religion of Israel were true—though it could be proven that the Jews rose out of polytheism into belief in one God, that the prophets of the eighth century B.C. were simply great preachers of pure morals, that the Levitical institutions were post-exilic and a compromise between the popular religion and prophetic teaching: it would be impossible, even then—without the aid of naturalistic postulates—without doing violence, moreover, to the facts of the New Testament—to make the reconstructions of Jewish history proposed by Kuenen and

Wellhausen the logical warrant for denying the supernatural character of Christianity. For Judaism, however explained, is genetically related to the Christian religion. Were there no exceptional facts that accredit the Divine authority of Christ, it might be possible to say that Jesus was simply a successor of the prophets, that the significance of His work resides exclusively in His ethical precepts, and that Paul taught a reactionary theology. And but for these exceptional facts it might be possible, supposing Kuenen's account of Judaism to be true, to put a naturalistic interpretation upon the course of Jewish history. If, however, there is a miraculous element in Christianity, there must be an inspirational element in Judaism, no matter in what order the events in Jewish history occurred. Men may refuse to believe that God appeared to Moses and delivered to him a completed system of jurisprudence and a complex sacrificial ritual. But they cannot ignore the correspondence between the Old Testament and the New. Grant, then, that a rude people rose gradually out of polytheism toward faith in the living God; that they gradually realised the need of ethical purity, and voiced it in their prophets; that they had a growing sense of sin which found expression at last in a priestly system; and, finally, that priest and prophet stood in sharp antithesis to each other, emphasising different sides of life, and not knowing the true relation between them, until Jesus came as the climax of both developments and their synthesis:—it would be necessary still to ask, How did Judaism happen to sustain this relation to Christianity? And there is but one answer to this question. Mere naturalism will not explain Judaism, unless it will explain Christianity as well. The man who believes that Jesus is the Son of God cannot resist the belief that Jewish history was a series of preparations for His advent. He may reject the inspiration of the book that records this history, but he cannot doubt the inspiration of the history itself.

It is, however, with the results of evangelical criticism that we are more immediately concerned. Let it be understood that the word "evangelical" is not used here as the opposite of sacerdotal, nor as a shorthand equivalent for a few doctrines which some people suppose are so fixed that their number can

neither be increased nor diminished. In describing certain critics as evangelical, all that is meant is, that however much they may be at variance with one another and with the Church creeds, they nevertheless believe that Christ died, the just for the unjust, that we have redemption through His blood, and that there is no other name given under heaven among men whereby we can be saved. In other words, they believe in the Gospel. Among these there are wide differences of view. Some accept our full confessional theology, others are clearly opposed to it in regard to some points, while of others it can only be said that their views have "an unsettling tendency" —if we make use of a current phrase to denote an idea which is very palpable, so far as we see it ourselves, though sometimes very intangible when we undertake to show it to others. This expression, since it has been used, may serve to introduce the discussion of an important question; for it may be conceded that it is very hard to make a comparison between the "tendency" of a certain statement, and the teachings of the Confession of Faith. Yet, one should not take advantage of this difficulty: and though critics may have some excuse for not rating very highly a great deal of what is said by those who attack them, they should remember, if they are Presbyterian ministers, that they are ministers first, even if they are literary men as well. Nor are we as clear as many seem to be that "tendency" can never be made a matter of judicial investigation. But we cannot deal fully with this question here. All that it is necessary to say about it will come before us in the comparison it is now proposed to make between the Confession of Faith and some of the results of Pentateuchal criticism.

This comparison cannot be made simply by placing the words of the Confession and the utterances of critical writers side by side. It is necessary first to understand what constitutes a contra-confessional opinion; and unless one has deliberately pondered this question, it is quite likely that he will not know how much real difficulty there may be in determining it. Thus, it must be admitted that to a great extent it is true that the logical consequences of confessional statements being no part of the Confession, a man may hold them or not without prejudice to his orthodoxy. And yet the Con-

fession cannot be taken for its "face value" in such a sense as to imply that there is no such thing as inferential heresy. If, for example, a man should hold an opinion contradictory to the teaching of Christ, such an opinion would be anti-confessional, by being inconsistent with the teaching of the Confession regarding our Lord's authority; but the inconsistency would be made apparent inferentially, and not as a direct contradiction of the Confession. It must also be admitted that great care should be taken when it is proposed to hold a man responsible for the logical consequences of his own views. A certain conception of the relation of God to the world may be logically related to Pantheism, but we may have no right to charge a man with Pantheism because he entertains this conception. Yet, here again, this must not be pressed to the extent of saying that a man must never be charged with the logical consequences of his own doctrine. For even though he should earnestly disavow his belief in those consequences, they may be so obviously related to the belief avowed that it would be impossible to find any rational ground for separating them. If a man should say that the Bible teaches error, it would be of no avail for him to avow his belief in plenary inspiration, since the two ideas are palpably inconsistent. There may be, therefore, different degrees of contra-confessional belief. An utterance may be a direct traverse of the words of the Confession, or it may be simply inconsistent with confessional teaching. This may be illustrated by the doctrine of Inspiration. The Confession of Faith teaches that all the books of the Canon are inspired; that God, having made a revelation, has been "pleased to commit the same wholly unto writing," and that we have a full persuasion and assurance of the "infallible truth and divine authority thereof." It is not held that we know how God's agency stands related to human agency in the production of an inspired writing. It is not denied that what is a revelation, in the sense that it is God's message to man, may also be Literature in the sense that it had a human genesis as well. But it is held that whatever influence was exerted on the writers of Scripture, and however different that influence may have been in different cases, inspiration can be, and is, predicated of the *writings*, and that by being inspired writings they are infallible. Any opinion inconsistent with the in-

errancy of Scripture (meaning by Scripture the autograph copies of Scripture) is contra-confessional. For it is obvious that a man may as well deny Inspiration as deny the results secured by Inspiration, or make statements inconsistent with these results. It is not always easy to say whether statements possess this character, for regard must always be had for the literary form of the writing, and we must be sure before we make the charge of contra-confessional teaching, that we have properly interpreted the passage which constitutes the basis of the allegation. We must distinguish between poetry and prose; we must not force literalistic meanings upon metaphors, or mistake dramatic statements for history; nor must Inspiration ever be held responsible for wrong exegesis. Hence the generally accepted interpretation of the "days" of Genesis does not conflict with the Confession's doctrine of Inspiration. Yet, if one should affirm that the story of Samson is a myth, we should not hesitate to say that such a view would be incompatible with Inspiration; and, speaking generally, we should say that any sober historical statement professing to relate fact must be factually true, or it cannot be inspired. It is clear, then, that all alleged departures from confessional teaching on the subject of Inspiration are not equally obvious. Thus, a man may simply contradict the Confession by saying, "The Scriptures are not inspired," or he may utter what is inconsistent with Inspiration, and say, "The Scriptures teach error." Or, he may say, "The world was not made in six days of twenty-four hours each;" and on the assumption that the days of Genesis are days of twenty-four hours, it may be alleged that he believes that the Scriptures teach error, and therefore does not believe in their inspiration. Or, he may say, "The Pentateuch was not written by Moses;" and on the assumption that the words "of which tribe Moses spake nothing concerning priesthood" can refer only to something that Moses wrote, and on the further assumption that the writing thus referred to is the whole Pentateuch, it might be alleged that to affirm the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch involves the imputation of error to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and consequently a denial of the Confession's doctrine of Inspiration. It is perfectly clear, however, that the assumptions just referred to serve to invalidate the inferences that depend upon them; and

it is just as clear that in cases similar to those just mentioned there may be more or less room for differences of opinion respecting the import of particular passages of Scripture, and, consequently, that an alleged departure from confessional teaching where it is not expressed in the terms of direct contradiction of the Confession, or in terms that are necessarily inconsistent with it, may be a matter of greater or less probability. This probability may be so great, it may concern such vital questions, it may be expressed in so many specific forms, as to support the charge of heresy. An opinion, moreover, may seem to involve a contradiction of confessional doctrine, in the terms of such decided probability, that it may safely may be pronounced unsettling or perilous, and the inculcation of it may be forbidden, though it might be improper to impute to the party holding it the conclusions to which it seems to point. If a man affirm his belief in the infallibility and inspiration of the Scriptures, this should not be challenged without the strongest reasons; yet it may easily happen that sentiments which in his case do not involve heretical results, may, in the minds of most people, inevitably involve these results. Hence a proper regard for the rights of the individual on the one hand, and the purity of the Church on the other, may sometimes require that an opinion be condemned, even though no charge of heresy can be sustained against the individual who entertains it. In a large number of cases, however, it will be found that alleged incompatibility between certain interpretations of Scripture and confessional teaching regarding Inspiration are only apparent, and on this account any form of ecclesiastical action whereby a case of contra-confessional opinion is decided, by deciding prematurely and without sufficient consideration a question of exegesis where different views are, to say the least, possible, is greatly to be deprecated.

Remembering the distinctions that have been made in regard to the different forms of contra-confessionalism, let us compare with the Confession of Faith the opinions of certain evangelical writers which have been presented or criticised in this *Review*. Dr. Green has defended the traditional belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. By others this belief is either denied, or accepted subject to certain modifications. It

is very important at the outset to make a sharp distinction between the post-Mosaic origin of Pentateuchal institutions, and the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch itself. The first position involves the second, but the second by no means implies the first, and there is danger of doing injustice to those who hold the latter view by a failure to keep this distinction steadily in mind. We propose to deal with these two questions separately.

IS BELIEF IN THE POST-MOSAIC ORIGIN OF THE JEWISH SACRIFICIAL SYSTEM CONTRA-CONFESSIONAL ?

This question should be answered without hesitation in the affirmative.

1. First, because it is opposed to the teaching of the Confession respecting the covenant of grace. And that this may be seen let us quote the words of the Confession that are supposed to be impugned :—

“Man by his fall having made himself incapable of life by that covenant, the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the covenant of grace” (c. vii. sec. 3). . . . “This covenant was differently administered in the time of the law and the time of the gospel ; under the law it was administered by promises, prophecies, sacrifices, circumcision, the paschal lamb, and other types and ordinances delivered to the people of the Jews, all fore-signifying Christ to come, which were for that time sufficient and efficacious, through the operation of the Spirit, to instruct and build up the elect in faith in the promised Messiah, by whom they had full remission of sins and eternal salvation” (c. vii. sec. 5). . . . “Although the work of redemption was not actually wrought by Christ till after His incarnation, yet the virtue, efficacy, and benefits thereof were communicated unto the elect in all ages successively from the beginning of the world in and by those promises, types, and sacrifices, wherein he was revealed and signified to be the seed of the woman which should bruise the serpent’s head and the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world, being yesterday and to-day the same and for ever” (c. viii. sec. 6). . . . “The justification of believers under the Old Testament was in all these respects one and the same with the justification of believers under the New Testament” (c. xi. sec. 6).

The account of the Jewish sacrifices presented by Dr. Robertson Smith in his *Old Testament in the Jewish Church* is very different from that given above. Prior to the exile, he says, sacrifices were not commanded. He affirms that “through the whole period from the Judges to Ezekiel the law in its finished state and fundamental theories was never

the rule of Israel's worship." The prophets are represented as teaching that Jehovah "has not enjoined sacrifice." He contradicts the traditional theory by saying that "the theology of the prophets before Ezekiel has no place for the system of priestly sacrifice and ritual." Sacrifice existed, it is true, before the exile, but it formed "part of natural religion which other nations shared with Israel." In fact, it formed part of the "popular religion" where "the people hoped to influence Jehovah's disposition toward them by gifts and sacrifices, by outward tokens of penitence." The passover might seem to be an exception to this rule, for its Mosaic origin is not denied, but it was a national feast, resting on a "historical basis" and possessing also an "agricultural significance." Dr. Smith gives no intimation that it had any sacrificial significance. He hints broadly in the opposite direction. Prior, then, to the exile, forgiveness of sin through sacrifice was unknown. When the Jews disobeyed God they were punished; when they repented they were forgiven. There was no atonement. "The law of forgiveness works directly and without any ritual sacrament." From the beginning of the world, then, down to the exile, the covenant of grace was not by sacrifices and the paschal lamb, as the Confession teaches. Any correspondence between the teaching of the Confession and the facts of the Old Testament concerning sacrifice must be looked for, if we are to trust Robertson Smith, after the time of Ezra. But why should a sacrificial system be commanded then? Was it to typify forgiveness through the blood of a greater sacrifice? Was it to mediate the blessings of the covenant of grace? No; it was simply an expedient to secure the separation of the Jews from the surrounding heathen. "It served only to direct the religious attitude of the people, to prevent them from turning aside into devious paths and looking for God's help in ways that might tempt them to forget His spiritual nature and fall back into heathenism. . . . The spontaneous unregulated character of the old service gave room for the introduction of heathen abominations. The new service shall be reduced to a divine rule, leaving no door for what is unholy." And this indeed is all that could be said. For if Noah, Abraham, Moses, David, and the people of God generally, were saved without sacrifices

it would be hard to see why sacrifice should be necessary to salvation in the time of Ezra. Salvation without atonement before Ezra is apt to carry with it salvation without atonement after Ezra. And though Dr. Smith may say that the post-exilic sacrifices were divinely appointed, there is nothing in his pages to show that they were expiatory, but much to imply that they were not. Dr. Smith admits that the Levitical system introduced by Ezra presented a lower type of religion than the non-sacrificial system of the prophets, and it might have occurred to him to ask why, after the exile, God borrowed a leaf from the prayer-book of the popular religion, seeing He had aforetime denounced that religion by the mouth of all His holy prophets? How is this retrograde movement explained? Why condemn sacrifice in one age and in the next insist upon punctilious attention to a sacrificial ritual? And how does it happen, moreover, that the lower Levitical system rather than the higher prophetic teaching has been chosen by the apostles for the purpose of expounding the mission of our Lord? Dr. Smith has not answered these questions, though they are important, and it seems to us that he might have postponed some of his researches in historical jurisprudence rather than leave such *lacunæ* in his argument. We do not say that Dr. Smith holds Socinian views regarding our Lord's atonement, but every one knows that a very close logical relation subsists between the sacrifices of the Old Economy and the sacrifice of Christ, and Socinian theologians will thank Dr. Smith for labouring so earnestly to show that the doctrine of satisfaction finds no support in the Levitical institutions. If, however, Dr. Smith has not surrendered his belief in our Lord's satisfaction, he must hold that the Old Testament economy of grace was very different from that of the New Testament, and in this way he stands squarely antagonistic to the Confession's statement that the justification of believers was in all respects the same in both Testaments.

2. To affirm the post-Mosaic origin of the Levitical system may also be fairly regarded as contrary to the teaching of the Confession regarding Inspiration. According to Dr. Robertson Smith, the Deuteronomic code (Deut. xii.-xxvi.) is identical with "the book which Hilkiyah, the priest, found in the house of the Lord" (2 Kings xxiii. 24) in the reign of King Josiah.

Dr. Smith is sure that this book was not a forgery perpetrated by the temple priests. This is proved by the provision made for the rural Levites in Deut. xviii., which Dr. Smith discerningly considers far too liberal to be due to metropolitan magnanimity. But if it was not a forgery, how did it happen to be so opportunely discovered? Dr. Smith may suppose that in exonerating the temple priests from the charge of forgery he has eliminated the element of fraud from his own theory. But we cannot see that he has. For, according to that theory, there is a very remarkable coincidence between the reforms of Josiah's reign and the discovery of a book which served as the legislative programme of these reforms. Nothing could be more seasonable than the discovery of a code that professed to speak in the name and with the authority of Moses. The operative significance of the code consisted in the weight that it would have as the law of Moses. Grant then that it was not a forgery committed by the priests. Somebody is responsible for palming this Deuteronomic code upon the public as the work of Moses. Who committed the fraud? Dr. Robertson Smith says that "the authority that lay behind Deuteronomy was the power of the prophetic teaching." Then we are to conclude that the prophets of that period sanctioned a proceeding by means of which a body of jurisprudence went into Jewish literature as the work of Moses which did not originate for a thousand years after Moses' death, and which simply "gathered up in practical form the results of the great movement under Hezekiah and Isaiah and the new divine teaching then given to Israel." Undoubtedly a book that gathered up these results might very well "become the programme of Josiah's reformation;" and under certain circumstances it might have been "of no consequence to Josiah . . . to know the exact date and authorship of the book." But according to Dr. Smith this book was identical with our Deuteronomic code, and that code claims to have been delivered through Moses. Under these circumstances it was a matter of great importance to Josiah, and it is a matter of great importance to us, to know whether it originated in the time of Moses, or not for a thousand years thereafter. Did Josiah use a pious fraud in prosecuting his reforms? Did prophetic authority aid and abet him in so doing? And, moreover, did God com-

mit to writing as part of His infallibly inspired Word a body of jurisprudence which was composed in the reign of King Hezekiah, but which professes to have been delivered by Moses, and which is inseparably connected with a historical narrative that deals with the occupation of Canaan as an event still in the future? Dr. Smith may try to reconcile us to this belief by saying that the ideas entertained in early times respecting literary property were very different from those that we are accustomed to: but he has not yet ventured to maintain that the ideas of truth which God entertained then are at all different from those which He entertains at this moment; and until he does this we shall be obliged to say that his theory respecting the origin of the Deuteronomic code is incompatible with any doctrine of Inspiration worthy of the name.

Let us, however, turn to the New Testament, for the utterances there are plain and unequivocal. Whatever doubt there may be regarding the bearing of the New Testament upon the authorship of the Pentateuch, there is no room for a reasonable doubt respecting the assertions of the inspired writers concerning the Mosaic legislation. Thus: John i. 17, "The law was given by Moses;" Heb. ix. 19, "For when Moses had spoken every precept to all the people according to the law, he took the blood of calves and of goats, with water, and scarlet wool, and hyssop, and sprinkled both the book, and all the people;" Heb. vii. 14, "For it is evident that our Lord sprang out of Juda; of which tribe Moses spake nothing concerning priesthood." The context shows unmistakeably that in the mind of the writer of this Epistle the provisions respecting the "Levitical priesthood" came through Moses. On the supposition that the Levitical priesthood was developed after the exile, how are these references to be accounted for? When a part of the Pentateuch is quoted as proof that Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch, it is replied that the portions quoted prove only that he wrote the parts ascribed to him. When laws are ascribed to Moses it is said that he might have been the author of the laws without being the author of the books that contain the laws. But we are not seeking to prove just now that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. We affirm that the New Testament imputes to

him the Pentateuchal Codes. How can those who believe that the Levitical institutions began with the reforms of Josiah or of Ezra explain the fact that the New Testament writers impute them to Moses? How can Inspiration make a mistake of a thousand years? How can we believe that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews was under the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost after we discover that the entire analogy between Christ and Aaron is founded upon an anachronism? How can Christ be a priest like Aaron if Aaron was not a priest? And how can Aaron be a priest unless he have somewhat to offer? And how could he have somewhat to offer if sacrifices were unknown, save as adjuncts of natural religion, until after the exile? And what is the value of a book whose whole dogmatic significance is destroyed with the discovery that the institutions whose origin it imputes to Moses were the outgrowth of a later development? And what value would Inspiration have after we had ascertained that it was employed to produce a worthless book? And, finally, who will hesitate when he is called to choose between an Inspiration that secures no good result and no Inspiration at all?

3. The question under discussion must be answered affirmatively for yet another reason, and that is, the absolute incompatibility between the teaching of the Confession respecting the authority of Christ and belief in the post-Mosaic origin of the Levitical law. Jesus repeatedly speaks of Moses as the giver of the law, and He speaks so specifically in regard to this point that there can be no doubt that He meant the Levitical system. Thus: "John vii. 19, "Did not Moses give you the law? Moses therefore gave you circumcision (not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers);" Mark i. 44, "See thou say nothing to any man: but go thy way, show thyself to the priest, and offer for thy cleansing those things which Moses commanded" (compare Lev. xiv. 2, 32); Matt. xix. 7, "They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give her a writing of divorcement, and to put her away? He saith unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so") compare Deut. xxiv. 1). Those laws referred by our Saviour to Moses are to be found in the Deuteronomic code which Dr. Robertson Smith assigns to the period between

Hezekiah and Josiah, and the Levitical code which he put as late as the time of Ezra. Here, again, there can be no doubt as to our Saviour's meaning. He is not naming books which go by the name of Moses. He is not using the word "Moses" to describe a religious system. He is speaking of a well-known body of law as given by Moses. He names certain specified laws and says that Moses was the author of them. How, then, can we deny the Mosaic origin of the Deuteronomic and the Levitical codes without denying the authority of Christ? We hold that this is impossible, and we understand Dr. Briggs to agree with us upon this point. He says:—

"The New Testament proves the *historical* character of the narratives of the Pentateuch, the fact that Moses was the great *lawgiver and prophet*, the *fundamental* position of the Mosaic legislation to the Old Testament, and above all the *divine authority* of the Pentateuch; and those who antagonise *these things* come into collision with Jesus and the apostles."

Dr. Robertson Smith, however, finds himself under no necessity to choose between the authority of Christ and the post-exilic origin of the Levitical code. He saves his orthodoxy by means of a *tertium quid* which deserves notice as one of the curiosities of literature. Thanks to what must have been a hasty reading of Sir Henry Maine's *Ancient Law*, he has made the discovery that the Levitical code, though originating in the time of Ezra, was imputed to Moses by a "legal fiction." Why our Lord should have sanctioned this legal fiction he does not say. Nor does it seem strange to him that our Lord, who was so careful to remind the Jews that circumcision antedated the law of Moses, and that the law of divorce began with Moses and did not represent the Divine ideal of marriage, should have so completely ignored the historic falsehood upon which popular faith in the so-called Mosaic institutions was based. But Dr. Smith has misread Sir Henry Maine. For, according to this eminent jurist, unwritten custom represents the first stage of law. Following consuetudinary law comes the Code or body of written though not necessarily systematised law. After this the adaptation of the law to the changes in society proceeds according to three methods: Legal Fiction, Equity, and Legislation. A legal fiction is simply a device which affects to conceal that the law, though actually changed, has been changed. It thus mediates between the spirit of prescription and the necessity for change; and as Sheldon Amos

remarks, by this means "the form of the old law continues to be maintained in procedure as a sort of tribute to the sentimental and unprogressive instincts of the bulk of the nation, while the wants of a nascent age are provided for through an artificial interpretation of that law." But the case before us is something utterly different. It is not some new departure from the Code every now and then which by legal fiction is imputed to and read into the Code, as where the *Responsa Prudentum* among the Romans were supposed to be based upon the Laws of the Twelve Tables. Here we have an entirely new code containing an elaborate sacrificial ritual, and "the new laws of the Levitical code are presented as ordinances of Moses, though when they were first promulgated every one knew that they were not so." And Dr. Smith presents us this as an illustration of legal fiction analogous to that which appears in the common law of England and the *jus civile* of Rome. Very appropriately it stands upon the last page of his book as marking the climax of absurdity; for it is as conceivable that the Statute of Frauds in the reign of Charles II. should have been referred by legal fiction to Magna Charta, as that a body of laws which Ezra introduced should have been referred by legal fiction to Moses. We concede to Dr. Smith the personal benefit of his own apologetic, untenable logically as his position undoubtedly is; but no Church that is jealous of the honour of Christ can afford to tolerate the inculcation of the doctrine that the Levitical sacrifices are post-exilic.

IS BELIEF IN THE NON-MOSAIC AUTHORSHIP OF THE PENTATEUCH
CONTRA-CONFESSIONAL?

We are obliged to answer this question in the affirmative, for reasons that will presently appear. At the same time it should be kept in mind that there are some very important considerations bearing upon the interpretation of this question, and consequently upon the answer that has just been given.

1. A great deal depends upon what is meant by affirming that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. Do we mean that Moses was the sole author of the whole of each of the five books that go by his name? or do we mean that Moses stood in such a relation to these books that we can without any impropriety speak of them as his writings, and refer to him as their author? These questions are not exactly the same; and it is in the latter

sense that we have given an affirmative answer to the question just propounded.

2. We must distinguish yet further between two very different ideas. It is one thing to say that all fair dealing with recognised canons of interpretation establishes the conclusion that in all probability Moses was virtually the author of the entire Pentateuch; and another thing to say that Moses is declared by Christ and His apostles to be the author of the entire Pentateuch in such terms that to question the statement that Moses wrote the entire Pentateuch is to contradict Christ and His apostles. The former position may be maintained; the latter cannot be.

3. It must be remembered that there is room for great divergence of opinion among those who dissent from the traditional belief that Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch. This has been abundantly illustrated in the series of articles under discussion. Thus all who deny the Mosaic origin of the Codes in Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Leviticus, deny of course the Mosaic authorship of these books. Dr. Robertson Smith belongs to this class. Professor H. P. Smith's position is not defined. He urges some strong objections to Wellhausen's theory that Ezra was the author of the priest-code and that the tabernacle was "the shadow of Solomon's temple cast upon the background of the Mosaic age by the imagination of later times." Moreover, he energetically repudiates the naturalism which is the foundation of Wellhausen's theory. But he does not affirm (though he does not deny) that the three codes came through Moses, and he has left room for the surmise that he may not regard them as Mosaic by a criticism of Dr. Green's article, in which he says, "that while his argument sufficiently establishes a very early Mosaic tradition, it does not seem to us to prove that any large portion of that tradition was fixed in a written form before the time of the monarchy." He accepts the results of Pentateuch-analysis, and holds, therefore, to a plurality of Pentateuchal authorship. Dr. Briggs teaches unequivocally that the Pentateuch gives us three codes of Mosaic legislation, "a judicial code, a people's code, and a priest code." His position, therefore, is in literal accord with the statement that the Law came by Moses. But holding, as he does, that the Pentateuch is a fourfold narrative, he cannot

hold the Mosaic authorship of the entire Pentateuch in any literal sense. It should be observed, however, that it is not claimed that there is anything in the style of the Pentateuch to militate against the idea that the four writings supposed by Dr. Briggs to compose it were produced in the time of Moses. Thus Dr. Briggs says :—

“The inter-relation of the four writings and their combination by a redactor is independent in itself of any theory or theories as to the *order* or the *time* of their genesis. There is nothing in this variation of documents as such to require that they should be successive and separated by wide intervals, or that would prevent their being very nearly contemporaneous. There is nothing in this distinction of documents as such that forces us to abandon the Mosaic age as to the time of their origin.”

Dr. Curtiss maintains that the three codes are Mosaic, and that Moses is virtually responsible for the entire Pentateuch, though not the author of all of it. He says :—

“There seems to be no reason why we should deny that at least those parts of the Pentateuch were written by Moses which are assigned to him ; and that other parts may have been penned under his direction or sufficiently soon after his death to assure their essential truthfulness as history.”

4. Returning, then, to the question respecting the attitude of the Confession to the problem under discussion, it should be observed that the Confession nowhere states that Moses wrote the Pentateuch or any part of it. It should be noted also that none of the doctrines of the Confession are affected in any way by the question respecting the authorship of the five books of Moses, unless it be the doctrine of Inspiration or that of our Lord's authority. The question, then, reduces itself to the inquiry whether the inerrancy of Scripture and the supreme authority of Christ are involved in the denial of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch. And here, let it be observed, our attitude to the evidence is not the same as when we are asking the question, What is the fair conclusion respecting the authorship of the Pentateuch, indicated by the words of our Lord and the New Testament writers? For although when we are asking, What do the words of Christ teach respecting the authorship of the Pentateuch? it is not enough to show what they *may* mean, and it is quite proper to expose the fallacies of those writers who propound a possible meaning as the true meaning: the case is very

different when the object is to show that to put a particular meaning upon the words of Christ is to contradict Christ. When the allegation is that one has come into collision with Christ and His apostles, it is a sufficient reply to that charge to say that the words of Christ will bear the meaning that was put upon them. And though the probability be but slight that such is the true meaning, the burden of proof lies fairly upon the party making the charge of contradiction to show that such a meaning is unreasonable. This distinction is of great importance in a discussion of this nature.

Let us ask then whether the Pentateuch itself claims throughout to have been written by Moses. This is the inference we should naturally draw from Deut. xxxi. 9. And so Hengstenberg, Keil, and others interpret it. But it would not be fair to insist on this interpretation in such strong terms as to bring those who do not accept this interpretation into collision with the doctrine of Inspiration. In five instances portions of the Pentateuch are said to have been written by Moses. The Mosaic authorship of these portions could not be denied without contradicting the doctrine of the Confession regarding Inspiration, and the Mosaic authorship of these portions may constitute a strong argument for the Mosaic authorship of the rest, but it does not, of itself, shut us up to this belief. Again, do the writers of the New Testament, and, particularly, does Jesus declare that Moses wrote the Pentateuch? We must answer this question in the affirmative, even though we admit that the words of Christ and His apostles do not shut us up to the choice between a rejection of their authority and the avowal that Moses wrote the whole of the Pentateuch. Thus we read, Acts xv. 21, "Moses hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath-day." And our Saviour said, John v. 47, "If ye had believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" There can be no room for doubt that a body of literature substantially identical with our Pentateuch was known and named by Christ and His apostles as the writings of Moses. We believe that a fair examination of all the facts will lead to the vindication of the traditional belief in the Mosaic authorship of the entire Pentateuch.

Nor can men accept the authority of Christ as final and reach any other conclusion, if they allow themselves to be guided by the logical implications of our Saviour's words. If, however, it were held that the words of Christ and of the New Testament writers are sufficiently accounted for by supposing that a fourfold document was composed under the direction of Moses, parts of it being written by Moses himself, or that Mosaic writings were the basis of our present Pentateuch, we should be obliged to admit that though this view may fall very far short of the truth, it nevertheless cannot be held to be inconsistent with the teachings of the Confession of Faith.

III.

Admitting now that it is more important to believe that Moses gave the Law than that he wrote the Pentateuch, and admitting, moreover, that the denial that Moses wrote the entire Pentateuch is not contra-confessional, it appears that we are nevertheless required, by all fair interpretation of the words of Christ and the writers of the New Testament, to believe that Moses was in some sense the author of the books that go by his name. That being the case, the authorship of the Pentateuch ceases to be merely a literary question, and becomes invested with important dogmatic significance. In looking at this question from a dogmatic point of view, we do not choose to assume the inspiration of the Scriptures, and on this ground close the discussion without facing the objections that have been urged to the traditional belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Neglecting minor considerations, as the alleged anachronisms involved in Gen. xxxvi. 31, Deut. ii. 12, and Deut. i. 1, it is safe to say that the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is contended for on three principal grounds: (1.) Certain naturalistic postulates; (2.) The alleged post-Mosaic origin of two of the Pentateuchal codes; (3.) The alleged composite character of the Pentateuch itself. Let us consider these arguments in the order named.

NATURALISTIC POSTULATES.

It would be very hard, if it would not be impossible, for a student not to be influenced in this discussion by his theory of the universe. When, therefore, men deny the personality of

God, or, being theists, nevertheless believe that all religious belief is the outcome of a process of development, they cannot help construing the history of Israel in the light of these naturalistic presuppositions. Accordingly, when they find Moses represented as inculcating a lofty type of religious belief, as the centre of a great miraculous dispensation, as the giver of a complex system of Law which was destined to remain without improvement or material change through the entire life of the Jewish nation, the historicity of the Pentateuch is denied by them at the start. For men like Kuenen, then, to reconstruct Jewish history so as to harmonise it with their theory of the universe, becomes a perfectly intelligible thing. Their postulates, of course, are absurd; but conceding their theory of the universe to be true, they have no choice. And having interpreted the Jewish law according to the canons of naturalistic criticism, they do not stop half-way, but give us a naturalistic Christianity as a sequel to naturalistic Judaism. In this way their work assumes the form of unity and coherence, although the system throughout illustrates the domination of theory over fact, of foregone conclusion over historical testimony. When, however, a critic repudiates naturalism, and works without the momentum and inspiration of a great presupposition like this, and yet wishes to take advantage of the results reached through this hypothesis, he labours under great disadvantages. It might be greatly to the credit of the critics who belong to this class that they do not depend upon these postulates of naturalism, but that their conclusions are based upon an inductive investigation of the fact. And certainly this would be the case if the facts warranted their conclusions, or they were ready to be governed altogether in their conclusions by the facts that have been subjected to scrutiny. But when evangelical critics confine themselves to the Old Testament facts without any naturalistic bias, they will find that though a post-Mosaic authorship of the law were a plausible explanation, a Mosaic authorship is also a plausible explanation; and that being the case, why should they say that the law was post-Mosaic? Or if the facts show that the priest-code of Leviticus could not have existed until after the exile, they also show that it might have been developed in the ordinary course of events about that time. Why, then, do they

not hold that it was due to natural causes? Because, at this point in the argument, they cease to be inductive and seek information from the lips of Christ, so that they reject supernaturalism at the first only to accept it at a later stage. But if men can accept the supernaturalism involved in accepting the authority of Christ, there should be nothing to hinder their accepting the supernaturalism involved in believing that the Jewish nation started out with a complete system of divinely revealed jurisprudence; and least of all should this be difficult when, having accepted Christ's authority, they have His authority for saying that Moses gave the law. We do not say that the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch might not possibly be rejected on grounds that are purely literary and historical; but it should be kept in mind that when one has abandoned the naturalistic postulates he has abandoned one of the strongest reasons for rejecting the traditional view. And the critic cannot be allowed to occupy the double position, of first repudiating naturalism and then using an *a priori* argument that naturalism suggests. This is the position occupied by Dr. Robertson Smith. In his first lecture, in the book already referred to, he says: "If you find me calling in a rationalistic principle, if you can show at any step in my argument that I assume the impossibility of the supernatural, or reject plain facts in the interest of rationalistic theories, I will frankly confess that I am in the wrong." Yet further on, he says:—

"On the traditional view three successive bodies of law were given to Israel within forty years. Within that short time many ordinances were modified and the whole law of Sinai recast on the plains of Moab. But from the days of Moses there was no change. With his death the Israelites entered on a new career, which transformed the nomads of Goshen into the civilised inhabitants of vineyard land and cities in Canaan. But the divine laws given them beyond Jordan were to remain unmodified through all the long centuries of development in Canaan, an absolute and immutable code. I say, with all reverence, that this is impossible."

Dr. Smith is not assuming here the impossibility of miracles, but he is using an argument that has no force without that assumption. Here, therefore, as is so often the case with those who deny the traditional view, all that he gains in orthodoxy is so much subtracted from his consistency.

ARE THE PENTATEUCHAL CODES POST-MOSAIC ?

With the giving up of naturalism, the critic who denies the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch gives up one of the three great arguments in support of his position, though we do not say that he gives up one-third of his case. The second great reason relied on to prove that Moses did not write the Pentateuch is the allegation that the Deuteronomic and Levitical codes came into existence at a late period in Israel's history. In support of this position several historical facts are alleged, the most important of which may be grouped under the following heads: (1.) Variations in the codes; (2.) Witness of History; (3.) Ezekiel's programme. Before dealing specifically with these facts and the conclusions based upon them, let us notice the different positions that it is possible to take respecting them. The facts may be admitted and the conclusions admitted. This is Dr. Robertson Smith's position. Or both facts and conclusions may be denied. This is Dr. Green's position. Or the facts may be admitted and the conclusions denied. This is Dr. Briggs' position.

Turning now to the allegations of fact grouped under the three heads just mentioned, it is evident that they do not stand on the same level, and that they must not be treated as so many separate proofs of the post-Mosaic origin of the Levitical code. In order that they may be properly estimated, it is necessary to know how they stand related to one another in the critics' argument. In the first place, certain alleged variations in the codes constitute the basis of the hypothesis that in their genesis they were separated from each other by long intervals. These variations are: plurality of altars in Exodus as opposed to a central altar in Deuteronomy; undifferentiated functions of priests and Levites in Deuteronomy in contrast with the sharp antithesis between the two orders in Leviticus and Numbers; a small number of ceremonial requirements in Exodus, followed by a more developed ritual in Deuteronomy, and by one still more elaborate in Leviticus. To account for these variations, it is said that we must allow a long period of time. Again, it is said that if we compare the codes with the actual history of Israel, we shall find that the latter reveals just such a state of things as the hypothesis implies: entire

ignorance or unrebuked violation of the Levitical system up to the time of the exile and of the Deuteronomic code prior to the reign of Hezekiah. In the third place, it is alleged that in Ezekiel's programme we can watch the actual process of development, and see in the degradation of the Levites how the Deuteronomic Torah passed into the Torah of Leviticus. So that we have first the variations in the codes that give rise to the hypothesis; then the witness of subsequent history in support of the hypothesis; and finally, the verification of the hypothesis by the discovery of the "missing link" in the 44th chapter of Ezekiel. It must be admitted that this has the appearance of being a very plausible theory. If we were to reason inductively on the basis of these facts alone, and without regard to the words of Christ, we should say that if we admit the facts we cannot help admitting the theory. Therefore, the boldest and best way to defend the Mosaic authorship of the Deuteronomic and Levitical codes is to challenge the facts in support of the contrary hypothesis. This is the method adopted by Dr. Green; and he has maintained his position, we feel bound to say, after repeated perusal and most patient study of his article, with an array of fact and argument absolutely overwhelming.

It is alleged, and Dr. Briggs supports the allegation, that in Exodus xx. 24 a plurality of altars is contemplated, whereas in Deut. xii. provision is made for a central altar. Dr. Briggs writes the words "in all places" of the first passage in italics, as though the idea of a simultaneous plurality of altars were necessarily implied in the original. Dr. Green, on the other hand, says that this translation "does not accurately represent the Hebrew," and goes on to show that the plurality referred to in the passage is a plurality of succession and not a plurality of co-existence: a very natural thing, considering the fact that Israel was on the march when this law was given. Such a plurality of altars is surely not incompatible with the provision for a central altar in Deut. xii., made when the Jews were on the eve of entering Canaan, and having reference to their settled abode in the land of promise.

It is said, moreover, that the distinction between the priests and the Levites, which is so sharply made in Leviticus-Numbers, is not recognised at all in Deuteronomy. Priests and

Levites are supposed to be dealt with in Deuteronomy as interchangeable terms, and this not only on the ground of the oft-recurring phrase, "the priests the Levites," but also because the Levites were said "to stand before the Lord." We do not agree with Dr. Briggs when he says that "the effort to show a distinction between the priests and Levites in the Deuteronomic code must be regarded as a failure." Any one who will read Dr. Curtiss's *Levitical Priests* or Dr. Green's *Moses and the Prophets*, with his English Bible in his hand, can satisfy himself on this point. It has been shown that "standing before the Lord" was not a function of the priests exclusively; that "the priests the Levites," meaning the Levitical priests, was a very natural mode of designating the priests in a book written some time after the institution of the priesthood, and contemplating the priesthood in general, rather than Aaron and his sons in particular; and that in Deut. xviii. 1 the Levites are distinguished from the priests, otherwise there is tautology in the expression, "the priests the Levites and all the tribe of Levi." Again, it is said that in Exodus, Deuteronomy, and Leviticus, respectively, the feasts, sacrifices, and purifications are presented with increasing number and with growing minuteness of ceremonial detail. But this may be granted without conceding that it is any reason for separating by a long interval Deuteronomy from Exodus, or Leviticus from Deuteronomy, and making Leviticus the last in the series. For upon the supposition that Deuteronomy was written last; that it was intended to be the "people's book;" that it took for granted, without reiteration, the more minute provisions in Leviticus: all the difference between Deuteronomy and the middle books of the Pentateuch can be accounted for.

It is fair, then, to say that there is not such variation in the three Pentateuchal codes as to warrant an hypothesis respecting the genesis of two of them which is so plainly in conflict with the historical context. It is, moreover, just as correct to say that the alleged discrepancy between the two codes referred to and the history of the Jewish people does not sustain and certainly does not demand the post-Mosaic hypothesis under consideration. Indeed, we are unable to see that any such discrepancy exists, though Dr. Briggs says it "must be admitted by every candid investigator of Scripture." As illustrating

this discrepancy we are told that during the time of the Judges, and even in the days of Samuel, local sanctuaries abounded, and that, contrary to the Deuteronomic law, sacrifices were offered by laymen. In answer to this, however, it has been very satisfactorily said that the so-called violations of the Deuteronomic code were exceptional, and, in all recorded instances prior to the defeat at Ebenezer, were associated with special manifestations of Jehovah's presence; and furthermore, that throughout the period referred to, or rather until the Ark was taken by the Philistines, the house of God was at Shiloh, and the Aaronic priesthood performed their functions there and there only. After the desertion of Shiloh by Jehovah there was "no place which God had chosen to put his name there," and before the building of the temple "the people sacrificed in high places because there was no house built unto the name of the Lord until those days" (1 Kings iii. 2). These "high places" in time became associated with idolatrous worship; and when pious kings undertook a reform in religion they were only partially successful, so that while the idols were destroyed the high places were not taken away. This, too, is one of the discrepancies referred to above. But it only proves that a good king may be unable to realise a coveted ideal, or that the ideal of a good king in an idolatrous community may not be very exalted. Nor do the utterances of the early prophets regarding sacrifices give any colour to the idea that the Levitical code was post-exilic. Isaiah does, indeed, represent God as saying, "My soul hateth your new moons and your feasts; they are a burden to me;" but any one who has not a theory to maintain can see that this language is only a natural and vehement protest against an externalism that had taken the place of vital piety. And in the same spirit Amos asks the question: "Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?" but Dr. Smith has no right to say that this "proves God's indifference to ritual," and Dr. Briggs is taking too much for granted when he supplies a plain prosaic negative as the answer to this question. Micah teaches that thousands of rams and ten thousands of rivers of oil are a poor substitute for an elevated ethical nature that shows itself in doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly with God. But it betrays a great lack of

spiritual as well as literary perception when these passages are made to yield the dogmatic statement that "Jehovah has not enjoined sacrifice." These are the passages, however, with which Dr. Robertson Smith opposes the belief of the Church, and on the ground of which he says: "It is impossible to give a flatter contradiction to the traditional theory that the Levitical system was enacted in the wilderness." In further illustration of the discrepancy between the laws of Deuteronomy and Leviticus and the history of Israel prior to the exile, it is common for the critics to speak of the silence of Scripture regarding certain features of the Levitical law. Thus we are reminded by Dr. Briggs that in the time of Samuel the only sacrifices mentioned are burnt-offerings and peace-offerings, though he admits that the priest-code must have been known, since the Urim and Thummim were consulted; that in the organisation of the temple services the Levitical purifications are not mentioned, although that organisation "points back to the simpler Mosaic legislation of which it is an elaboration;" that the sin-offering is not found "in the pre-exilic prophets, or in the entire Psalter save Ps. xl., or in the ethical writings;" and finally that there is no allusion to the day of atonement. Dr. Briggs holds that notwithstanding these silences, there is clear proof in the facts just referred to that the Levitical code was in existence. But though there were no such positive proof, the absence of it could not be called a "discrepancy." For, as Dr. Briggs very justly observes: "To an evangelical man transgression and silence do not prove the *non-existence* of the code." Dr. Briggs seems to think, however, that transgression and silence prove "a general *neglect* and *ignorance* of it;" and it is with reference to this that the traditional belief must, in his opinion, undergo some modification.

We come now to that part of the discussion which deals with the verification of the hypothesis under notice. The 44th chapter of Ezekiel bears in a very important way upon this hypothesis. For, granting the variations in the codes, it might be said that these variations do not prove that they are not contemporaneous; and granting that Scripture were silent respecting some of the more important provisions in at least one of them, it might still be said that the argument *e silentio*, always unsafe, is in the present instance reduced to zero, by

the positive averments of the Pentateuch. But if it were to be proved that during the exile, a law came into existence which gave every indication of being based upon that of Deuteronomy, assigning a reason for one of the chief points of difference between the Deuteronomic and Levitical codes, and seeming to be the bridge between the two: this fact would deservedly have great weight. It would not only constitute an argument in itself, but it would serve to resuscitate the other arguments just referred to, and it might be necessary to inquire whether all these considerations taken together do not give strong support to the post-exilic hypothesis, even though taken separately they may not have much force. We should be very slow, therefore, to agree with Dr. Briggs in saying that "the intermediate position of the code of Ezekiel between the Deuteronomic code and the priest-code seems to be proved." We do not believe that this intermediate position has been proved, though if proof is to be found anywhere it is in the so-called degradation of the Levites. But the degradation of the Levites, as this is understood by the critics, can be proved only by assuming that in the expression "the priests the Levites," we are to understand that the relation of these terms is one of identity instead of inclusion in a class. That a class called Levites were degraded so that they would no more appear before God "to do the office of a priest," is perfectly clear. If all Levites were priests, then in the degradation of the Levites we may have the origin of these two orders. But this is the point to be proved, and this chapter cannot help the hypothesis it is supposed to verify, without begging the question at the start. All priests were Levites, and might be called Levites. But all Levites were not priests, as we learn outside of Leviticus in 1 Kings viii. 4. Those Levites who were degraded so that they could no more "do the office of a priest" were priests. And the statement in Ezekiel must be understood to mean that because the priests of Zadok's line had been faithful to God, they alone should appear before God in the priest's office; and because other priests—the priests, that is to say, of Abiathar's line—had been unfaithful and had compromised themselves by idolatry, they were degraded and sent back to the ranks, and made to do the subordinate work appointed unto the Levites. But in no event can Ezekiel's

Torah be assigned a place between Deuteronomy and Leviticus, for, as Dr. Green has shown, it contemplates a division of labour among the Levites, that the priest-code says nothing about; and in its limiting the priesthood to the family of Zadok, it represents a stage of differentiation more advanced than that of Leviticus, where the priesthood is allowed the wider area of the family of Aaron. If, therefore, we are to determine the relative ages of Ezekiel's Torah and the priest-code by the philosophy of evolution, we must conclude that the prophet's forty-fourth chapter presupposes the prior existence of Leviticus.

We are able now to understand the relations which critics of different schools must sustain to this hypothesis. Naturalistic critics are obliged to interpret Jewish history so as to support the theory that the Levitical system was a gradual growth. History must be made to support their theory, or the theory must be sacrificed. Critics who have no antecedent bias, who interpret the Jewish sacrificial system on the basis of facts furnished by the Old Testament, have no good reason for adopting this hypothesis. For granting that some facts seem to favour it, others as decidedly oppose it; and nothing has been offered in evidence to set aside the presumptions founded on the plain narrative of the Pentateuch. Christian critics, on the other hand, are bound by every consideration to disavow the hypothesis. The priest-code is woven into the historical context of Leviticus. It would be as hard to separate it from that context as it would have been to take the figure of Minerva out of the shield of Achilles. If Moses did not give the law of Leviticus, then the narrative in Leviticus is not true; and if it be not true it cannot be inspired; for Dr. Robertson Smith has said that all sound apologetic admits that "the proof that a book is credible must precede belief that it is inspired." And that is not all: our Saviour referred the law of Deuteronomy and Leviticus to Moses; the New Testament writers say that Moses gave the law; the entire Epistle to the Hebrews proceeds upon this assumption. How is it possible to believe that Christ is Divine, and that the New Testament is inspired, and at the same time believe that the Levitical law originated after the exile? This is a hard question. It is a question which no amount of Semitic learning will

solve. It is a question upon which none of the departments of theological inquiry can throw any light. Philosophy, which has so often been the advocate of heresy, will accept no retainer from Robertson Smith; and in his dire distress, as we have seen, he invokes the aid of historical jurisprudence. His hope of reconciling his allegiance to Christ and his belief in the post-exilic origin of the Levitical priesthood, depends upon his ability to prove that the priest-code, as they call it, was a legal fiction. But where in the history of jurisprudence is there another case of legal fiction like this? Did legal fiction ever make a Code? Did it invent the decemviral text? or the Brehon code? or the code of Menu? Legal fiction has modified existing codes, but it never made one. In the present case, however, if Robertson Smith's theory be true, legal fiction has not only invented a code but it has manufactured a history to match it; it has set the code in operation, and fabricated the story of Korah as an illustration of its violation; as represented in Ezra, it has anticipated the doctrine of evolution and invented the Ark and the Tabernacle, in order to complete the Levitical pedigree and find a prototype for Solomon's temple! Can the jurisconsults of all ages match this case of legal fiction? Is there anything like it in the bench-made law of England or the bar-made law of Rome? Is the Roman doctrine of adoption, is the English doctrine of fine and recovery, is the Indian doctrine of water-supply, in the remotest degree analogous to this supposed case of "legal fiction," which, in Dr. Smith's opinion, is to serve such a conciliatory purpose in the history of apologetics? Speaking of the traditional view, Dr. Smith declares, "with all reverence, this is impossible." And with like confidence Dr. Briggs says, "Impossible!" in reference to this theory of legal fiction. Whose "impossible" shall we accept?—the "impossible" of Dr. Smith or the "impossible" of Dr. Briggs?

We are glad to avail ourselves of our colleague's strong support in opposing the theory of Dr. Robertson Smith, and it will do no harm if we call attention at this point to the fact that these two representative evangelical critics, both Presbyterians, and both antagonising what is called the traditional view, stand in irreconcilable antagonism to one another. And since traditionalism has had the help, first of Dr. Smith and

Dr. Briggs in opposing Kuenen and Reuss, and then of Dr. Briggs in opposing Dr. Smith, the simple question seems to be whether traditionalism is able single-handed to grapple with Dr. Briggs himself. The article in which Dr. Briggs presents his views respecting this Pentateuchal question has deservedly attracted attention by reason of the great command of historical material which it evinces. Those who differ most decidedly with Dr. Briggs, must acknowledge the erudition evinced by this article, and will own their indebtedness to him for having placed before them with such definiteness of grouping, and in such condensed form, a history of the Higher Criticism which is certainly not to be found elsewhere in the English language. The theory which Dr. Briggs proposes in his article will also receive attention on account of its novelty and its claims. We have no doubt that it will be subjected to very searching examination by critics whose names will stand for authority in the department of Old Testament criticism. But inasmuch as the theory is put forward for the acceptance of Christians in general, and not simply for the consideration of Semitic scholars in particular, no apology need be made for the appearance of a few words in examination of it by one who does not belong to the learned body last named.

The position taken by Dr. Briggs may be roughly represented as a plea in confession and avoidance. He admits the main facts alleged in support of the post-Mosaic origin of the codes, but sets up other facts which neutralise them. Thus, according to the traditional view, the Deuteronomic and Levitical codes were given by Moses, and going into operation immediately, continued in operation, though subject to interruption, throughout the history of Israel. According to Reuss, the codes referred to did not enter into the historic life of the Jews until the reign of Josiah and the return from captivity, and cannot, therefore, have been given by Moses. The theory offered by Dr. Briggs adopts half of each of the foregoing theories: Reuss is right in regard to the place of the codes in the national life of the Jews; the traditional view is right in saying the law was given by Moses. It must be observed, however, that while the three groups of facts in support of the post-Mosaic hypothesis are accepted by Dr. Briggs, it is also affirmed by him that traces of the priest-code are found all

through the history prior to the exile, and that the theory of Reuss will not explain them. Now, it will occur to any one that the theory of Dr. Briggs must, in the nature of the case, be in unstable equilibrium between the traditional theory on the one hand and the theory of Reuss and Wellhausen on the other. Either of these is consistent: whether Dr. Briggs' theory is consistent remains to be seen. But it would not be strange if it failed to satisfy either its companion on the right or its companion on the left. For the critic of the Reuss school will say, that having admitted all that is claimed as to variations in the codes; having admitted the "discrepancy" between the codes and the history of the Jews; and finally, having admitted the "intermediate position" of Ezekiel's Torah, consistency would require that the post-Mosaic authorship of the codes should also be admitted. To the statement on the part of Dr. Briggs that allusions to Urim and Thummim and the like presuppose the existence of the priest-code, the critic might reply that these traces cannot avail to upset a conclusion pointed to by the whole trend of fact, and further, that they can be explained as stages in a process of growth, as elements in the popular religion subsequently embodied in the elaborated *cultus* of the Second Temple. So that it might well be argued that the position taken by Dr. Briggs is one where the Old Testament facts point in one direction and the words of Christ in the opposite; and that, while he affirms the Mosaic origin of the codes, he does so by leaving the inductive basis of Old Testament fact, and falling back upon the authoritative word of Christ. The traditionist will, of course, approve his decision, and honour him for going with the word of Christ rather than with the natural consequences of his admissions: but he will say that there is no need of placing historic fact and Christ's authority at variance in this way; that having avowed his belief in the Mosaic origin of the codes the traditional view as to their place in Jewish history is the logical result; and that there is nothing in the facts, when properly construed, to contradict it.

But let us look more closely at the position taken by Dr. Briggs. The following passages, taken from our colleague's article on the Higher Criticism, will serve to exhibit his theory:—

"It will be observed that these variations are the *chief* features of the ceremonial system. They present the appearance of development from the more simple to the more complex, and in the order, covenant code, Deuteronomic code, and priest code. The traditional theory is certainly at fault here in regarding the Deuteronomic legislation as *secondary* over-against the priest code as *primary*. The Deuteronomic code is secondary to the covenant code, but not to the priest code. This fault of the traditional theory had not been overcome by the theories of Eichhorn, Geddes, or De Wette. Here is an advantage of the Reuss theory over all previous ones. We must admit the *order* of development, but we deny that it is necessary to postulate a thousand years to account for this development. A code for the elders and judges of tribes or clans in their various localities; a code for the instruction of the nation as a whole in the rhetorical and popular form, and a code for the priests from the holy place as a centre, in the nature of the case, will show a progress from the simple to the more and more complex and elaborate in matters of ritualistic observance. . . . Thus comparing the three codes with the history, we must regard them as three grand ideals in an ascending series from the covenant code through the Deuteronomic code to the priest code, which could not be realised in the historical experience of the nation, owing to their failure to fulfil the underlying *covenant* obligations. . . . The Mosaic legislation was a magnificent *Prophetic ideal*, even more so than the legislation of Ezekiel. This ideal and prophetic element of the Pentateuchal legislation has been buried under the traditional theory of the Pharisees, which has come down as a yoke of bondage and a dark cloud of superstition to the Christian Church. Stripping these off, we behold in the Pentateuch vastly more than it has been the custom to find there. We find not only the Deuteronomic prediction of a prophet like Moses fulfilled in Jesus Christ, but that the *whole law is prophetic of the gospel*. . . . The Mosaic legislation was *delivered* through Moses, but it was enforced only in part, and in several stages of advancement, in the historical life and experience of Israel from the conquest to the exile. It was a *divine ideal*, a supernatural revealed instruction, to guide the people of Israel throughout their history, and to lead them to the Prophet greater than Moses who was to fulfil and complete his legislation."

These codes, we are told, give evidence of development from the simple to the more complex. This does not mean that they emerged in successive periods of history, for they were practically synchronous. Nor can it mean that in the space of forty years the simple covenant code passed by a process of natural development into the priest-code, remaining fixed for ever afterwards. It can only mean that there were three distinct levels of Mosaic legislation in which the covenant code contemplated the simplest, and the priest-code limiting the sacerdotal function to the family of Aaron, the most complex form of worship. This, however, only means that the

logical order of the three codes, though not the order in time, is covenant code, people's code, priest-code. And we grant that this presents a very definite conception to our mind. We grant, moreover, that if this view were warranted by the facts, we should see in the converging lines that represent the narrowing area of the sacerdotal function, the prophecy of the great High Priest of our profession. But this view is based altogether upon the assumption that the priesthood in Deuteronomy is co-extensive with the tribe of Levi—a position which cannot be maintained. If, however, we must find a logical relation between these three codes, we shall reach just as satisfactory an arrangement by regarding the priest-code as the determining factor in Jewish history. Its distinction of outer court, holy place, and holy of holies; its hierarchy of Levites, priest, and high priest; its scheme of sacrifices culminating in the great day of atonement; its Sabbath, sabbatical year, and year of Jubilee, were prophetic of the Christian dispensation. The covenant code in Exodus anticipated the priest-code, and must not be taken as something standing by itself. The people's code in Deuteronomy pre-supposed the priest-code, and makes repeated allusions to it. So considered, the Mosaic system is symmetrical, and though one's insight into its prophetic significance should not go beyond that possessed by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, we should be able even then, without the aid of Dr. Briggs' hypothesis, to see that "the whole law is prophetic of the gospel."

Again, we are told that the Mosaic legislation was "a divine ideal." What can this mean? Does it mean that by being enacted it became the norm of duty to Israel? In that sense we all believe that it was an ideal. Does it mean that though the norm of duty, the people of Israel by reason of their wickedness did not obey it, or by reason of their political conditions were sometimes unable to obey it? We notice here no point of contrast with the traditional view. And to find such a point of contrast we are obliged to suppose that in speaking of the Mosaic legislation as an ideal, the idea intended to be conveyed is that this body of law was a grand scheme of proleptic legislation; that Moses did not intend the people's code and priest-code to go into operation at once, but that he was making legislative provision for the reign of King Josiah and

the *cultus* of the Second Temple. This, again, is a conceivable thing, though it is flatly contradicted by history, and is a rebound from the idea of development more pronounced than the most ardent opponent of development could ask for. Again, it is said that this legislation was "a magnificent prophetic ideal." But "prophetic" of what? If the writer means to say that it was prophetic of Christ, this is exactly what we all believe; and Dr. Briggs has certainly not given us any stronger reasons for believing this than we had before. Was it prophetic of itself? of its fulfilment, that is to say, by the Jewish people? But in this sense all law is prophetic. For in so far as it commands, it predicts; the supposition being, of course, that the sovereign power issuing the command can and will enforce it with appropriate sanctions. We can attach but one meaning to this statement, namely: that inasmuch as the Jewish people in their national life passed through the stages represented by these three codes, we are to regard these codes as prophetic of that history. This, again, is a perfectly conceivable idea, and when first presented to the mind is rather attractive. Yet it is impossible to fit the theory to the facts without meeting with difficulties that rob it of all credibility. If, for example, in the spontaneous life of the Jewish people the religious *cultus* gradually assumed a more complex form; if the reforms of Josiah culminated in the Levitical system, Ezekiel's Torah representing the transition from the one to the other, it might be said that we have in the inspiration which guided the nation, the parallel of the inspiration that gave these prophetic ideals. But here, again, we are beset with the difficulty that the correspondence between the history and the law is based on two assumptions: the assumption that this ascending series is seen in the law, and the assumption that these three stages of development are seen in the history. But, as we have seen, neither assumption is warranted by fact. Does it not look rather as though the so-called facts were made to fit the theory when it is assumed that after the Mosaic legislation had been lost sight of and cast aside, the Deuteronomic code and it alone was opportunely discovered so as to serve as a programme of reform in Josiah's day; while the priest-code was left in darkness and in obscurity

until in Ezra's time it comes to light as the basis of his reform? Dr. Briggs would say that these coincidences were Providential; and so they may have been, but ordinarily Providence is not so mathematical.

In making these criticisms of the theory advocated by Dr. Briggs, we are aware, of course, that the question cannot be settled by *a priori* considerations. The theory may give us a very symmetrical conception of the covenant people, and illustrate the progress of doctrine in the Old Testament, but this does not prove its truth. On the other hand, we should not hesitate to treat it with hospitality because it is contrary to our traditional beliefs. We have no beliefs which we are not ready to surrender whenever they can be shown to be false. The question therefore is, whether, admitting that Moses gave the three Pentateuchal codes, the facts call for a modification of the traditional view regarding their relation to one another, and whether, in any event, the facts will warrant the theory proposed by Dr. Briggs. If as to origin the covenant code, the people's code, and the priest-code were separated from each other by long intervals, it would be very natural to say that these so-called variations were proofs of development; that is to say, the known history of the codes would inevitably colour our interpretation of them, and of two possible meanings we should take the one that was most in accord with the idea of development. But when it is held that the three codes all came through Moses, there are no antecedent reasons for supposing that the codes will show traces of development from the simple to the more complex, and it could only be under the stress of exegetical necessity that we should regard the variations between them in this light. The facts revealed in the codes themselves are all satisfied when the Levitical code is regarded as the central and complete system contemplated by the Exodus code and presupposed in the Deuteronomic code. The facts call for no new hypothesis in order that the relations of these codes to one another may be better understood. And we certainly cannot accept the hypothesis offered by Dr. Briggs. For, assuming that the priest-code was a prophetic ideal which was not designed to go into immediate operation, how does it happen that Korah, Dathan, and Abiram were punished because they had presumed to perform

the functions of the priesthood? Nothing can be clearer than that the distinction between the priests and the Levites was known in the wilderness. Korah's rebellion settles the question that the priest-code was not a prophetic ideal having reference to some future day. It proves, too, that the distinction between priests and Levites was not a matter that took definite form in the generation immediately succeeding Moses. We say this because unless some such thought is in the mind of Dr. Briggs, we are at a loss to understand the following sentence:—

"This code [the priest-code] is represented as given by Jehovah to Moses or Aaron, or both, but it is not represented as written down by Moses, as is the case with the two other codes. It claims to be Mosaic legislation, but if we should suppose that Eleazar or some other priest gathered these detailed laws and groups of laws into a code in the time subsequent to the Conquest, all the conditions of variation and development might be explained."

We are not sure that we grasp the full meaning of this passage. But it seems to teach: (1.) that the priest-code was given by Jehovah to Moses; (2.) that it represents a stage of development in advance of the Deuteronomic code; and (3.) that this development might be explained by supposing that the laws embraced in this code "were gathered . . . into a code" by Eleazar, or some one else, in the time subsequent to the Conquest. If we do not misunderstand the passage, then some obvious reflections are admissible. Thus: (a.) If the priest-code, as to the features wherein it varies from Deuteronomy, was given by God to Moses, there is no need of supposing that it was "gathered into a code" in the time subsequent to the Conquest, in order to explain these variations. (b.) If the priest-code given by God to Moses said nothing about the limitation of the priesthood to the family of Aaron, it will account for the difference between Deuteronomy and Leviticus, to be sure, to suppose that this element in the priest-code was introduced subsequent to the Conquest; but this would only be saying that the priest-code, as to one of its very essential features, was not Mosaic. (c.) Unless subsequent to the Conquest elements were introduced into the code that were not in it before, there is no need of supposing Eleazar had anything to do with it. And, if subsequent to the Conquest anything

has been introduced into the code, how are we to know how much was introduced, and how long "subsequent to the Conquest" this took place? (*d.*) But while this passage leaves it doubtful what "conditions of variation and development" Dr. Briggs had in his mind, the account of Korah's rebellion proves that the priest-code was in full operation in the wilderness.

PENTATEUCH-ANALYSIS.

The alleged composite character of the Pentateuch constitutes the third principal reason for denying its Mosaic authorship. And it must be remembered that with those who reject the naturalistic postulates already spoken of, and hold that Moses is the author of the codes, this is the only reason. Dr. Briggs evidently thinks that the proof of a fourfold authorship of the Pentateuch is conclusive. Astruc's speculation he calls a "real discovery." Eichhorn's analysis has been "the basis of all critical investigation since his day," and is characterised by the "*invincible* strength of the evidence." It should be observed that by believing in the composite nature of the Pentateuch one does not necessarily deny that the literary responsibility of Moses was co-extensive with the five books that are called "his writings." For, as Dr. Briggs has said, there is nothing in Pentateuch-analysis to forbid the idea that substantially the entire Pentateuch was produced in the Mosaic age. And yet we cannot overlook the fact that those who are the most strenuous advocates of the documentary and supplementary hypotheses, are at the same time engaged in the reconstruction of Jewish history, and that some of their strongest arguments in support of these hypotheses are based upon their speculative treatment of history. This application of the *a priori* method in history to the Pentateuchal question is not confined to matters pertaining to the order of priority in the documents and the time of their genesis, but it covers the question as to the existence of such documents as well. We have an illustration of the way in which historical postulates control this discussion in the revolution of sentiment respecting the relations of the Jehovist to the Elohist in the Pentateuch. Assuming that two documents described by these names can be traced in the Pentateuch, the opinion formerly was that the Elohist was the older document. This opinion

was based on Ex. vi. 2. But inasmuch as the priest-code, an Elohist writing, is held to be post-exilic, the Elohist is now regarded as the youngest of the four Pentateuchal authors. We do not forget that some consideration is due to the fact that while critics differ respecting the relative ages of the Elohist and the Jehovist, they do agree pretty generally respecting the portions of the Pentateuch to be assigned to these writers. It nevertheless remains true that belief in the late origin of our existing Pentateuch is the presupposition of nearly all Pentateuch-analysis. If the Deuteronomic code dates from the reign of Josiah, and the priest-code from the time of Ezra, the composite character of the Pentateuch is certain. And if a critic comes to the study of the Pentateuch already sure that it is composed of several documents separated from each other by long intervals, one of them being as late as the exile, he will very naturally devote himself to the work of separating the parts that compose the Pentateuch from one another. And if, acting on this assumption, he extends Astruc's hypothesis so as to make it cover the whole Pentateuch, and after making the best use of allusion, anachronism, and difference of style, presents us with an analysis of the Pentateuch under the hypothesis of a fourfold authorship: we shall say that, however much the analysis may testify to the critic's ingenuity, it derives its main support from the historical presuppositions that underlie it; and, therefore, that when these historical presuppositions are wanting, the theory of a fourfold authorship loses a large part of its support. We agree with Dr. Briggs when he says that in criticising the supplementary and crystallisation hypotheses, "we must distinguish between these theories and the facts upon which they are grounded." We agree with him also when he says that we should not be influenced "by the circumstance that the majority of the scholars who have been engaged in this discussion have been Rationalistic or semi-Rationalistic in their religious opinions." Yet it cannot be denied that these writers, with the view which they entertain regarding the Pentateuchal codes and their place in Jewish history, have reasons for believing in the composite character of the Pentateuch which Dr. Briggs cannot have. For, if the codes were Mosaic and the books of the Pentateuch were pro-

duced in the Mosaic age, why should they not have been written by Moses himself? The Rationalistic critics must believe in the composite character of the Pentateuch. Their whole theory of Jewish history is bound up with it. Dr. Briggs has no reason for believing it, save on the ground of literary criticism. If any one wishes to satisfy himself as to the place that is given to historical arguments in recent attempts at Pentateuch-analysis, he may read Strack's article, "Pentateuch," in Herzog's *Real-Encyklopädie*; but it is sufficient for us to cite a passage from Merx, quoted by Dr. Briggs, in which that writer, speaking of the fragmentary and documentary hypotheses, says that they "have this in common, that they seek to attain their aim chiefly by the way of literary criticism, and neglect or use only as a subsidiary help the realistic, antiquarian, and historical criticism of the contents of the Pentateuch. This element De Wette chiefly brought into the scientific investigation in his *Kritik der Israelitischen Geschichte*."

It is perfectly clear that critics have no right to the results that follow from a certain view of history while at the same time they reject that view of history. When, therefore, Dr. Briggs affirms that we have in the Pentateuch a fourfold narrative, he must remember the great difference between his position and that of critics like Wellhausen and Dillmann; and that while they can use historical criticism in behalf of the first and second Elohist, the Jehovist, the Deuteronomist, and the Redactor, he is shut up to the resources of literary criticism alone. We may go further, and say that Dr. Briggs is shut up to a smaller area of testimony than Professor H. P. Smith, for the latter declares his belief that the age of the Pentateuchal documents is altogether uncertain, and from the application which he makes of what he calls his third "axiom" of criticism, it is very natural to believe that he favours the late origin of the Pentateuchal literature. Thus he says: "The writers whose works are now known to us by the extracts we find in the Pentateuch probably do not differ from others. They will betray the point of religious development at which they stand, even if they have only put on record *what they received by oral tradition*."

We agree with Professor Smith so far as to say that if the

Pentateuchal narrative gave clear evidence of being coloured by the conditions of a particular period, this would be strong evidence that it was written in that period. But Professor Smith has not given us an instance of such colouring; and we must remember that it is one thing to have the colouring so marked that it suggests the date of authorship, and quite another thing to have the date of authorship so decided upon that one must needs be on the look-out for some confirmatory colouring. We venture to say that it will be in the latter sense alone that Professor Smith's third "axiom" can play any part in Pentateuch-analysis. In the same way, we should assent in general terms to the second canon of Professor Smith, that "the historical circumstances in which an author writes are apt to be reflected with more or less definiteness in his work." And because the Pentateuch gives evidence of such minute acquaintance with Egypt, because the narrative of the exodus and the wilderness journey has so much local colouring, and is so manifestly written by one who was personally familiar with the events described, we say that the narrative cannot be assigned to the time of the monarchy. But it is a poor application of this rule when the prevailing indications of the story are upset by a casual verse, and because some allusion is made to "the king" it is inferred that the document containing it was written in the time of the monarchy. Such trifling matters ought to occasion no serious difficulty to critics who, no matter how many original documents the Pentateuch may be resolved into, can under no circumstances get along without a Redactor. It is, however, with Professor Smith's first "axiom" that we principally have to do. And here we are told that "differences of style simply imply differences of author."

Considering the question of Pentateuch-analysis from Dr. Briggs' point of view, that is to say, without the benefit of the historical presuppositions which influence writers like Wellhausen and Reuss, the question is whether as a simple matter of pure literary criticism the "fourfold narrative" in the Pentateuch can be made out. Dr. Briggs speaks so approvingly of Professor Smith's article that we assume he will not object to have this question tested by Professor Smith's axioms. But only one of these axioms is at all applicable to the problem viewed under the limitations just spoken of. If,

therefore, there be a fourfold narrative in the Pentateuch, it must be discovered by the aid of "axiom" one: "differences of style imply difference of author." This is the reagent whereby the Pentateuchal chemist is to find a trace of the Elohist in Lev. xxii. 1, of the Jehovist in Lev. xxii. 2 (see Kleinert's tables), and again of the Elohist in Deut. xxxiv. 1-3, the Jehovist in Deut. xxxiv. 4, 6, and the Deuteronomist in Deut. xxxiv. 5, 10-12.

It is not necessary to criticise Professor Smith's "axiom," for, while he states it in such an absolute way, he afterward qualifies it so as to make it apparent that a more uncertain test could hardly be supposed. The rule must be "applied with some limitations, especially in Hebrew," "differences of style are here [in Hebrew] more difficult to discover than elsewhere;" but then, when they are discovered, "they argue all the more strongly for difference of author." In view of these "limitations" it is a safe rule, we should think, to "disregard fractions of a verse," as Professor Smith has done. Let us place ourselves now in an attitude favourable to the serious contemplation of some great scheme of Pentateuch-analysis. Take Schrader's, as described by Dr. Briggs. We are to imagine the Pentateuch as composed originally of two great documents, the annalistic and the theocratic. In each of these, earlier written sources were used. The annalist wrote in the reign of David; the other soon after the division of the kingdom. Then, in the reign of Jeroboam II., a third prophetic narrator (Jehovist) combined these two documents, at the same time "freely appropriating, and rejecting, and enlarging by numerous additions." And finally, the Deuteronomist composed the law of Moses contained in the Deuteronomic code, and became the final Redactor of the Pentateuch in its present form. It becomes one who is not a specialist to speak modestly, for a critic's powers may far transcend those of ordinary men, and we may err in judging him by a merely human standard; but let us ask, Is it possible that a critic can take a book like the Pentateuch—having no contemporary literature with which it can be compared—absolutely silent as to an age subsequent to Moses—offering no point of contact with the monarchy—and then, on the basis of the single axiom just stated, disintegrate it: show what the annalist wrote, and pick out the docu-

mentary sources which he has incorporated in his material; do the same with the theocratic writer; then undo the work of the Jehovist, ripping up the seams and showing how he combined these two documents, and where he added original material: and after that show us the traces of the Redactor's hand in four of the books, and identify this unknown with the author of Deuteronomy? Is it necessary that one should devote his days and nights to Semitic study in order that he may earn a right to say that this is inconceivable? Yet, if we believe that the codes were Mosaic, and the Pentateuchal documents were Mosaic, literary criticism—the criticism of style—is all we have to help us in this analysis. English readers are not unfamiliar with the precarious nature of arguments based on style. Some of us have not forgotten the discussion of the question whether Bacon wrote Shakespeare. Stanley Leathes, himself a Hebraist, makes admirable use of a controversy carried on in the columns of the *London Times* respecting the authorship of a poem, and says:—

“If, some two hundred years after Milton's death, a number of educated Englishmen, versed in the many known writings of Milton, cannot agree about the authorship of a certain poem upon internal evidence, are we to believe that great weight should be attached to the assertion of a German critic, who, some twenty-five centuries after the death of a Hebrew prophet, declares positively, upon internal evidence alone (for here there is no handwriting to help us), that a series of poems are not by him?”

He is speaking of what he calls “the imaginary figment of a second Isaiah,” but the illustration suits the question in hand equally well.

It would have been better for the theory of a “fourfold narrative,” so far as we are concerned, had Professor Smith contented himself with the *argumentum ad ignorantiam*, and told us that this is a matter that no one but a critic can understand. For, in attempting to make us see the argument upon which criticism relies, he has confirmed our scepticism. We may assume that in illustrating difference of style between Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, he would not choose the passages in which it is least apparent; indeed, when we read the parallel passages in which he holds up this difference of style to the gaze of eyes that are kindly supposed to be unfamiliar with the Hebrew text, we take it for granted that we

have before us a crucial instance. As such we have studied it according to our lights, and our conclusion is that, judging by the differences apparent in these passages, the critics have most ungrudgingly obeyed the law of parsimony when they assign only four authors to the Pentateuch. Why not forty? For we have no hesitation in saying that, by the same rule which gives four authors and a redactor to the Pentateuch, we will undertake to show that four authors and as many redactors were concerned in each of the articles written respectively by Professor Smith and Dr. Briggs.

But let us listen to what specialists have to say upon this subject. Professor Smith admits that "literary criticism, though a good and delicate tool," is subject "to special limitations in the case of Hebrew," and that "when carried beyond a certain point it arouses suspicion." Professor Curtiss tells us there is "need of great caution in accepting the analyses of the critics." Dr. Green regards the recent right-about-face as to the order of the Elohist and the Jehovist as "a fresh demonstration of the precarious and inconclusive nature of their entire process of argument." Stanley Leathes pronounces unsatisfactory and unsound the results of criticism "which arise from the application of the Elohist and Jehovistic theory to the composition of the Pentateuch." "Imaginative" and "unreasonably arbitrary," says Dr. McCaul, speaking of the Elohist question; and Dr. Harold Browne puts his estimate upon the theory that denies the Mosaic authorship of Genesis when he says: "The romance of modern criticism is as remarkable as its perverse ingenuity."

These testimonies are sufficient to confirm us in the *a priori* belief that it would be absurd to suppose that any reliance can be placed upon an analysis conducted according to a single canon of literary criticism that ends in distributing the responsibility of producing the Pentateuch between four authors and a Redactor. We are still further confirmed in this conclusion by the fact that Astruc and Eichhorn did not attempt to carry their analyses beyond the Book of Genesis. It is admitted that there is less evidence in the subsequent books of the Pentateuch for plurality of authorship than is to be found in Genesis. And it was only when criticism wanted evidence that Moses' writings were written in a post-Mosaic age that

Astruc's "discovery" of the Jehovist and the Elohist in Genesis was found to serve the purpose of effecting a disintegration of the entire Pentateuch.

Unaided by historical prepossessions, it is safe to say that literary criticism cannot carry the distinction between the Jehovist and the Elohist further than Exodus vi. 3. And the value of this is reduced to a *minimum* by Quarry's analysis of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, as any one can see by consulting the first volume of *The Bible Commentary*. If, however, it were held that Moses made use of pre-existing documents in the composition of Genesis, there would be nothing antecedently improbable in this, nor anything to the prejudice of the authority and inspiration of his book. It is a matter, however, of grave question whether Astruc's "discovery" is worthy of "the consent of the vast majority of Biblical scholars," though Dr. Briggs says it has "won" it. Worthy or not, however, it is applicable to Genesis alone, and it can be extended over the whole Pentateuch only by the aid of foregone conclusions respecting the history of the Jewish people which are repudiated by Dr. Briggs.

We cannot regard the theory of a fourfold narrative in the Pentateuch as proved, or even as tenable. There is no adequate evidence for it, and the lack of evidence cannot be supplied by a supposed analogy between this narrative and the fourfold Gospel which we must be allowed to regard as fanciful, although it has the support of Delitzsch and Bredenkampf, as well as Dr. Briggs.

IV.

If now it were asked why we continue to believe in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, our answer would embrace the following considerations :—

1. There is no good reason for disbelieving it. Of course, absence of proof that Moses did not write the Pentateuch is no evidence that he did write it. But we may very properly consider it a good reason why a belief already in possession should not be exchanged for disbelief, unless we happen to agree with the author of *Regal Rome* that "*wisely to disbelieve* is our first grand requisite." We do not accept this *dictum* as a safe canon of historical investigation ; whatever may be said

for the method of Doubt, there is nothing to justify the method of Disbelief. But even Doubt at the beginning of investigation is a very different thing from Doubt at the end of an investigation, the results of which show no reason for a surrender of a former belief. But we agree with what Professor Beecher has so well said in his powerful criticism of *The Logical Methods of Professor Kuenen*:—

“In Biblical studies it is not essential to genuine critical acumen that the student be without convictions as to the divine authority of the Word. The most ruinous of all processes of thought is that in which one undertakes to abandon, arbitrarily, the convictions he has been accustomed to hold, for the sake of allowing fair weight to new evidence.”

In the preceding pages we have noticed briefly the arguments against the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch which have most weight at the present day. No notice has been taken of the objections made long ago by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Clericus, because they are nearly all instances of alleged anachronism that can be accounted for in various ways without assuming the post-Mosaic authorship of the books wherein they occur. They were very satisfactorily dealt with by Witsius, whose chapter, *An Moses auctor Pentateuchi*, is well worth reading.

2. Tradition offers very strong presumption in favour of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch.

Throughout this article no protest has been made against what some seem to regard as a stigmatising epithet. The view that we advocate is undoubtedly the traditional view, but that is no reason why it should be a false view. Traditions are often untrue, but this is not the same as saying that tradition has no evidential value. There is room for difference of opinion as to the evidential value of tradition, we concede; and the evidential value of different traditions varies indefinitely according to circumstances. In the case of the New Testament Canon, of course, the period covered by oral tradition is so short, that is to say, we get written testimony as to authorship and authority so early, that the traditional evidence is of the strongest possible kind. Still, it is tradition; and when men enter upon an indiscriminate disparagement of tradition, as some are so disposed to do, they should take care lest they unwittingly deal a blow at the canonicity of the New Testament.

In the present case the tradition respecting the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch has decided evidential value, though, partly, through devotion to the Cartesian method of Doubt, partly through the abuses of tradition in the Roman Catholic Church, and partly through the influence of the common-law doctrine of Hearsay, it has been greatly overlooked. Like any other witness, tradition may be impeached, and its credibility lessened or set aside; but we are speaking now of competency, not of credibility. Therefore, in urging the evidential value of tradition, we are making no concession to the claims of Rome, nor shall we have occasion to say anything that might prove embarrassing in a discussion regarding the Isidorian decretals or the epistles of Ignatius. Moreover, we do not presume to criticise the common-law rule excluding hearsay evidence; and yet when writers like Sir George Cornewall Lewis wish to make canons of historical inquiry out of common-law practice, it may be well for us to remember that the exclusion spoken of does not prevail on the continent of Europe, is closely related to the system of trial by jury, and, therefore, is not so common in countries where the Bench tries issues of fact as well as issues of law. And even in common law the recognised exceptions to this rule prove the absurdity of making it a canon of historical inquiry to exclude all derivative evidence. With as much propriety it might be insisted on that no testimony of an eye-witness ever should be received as historically credible unless it were given under oath, and the witness subjected to cross-examination. The common law gives us two instances of hearsay or traditional evidence germane to our inquiry in the cases of testimony as to public matters beyond the memory of men, and testimony regarding pedigree given by relatives *ante litem motam*. And it is worth noticing, that in the sphere of jurisprudence, where the largest volume of experience has been gathered respecting the qualifications affecting the truth of human testimony, and where the utmost vigilance is exercised to exclude anything that ought not to affect the minds of a jury, hearsay testimony, which in cases of pedigree is almost always in the form of tradition, is freely allowed. Now, it is not sufficient to say that this is allowed simply because it is the best to be had. For unless experience justifies the expectation that testimony of this kind (either because *ante litem*

motam in cases of pedigree there is no motive to falsify, or because in regard to public matters it is comparatively difficult to falsify) is likely to be true, it ought to be admitted. That it is admitted we take to be a tacit induction (which has great weight by reason of the exceptional opportunities of observation which jurists have) that hearsay testimony or tradition in regard to these matters is probably true. If, then, in a system which makes the exclusion of hearsay the rule, this rule is suspended in regard to matters that partake more specifically of the nature of unwritten history, it is very absurd to suppose that history itself can be reduced to the methods of judicial evidence. There is a great difference between judicial proof and historical proof, and a statement might have high historical authority whose legal value would be zero. None of the text-writers has stated this distinction more clearly than Best, who makes the following very pertinent remarks :—

“Suppose the events, either sacred or profane, which took place in the first year of the Christian era existed solely in oral tradition, and taking a generation to last thirty years, the account which those who lived at the beginning of the present century had of those events seems to have come to them by hearsay at the *sixtieth* hand—evidence, the value of which in a court of justice would be rightly estimated at zero. And although many of these events having been committed to writing affords a better security for their truth, still the custody and genuineness of the documents in which they are recorded rest, in part at least, on oral tradition. But it is a great mistake to suppose that the real probative force of the evidence of these facts which we possess in the present century rises no higher than this. The fallacy consists in treating each generation as *one* single person, by whom a bare relation of the fact has been handed down to the next, and not as consisting of a number of persons interested in ascertaining its truth, besides wholly overlooking the corroborative proofs supplied by permanent memorials and the acts of men. In short, as a modern historian has well expressed it, ‘The presumption of history, to whose mirror the scattered rays of moral evidence converge, may be irresistible when the legal inference from insulated actions is not only technically but substantially inconclusive.’”

Niebuhr's method of reconstructing history on the basis of internal evidence through some “occult faculty of historical divination” is undoubtedly wrong. But just as wrong is Sir George Cornewall Lewis's method of disbelieving every fact alleged until it is substantiated according to the methods of judicial proof. Mure is right when he says that “the more rational principle of research . . . is, that in regard to the

remoter ages of any people, where written records fail, where, consequently, the primary condition of all inquiry is an absence of positive proof, the historical critic is entitled to test the truth or falsehood of national tradition by the standard of speculative historical probability." Let the tradition of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch be tested in this way.

Philo and Josephus speak of Moses as the author of the Pentateuch. Their testimony has been rightly taken to express the belief current among the Jews in the time of Christ. There is not a shadow of reason for believing that they have put into their writings a belief on this subject that was not shared by the community with whom they lived. There is not the slightest reason for saying, as Professor Brown suggests, that this might have been an Alexandrine sentiment which the Palestinian Jews did not share; and we may reply to this suggestion in the words of Dr. Robertson Smith: "That would imply such a schism between the Hellenistic and Palestinian Jews, between the Jews who spoke Greek and those who read Hebrew, as certainly did not exist." But it adds to the evidence that the Jews in Christ's day believed that Moses wrote the Pentateuch to know that the Jews before Christ's day believed this. In the first place, they identified the Law with the Pentateuch; and in the second place, they called the Pentateuch by the name of Moses. Professor Brown does not admit this, yet here again, Dr. Robertson Smith, who is no friend to the traditional view, has expressed himself very clearly. Speaking of the time of the Maccabees, he says:—

"The Jews identified religion with the Law, and the Law with the words of Moses. . . . According to the Son of Sirach, the sacred Wisdom . . . is identical with the book of the covenant of God most High, the Law enjoined by Moses. . . . What place was left, then, for the Prophets, the Psalms, and the other books? They were inspired and authoritative interpretations and applications of the law of Moses, and nothing more. . . . And so clearly was this the Jewish notion that the same word—*Kabbala*, doctrine traditionally received—is applied indifferently to all the books of the Old Testament except the Pentateuch, and to the oral tradition of the Scribes, The Pentateuch alone is *Mikra* 'reading,' or, as we should call it, 'Scripture.'"

Dr. Robertson Smith being witness then, the Jews in the time of the Maccabees identified the Law with the Pentateuch,

and called it the Law of Moses. But Dr. Robertson Smith says that this view of the law goes back to Ezra:—

“This Canon of Ezra was the Pentateuch. The people entered into a covenant to keep the law of Moses which Ezra brought with him from Babylon (Ezra vii. 14). That was the establishment of the Pentateuch as the canonical and authoritative book of the Jews, and that is the position it holds ever afterwards. . . . In the strictest sense of the word, the Torah is not merely the Canon of Ezra, but remained the Canon of the Jews ever after.”

How this is to be reconciled with the author's doctrine of legal fiction does not concern us here. It is enough for us that the author testifies that in Ezra's day the law was identical with the Pentateuch, and was called the law of Moses; and that the same thing was true subsequently, as is proved by the Apocrypha. When to this we add the statements of Philo and Josephus referred to a little ago, stronger proof that the Jews in Christ's day believed that Moses wrote the Pentateuch need not be asked for. This, in fact, is so generally conceded, even by those who most strenuously deny the traditional belief—Bleek, for example—that one is surprised that Professor Brown should undertake to challenge it (we refer to his recent articles in the *Independent*) without being able to urge any stronger argument than that the contrary view is possible.

Moreover, if the law means the Pentateuch in Ezra, why should it mean anything else in Kings and Chronicles and the book of Joshua, where it is repeatedly referred to as to “the law of Moses,” “the book of Moses,” “the book of the law of Moses”? What is to prevent us from believing that the Jews as continuously identified the Torah (= Pentateuch) with Moses from Joshua to Ezra, as from Ezra to Josephus? And though the perpetuation of this belief were intrusted to oral tradition alone, which is not likely, what was there to prevent the Jews from handing down a true account of the writing of that literature which contained the history of their deliverance from bondage as well as their political constitution? Judging the matter by what is known of the Jews respecting their scrupulous care in the transmission of the text of Scripture; considering, too, that if the Pentateuch was written in the time of Ezra, or in a time not long prior to his reform, there is no reason why it should have been believed to be written by Moses, and that if it was written long before the time of Ezra

there is no one more likely to have written it than Moses: we should say that a tradition that Moses wrote the Pentateuch ought to be regarded as having pretty strong "speculative historical probability."

3. The Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch may be fairly inferred from statements in the Pentateuch and other parts of the Old Testament.

The force of this argument will depend somewhat on the view taken respecting the Old Testament dispensation. Dr. Robertson Smith says of the traditional view of this matter "that it is perfectly logical and consistent in all its parts." That is a great deal more than can be said of his theory, as we have tried to show. According to this "perfectly logical and consistent" theory, then, we hold, for reasons already stated, that the codes of the Pentateuch were given by Moses. That being the case, there is no reason for believing that the narrative of the Pentateuch was written at a period later than Moses. And if written in Moses' day, why not by Moses himself? And if there is no antecedent reason for saying that the Law (=Pentateuch) was not written by Moses, why should we impose a non-natural sense upon the passages that speak of the book of Moses, the book of the law of Moses? Why not take them as teaching what one would naturally suppose them to teach: that the book thus described was written by Moses? If Torah meant Pentateuch in the days of Ezra, who shall say that it did not mean Pentateuch in the days before Ezra? When, therefore, we read in Deuteronomy xxxi. 9 that "Moses wrote this Law," why should we restrict the meaning of Torah to the legislative portion of Deuteronomy? It is conceded that one could not prove the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch from the passages in Exodus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy which speak of Moses as writing or being commanded to write an account of certain transactions. But Professor Brown's treatment of these passages impresses us as an effort to make out a case rather than an inquiry respecting the inference which we should fairly draw from them. We confess that the unjudicial aspect of his writing would have been materially lessened if some of his suggestive parentheses had been omitted. Thus, after referring to the command: "Write this [the defeat of Amalek] in a book," the following caveat is

needlessly inserted: "(the absence of any statement that Moses did so is, of course, not to be pressed)." Far more reasonable, it seems to us, it would be to say: "Here is a book which the Jews call the book of Moses. It consists, for the most part, of a narrative of the wilderness journey and of the Mosaic legislation. It gives evidence of being a contemporaneous record of the events described. Specific passages prove that Moses was commanded from time to time to commit certain accounts to writing. We might antecedently expect that Moses, educated as he was in Egypt as the son of Pharaoh, would be the historian of the Exodus. These specific passages fall in with that expectation, and constitute a strong argument for the Mosaic authorship of the entire Torah." But if it be true that these passages "do not singly or collectively afford any proof whatever that Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch," how does it happen that writers like De Wette and others, who are most opposed to the traditional view, are forced to admit that the author of the last four books of the Pentateuch wished at least to be taken for Moses?

4. As has been already said, there is strong internal evidence to support the belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Of course, this internal testimony, apart from the express statements of authorship just referred to, can only prove directly that the last four books of the Pentateuch were coeval with the events described in the narrative. If it will do this, however, it will go far toward establishing the Mosaic authorship of these books. For if the author of the books was one who participated in the experiences of the wilderness, there is not the shadow of a reason for denying or calling in question the belief that imputes the authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses. But, as has been repeatedly shown by Hengstenberg and others, the narrative is full of indications that it was written by an eye-witness of the events described. This is seen in the legislative provisions that had special reference to the wilderness, and in the minute familiarity with Egypt which, say those who have a right to an opinion on the question, is everywhere apparent. So strong a case does Hengstenberg make out of this fact alone, that Rawlinson records in the following terms the impression made upon his own mind by Hengstenberg's argument:—

"That either a person born and bred in Egypt about the time of the Exodus wrote the Pentateuch, or that a writer of a later age elaborately studied the history and antiquities of the Egyptians for the purpose of imposing a forgery on his countrymen, and that he did this with such skill and success that not even modern criticism, with its lynx-eyed perspicacity and immense knowledge of the past, can detect and expose the fraud, or point out a single place in which the forger stumbled through ignorance."

It appears, then, that Moses, educated as he was, could have written the Pentateuch; that the chapters in the history of Israel recorded in this book are so important that we should naturally expect them to be written by a contemporary and with official sanction; that the books show every sign of being written by one who took part in the scenes described; that antecedent probability would point strongly to Moses as the historian of the Exodus; that portions of the Pentateuch are distinctly said to have been written by Moses according to Divine command; that the book of the law of Moses is a common form of expression in the Old Testament; and, finally, that a uniform tradition from Ezra to Josephus assigns the authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses. What stronger argument than this could we ask for? How many ancient books there are, the authorship of which is never called in question, where the proof of authorship will not compare with the evidence already offered to show that Moses wrote the Pentateuch! But we have evidence far more weighty still.

5. In support of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, we urge the testimony of Christ and the writers of the New Testament.

Inasmuch as this argument can have no value except upon the basis of certain dogmatic presuppositions regarding the Divinity of Christ and the inspiration of the Scriptures, a few words are called for in explanation of our position. For, having said that the doctrine of Inspiration (and we might have said the Divinity of Christ) stands or falls with the results of Criticism, we must be prepared to meet the objections of those who say that the authorship of the Pentateuch is a literary question that should be judged by the canons of literary criticism and not be prejudiced by dogmatic considerations. Taking our own words, in fact, critics of the class referred to may say that very possibly as the result of criticism we shall be obliged to modify our notions of Inspira-

tion, and perhaps even of the attributes of Jesus. They may, therefore, say that statements made by Christ or the New Testament writers to the effect that Moses wrote the Pentateuch are not necessarily conclusive.

Now, it is clear we must choose between these positions : either (1.) that Moses wrote and Christ said that he wrote the Pentateuch ; or (2.) that Moses did not write though Christ said he did write the Pentateuch ; or (3.) that Moses did not write the Pentateuch and Christ did not say that he wrote it. If, on literary grounds alone, the critic is convinced that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, it is evident that his main hope of defending his belief in the Divinity of Christ against the inferential consequences of this conviction, is in being able to show that Christ nowhere taught that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. In fact, if Moses did not write the Pentateuch, every Christian is interested in exculpating Jesus from the charge of saying that he wrote it. We are able, therefore, to realise the intellectual exigency in the case of Professor Brown, which has led him to repel with so much earnestness the suggestion that Jesus said that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. And he has managed his case so well, that perhaps it would be difficult to find a jury who would be unanimous in saying that Christ affirmed the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, though it will never be possible for the best advocate to change the general belief that on this subject our Lord agreed with the sentiment prevailing in His day. And so hard to reconcile with Christ's divinity are non-Mosaic authorship on the one hand and Christ's assertion of Mosaic authorship on the other, that one cannot help feeling we are in great peril when our hope of saving the central dogma of Christianity lies mainly in the dexterous use of forensic skill, whereby a construction can be put upon the words of Christ which is foreign to their natural sense.

If, then, the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch be considered as inductively settled, the divinity of Christ can stand related to the problem only in two ways. Some will defend this doctrine by the method adopted by Professor Brown ; but it is to be feared that others not satisfied with such defence will feel that the doctrine itself, or at least our understanding of it, needs modification to suit the facts. But

the problem which critics would put before us as an objection to the line of argument we are about to consider is this:—“How can you use the Divinity of Christ and the Inspiration of the Scriptures to settle facts, which, except as they are contradicted by these dogmas, would go far toward modifying these dogmas? How can you say that criticism conditions belief in Inspiration, and at the same time settle questions of criticism by assuming Inspiration? You say that the writers of the New Testament, being inspired, were infallible; but if it turn out that they were wrong about the Pentateuch, they were not infallible. Is it not better to gather from the facts the meaning that we can properly impose on Inspiration, rather than settle facts by assuming Inspiration?” We think we do fair justice to the thought that lies in the minds of many men in this form of statement, and it is worthy of consideration.

It is forgotten by those who use this line of argument that every doctrine, as soon as it has recognised value as an induction resting upon a fair amount of evidence, becomes the premiss of a deductive process—its value as a premiss in a deductive process depending, of course, upon its value as the conclusion of a previous inductive inquiry. Thus, assuming (which is, indeed, the real question in debate) that Christ said that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, then if it be true that Christ is Divine, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch seems to follow. If on the other hand it be true that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, the Divinity of Christ seems to be compromised. If each of these premisses were equally supported by independent proof, then we should be in the position where arguing from either deductively the other would be challenged. In other words, we should have a case of irreconcilable antagonism. But surely no Christian will say that for that most difficult negative—the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—there can be any such evidence as that which can be urged for the positive doctrine of our Lord's Divinity. Putting the critic's case, indeed, in much stronger terms than the facts as we understand them will warrant, we may even then safely say that the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is not supported by an amount of evidence that will warrant us in making it the premiss of a deductive process. On the other hand, the Divine authority of Christ is

vouched for by such a consilience of proof, that we can have no hesitation in making it the premiss in a process of reasoning whereby we say that what contradicts that authority must be wrong. There is a legitimate place, then, for reasoning in this Pentateuchal question, which proceeds upon the assumption that certain doctrines are so settled that they can be made use of as arguments. It is wrong, therefore, to say that the Pentateuchal question is one which dogmatic theologians have nothing to do with, and those who say it seem to have forgotten that where we are dealing with doctrines that are related to one another as well as to the specific facts that support them, we must take account of deduction as well as induction. Such a book as the well-reasoned treatise by Dr. Watts on *The Newer Criticism* fills a very important place in this discussion, and we agree with the author in saying "that it is indispensable that the critic have a thorough acquaintance with the structure of the economy whose closely correlated provisions have been revealed through the agency of the sacred penmen—whose writings furnish not merely grammatical exercises, but theological problems, which are immensely the profoundest with which the human mind has to deal."

Why we believe in the infallible inspiration of the New Testament writers and in the supreme Divinity of Christ, we of course cannot undertake to state here; it is enough to say that the convictions of which we intend to make argumentative use rest upon evidence which has nothing to do with the Pentateuch. And in so using these convictions it is not forgotten that an argument based upon the Divinity of Christ will have weight with many who would not feel it a great strain upon their Christian faith to be persuaded that inspired writers had fallen into error regarding the authorship of the Old Testament. Let us, therefore, deal with the testimony of these inspired writers before considering the specific utterances of our Lord.

We have already shown that there is no possible room for doubt that in the New Testament Moses is treated as the author of the Pentateuchal codes: and that there is conclusive proof that the literary responsibility imputed to Moses in the New Testament covers the whole Pentateuch, however the results of Pentateuch-analysis might require us to interpret

that responsibility. But leaving Pentateuch-analysis out of view, and studying the New Testament not to ask what meaning it may possibly have, but what meaning is fairly to be gathered out of a study of all the passages bearing upon the question in hand, there can be little doubt that Moses was regarded by the New Testament writers as being in the strictest sense the author of the Pentateuch. In order that this may be seen, it must be remembered that in the time of our Lord the division of the Old Testament into "the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms" was known and recognised; that whatever doubt there may be as to the books that then composed the Canon, there is no doubt, Dr. Robertson Smith being witness, that the Law was identical with our Pentateuch; and that the Pentateuch was called the law of Moses. In fact, Professor Brown comes dangerously near making a similar admission when speaking of 4 Ezra he says that it "dates from the first Christian century," and is intended to teach "that the Law (= Pentateuch) in the hands," etc. In the first century, then, according to Professor Brown even, Law = Pentateuch.

Of course we are not to look for statements of Mosaic authorship categorically affirming that Moses wrote the whole of each book of the Pentateuch. Such an assertion would never be made unless authorship were challenged or there were some other special reason for technical formality. But we find the name of Moses associated with the Pentateuch in the various forms that would naturally occur to writers who shared a popular belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. Thus: (a.) Passages from the Pentateuch are quoted as containing what Moses said: "This is that Moses who said unto the children of Israel, A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you," etc. (Acts vii. 37). It was God who said this first (see Deut. xviii. 18); Moses said it as the author of the book recording it. (b.) A quotation from the Pentateuch is referred to in Rom. x. 5 as something that Moses had written: "For Moses describeth [writeth] the righteousness which is of the Law," etc. The reference is to Lev. xviii. 5. But why should the apostle affirm and expect those to whom he wrote to believe that Moses wrote this, unless it be that he believed and knew that the Jews believed that Moses wrote the whole book in which this occurs? What right have we to say that Shake-

speare says that "conscience makes cowards of us all," if it be not based upon the conviction that Shakespeare wrote the play in which these words occur? (c.) Moses is quoted as an author in Rom. x. 19: "First Moses saith, I will provoke you to jealousy by them that are no people." It is true that these words occur in the song of Moses recorded in Deut. xxxii. 21, but from the reference in the next verse to Isaiah it is fair to suppose that the apostle had in mind, not this song, but the entire body of literature that currently went under Moses' name. (d.) Moses is repeatedly spoken of in relation to the Law. John i. 17: "The Law was given by Moses." Acts xxi. 21: "And they are informed of thee that thou teachest all the Jews which are among the Gentiles to forsake Moses, saying that they ought not to circumcise their children," etc. 1 Cor. ix. 9: "For it is written in the law of Moses," etc. Acts xiii. 39: "And by him all that believe are justified from all things from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses." It is gratuitous to say that the law spoken of in these passages means the legislative portions of the Pentateuch when we know that "the Law" meant, in the current usage of those days, the whole Pentateuch. (e.) The Pentateuch is repeatedly referred to as a collection of writings under the name of Moses. Luke xxiv. 27: "And beginning at Moses and all the prophets he expounded," etc. Acts xv. 21: "Moses of old time hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath-day." 2 Cor. iii. 15: "But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart." Grant, now, that a book may be called by the name of a particular man, because, as Professor Brown says,—as Hobbes said,—as Spinoza said—"he wrote it," or "is the author of an important part of it," or "is the most prominent figure in it;" still we cannot be at a loss to know what sense to put upon these passages. For construing them in the light of the current belief that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, and reading them in connection with previous passages where quotations from the Pentateuch are made as quotations from Moses, there is nothing to justify any other supposition than that the New Testament writers shared the popular sentiment that Moses wrote the books that are called by his name. Believing, then, as we do, that the inspired writers were infallibly guided, and believing, more-

over, that they may be fairly held to teach that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, we add this argument to those already offered in support of the traditional view.

Let us turn now to the testimony of our Lord. And here again we find the same unmistakeable reference to a current belief. The specific laws are quoted out of the Pentateuch as given by Moses. The Pentateuch itself is quoted as the "book of Moses." The accepted division of the Old Testament is recognised in the twice-repeated phrase, "Moses and the Prophets." Says our Saviour, "he [Moses] wrote of me;" and He adds, "If ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" How would these passages strike an unprejudiced reader? Would any one hesitate for a moment to say that our Saviour affirmed the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch if he did not wish to extort another meaning from His words? And now it is our turn to quote Spinoza, for we find him making this apt remark, intended, it is true, to serve a very different purpose, yet suiting our purpose just as well: *Quid cum illis agas, qui nihil vident, nisi quod lubet? quid, inquam, hoc aliud est, quam ipsam Scripturam negare et novam ex proprio cerebro cudere?* Men are engaged in a very perilous undertaking when they begin to interpret Scripture by asking what meaning it will possibly bear, instead of seeking what it may be fairly understood to teach. Very easy is it also to make a plausible argument against the traditional view by taking proof-texts one by one and showing that not any single passage conclusively and without the possibility of doubt proves the traditional belief. This, however, is an old device, and those who know anything of the Arian and Socinian controversies need not be reminded of the fallacy that underlies it. Undeniably true, moreover, it must be confessed, is the statement that because Moses wrote a chapter in Deuteronomy or a verse in Leviticus, it does not necessarily follow that he wrote the whole Pentateuch; that is to say, we cannot logically infer the authorship of the whole from authorship of a part, in the same way that we can demonstrate authorship of a part from authorship of the whole. But in reasonings of this sort we must make some use of common experience, and that experience justifies us in assuming sometimes that the part implies the whole. So at least we reason when we credit the

apostolic fathers with a knowledge of the New Testament by reason of scattered passages from the Gospels and Epistles to be found in their writings. It would be interesting, by the way, to see how Professor Brown's method of dealing with quotations would operate in the discussion of Canonicity.

The effort to show that Christ did not teach the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch cannot be regarded as successful. Those who make it forget that texts must be interpreted by history as well as by grammar and lexicon: they forget that psychological presuppositions expressing tacit understandings between speaker and hearer underlie all speech; and that propositions generally convey more meaning than when measured by a merely logical quantification they seem to imply: they forget that the aggregate value of textual proof is something different from the sum of the separate values of individual texts; that the texts relied on to prove the traditional view are not links in a chain where the weakest represents the strength of the cable; and that the traditional view is not overthrown when the texts that seem to teach it have been sorted, when some have been thrown aside as worthless, when others are found to be capable of bearing a meaning different from the one ordinarily given them, and it is concluded that no single text is strong enough to bear the strain imposed upon it by the traditional interpretation: and, finally, they forget that they do not tell us what the words of Christ *do mean when taken together*, in attempting to show us what these same words *may mean when studied one by one*.

It is not surprising, however, that this effort should be earnestly made; for an element of extreme perplexity would be introduced into the Pentateuchal problem were we required to believe that Moses did not write, though our Saviour said he did write, the books that are called by his name. If, by a fair examination of facts, one felt himself obliged to hold these two conflicting views, and still in his heart were loyal to his Lord, we should be disposed to allow him every personal advantage that his apologetic could afford. Yet we cannot fail to see the endless difficulties into which one must be led by these beliefs. How could Christ say or imply that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, if Moses did not write it? Was He ignorant? How then can He be God? Some may answer

this latter question by referring to the limitations of His finite human nature, or they may take refuge in some of the Kenotic theories of His Person. But the voice of Christendom will repel the suggestion of ignorance as an insult to the Divine majesty of Jesus. And if it were possible to suppress emotion, and calmly ask whether a mistake about Moses were compatible with the Divinity of our Lord, if it were possible even to hold that the Divinity of Christ would not be compromised by supposing that He did not know who wrote the Pentateuch, there would arise the further question respecting the value of Inspiration. For how much can we depend upon it if it were not sufficient to keep Him to whom the Spirit was not given by measure from falling into the common errors of His day?

Or shall we say that Jesus knew that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, but that He accommodated His language to popular conceptions? Professor Brown looks upon this as at least a not untenable hypothesis, and accordingly says :—

“ If, indeed, it should ever appear that Jesus, for the purpose of avoiding a strife with the Jews which might have obstructed His work, and in which no principle was at stake, used His absolute discretion in omitting to make any statement as to the authorship of the Pentateuch, because He knew the popular belief to be false, while He freely and rightly appealed to Moses’ *authority* whenever it could serve His purpose, we could only admire His wise caution.”

If “ wise caution ” is something to be admired in Christ, it is also something that becomes the students of the Higher Criticism, especially when their studies lead them to the discussion of themes as serious as this. We cannot assent to Professor Brown’s hypothetical concession, because we cannot help seeing the logical consequences with which that concession is attended. For if the reference to Moses on the part of our Lord were capable of being explained as an accommodation to popular belief, why might we not explain other features in His earthly life in the same way? How do we know that His doctrine of the kingdom of God was not borrowed from the popular Messianic conception, for the purpose of giving form to His own ethical teaching? How do we know that He did not fall in with the current notion regarding demoniacal possessions while understanding all the time that there was a natural explanation of these phenomena? How do we know

that the doctrine of atonement, as He taught it, was anything more than the adaptation of His teaching to the current system of sacrifices, "wise caution" teaching Him that it was better to utilise these ready-made conceptions as the vehicles of His own ethical system, than shock the religious sentiment of the age by a premature attack upon an ancient faith? These are only some of the questions that start up when the accommodation theory is suggested as a possible explanation of our Lord's reference to Moses.

But we need not dwell longer upon this attempt to defend the conduct of our Lord, for we prefer to believe that it calls for no defence. We do not undertake to say how near the precipice our Jehus of Criticism may wisely drive; but we shall choose the company of those who value safety more than skill, and who in the exercise of a "wise caution" have learned to leave a wide margin. We believe that the Law was given to Moses by Jehovah, and not imputed to him by "legal fiction." We believe that the Pentateuchal codes were meant for the immediate use of the Israelites in the wilderness, and that they were not merely "prophetic ideals." We put the words of Jesus above the inductions of the critics, and are sure that the responsibility of Moses for the books that are called by his name must be understood according to the plain implication of the passage which speaks of them as "his writings." We do not believe in the composite character of the Pentateuch; and if we did, we should have no confidence in the critical omniscience that pretends to determine within "fractions of a verse" what part was written by the Jehovist, what by the Elohist and the Deuteronomist, and where the handiwork of the Redactor is visible. We believe that Moses wrote substantially the whole Pentateuch. This view is in harmony with antecedent probability, with the presumptions of tradition, with the internal testimony of the books, with the unvarying voice of Inspiration, with the words of Christ. And after all that has been said, the leading reason in support of the contrary idea seems to be founded on the deep conviction that God cannot work miracles, and the critics can.

FRANCIS L. PATTON.

ART. V.—*What is Inductive Demonstration ?*¹

THE terms Deduction, Induction, are very currently used, and they seem to be regarded as signifying two contrasted methods of ascertaining truths. The description usually given in popular statements is, that, while deduction is the drawing down of an inference from a more general truth, induction is the leading in of a general truth from individual facts. There has doubtless been much bandying of the terms, which was not more intelligent than the word-play with that other pair of ambiguous terms, "analysis and synthesis." It is customary to say that Aristotle first examined and formulated the deductive logic or syllogism, and Bacon the inductive method. While almost entire barrenness is imputed to the syllogism, the glory of great fruit and utility is claimed for the induction. Some, indeed, are perspicacious enough to see that neither Aristotle nor Bacon was the inventor of the one or the other method of reasoning, any more than the first anatomists of human limbs were the inventors of walking. Nature has enabled men to walk, and insured their doing so, with at least imperfect accuracy, by fashioning the parts of their limbs, nerves, bones, tendons, and muscles. The anatomist has only described what he found in the limbs by his dissecting-knife. Men virtually syllogised before Aristotle, and found inductive truths before Bacon. Yet even these more accurate historians seem to think that the two are opposite methods of logical progression.

These vague opinions of what induction is are obviously unsafe. They lead to much invalid and even perilous reasoning. No stronger testimony against the unauthorised character of much that now calls itself physical science, under the cover of sophistical inductions, need be cited than that of J. Stuart Mill.² "So real and practical is the need of a test for induction, similar to the syllogistic test of ratiocination, that inferences which bid defiance to the most elementary notions of inductive logic are put forth without misgiving by persons eminent in physical science, as soon as they are off the ground on which

¹ From the *Southern Presbyterian Review*.

² *Logic*, vol. i. pp. 480, 481. 7th Edit.

they are familiar with the facts, and not reduced to judge only by the arguments ; and as for educated persons in general, it may be doubted if they are better judges of a good or bad induction than they were before Bacon wrote. . . . While the thoughts of mankind have on many subjects worked themselves practically right, the thinking power remains as weak as ever ; and on all subjects on which the facts which would check the result are not accessible, as in what relates to the invisible world, and even, as has been seen lately, to the visible world of the planetary regions, men of the greatest scientific acquirements argue as pitifully as the merest ignoramus." In these days, when the followers of physical research so often imagine the theologians to be in an active state of hostility against them and their sciences, it is well that we have this accusation from one as remote as possible from alliance with theology. This able witness proves at least so much : that every beam of light which can be thrown on the true nature of the inductive logic, though slender, is desirable ; and will be useful both to purify the sciences of matter and to reconcile the conflict, if any such exists, between them and philosophy and theology.

We propose first to account for the vagueness which Mr. Mill has noted in the applications of this species of reasonings by briefly displaying the uncertainties and discrepancies existing among the logicians who have professed to treat of it. The modern admirers and expounders of Aristotle are found to deny that he did overlook the inductive method, and confine himself to the syllogistic ; they claim that he formulated the one as really, if not as fully, as the other. But when they proceed to exhibit what they suppose to be the Aristotelian form of induction, they are not agreed. Thus, Grote's Aristotle (vol. i. p. 268, etc., Murray, London) interprets him thus :—

" In syllogism as hitherto described, we concluded that A the major was predicable of C the minor, through B the middle. In the syllogism from induction we begin by affirming that A the major is predicable of C the minor ; next we affirm that B the middle is also predicable of C the minor. The two premises, standing thus, correspond to the third figure of the syllogism (as explained in the preceding pages), and would not therefore justify anything more by themselves than a *particular* affirmative conclusion. But we reinforce them by introducing an extraneous assumption that the minor C is co-extensive with the middle B, and comprises the entire aggregate of individuals, of which B is the universal, or class term."

"That either a person born and bred in Egypt about the time of the Exodus wrote the Pentateuch, or that a writer of a later age elaborately studied the history and antiquities of the Egyptians for the purpose of imposing a forgery on his countrymen, and that he did this with such skill and success that not even modern criticism, with its lynx-eyed perspicacity and immense knowledge of the past, can detect and expose the fraud, or point out a single place in which the forger stumbled through ignorance."

It appears, then, that Moses, educated as he was, could have written the Pentateuch; that the chapters in the history of Israel recorded in this book are so important that we should naturally expect them to be written by a contemporary and with official sanction; that the books show every sign of being written by one who took part in the scenes described; that antecedent probability would point strongly to Moses as the historian of the Exodus; that portions of the Pentateuch are distinctly said to have been written by Moses according to Divine command; that the book of the law of Moses is a common form of expression in the Old Testament; and, finally, that a uniform tradition from Ezra to Josephus assigns the authorship of the Pentateuch to Moses. What stronger argument than this could we ask for? How many ancient books there are, the authorship of which is never called in question, where the proof of authorship will not compare with the evidence already offered to show that Moses wrote the Pentateuch! But we have evidence far more weighty still.

5. In support of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, we urge the testimony of Christ and the writers of the New Testament.

Inasmuch as this argument can have no value except upon the basis of certain dogmatic presuppositions regarding the Divinity of Christ and the inspiration of the Scriptures, a few words are called for in explanation of our position. For, having said that the doctrine of Inspiration (and we might have said the Divinity of Christ) stands or falls with the results of Criticism, we must be prepared to meet the objections of those who say that the authorship of the Pentateuch is a literary question that should be judged by the canons of literary criticism and not be prejudiced by dogmatic considerations. Taking our own words, in fact, critics of the class referred to may say that very possibly as the result of criticism we shall be obliged to modify our notions of Inspira-

tion, and perhaps even of the attributes of Jesus. They may, therefore, say that statements made by Christ or the New Testament writers to the effect that Moses wrote the Pentateuch are not necessarily conclusive.

Now, it is clear we must choose between these positions : either (1.) that Moses wrote and Christ said that he wrote the Pentateuch ; or (2.) that Moses did not write though Christ said he did write the Pentateuch ; or (3.) that Moses did not write the Pentateuch and Christ did not say that he wrote it. If, on literary grounds alone, the critic is convinced that Moses is not the author of the Pentateuch, it is evident that his main hope of defending his belief in the Divinity of Christ against the inferential consequences of this conviction, is in being able to show that Christ nowhere taught that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. In fact, if Moses did not write the Pentateuch, every Christian is interested in exculpating Jesus from the charge of saying that he wrote it. We are able, therefore, to realise the intellectual exigency in the case of Professor Brown, which has led him to repel with so much earnestness the suggestion that Jesus said that Moses wrote the Pentateuch. And he has managed his case so well, that perhaps it would be difficult to find a jury who would be unanimous in saying that Christ affirmed the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, though it will never be possible for the best advocate to change the general belief that on this subject our Lord agreed with the sentiment prevailing in His day. And so hard to reconcile with Christ's divinity are non-Mosaic authorship on the one hand and Christ's assertion of Mosaic authorship on the other, that one cannot help feeling we are in great peril when our hope of saving the central dogma of Christianity lies mainly in the dexterous use of forensic skill, whereby a construction can be put upon the words of Christ which is foreign to their natural sense.

If, then, the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch be considered as inductively settled, the divinity of Christ can stand related to the problem only in two ways. Some will defend this doctrine by the method adopted by Professor Brown ; but it is to be feared that others not satisfied with such defence will feel that the doctrine itself, or at least our understanding of it, needs modification to suit the facts. But

the problem which critics would put before us as an objection to the line of argument we are about to consider is this:—“How can you use the Divinity of Christ and the Inspiration of the Scriptures to settle facts, which, except as they are contradicted by these dogmas, would go far toward modifying these dogmas? How can you say that criticism conditions belief in Inspiration, and at the same time settle questions of criticism by assuming Inspiration? You say that the writers of the New Testament, being inspired, were infallible; but if it turn out that they were wrong about the Pentateuch, they were not infallible. Is it not better to gather from the facts the meaning that we can properly impose on Inspiration, rather than settle facts by assuming Inspiration?” We think we do fair justice to the thought that lies in the minds of many men in this form of statement, and it is worthy of consideration.

It is forgotten by those who use this line of argument that every doctrine, as soon as it has recognised value as an induction resting upon a fair amount of evidence, becomes the premiss of a deductive process—its value as a premiss in a deductive process depending, of course, upon its value as the conclusion of a previous inductive inquiry. Thus, assuming (which is, indeed, the real question in debate) that Christ said that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, then if it be true that Christ is Divine, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch seems to follow. If on the other hand it be true that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, the Divinity of Christ seems to be compromised. If each of these premisses were equally supported by independent proof, then we should be in the position where arguing from either deductively the other would be challenged. In other words, we should have a case of irreconcilable antagonism. But surely no Christian will say that for that most difficult negative—the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch—there can be any such evidence as that which can be urged for the positive doctrine of our Lord's Divinity. Putting the critic's case, indeed, in much stronger terms than the facts as we understand them will warrant, we may even then safely say that the non-Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is not supported by an amount of evidence that will warrant us in making it the premiss of a deductive process. On the other hand, the Divine authority of Christ is

vouched for by such a consilience of proof, that we can have no hesitation in making it the premiss in a process of reasoning whereby we say that what contradicts that authority must be wrong. There is a legitimate place, then, for reasoning in this Pentateuchal question, which proceeds upon the assumption that certain doctrines are so settled that they can be made use of as arguments. It is wrong, therefore, to say that the Pentateuchal question is one which dogmatic theologians have nothing to do with, and those who say it seem to have forgotten that where we are dealing with doctrines that are related to one another as well as to the specific facts that support them, we must take account of deduction as well as induction. Such a book as the well-reasoned treatise by Dr. Watts on *The Newer Criticism* fills a very important place in this discussion, and we agree with the author in saying "that it is indispensable that the critic have a thorough acquaintance with the structure of the economy whose closely correlated provisions have been revealed through the agency of the sacred penmen—whose writings furnish not merely grammatical exercises, but theological problems, which are immensely the profoundest with which the human mind has to deal."

Why we believe in the infallible inspiration of the New Testament writers and in the supreme Divinity of Christ, we of course cannot undertake to state here; it is enough to say that the convictions of which we intend to make argumentative use rest upon evidence which has nothing to do with the Pentateuch. And in so using these convictions it is not forgotten that an argument based upon the Divinity of Christ will have weight with many who would not feel it a great strain upon their Christian faith to be persuaded that inspired writers had fallen into error regarding the authorship of the Old Testament. Let us, therefore, deal with the testimony of these inspired writers before considering the specific utterances of our Lord.

We have already shown that there is no possible room for doubt that in the New Testament Moses is treated as the author of the Pentateuchal codes: and that there is conclusive proof that the literary responsibility imputed to Moses in the New Testament covers the whole Pentateuch, however the results of Pentateuch-analysis might require us to interpret

less warm; and the *vindemiatio*, or induction to the true *forma*, or law of caloric, may be cautiously made. This is, that "*Caloric is an expansive motion*, repressed, and striving in the lesser parts of the warm body" (Book II. Aph. 18). This first *vindemiatio* is then to be tested and confirmed by considering a number of *prerogative instances*; which are particular instances presenting the property under such circumstances as give them the prerogative of determining the law of the property. Of such instances, twenty-five are enumerated! and with a refinement and intricacy of distinction which must be utterly confusing to a practical investigator.

The disparaging verdict which Mill pronounces upon this technical part of the Baconian *Organum* must be admitted to be just. Yet it should be mitigated by the fact that, cumbersome as the proposed canon is, it seems to have led Bacon, centuries in advance of his age, in the direction of the latest theory as to what caloric is. That theory now is, that caloric is a mode of molecular motion. Bacon's conclusion was that it is "the striving of an expansive but restrained motion in the lesser parts of a body"! His method was not mere groping: it foreshadowed an imperfect truth. In the light of fuller inquiries, Bacon's errors seem to have been these: that his contempt for the abstract in metaphysics led him to neglect the fundamental motion of *power in the efficient cause*, discriminating it so vitally from the material, formal, and final causes, and thus to depreciate the inquiry into efficient cause; that he had not pondered and settled this other truth of metaphysics, the relation between power and properties in individual things; and that he applied his induction, in his favourite examples, to detect the *forma*, or law of a property, instead of the *laws of effects*. It is the latter inquiry in which inductive science is really concerned, and the solution of which extends man's powers over nature. The thing we wish inductive philosophy to teach us is, How may we be sure to produce, in the future, a given desired *effect*, which has been known in the past?

The illustrious Newton, who did more than any other to throw lustre on the new method by its successful application, presents us, in his four Rules (*Principia*, 3d Book), a substantive advance upon the rude beginnings of Bacon. These rules

are far from being exhaustive ; nor are they stated in an analytic order, but they are the sound dictates of the author's experience and profound sagacity :—

“ 1. We are not to admit other causes of natural things than such as both are true (not merely imaginary) and suffice for explaining their phenomena.

“ 2. Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred to the same causes, as far as can be done.

“ 3. The qualities of bodies which cannot be increased or diminished in intensity, and which belong to all bodies in which we can institute experiments, are to be held for qualities of all bodies whatever.

“ 4. In experimental philosophy, propositions collected from *phenomena* by induction are to be held as true, either accurately or approximately, notwithstanding contrary hypotheses, till other phenomena occur, by which they may be rendered either more accurate or liable to exception.”

Sir William Hamilton, in his *Logic*, Lect. 17th, describes his “inductive categorical syllogism” as “a reasoning in which we argue from the notion of all the constituent parts discretely, to the notion of the constituted whole collectively. Its general laws are identical with those of the deductive categorical syllogism ; and it may be expressed, in like manner, either in the form of an intensive or of an extensive syllogism.” This he calls “logical or formal induction.” The process is precisely that which we have seen described by St. Hilaire : When a given predication has been found true of every individual of a class, it is also true of the class as a whole. This is unquestionably true ; but as unquestionably useless, as we have seen from the statement of Galileo. It gives us only a truism, and no new truth. But Hamilton proceeds to distinguish from this what he calls the “philosophical or real induction,” in which the argument is not from all of the individuals in a class to the class as a whole ; but from a part of the individuals to the whole. He says that the validity which this induction may have is not from the logical law of identity, but from a certain presumption of the objective philosopher, founded on the constancy of nature. This species of induction proceeds thus :—

- (1.) This, that, and the other magnet attract iron.
- (2.) But this, that, and the other magnet, represent all magnets.
- (3.) *Ergo*, all magnets attract iron.

This doctrine he again enlarges in his 32d Lecture, where he treats of modified logic, and deals with the "real or philosophical induction" expressly. He again makes it an inference from the many to the all. To the soundness of such an induction two things are requisite: that the cases colligated shall be of the same quality, and that they shall be of a number competent to ground the inference. But to the question, How many like cases are competent? he has no answer. This species of induction, he admits, cannot give a categorical conclusion. It only raises a probability of truth, and leaves the conclusion a mere hypothesis, sustained by more or less of likelihood. That likelihood is, indeed, increased as a larger number of cases is compared, as the observation and comparison are made more accurate, as the agreement of cases is clear and precise, and as the existence of possible exceptions becomes less probable after thorough exploration. Hamilton concludes by quoting with approbation these words from Esser's *Logic*: "Induction and analogy guarantee no perfect certainty, but only a high degree of probability."

The objection against the Aristotelian syllogism of induction, which we have already urged had been stated by Archbishop Whately. Let it be put thus:—

- (1.) This, that, and the other magnet attract iron.
- (2.) But this, that, and the other magnet, etc., are conceived to constitute the genus magnet.
- (3.) *Ergo*, the genus magnet attracts iron.

Whately's objection is, that *the second proposition is manifestly false*. Hamilton pronounces this, which appears to us a fatal, "a very superficial objection." His reason is, that it is extra-logical; that logic is a formal science only; and that hence the correctness of its forms is not vitiated by the circumstance that some proposition expressed in them and correctly connected, so far as these forms go, with other propositions, is in fact untrue, and that the imaginary propositions with which the text-books of logic illustrate the logical forms answer just as well, whether they be really true or not. Hamilton is here

clearly misled by a confusion of thought. Because an imaginary, or even a silly proposition may serve to illustrate a rule of logic, when that rule is the subject of inquiry, it does not follow that, when the ascertainment of other truth by the use of the rules of logic is our object, that can be a good logic whose framework always and necessarily involves a false proposition. Blank cartridges may serve very well for the purposes of an artillery drill; it by no means follows that blank cartridges are adequate for actual artillery practice in war. Such artillery would be practically no artillery; for it would repulse absolutely no enemy. And such logic would be practically no logic. Logic is a formal science. True. But it professes to give the general forms of elenctic thought, by which the truth of the propositions of all other sciences, besides logic, may be ascertained. Hence, if it proposes to us a given form of thought which is always and necessarily invalid in every real science to which logic offers its method, that form is incorrect as a logical form. We affirm Whately's objection, then, in order to call the reader's attention again to the fatal weak spot in these theories of induction.

What, then, is Whately's own explanation of the inductive syllogism? See his *Logic*, Book IV. chap. 1. He begins by justly distinguishing two uses of the word Induction, which are entirely different. The one process is not a process of argument to the conclusion, but is wholly preliminary thereto, the *ἐπαγωγή*, or bringing in of like instances; the collecting process; and this is, in fact, nearer to the literal meaning of the word. The other process called induction, is the argumentative one, leading in the conclusion, as to the whole class, from the instances. Now, of this logical induction, Whately remarks that, instead of being different from the syllogistic, it is the same with it. And, indeed, unless we assert its sameness, we must give up the theory of the syllogism; for that theory is, that syllogism expresses the one form in which the mind performs every valid reasoning step. The logical induction is, then, says Whately, a syllogism in the first mode and figure, with its major premiss suppressed. That suppressed major is always substantially the same in all logical inductions: *that what belongs to the individual cases observed, belongs to their whole class.* The induction by which we predict, in advance

of individual examination, that all magnets will attract iron, would then stand thus, according to Whately :—

(1.) What belongs to the observed magnets belongs to all magnets.

(2.) But these observed magnets attract iron.

(3.) *Ergo*, all magnets attract iron.

Now the reader will observe that Whately's process only inverts the order of the first two propositions in Hamilton's. For Whately's first is only a different way of expressing Hamilton's second : that

(2.) "This, that, and the other magnet represent all magnets."

The order of propositions given by Whately seems obviously the simple and correct one. But the difficulty he had propounded as to the Aristotelian form of the induction recurs as to his : How have we ascertained our major premiss, that what belongs to the observed magnets belongs to the whole class ? Are we entitled to hold it as a universal truth ? The same difficulty virtually meets Whately. It is amusing to find him attempting to parry this fatal difficulty in a way similar to that which Hamilton uses to parry him : "Induction, therefore, so far forth as it is an *argument*, may, of course, be stated syllogistically ; but so far forth as it is a *process of inquiry*, with a view to obtain the premisses of that argument, it is, of course, out of the province of logic." The evasion is as vain for Whately as it was for Hamilton. For that universal major premiss, viz. that what belongs to the observed individual cases belongs to the whole class, can no more be the immediate non-logical result of a mere colligation of cases, than the conclusion itself of the inductive syllogism can be. Whately has himself admitted that if a premiss used in a syllogism now in hand was a conclusion of any previous reasoning process, then our logic must concern itself about that premiss also, and the mode by which we get it, as well as about the form of its relations to the other propositions in our present syllogism. Now, the universal major he claims, is not the mere expression of an extra-logical colligation—that is self-evident. Unless it is an original intuition, it must be the conclusion of a prior logical process. What is that process ? Is this universal major valid ? Whately gives us no sufficient answer ; and thus his theory of inductive argument fails like

the others. Yet it presents us, as we shall see, one step in advance of the others, towards the right direction.

Dr. Whewell deserves mention also, by reason of his wide learning, extending into the domains of physics and metaphysics, and his authorship of a work, once a standard, devoted to this very subject. This is his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*. His view of induction may be seen in these citations (vol. i. p. 22): Where "truths are obtained by beginning from observation of external things, and by finding some notion in which the things, as observed, agree, the truths are said to be obtained by induction." Contrasting deduction with induction, he says, "Deductive truths are the results of relations among *our thoughts*. Inductive truths are relations which we perceive among existing *things*." And of the deductive process he thinks the geometrical demonstrations the best examples.

Now, the insufficiency of these descriptions is obvious from these remarks. Lines, angles, surfaces, solids, in geometry, are as truly *things* as any observed phenomena or effects in physics. Thus the distinction wholly fails. Again, Whewell has combined, in his description of induction, two processes of mind which are wholly distinct, and only one of which is a logical process. Both have, indeed, been called induction (in different senses), but the first is only a *colligation* of observed things or facts. This process only completes a general statement which gives correct expression to a series of individual observed facts, when taken as a whole. The instance given by another presents this process very simply: A navigator in unknown seas beholds land; he knows not whether it is continent or island. But he sails along its shores, noting its bays and headlands, and taking ocular evidence of the continuity of the whole coast, until he beholds again the same spot he first saw. He calls the land now an island. But he has made no *logical inference*: he has but colligated all his separate notes of the coasts, with their connecting continuity, into that general concept of which "island" is the correct name. Now, this is really what Kepler did when he performed what has so often been cited as a splendid instance of induction; from a number of observed angular motions of the sun in the ecliptic, he declared that the earth moved in an ellipse, with the sun at one of the *foci*. The real

process was but to plot and colligate upon a plane surface, all the successive positions of the earth ; whereupon inspection showed that the line she had pursued was elliptical. A still simpler and equally illustrious instance of this process was given when Maury enounced the general facts of his wind-and-current charts. His results were obtained by faithfully plotting, upon blank charts of the oceans, the directions of the winds and currents, with the successive dates, from a multitude of actual observations in sailors' log-books. When this humble but noble work was patiently done, the general facts as to the directions of the winds and currents, at different seasons, revealed themselves to inspection. Here was a grand colligation, but, as yet, no inference. But we have a true instance of inductive inference when Newton derived the great law of the attraction of gravitation, as expressing the true cause of that elliptical circulation. Kepler had colligated only a general fact ; Newton inducted a law of cause. Whewell seems, p. 23, to confound them.

But on p. 48 he speaks, if still too indefinitely, yet more nearly to the truth. "Induction is familiarly spoken of as the process by which we collect a *general proposition* from a number of particular cases ; and it appears to be frequently imagined that the general proposition results from a mere juxtaposition of the cases, or, at most, from merely conjoining and extending them." . . . "This is an adequate account of the matter." . . . "There is a *conception of the mind* introduced into the general proposition, which did not exist in any of the observed facts. The phrase "conception of the mind" is indeed an inaccurate expression for the missing but all-important element of the logical induction. But Whewell had perceived so much : that this element of proof was not in the mere colligation of agreeing instances alone, but was to be furnished from another source. And he points our inquiries in the right direction in seeking this vital premiss among the intuitive judgments of the reason. It is to be found in that judgment which so many of these writers speak of as our *conviction of the uniformity of nature* ! Thus, in substance, answer the most of them, as Hamilton and his great German authorities, Krug and Esser. But this is the question.

The comments of Lord Macaulay on the inductive method,

in his famous Essay on Lord Bacon, justify the angry estimate of his comrade, Brougham, by their superficial character. But they may also serve to show how just the complaint of Mill is as to the confusion of the opinions of even educated men on this subject. Macaulay, with his usual plausible brilliancy, assures us that the method of the *Novum Organum* was nothing more than the familiar experimental argument of the English squire as to the cause of his bodily ailments. The result of the squire's induction is to trace his sufferings to his indulgence in his favourite dainties. On the nights after free indulgence he suffered much. On nights when he had wholly abstained, he was free from pain. On nights when he had indulged sparingly, he suffered slightly. Here, intimates Macaulay, we have the whole Baconian process, the *comparantia instantiarum similium*, the *exclusiones instantiarum negativarum*; the *comparationes pluris aut minoris*. He seems to think that this embraces the inductive logic!

Fleming, in his *Vocabulary of Philosophy*, after citing numerous definitions of induction, which exhibit the uncertainties and confusions criticised in these pages, gives his own statement thus:—

“By the principle of induction is meant the ground or warrant on which we conclude that what has happened in certain cases, which have been observed, will also happen in other cases which have not been observed. This principle is involved in the words of the wise man, Eccles. i. 9: ‘The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done.’ In nature there is nothing insulated. All things exist in consequence of a sufficient reason; all events occur according to the efficacy of proper causes. In the language of Newton, *Effectuum naturalium eusdem generis eadem sunt causæ*. The same causes produce the same effects. The principle of induction is an application of the principle of causality,” etc.

Of this description we may say what was said of Whewell's, but with more emphatic approval: that it points us in the right direction.

We now introduce the definitions of three contemporary American logicians. Dr. M'Cosh says (*Div. Gov.*, p. 289):—

“Induction is an orderly observation of facts, accompanied by analysis; or, as Bacon expresses it, the ‘necessary exclusions’ of things indifferent, and this followed by a process of generalisation, in which we seize on the points of agreement.”

Professor Bowen, *Logic*, p. 380, teaches that induction is from some observed cases to the many not observed ; and he passes this verdict on the process :—

“ But just so far as they (inductions) are means to these ends, they lose the character of pure or demonstrative reasonings, the syllogisms to which they are reducible are faulty, either in matter, as having a major premise, the universality of which is merely *probable* ; or in form, as containing an undistributed middle.”

“ Induction, properly so called, concerns the matter of thought, and concludes from *some* to all.”

Dr. Porter (*Elements of Intellectual Science*, abridged edition, p. 393), says :—

“ Judgments of induction differ from simple judgments in several important particulars. (In the simple judgments we bring the individuals under the appropriate common concept.) In induction we proceed farther : we add to those simple judgments yet another, viz. that what we have found to be true of these, may be received as true of all others like them. The ground of the first judgment is facts observed and compared. The ground of the second is what is called the *analogy of nature*. A judgment of induction is, then, a *judgment of comparing observation, enlarged by a judgment of analogy*. The judgment of observation is founded on an *observed similarity* ; the judgment of induction on an *interpreted indication*.”

We have postponed to the last the notice of two celebrated philosophers, Dugald Stewart and John Stuart Mill, because they both exhibit, as a common trait, the influence of their countryman, Hume, in wresting their views from the truth. Stewart (vol. iii. chap. 4, of the *Method of Inquiry* pointed out in the *Experimental, or Inductive, Logic*), amidst many elegant, but confused, digressions, reaches substantially the same view of inductive reasoning with his predecessors (p. 246) :—

“ When, by thus comparing a number of cases agreeing in some circumstances, but differing in others, and all attended with the same result, a philosopher connects, as a general law of nature, the event with its *physical cause*, he is said to proceed according to the method of *induction*.” “ In drawing a general physical conclusion from particular facts, we are guided merely by our instinctive expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature ; an expectation which, implying little, if any, exercise of the reasoning powers, operates alike on the philosopher and on the savage.” . . . “ To this belief in the permanent uniformity of physical laws, Dr. Reid long ago gave the name of the *inductive principle*.”

Stewart seems to admit by implication what we have seen Hamilton and Bowen assert so plainly, that the physical induction can give only a probable evidence, and can never demonstrate absolutely a universal truth. For Stewart, in commenting on the interesting fact that the inductive method is applicable in mathematics, reminds us that it was only by this method Newton proved the binomial theorem; and then proceeds to argue, pp. 318, 319, that, had this theorem not really been sustained by some principle more valid than is found in any physical induction, mathematicians would not have accepted it as universally true for all exponents of the $(a+x)$. All the proof, says he, which Newton seemed to have of the binomial theorem was to expand the products, by actual multiplication, of the $(a+x)$ to the 2d, the 3d, the 4th, and to such a number of powers as satisfied him that the laws he found prevailing for the number of terms, and the exponents and co-efficients in all the products actually inspected, might be trusted to prevail in all other powers, however high. Now, had this been really all, Stewart thinks we should have had, in this mathematical formula, a specimen of induction exactly like physical induction. And he evidently thinks it could not have been demonstrative of the universal truth, but only evidential of the probable truth of the *formula* for untried cases. He thinks there is really, latent in the process of Newton, a further evidence, which is demonstrative: that when the actual multiplications are pursued to several powers, the mind sees a reason why the co-efficients and exponents not only do, but must, follow the law observed by inspection in the products expanded. Does not this imply that in the case of physical inductions a similar *desideratum* is lacking? Surely. But Stewart does not supply it. Surely he cannot think that he finds it in "permanent uniformity of physical laws," which he regards as the inductive principle; for he thinks it is instinctive, rather than rational. Thus he leaves his system of inductive logic as baseless of solid foundation as the others.

But the worst legacy of the philosophy of Hume he leaves us is his distinction between the physical cause and the efficient cause. The physical cause is the invariable actual antecedent of the *phenomenon* regarded as effect. The efficient cause is

the secret unseen power the mind imputes; and he declares the word *power* expresses an attribute of mind, not of matter. He expressly declares that the object of induction is to seek, not the efficient, but the physical cause (pp. 230, 231). And his reasons are but the deceptive ones of the sensationalistic philosophy which misled, in part, even Brown and Stewart, and so much more sadly, Mill: that observation of physical sequences gives us nothing but a regular antecedent and consequent; so that physical science should have to do with nothing more. That this often repeated conclusion is utterly sophistical appears from these two tests: observation of physical phenomena gives us no general concepts; for all philosophers agree that nature presents to the eye nothing but *individual* things and *phenomena*. Shall physical science, therefore, have no business with general concepts and universal propositions? Again, nature presents to the eye no inference of any kind. Shall physical science, then, discard inference? Carry out this argument, and man's relation to nature must sink to that of the cunning brute, the ant, or the beaver. Hence it appears that, if there is to be any science or any theory, elements must be contributed to it from the subjective powers of the mind, as well as from the outward observed facts and things. Stewart was the more unpardonable for making this concession against the inquiry for the efficient cause, for that he is not really a sensationalist, but admits the mind has intuitive notions and judgments. He should have remembered that, granting what the eyes observe in the rise of a *phenomenon* is only its regular antecedent, we rationally supply to the real causal antecedent, as its own property, the notion of *power*. Just as when by the senses we perceive a cluster of properties of a concrete thing, the law of the reason necessitates our supplying the notion of *substance*. It is impossible for us to think the antecedent which seems next the effect the real next antecedent, unless we judge it to emit the *power* efficient of the effect. In a word, the physical cause can, in truth, be none other than the efficient cause. If we do not know, by sense-perception, what the power is, we rationally know that it is; if we do not know its τὸ πᾶς, we do know its τὸ ὅτι. Hence, its reality is as proper a ground for argument and inference as the reality of any concrete body. Do we know what the

energy we call electricity is? Yet we construct a thousand experiments to seek it, and inferences from its power. Stewart ought to have affirmed, then, precisely what he denied, what Newton affirmed—that the real object of the inductive inference is *to find the efficient cause*.

We shall see that the chief, the only useful, problem of induction is, to ascertain the certain laws of given effects. *How can an antecedent bring the effect certainly after it, unless it be efficient thereof?* To limit induction, as Stewart and Mill do, to the ascertainment only of the physical antecedent, is to forbid induction from ever rising above the probabilities of mere enumerated sequences, whose worthlessness to science Bacon has so well exposed. Have we not the clew, in this refusal of the search after the efficient cause, to the imperfections and confusions of their treatment? We repeat, the reversal of this *dictum* of theirs is vital.

Mill is at once the best and the worst of all the English-speaking logicians, in his treatment of the inductive logic. His insight into its true nature is far the most profound and correct; and his technical canons of induction the most simple and accurate at once. But his error as to the rudimental doctrine, which underlies all his admirable discriminations, is the most obstinate. To him eminently belongs the credit of vindicating for the inductive logic the character of a true demonstration, and of showing where that demonstration is founded. Having set aside the inaccurate uses of the word Induction, he defines as follows (Bk. III. ch. ii. sect. 1).

“*Induction*, then, is that operation of the mind by which we infer that what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects” (chap. iii. sect. 1). “It consists in inferring from some individual instances in which a *phenomenon* is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain class; namely, in all which resemble the former in what are regarded as the material circumstances.” But since the mere observation of a similarity of sequence in a number of instances does by no means authorise this expectation as to instances not observed—a truth which Mill here implicitly recognises, and elsewhere expressly acknowledges—the all-important question remains, What is it that authorises

the mind to infer positively, in the case of the valid induction, that the unobserved instances will be like the observed ? He answers (sect. 1) : "The proposition that the course of nature is uniform is the fundamental principle or general axiom of induction." "If we throw the whole course of any inductive argument into a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive by more or fewer steps at an ultimate syllogism, which will have for its major premiss the principle or axiom of the uniformity of the course of nature." Again (chap. v. sect. 1), recognising the general law of logic, that only universal premisses can yield universal conclusions in the mathematical reasonings, he admits that it must be so likewise in inductive reasonings. "This fundamental law must resemble the truths of geometry in their most remarkable peculiarity, that of never being, in any instance whatever, defeated or suspended by any change of circumstances." But where do we find such a universal principle ? He answers : "*This law is the law of causation*" (sect. 2). "On the universality of this truth depends the possibility of reducing the inductive process to rules." "The notion of *cause* is the root of the whole theory of induction." And most emphatically (in chap. xxi. sect. 1) having expounded his canons of induction, for discriminating between the sequences which authorise, and those which do not authorise, expectation of the same *phenomena* recurring, he says : "The basis of all these logical operations is the law of causation. The validity of all the inductive methods depends on the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every *phenomenon*, must have some cause."

But this excellent doctrine he then fatally neutralises by the doctrine of the sensationalists concerning the notion of causation. This he declares to be of empirical origin (chap. v. sect. 2) : "The only notion of a cause which the theory of induction requires is such a notion as can be gained from experience." He deems that the tie of power, which we think the reason, but not the senses, sees between cause and effect, is "such as cannot, or at least does not, exist between any physical fact, and that other physical fact on which it is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its *cause*." He distinguishes, with Reid and Stewart, between the physical and the efficient cause, and declares that induction concerns

itself only about the physical cause. With him, causation is "*invariable, unconditional antecedence*;" nothing more.

Again (chap. v. sect. 3), after referring to the truth that a sequent effect is not usually found to be the regular result of a sole antecedent, but of a cluster of several antecedent *phenomena* and states, he claims that all these regular antecedents are equally cause, and that the mind has no ground for assigning efficiency to one more than another. He seeks to abolish the distinction between the efficient causes and the conditions of an effect. If one eats of poisonous food and dies, we have no reason to call the poison the *cause* of the death, rather than the idiosyncrasy of the man's constitution, the accidental state of his health at the time, and the state of the atmosphere, for all had some concurrent influence to occasion the result. "The real cause is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others."

These *dicta*, as we shall show, are subversive of the author's own better doctrine, cited in the previous paragraph. For it is easy to see that, if they were true, they would be fatal to that certainty and universality which he has himself correctly demanded for the major premiss of all inductions. Waiving, for the present, the discussion of the question, whether our notion of causation is empirical, we would point out that there is, obviously, no invariable, no certain connection between the mere condition of an effect and its actual rise. This condition must be present, if it is a *conditio sine qua non*, in order to the rise of the effect: but it may be duly present, and yet the effect may not come. This simple remark shows that, were efficient cause no more invariably connected with effect than is a condition, then cause and effect would not have any of that uniformity and universal certainty of effect which, Mill admits, is essential to ground the inductive argument. But he asserts that the condition is part cause, and as much entitled to be viewed as real cause as any other part of the antecedents supposed to be more efficient. Thus he contradicts himself. This suggests the further argument, that our common sense is not mistaken in ascribing an efficiency or power to the cause such as it does not ascribe to the occasion; because we know,

experimentally, that the true cause has a connection with the effect more necessary than the occasion has. Oftentimes conditions may be changed, and yet the regular effect continue to occur; but if the truly causal antecedent be lacking, all the appointed conditions remain dumb and barren of effect, though duly present. For instance: in order that germination may result, there must be moisture, warmth, and vegetable vitality in the seed. Can any reasoning man believe that moisture or warmth is as essentially efficient of the growth as the vital energy is? No. For he sees that all the water in the sea and all the caloric in the sunbeams conjoined, would never produce growth until the vital germ is added. But as soon as this is present, in addition to the other two, the growth regularly takes place. They are conditions, this alone efficient cause of living, vegetable growth. Mill has evidently been unconsciously deceived by the fact that there are effects in which more than one *vera causa* concur as efficient, in addition to certain conditions. Thus, in the case of a moving body, driven by two forces in different lines, each force is *true cause* of the resulting diagonal motion, in addition to the other *conditions* of mobility.

But to us this appears to be the crowning proof of error in this doctrine of Mill, that often we find conditions of effects which are merely negative. Yet they may be conditions *in qua non*. The burglar was enabled to effectuate his felonious purpose of burning the dwelling by reason of the absence of the fire-engine. How could an engine, *which was absent*, exert efficiency in the destruction of the house? The very amount of this condition was, that this engine exerted absolutely no efficiency, did nothing in the case.

The error of Mill's doctrine appears also when it is carried into psychology. Our author is, in a sense, a Necessitarian, or, at least, a Determinist, in his theory of volition. Now, when a given volition rose, the whole set of conditions attending its rise included a certain subjective motive, which was a complex of a certain judgment and appetency; and a certain objective inducement, not to say other circumstances, conditioning the feasibility of the volition. According to Mill, this whole cluster of conditions, taken together, should be regarded as the cause of that volition; and one element has as much right to be

regarded as efficient thereof as another. Then, the objective inducement and the subjective motive were as really efficient, the one as the other? Where, then, was the agent's rationality and free agency? In the objective presentation of the inducement, the man's spontaneity had no concern, in any shape. To him, that presentation was as absolutely necessitated as the fall of a mass unsupported. Hence, if that objective inducement was as truly *cause* of his volition as his inward appetency was, his free-agency was a delusion, and his act of soul was absolutely necessitated. But of his exercise of these attributes in that volition, his consciousness assured him. We thus vindicate that philosophy of common sense which distinguishes the real efficient from the mere conditions of an effect. It is the presence of the former which determines and produces the effect; the others are merely conditions *recipient* of that effect.

This review of the history of the inductive logic the reader will find to be not a useless expenditure of his time. It has not only traced the growth of the doctrine in its progress towards correctness; but it has familiarised his mind to the terms and ideas with which he has to deal in the further study. It has given us opportunity to criticise and establish the proper views on some points, like the one last discussed, which will be found vital to the development. And above all, it has disclosed to us the true problem which yet remains to be solved, to complete that development. The most important points of this review to be resumed are these, that "induction" has been used to describe three distinct processes of the mind—of which the first is the colligating of many resembling percepts into one general concept of the mind; the second is the inference to the truth of the predication concerning the whole from its ascertained truth concerning each and all of the individuals of that whole; and the third is, the inference from some observed instances to all the other unobserved instances of the class.

That the first of these processes the writers we have consulted declare to be no logical process at all, but only a preliminary thereto; that the second was found by us perfectly valid, but also perfectly useless, except as a compendious form for recording knowledge already ascertained; that the third is the useful process of the inductive inquiry, and the only one which really extends our knowledge or our power over the

previously unknown. But the vital problem about this process is, *how* the ascertainment of only some of the resembling instances entitles us to infer a universal rule, which shall be held true of cases absent in space, or future in time, from the sphere of the actual observation? That the answer given is, our expectation of the "uniformity of nature" is what entitles us; and that the best of our teachers, as Newton, Fleming, and Mill, ground that expectation in the law of causation.

But that we may comprehend the difficulty and gravity of the main problem, we must inquire whether this expectation of the uniformity of nature is valid, and whence it is derived. Does nature, in fact, present an aspect of uniformity? Far from it. A very great part of her *phenomena* are unexpected and unintelligible to men. The unlikely and the unexpected is often that which occurs. Whole departments of nature refuse to disclose any orderly law to man's investigations, as the department of meteorology refused to our fathers; so that the results which arise are well described to our apprehension by the phrase "as fickle as the winds." That the aspect of nature is to the popular and unscientific observer almost boundlessly variable and seemingly capricious, is shown by the sacrifices of the Romans to the goddess *Fortuna*, whom they supposed to rule a large part of the affairs of men, and whose throne they painted as a globe revolving with a perpetual but irregular lubricity. What else do we mean by our emphatic confessions of our blindness to the future, than that the evolutions of nature are endlessly variable to our apprehension; and for that reason, baffle our foresight? See Mill, chap. 21: "It is not true, as a matter of fact, that mankind have always believed that all the successions of events were uniform and according to fixed laws. The Greek philosophers, not even excepting Aristotle, recognised Chance and Spontaneity as among the agents in nature," etc. etc. So Baden Powell, *Essay on the Inductive Phil.*, pp. 98-100. No writer has made more impressive statements of this uncertainty of the aspects of nature than that idolater of the inductive sciences, Auguste Comte. His *Philosophie Positive* says of her energies:—

"Their multiplicity renders the effects as irregularly variable as if every cause had failed to be subjected to any precise condition. It is only where

natural causes work in their greatest simplicity and smallest number that any appearance of invariable order is obvious to the common observer. As soon as the number of concurring or competing causes becomes larger, and the combinations more intricate, the resultant *phenomena* begin to wear to us the aspect of a disorder which obeys no regular law whatever."

Such is Comte's confession. This suggests the question, What, then, authorised the observer to postulate this proposition, that "nature is uniform"? Shall it be said that he is authorised to do so because his inductions have led him to detect latent laws of order amidst nature's seeming confusions? But the postulate of nature's uniformity was, as it appears, necessary to his first inductions. Whence did he derive it at the beginning? Is his induction all reasoning in a circle? The same philosopher has also pointed out this general fact, that the departments of nature, in which her causes are few and simple, and her movements therefore uniform, are the very ones which are farthest from man and from his control; while in those departments which are nearest to him, which most concern him, and which it is most desirable for him to control, causations are most innumerable and complicated, and all principle of uniform order most latent. The heavenly bodies move in orbits, under the operation of two forces only; and hence their movements are manifestly regular, intelligible, and capable of exact prediction. Astronomy is the most exact of the physical sciences. But these stars are the farthest bodies from us, and the ones over which we can have absolutely no control. As we approach nearer to our human interests and persons, natural causations become more numerous and intricate. The chemistry which governs in the composition of our food and medicines, presents us with physical energies much more numerous and subtle than the two forces, centrifugal and centripetal; and in that science results are far less regular and capable of prediction by us, just as they are nearer and more important to us. But when we come still nearer, to the vital energies which govern our health, disease, pain, or ease and death, there the appearance of uniformity is least, and the fortuity seemingly greatest. No man knoweth "what a day may bring forth." How, then, are we warranted to set out with this assumption of the "uniformity of nature"? How is it that we claim to account for her actual complications and

apparent fortuities, thus embarrassing us at every turn, by our hypothesis of the inter-actings of *latent laws*; when the very question is, whether these irregularities do not refute the very idea of permanent law in her realm ?

If it be urged that there are regularities amidst the seeming fortuities of nature, and that induction may proceed from these regularly recurrent instances, we shall be met with another difficulty. It is demonstrable that no amount of mere regularity in a recurring sequence can amount to demonstration that the same sequence will recur in the future. The customary apprehension of the inductive argument seems to be thus: that if a given *phenomenon* be actually observed to go immediately before another a *sufficient number of times*, this justifies the postulating of a regular law. And such, in fact, is the amount of most of the so-called scientific observation and argument. If one asks, *How many* observations of the same recurring sequence are sufficient to reveal, and thus to prove, a law? no consistent answer is given to us. And let it be supposed that any answer whatsoever were given us—as that fifty or five hundred entirely agreeing instances would be sufficient to establish a law—then we must ask, *What is there different* in the last crowning instance, say the five-hundredth, which makes it conclusive of a law, when the four hundred and ninety-nine were not? The argument was begun on the assumption that they were to be all agreeing instances; for the disagreeing instances would rather cross and contradict the induction than strengthen it. And yet this five-hundredth must have something in it different from the four hundred and ninety-ninth, for that is conclusive where this was not. To this difficulty also we get no consistent answer.

In truth, the inquiry has proceeded far enough among the inductive logicians, to prove thus much, absolutely, that this species of induction, which does no more than count up agreeing instances of sequence, can never be a demonstration. Bacon calls it the "*Inductio per enumerationem simplicem*." His verdict against its validity may be found in the *Novum Organum*, L. I., Apothegm 105: "Some other form of induction than has been hitherto in use must be excogitated in establishing an axiom" (general principle). "And this is necessary, not only for discovering and proving what they call *first truths*."

but also the lesser and the mediate axioms ; in fine, all axioma. For an induction which proceedeth by simple enumeration is a puerile affair, and gives a precarious conclusion, and is liable to peril from a contradictory instance ; and oftentimes it pronounces from fewer instances than is meet, and only from such as lie readiest at hand." So Mill (Book III. chap. iii. sect. 2): "To an inhabitant of Central Africa, fifty years ago, no fact probably appeared to rest on more uniform experience than this, that all human beings are black. To Europeans, not many years ago, the proposition, All swans are white, appeared an equally unequivocal instance of uniformity in the course of nature. Further experience has proved to both that they were mistaken." (See also chap. xxi. vol. ii. p. 101.) So speak all the thoughtful writers. The invalidity of such induction is also proved by familiar examples. Experience observes the invariable death of our fellow-men. We confidently expect all living men, including ourselves, will die. Experience has, with equal certainty, shown us night always preceding day within the limits of twenty-four hours ; for we live between the arctic circles. But no man dreams that night or darkness *causes the day* ; and if he concluded that the sequence must hold as he has seen it, he would be refuted by the first winter within the arctic circle. Every man who rises early enough hears the cock crow invariably before the dawn ; no man infers that the cock's crowing causes dawn, or must necessarily precede it. Babbage's calculating-machine presented a curious refutation of this species of induction. Its machinery could be so adjusted by the maker as to present to the eye a certain series of numbers, increasing by a given law, and this was continued through instances so numerous as to weary the spectator. Did he now conclude that these numerous agreeing instances revealed to him the necessary law of the machine ? He was speedily refuted by seeing it change the law of the series by its own automatic action.

But does not such an enumeration of agreeing instances teach anything ? We reply that it does raise a probability of a law which may be found to regulate the future rise of similar instances. The more numerous the agreeing instances summed up, the more this probability will usually grow ; and when, by our own observation and the testimony of our fellow-men, the

agreeing instances become exceedingly numerous, and none of a contradictory character appear, the probability may mount towards a virtual certainty. The ground of this will appear when we have advanced further into the discussion. It must also be conceded that inferences which have only probability, may be of much practical value in common life, and serve a certain purpose even in the proceedings of science. Bishop Butler has taught us that, to a great extent, probability is the guide of life. Junctures often arise when it is not only man's wisdom, but his clear duty, to act upon only probable anticipations of results. In science, also, these imperfect inductions have their use, which is this, to guide to some probable but only provisional hypothesis, which is taken only as a guide to experiments that are made for the conclusive investigation of nature. What we observe, then, of this induction by mere enumeration of agreeing instances is, that it is not useless ; but it can never give demonstrated truths. But science requires, in its final results, complete demonstration.

Not a few logicians, among whom Hamilton is to be numbered, in view of this imperfection in the mere induction from the many to all, have roundly declared that induction can never give more than probable evidence of its laws.—(*Logic*, Lecture 32, end.) He asserts that it is impossible for it to teach, like the deductive syllogism, any necessary laws of thought or of nature ! Must we concede this ? Is the problem, the gravity of which was indicated, indeed hopeless ? Must we admit that all the sciences of induction, and all the practical rules of life, which are virtually also inductive, are for ever uncertain, presenting us only probabilities, and remaining but plausible hypotheses which await the probable or possible refutation from wider investigations ? This we cannot believe. We claim a demonstrative force for this species of evidence, when it is properly constructed. We must substantiate such a view, or else candidly surrender the proud claim and name of *science* for our opinions upon all the natural phenomena. Real demonstration cannot be grounded in uncertainties, however much they be multiplied. They can only be grounded, as Mill has most truly declared—however inconsistently for his own logic—in necessary truths. Moreover, the common sense of mankind rejects the conclusion that

all its inductions are only probable. Some of them we know to be certain, and experience never fails to confirm their certainty. The question, then, recurs, which is the great problem of this species of logic, How does the inference seemingly made from the some or the many to the all, become valid for the all?

R. L. DABNEY.

ART. VI.—*St. Thomas Aquinas: or, Scholastic Philosophy in Modern Theology.*¹

A SPECIAL prominence is given at this time to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas by two recent encyclicals of the Pope, who calls the priests of the Roman Catholic Church to its study, and recommends its use in the interpretation and defence of the Roman faith. The Pope at the same time exalts Aquinas as the patron of all Catholic academies, lyceums, and schools, and officially stamps his philosophy as the philosophy of Catholicism.

The study of any writer, no matter how worthless his thoughts, by so many men, no matter how valueless their investigations, makes him an object of great importance to the public. Especially is this so when the persons thus required to study him have large interests to control and the education of many youth to direct.

In the thirteenth century, with the dawning of that light which was to slowly brighten into the Reformation, a movement was made by three great minds to reconcile science and religion: Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus; so that Thomas Aquinas stands historically in the centre of a grand trio, who, more than anybody since St. Augustine and before Calvin, moulded theology. This reconciliation was harder then than in our day, because religion at that time included all the mediæval theology, with its accretion of fabulous legends, which have been largely eliminated by the Reformation. It was also easier than in our day, inasmuch as science then included little more than the works of Aristotle

¹ From the *New Englander*.

and his commentators, and so offered less with which religion had to be reconciled.

Albertus Magnus commenced this work of reconciliation by systematising the whole works of Aristotle, according to the Arabian commentators, with a view to accommodate them to the essential dogmas of religion. Thomas Aquinas, coming after him, systematised the whole of Christian theology with a view to accommodate it to Aristotle. Dun Scotus, coming next, made the application, and, in the spirit of Kant, criticised both, in the course of which he gave up all Christian doctrine as incapable of rational proof, and demanded that it be received on authority, which authority should also compel obedience; at which point the attempted reconciliation practically ended, to be succeeded by the subjection of science until the Renaissance of the sixteenth century.

The age of Aquinas was the culminating of a long period of reconciliation. From Aristotle to Bacon there was a comparative blank in philosophy. The thinkers, few and feeble, did little else than try to harmonise the systems of a livelier age—the Græco-Roman age. Christianity, which had in this time sprung up and swept over the Western world, was the chief interest. It was accepted by all, and so had to be reconciled with whatever was held by any. Though unlike any of the previous systems, it yet had to be shown in unity with all of them. It thus had to be reconciled with Judaism, with Paganism, and with "Philosophy." In reconciling it with Judaism it was attempted to harmonise the Old and New Testaments, and to explain the rejection of the ceremonies and sacrifices, as well as of the laws of Moses, by the theory of their fulfilment in Christianity, or of the merging and superseding of the provisional in the permanent. In reconciling it with Paganism there was a compromise, or combination, known as Catholicism, in which the idolatry, or image-worship, of the Pagans, together with their divinities and ceremonies, were preserved under other names and associations. In reconciling Christianity with philosophy there was a combination, first with Platonism, or rather Neo-Platonism, in a mystic theosophy concerning the Logos, the Trinity, and the soul in relation with the divine mind, and afterward, on the superseding of Platonism by Aristotelianism, with the latter in a logical system of nature

and its supernatural relations ; at which point the great trio of which I have spoken appeared on the scene.

With the fall of Platonism, which dominated the earlier part of the Christian era, theology became largely eliminated from science. Reconciliation, consisting thenceforth in harmonising theology with Aristotle's philosophy, which had almost nothing to do with theology (being mostly physics, logic, rhetoric, music, and the like), was mainly found in the separation of philosophy and religion. By allowing each a particular sphere, on which the other was not allowed to encroach, a reconciliation became more easy, or, at least, conflicts less necessary.

About the same time there was also a marked tendency to distinguish between the known and the unknown, and to separate the latter from science to be received on authority. This again made reconciliation more easy. By excluding so many topics from scientific discussion, and ceasing in a measure to determine the indeterminable, the issues on which conflicts could arise became materially reduced. It is difficult enough to reconcile the known ; but when the unknown and unknowable had also to be reconciled with it, it was hopelessly perplexing. Reconciliation from this time forward consisted mainly in showing that there is nothing in science contradictory to what may possibly be true outside of our knowledge, namely, in those things which are accepted on faith, the substantial proposition of which reconciliation is, that we do not know that there is anything in what we do know that contradicts what we do not know.

We say, accordingly, that the age of St. Thomas Aquinas was an age of culminating reconciliations. Men reconciled God with himself in a perfected system of the Trinity ; they reconciled God with man in the Atonement ; the idea with the thing in Realism ; philosophy and religion in Scholasticism ; and Church and State in the Papacy.

They wrought out, through great struggles, a unity in things, as a result of all this reconciliation ; a unity of nations in the Holy Roman Empire, of churches in the Holy Roman Catholic Church, of science in the Scholastic Philosophy, and of theology in the *Summa Theologiæ*, which was the crowning work of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the capstone of the whole fabric of reconciliation.

It was an age which ended a long period of commentating, as preparatory to this—commentating on Scripture, commentating on Aristotle, commentating on tradition and dogma. It was an age of explaining things, or of getting our knowledge into unity. Aquinas was the most perfect embodiment of this age and spirit, and his work stands out as its monument to subsequent times. He was to Catholicism what Justinian was to Roman law, Coke or Blackstone to Common law, and Napoleon to French law. He was the intellectual Charlemagne of the middle ages, who conquered and organised in one intellectual empire all the sciences. He was the spiritual Hildebrand, who subordinated in one moral system all our thought; putting therein, heaven over earth, church over state, theology over science, duty over interest, and religion over secular life.

He added little that was new to philosophy, and not much to theology. He mainly collected what had been written before, and argued for or against well-known propositions. Like a judge he summed up, expounded and decided, but did not make or suggest much that was original. He was a storehouse in whose mind was gathered and arranged in system all existing knowledge; and he discoursed intelligently about it, giving it fixed form and statement. He reconciled, however, a past religion to a past science. He did not do much that will affect the present age or its problems.

The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas is accordingly essentially worthless to-day. No scientific man gives any serious attention to his distinctions, or can arrive at any discoveries or formulations of truth through them; while the speculative philosopher has passed to other subjects and other methods. St. Thomas is hopelessly out of date; and all the galvanising from that powerful central battery, the Vatican, will hardly bring him to life in this century.

Progress in philosophy consists less, perhaps, in solving the questions which it discusses than in giving them up. Few that it has ever raised have been settled. But it makes notable progress in learning that they are trivial, or else do not embrace what we want to know, so that we go on to something that is more really valuable. We are in advance of the ancients chiefly in confining our minds to more substantial and determinable questions, or to questions affecting more nearly our

practical life or experimental knowledge. The issues raised or discussed by St. Thomas are now regarded as merely curious, or else as altogether indeterminable.

The scholastic philosophy, which was at once the subject of Aquinas's speculations and the method of his procedure, which he gathered up and embodied in himself as its great representative—its chief interpreter and perfecter—was a combination of Christian theology and Pagan philosophy. For Pagan philosophy, which was at first regarded as an enemy of Christianity, came gradually to be used for the explanation and defence of Christianity; so that Christian doctrine came to be expressed and understood in its terms, and it came, in turn, to busy itself chiefly with Christian doctrine. For in like manner as Christianity, which was at first hostile to the Pagan religion, found it advantageous to reconcile itself to it by adopting its ceremonies and divinities under new names, so, from having long fought against Pagan philosophy, it found it profitable to adopt it, or incorporate it, like other interests, into its system. Scholasticism, the product of this attempt, is accordingly the then existing philosophy subsidised to the use of Christian theology, of which Thomism is the incarnation; and as philosophy came in the thirteenth century to be little more than Aristotle, Scholasticism, or Thomism, might be called Aristotle christianised. It busied itself chiefly with theological terms and problems, or with such subjects as entered as factors into theology; as substance and accidents, ideas and forms, universals and essences, body and spirit, simple and compound, material and immaterial, time, eternity, infinity, perfection, angels, and grace. Aquinas, accordingly, in explaining and perfecting scholasticism, largely dealt with these terms, and his writings are made up of their explanations and of discussions arising in connection with them.

Before specialising these, let us glance at the life of Aquinas. There is nothing very remarkable in this except what is not true. Being a saint as well as a philosopher, he had to be legended and miracled into the calendar, so that there is the usual halo of devout lies about him. These, however, like Mark Twain's stories, are usually big enough not to be confounded with the truth by moderns. They were invented mostly in the following century when he was canonised, it

being customary to wait a few hundred years after the death of a man before declaring him a saint, as it is then much easier to prove miracles on him than during his lifetime.

St. Thomas Aquinas was born of noble parents near Aquino, in the territory of Naples, in 1225 or 1227. He was educated in the convent of Monte Casino and in the University of Naples, where there was quite a contest for his possession by the different religious orders on account of his evident genius. He was fairly smuggled into the church and Dominican order, having been persuaded, without the knowledge of his parents, to take the first step. The monks, fearing the influence of his mother, who opposed his intentions, sent him secretly to Rome. When she tracked him thither, they despatched him, with four companions, into France. There he was captured by soldiers sent by his brothers, and conducted back to his father's castle. It is related that while in this castle every influence was used to dissuade him from his religious purpose. Finally, through the aid of the monks, he escaped from the castle, being let down out of a window at night and taken to Naples. The fight was continued for him between his parents and the monks until the Pope interfered and compelled his parents to give him up. He was then taken to Cologne and put under the instruction of Albertus Magnus, and afterwards went with his master to Paris. He subsequently became a teacher of philosophy and theology at Cologne, Paris, Rome, and elsewhere. He refused all ecclesiastical honours, and spent his whole life in the more congenial work of teaching and writing. He died in 1274 on his way to the Council of Lyons, where all Christendom was expected to bow to him as the greatest theologian of the age, and where he was to attempt the greatest of all reconciliations, that between the Greek and the Roman Church.

His youth foreshadowed the man. Being dark, silent, and inapproachable as a boy, on account of his being wrapped in meditation, he was called "the dumb ox of Sicily," on hearing which his master once said, "When the dumb ox gets to bellowing, he will shake the whole world with his noise." It is related that as a boy he was constantly asking his instructors, What is God? and we find that as a man he considered it the object of all philosophy to answer that question,

the science of God being another name for the *Summa Theologiae*, which was to be an encyclopædia of all knowledge.

According to his monkish biographers, he was so charitable that, as a boy, he would steal to give to the 'poor. His father once caught him carrying off provisions stealthily taken from the larder; and, when asked what he was carrying in his cloak, young Thomas, in his embarrassment, let fall his load, but instead of bread and kitchen stuff a shower of roses covered the ground beneath his feet.

This story is credited by his latest biographer, Archbishop Vaughan, who also defends the morality of his theft, on the ground that what is sin in one man is not sin in another, and intimates that the saints often get to be so good that a little stealing does not hurt them.

He was liberal above his contemporaries and Church, being generally in advance of his age; although, as he was the embodiment of his age, as well as of his Church, and, indeed, of all mediævalism, he was not much in advance, being in advance only as a leader, and not as a reformer or revolutionist. In collecting and systematising the doctrines of the Church, he lopped off many which he could not harmonise, and condemned some of the grosser superstitions. He demanded a high place for reason, and insisted that there was nothing in religion which it contradicted. He encouraged liberal study, even on theological questions, and enlarged the bounds within which men might exercise their private judgment. He denied the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, and would to-day be called a heretic. He hoped that even the lost would be restored, and it is said that he once prayed all night for the conversion and salvation of the devil. He charitably thought that an unbaptized infant might be saved if it died before it was born. He tolerated the Jews and those who patronised them, on the ground that they were already so badly damned that their further sins of living and trading could not damn them any more. But he thought that their property might be justly confiscated, and given under certain circumstances to the Church.

Some of his opinions were curious enough. He thought that the devil produces disease, and has power to transport men through the air; that the stars are moved by angels; that hell

is in the centre of the earth; that there is more reason for killing heretics than for killing criminals; that when in the early Church a man was excommunicated, the devil immediately began worrying him in the body, etc.

Among the curious questions which he seriously discussed with great learning are the following: Whether an angel can pass from point to point without going through the intermediate space; whether the damned rejoice in the punishment of their enemies; whether a Crusader who is returning from the Holy Land dies a better death than one who is going thither; whether an angel can be at the convexity of the heavens; whether a person could be naturally or miraculously both a virgin and a father; whether truth be stronger than wine, a king, or a woman; and why Christ did not assume the female sex.

His Catholic biographer, Archbishop Vaughan, already mentioned, makes him out a spiritualist. He says (p. 935):

"He not only dwelt in the unseen world, but he absolutely conversed with its inhabitants; so that what was hidden from the gaze of ordinary mortals became visible to him. . . . For instance, his sister who had died appeared to him in a vision; said she was in purgatory, and implored masses for her soul. . . . Shortly after she appeared to him in Rome, and said she was in glory. He asked after Landulf (his brother); she said he was in penal fire."

Again, he tells us that the spirit of Romanus, his old associate professor, appeared before him, and discoursed as the alleged spirits talk who are called up by modern mediums.

St. Thomas Aquinas often went off into trances, and might himself be appropriately called, in later life, a spiritualistic medium. "So habitual," says this biographer, "had the ecstatic life become to him that at last he could scarcely fix his mind in contemplation without being carried away in rapture, without being lifted off the ground entranced."

Sometimes the devil appeared to him, often in horrible shapes. Once when he appeared in the shape of a negro dressed in black, Aquinas rushed at him with his fist, as Luther did under like circumstances with the ink-bottle, typical, perhaps, of the two methods of warfare; for the Protestants have ever fought the devil with ink, while the Catholics have fought him with force.

These vagaries, however, were not characteristic of the man, but exceptional, being attributable to his age and affiliations rather than to his individuality. His mind was naturally rational and discriminating, and his writings are usually fair and logical. Taken all together, he was, perhaps, the greatest mind of the middle ages, an epitome of six centuries, with their intelligence and, in less degree, their superstition.

He was encyclopædic in the versatility of his genius and the universality of his attainments, as well as in the exhaustive scope of his projected work. His writings fill ordinarily from seventeen to twenty quarto volumes. There are so many special treatises that by their very number they almost become universal, while his four great works aspire, each in its sphere, to be exhaustive.

His smaller treatises contain profound and subtle discussions on modes, fallacies, fate, angels, the eternity of the world, the nature of matter, and many other subjects of philosophic and theological interest.

His four great works are his Commentary on Aristotle, which might be called, from his standpoint, a *Summa Scientiæ*, or Sum of all Science; his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombardus (a collection of Patristic views), which is a sort of theological Coke on Littleton, in which the notes are greater than the text; his *Summa contra Gentiles*, a rational demonstration of theology, intended for the heathen and unbelievers; and his *Summa Theologiæ*, a systematic presentation of all revealed doctrines, or sum-total of theology, as its name implies.

His method is to take a proposition or text or word, and to expound its meaning, and discuss every question that rises in connection with it, as well as to adduce what the Fathers, Aristotle, and Scripture, say on the subject.

He will, accordingly, often argue by the most bizarre jumbling of physical, metaphysical, biblical, patristic, and etymological reasons; maintaining a proposition about an ordinary question of morals or astronomy, by a derivation of the word, by adducing some natural law or experience, by quoting from St. Augustine or Aristotle, and by showing that if it were not so the angels could not perform their functions.

He is usually profound, clear, and logically consequent. He

states fairly and strongly the opposite views ; so much so that many Catholics have objected to his influence, as making infidels by raising objections which he cannot answer.

His philosophy, I have said, was the scholastic. He adopted in general Aristotle's logical and metaphysical basis of philosophy ; making metaphysics conversant with being as such and its modifications, and adopting the Aristotelian doctrine of concepts, judgments, syllogisms, and proofs. He was a modified realist, asserting the universal to exist in the mind of God as his ideas, in the particular things as their underlying forms, and in our mind as abstractions from them ; but he denied, as against Plato, the existence of separate ideas or species. He maintained that there are no innate concepts, but that all our knowledge comes ultimately from experience. He argued the existence of God from causality and design, the immortality of the soul from its immateriality, and its immateriality from its thinking the universal. He thought that all the soul is immaterial, including the senses, appetite, and will, and that it is all immortal. The will, he claims, always seeks what seems good, as taught by Plato, while its freedom consists in necessarily following our desires, without external compulsion, as subsequently taught by Jonathan Edwards.

He claims that God is an immaterial form, as are also angels and human souls. He denied against Plato the pre-existence of the soul, and against Averrhoes a common soul for all men. The world, he maintained, was created from nothing, and at that point time began.

In ethics he adds to the natural virtues of the ancients the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love ; which latter lead to supernatural happiness, as the former to natural happiness, while both lead to God, who is the end of life as well as the object of study.

He adhered, in general, to the distinctions and methods of the scholastic philosophy, and applied them to the usual problems of theology. And when to-day the Pope exalts him for study and authority in his Church, it is a movement to restore scholasticism as a basis of scientific speculation, especially in connection with religion.

Touching the adequacy of the Scholastic or Thomist philosophy and its distinctions for our present needs, it may be

sufficient to remark that we have passed beyond the subjects, the terms, and the methods of that system, and philosophy is now mainly employed in an altogether different field, and in an altogether different manner.

As compared with the more critical systems of Kant, Hegel, Comte, or even the modern experimental scientists, which analyse the very ground postulates of Scholasticism, and either explain them away or show them to be only subjective assumptions, it will stand no chance with modern thinkers. It must prevail, if at all, by authority, like the doctrine of Papal Infallibility or the Immaculate Conception. By teaching it to youth before they can think, and disqualifying them, by severe indoctrination, from thinking afterwards, it can be made their system ; but it will not again be seriously considered by the independent thinker ; and any defence of religion or interpretation of nature built upon it will be, to modern minds, without a foundation.

We are to-day in a period of the examination of the ultimate elements of our thought and subjects of thought ; and as, in chemistry, we have given up as elements, earth, air, fire, and water, and are considering oxygen, carbon, mercury, and other more simple elements, so in philosophy we have given up as elements form, substance, accidents, time, space, and quality, and are dealing with the genesis, conditions, and components of these as thoughts, and with the question of the possibility or impossibility of our knowing them as objective realities. We have reduced ourselves to ignorance on the very terms in which the Scholastics did their thinking, and by sweeping away their distinctions we cannot seriously consider their questions.

We do not consider to-day whether the soul is material or immaterial, because we do not know the difference between matter and immaterial stuff, as we once thought we did. We do not consider whether the mind is simple or composed, because we do not understand what simple is, or what composed is, in that remote and refined sense as applied to something beyond our tests. We do not consider whether space is finite or infinite, because we do not know, since Kant, whether there is any space or not. We do not consider whether time is

eternal or not, because we do not know whether there is any time. We do not consider the old questions of the forms and modifications of substances, because we do not know what form, or modification, or substance is. We do not consider what is absolutely true, or right, or perfect, because we do not know whether there is any absolute, as we once seemed so well to know. These questions, with the resolving and sublimating of their factors, have passed away from philosophy, except as historic curiosities, and their primitive simplicity which once divided men in issues interests us no more.

But it is not the philosophy, nor yet the theology, of Aquinas that peculiarly distinguishes him. These both were the current systems of his time. It is his reconciliation of the two with the thoughts engendered by their clashing in his gigantic mind that constitutes his great work, and makes him a representative man, and it is this that gives significance to the Pope's recent recommendation. For when this sovereign Pontiff holds up Aquinas for the consideration of the Church, it is his method for the reconciliation of science and religion that is prescribed.

Aquinas for this reconciliation distinguished clearly between theology and science, which had before been badly jumbled. He set off several subjects as distinctively Christian, as the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, Original Sin, and eternal damnation; and others as distinctively scientific, as forms, substances, causality, and concepts. The first, or peculiarly Christian doctrines, he taught, cannot be proved by reason, and we should not attempt it. They are to be received on faith. The most that reason can do is to show that they do not contradict science, and, in a few cases, to confirm them by analogies or other assistant proofs.

He next taught that there are two sources of knowledge for these two kinds of truth, namely, Revelation and Reason. By revelation we get theology; by reason we get science or philosophy. By revelation and reason he means, however, something more than we usually do by these terms. Both with him are traditional. By revelation he means not only the Bible, but also the Church Fathers and decrees of Councils. By reason he means not only the faculty we call by that name.

but the general body of Pagan and Mohammedan philosophy, and particularly Aristotle.

By putting ourselves in connection with these two sources of knowledge, revelation, and reason, we get religious knowledge on the one hand, and secular knowledge on the other. God speaks to us through these as through two channels. Both being from the same source, God, there is no conflict between them, and so between religion and science, which is the fundamental axiom of Scholasticism. For the reception of these two kinds of knowledge he claims we have two distinct faculties, the supernatural and the natural, or Faith and Reason, both being original, and each relying on itself, and not to be proved or disproved by the other.

In answer to the question how we know that what we get by faith is true (seeing that it is not proven), he would say that we are inwardly moved by God to accept the documents of revelation and the teachings of the Church, from which, being once accepted, it can easily be demonstrated.

But how we know that it is God who moves us to this acceptance, and not our training or prejudice, he does not explain. He alleges the *fact* and attributes it to his grace. The will, he says, makes us believe it, which, in the realm of faith, is supreme. The intellect assents to the articles of faith in obedience to the command of the will, and not because forced to do so by proofs, which is the reason of the merit of faith, it being voluntary.

There are, however, he claims, certain inducements or aids to faith (*præambula* or *prima credibilia*), which are the subject of demonstration, as the existence of God, miracles, and the benefits of Christianity. These make faith easier, and, while they do not prove it, make it less irrational.

These are the main ideas in the reconciliation of Religion and Science by St. Thomas Aquinas. Now involved in these, as their principal substance, when reduced to plain language, are the following principles:—

First, we must take some things for granted without proof; secondly, we must not consider some things when there is danger that we will doubt them; and, thirdly, if we find any of certain things untrue we must not admit the fact.

Here we have the three greatest of all intellectual vices, prejudice, slavery, and dishonesty, on which, more than on anything else, rests the responsibility for our culpable darkness.

We are to come with predilection to our investigation of religion; we are not to investigate at all where we are likely to learn anything different; and we are not to admit our conclusion if found to be unfavourable. Taking for granted what we want to know, we are not to consider what discredits it or admit anything found to be contrary to it. Starting out to find the truth, we are to take up something without looking at it, then not to examine it, and, if we ever learn our error afterwards, not to acknowledge it. We are to open the mind unduly, shut it unduly, and if anything not wanted gets in, to expel it unduly. Starting out to see, we are to look with our eyes shut, then not to open them, and if by chance we see anything, not to acknowledge it.

Religion is thus, according to Aquinas's system, never actually examined, is never allowed on principle to be examined, and its acceptance is never to be affected by examination if had.

Let us examine these points in detail. We say the first principle of Aquinas is to admit some things without evidence. He accepts the dictum of St. Anselm, *Credo ut intelligam*, I believe that I may know. That is, we are to accept some things that we do not know to be true, and then to deduce the rest of our knowledge from them, or base our intelligence on our ignorance.

The following are the matters that he specially asks us to thus accept without evidence: first, the principle of revelation, or the fact that God does communicate to us some things; secondly, the particular documents, or the fact that the Scriptures, decrees of Councils, and teachings of the Church are such a revelation; thirdly, the fact that we have a special faculty of faith to receive these Divine communications; and fourthly, the fact that our inward movings or inclinations to accept religion are influences from God.

For of none of these does he offer any proof, except to support them upon one another. He admits that all specially theological doctrines are incapable of demonstration, or of being proved in any way by reason. We must, he says, simply

admit them. His method of defending religion is to believe it, and then show that we do not know it to be otherwise. After believing it we may, indeed, get some confirmatory proof of its truth, but only by using our faith to support it. The process is as follows: Believe that the moon is made of green cheese, and then show that all science cannot prove absolutely that it is not.

Duns Scotus following this principle of Aquinas, and reducing it to its absurdum, claims that we can know nothing in religion, not even the existence of God, but that we must take it all on faith. And Scotus is logical. If you can believe a little without evidence, you can believe more, or all; you do not contravene any additional principle in so doing. And Scotus, accordingly, rather than Aquinas, is followed in the Roman Church, particularly by the Jesuits, who have so much to defend which nobody pretends to prove. He would say, practically, Follow authority without proving it: Admit what it teaches without first learning whether it knows: Open your ears more than your eyes. Accept religion without inquiry, and ask no questions till you are incapable of doubting.

Aquinas was good in defending theology from science, but not in giving theology a basis. His argument would be good, if a good case were first made out for theology. But he allows for no such case in his system. Theology must be taken for granted to give it a basis at all. Religious argument, according to him, can only confirm one who, by already believing, needs no confirmation.

The next principle involved in Aquinas's system of religious defence is that on some subjects we must not think. They are not subjects for reason, but for faith. They must not be investigated critically or scientifically, but admitted devoutly.

Among the matters not to be investigated, according to Aquinas, are creation, the sacraments, purgatory, and eternal life, in fact all the peculiar Christian doctrines; to which, for the masses, is added also the Bible, and, for certain classes, almost everything. Not only must you commence by taking these for granted, but you must not turn the light of reason upon them at all. This, he says, would be invading the province of faith. The philosophical faculties of Catholic

Universities have been prohibited from touching these questions. Geology, Astronomy, Biology must not make any inferences bearing on religion. Theology alone has this right; and, as theology admits them to commence with, there is virtually no investigation at all.

St. Thomas, in order to get this immunity for religion, divides off our ways of investigation, and lets only some of them undertake theological questions. This secures religion from the criticism of the rest. He divides off the sciences in like manner, and lets only some of them undertake theological questions. This secures religion against the rest. And in general it secures religion against all science by excluding those sciences which alone can critically deal with it. And in all investigation of religion it excludes criticism, and then allows consideration to proceed.

This is perhaps the worst feature of his system, which lays a ban, not only on individual thinking, but on the sciences, not only on the masses but on the thinkers, circumscribing alike the departments of investigation and the liberty of the investigator.

The other evil in the system of Aquinas is that it would prohibit conclusions of a certain kind however well established. Taking some things for granted, men are told that they must never admit anything contrary to them. As if it were not enough to make men shut their eyes much of the time, they must not see when they are open. The doctrines of the Church, no matter what the evidence against them, must not be admitted false. We must stop thinking first, and close up the mind. Those things which have been admitted without evidence must not be discredited by evidence.

Come to your work, St. Thomas would say, with the presupposition that there is nothing contradictory between science and religion. If then you find something that *is* contradictory, you must conclude, either that it is not science, or that it is not religion, or that it is not a contradiction. And you prove it in this way: It is not science, because it contradicts religion; it is not religion, because it contradicts science; it is not a contradiction, because both are true.

These are the dangerous vices of Aquinas's system, whose

resurrection and re-enthronement in religion at this time are to be specially deprecated in the interest of progress.

St. Thomas legitimatised prejudice, and gave a code for its defence. He organised ignorance into system, and made it a satisfying substitute for knowledge. He created the world of theology from nothing, and provided, by excluding the light, against its return to that element. He negotiated for a stand-still of thought on the height of the culminated scholastic philosophy, and effected, by separation, a truce between Science and Religion. By withdrawing from contemplation the difficulties of faith he provided for theology a retreat where it might be secure from the world of thought. He cloistered religion; that, like the saints, it might flourish alone.

In conclusion I may enumerate as among the advantages of Aquinas's system, or at least as steps in the direction of progress, the following: 1. The separation of the known and unknown, which, implying as it did a recognition of human ignorance, was, in those times of credulity, almost as valuable as their knowledge; 2. The separation of religion and science, with the conceding of a wider liberty to the latter; 3. The separation of the knowable and unknowable, which anticipated Kant's critique, and laid a basis (however invalid) for modern Agnosticism; 4. The separation of the religious from the secular in government, which, though but a distinction in thought with Aquinas, led the way for its application soon after by William of Occam to a divorce between the papacy and the empire; 5. The rejection of separately existing ideas, which prepared the way for Nominalism in the next century; and 6. The encouragement given to induction by rejecting innate ideas, and deriving all our knowledge from experience.

AUSTIN BIERBOWER.

ART. VII.—*Current Literature.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the disfavour with which religion and religious questions are regarded by some, it must, we imagine, still be allowed that such questions are interesting and fruitful to the majority of educated readers, as well as to the greater majority of the unlearned and unlettered *profanum vulgus*. In proof of this contention we have only to point to the mass of recent literature. One cannot avoid being struck by the variety and extent of quite recent religious and theological literature, unless indeed one wilfully closes one's eyes, and perversely denies a fact. Whether we seek devotional, polemical, historical, exegetical, or expository works, we have no need to go far in our search; they lie beside us. And if any one might object that it is true there are many ancient and ponderous tomes indeed, we hasten to explain that the musty volumes of our great-grandfathers are, while not by us undervalued or disesteemed, for the present overlooked, and we refer simply to the fresh productions of the brain and the printing-press. Surely the demand somewhat regulates and commands the supply. Though in some instances, and we can name a few, an author or a publisher may take a mistaken step in furnishing bookshelves with lumber, why should we refuse to acknowledge the common principle—the exception proves the rule? A really good book may often be a desideratum, and an epoch-making volume is of course and in terms not a thing of every day. But every day is adding to the toils,—whether to the sorrows or the joys of a reviewer, is another question. To some, at any rate, much study does not seem to be a weariness to the flesh; they seem to take, if not to deep and thoughtful study, at least to writing, and, not content with the limited play of their own fancy and feeling of satisfaction with work done easily or painfully, must needs endeavour to gather a crowd of admirers from among the public to swell with their praises the feeling of admiration and heighten the joys of imagination.

Of course there are many others who write and think deeply, and think deeply before, not after, they write and publish:

who look at their own productions with a calm and critical eye, and send them forth to find their way to the hearts and minds of men with some fear—the fear of modesty, yet with the confidence which springs from honest and faithful work. We find many such specimens of true research and thought among the large number of volumes lying upon our table, and waiting, we might almost say, as we recollect the list given in last number of this *Review*, demanding, attention.

Delaying only to say that Scottish authors and publishers are well represented, and hold their own alongside their English rivals, whether we regard the subjects, the number, or the form of the volumes, we hasten to introduce to our readers a goodly selection.

The editors of the *Pulpit Commentary* are working with a will. We have before us *Jeremiah*, vol. i. (1). We have already in previous numbers of this *Review* favourably noticed the good work alike of the editors and their contributors, and we might do no more here than just intimate a new volume. However, we may add that the name of the Rev. J. K. Cheyne, M.A., as the expositor, guarantees faithful work, which does not disappoint, and which is perhaps the most satisfactory part of the contents of the book. The Homiletics will be useful, by way of suggestiveness, to many, while the Homilies, by various authors, may rather tempt the indolent preacher or student to appropriate more than he can vivify with his own vitality in the pulpit. Truly, now-a-days, with so many helps and such a fulness of material, a man may merely vegetate, and even luxuriate, in the midst of this rich and abundant provision. We do not envy him, nor would we expect that any preacher would fail for himself to bring forth from the exercise of his mind upon the truth of God the beaten oil of the Sanctuary, which alone gives and supports the light of life in the soul of man. The *Introduction* is excellent, especially that part of it, which is the greater, which refers to “the life, times, and characteristics of Jeremiah.” To all who wish to preach to the times, in these times of worldliness and prevailing idolatries of various forms, we commend the study of the Book of the

(1) *The Pulpit Commentary*. Edited by Rev. Canon Spence and Rev. Joseph S. Exell. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co., 1883.

Prophet Jeremiah, and a good help in that study will be found in this volume.

The *Expositor* also holds bravely on its way. Vol. v., second series, is rich and varied in its contents. Perhaps the most interesting part of this volume (2) is the extensive contribution by the editor on *Balaam : an Exposition and a Study*. The staff of contributors is catholic in its composition so far as the Protestant Churches are concerned, and doubtless this fact will tend to the interest with which such an excellent and fresh list of papers will be, as it deserves to be, received.

The Book of Psalms has a just fascination to devout minds. Even the greatest statesmen and lawyers have exercised their intellectual powers upon attempts to supersede our present poetical versions, or at least to improve upon them. A very worthy attempt is made by Dr. W. Digby Seymour in a graceful and flowing version (3). The learned author professes a fair knowledge of Hebrew, and believes himself capable of rendering the sense of the original, and inasmuch as all others have failed, with two exceptions, to come up to the high standard of poetry in their efforts at translation, he quite heroically undertakes the difficult task. We give him all credit for his very fair work, and we value highly the fine devotional spirit which impelled and characterised the effort, but we can hardly go so far as to say that we have even yet seen a perfect Psalter. But we must admit that all in all this beautiful volume takes a very high place—far above the average—among the crowd of competitors.

Under an assumed name another contribution is made to the attempts referred to above of what we may call restoring the Psalms, or rather the Psalter, to the original form and use (4). The ostensible reason given in the preface for the issue

(2) *The Expositor*. Edited by the Rev. Samuel Cox, D.D. Second Series, vol. v. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

(3) *The Hebrew Psalter, or Book of Praises*, סֵפֶר תְּהִלִּים, commonly called the Psalms of David, a new metrical translation. By William Digby Seymour, Q.C., LL.D., Recorder of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1882.

(4) *The Book of Psalms in English Blank Verse, using the Verbal and Lineal Arrangements of the Original*. By Ben-Tehillim. Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1883.

of this version is to provide material really suitable for chanting. The author makes a bold venture. Although he has set before him the original Hebrew form as his standard, and the literal meaning of the Hebrew as his object, he confesses that while he has followed the former, he has been compelled to make many alterations in the translation. Of course in such a case a great deal depends upon the competency of the translator, and it is unfortunate that he has left the book to speak for itself without the authority of his name. In many instances, though verbally differing, we find here an agreement in sense with the rendering of Perowne, notably in the 16th and 34th Psalms, but we cannot see that there is an improvement upon our own English version. If, as our translator thinks, the chanting of the Psalms is to become common in Scotland, and if, as he says, it is ridiculous to chant prose, and the difficulties of rhyme are insurmountable to a faithful translation, we imagine he is within his judgment in giving us a version in blank verse, to which form there are fewest objections, but we fear he will fail to engage many to the belief that he has discovered a satisfactory mode of using the Psalter. In many instances, while he is faithful to blank verse, he is not equally careful of grammatical structure, and leads us to wonder how we could chant Ps. xiii. 1 :

“Till when, Jehovah, wilt forget me quite?”

or Ps. xxii. 1 :

“My God, my God, O why forsak’st thou me?
Far from my saving help,
The matters of my roar ;”

or Ps. lxii. 9 :

“Ah ! vanity are sons of man low-born,
Mere lie are sons high-born :
They in the balances to go aloft,
They shall at once be less than vanity ;”

or lastly, Ps. xcii. 10 :

“But thou’lt raise high my horn like the bison’s ;
I am instinct with verdurous oil.”

This last line beats all. Its equivalent in our homely Authorised Version is :

“I shall be anointed with fresh oil.”

The Old Testament Scriptures are always interesting to the student of human history, and we are always pleased to notice any endeavours to interest the young therein. Mr. Cross in his *Hints* (5) has done good service in this respect. He has done work similar to that of the Misses Rothschild in their *History and Literature of the Israelites*. But while they have been content to give merely a summary, truly interesting, of the contents of the books of the Old Testament, Mr. Cross has given an analytical synopsis of the more difficult books, and has entered somewhat minutely into some of the critical questions concerning the dates and composition. We do not accept his view of the history of the Exodus, nor can we receive his theories as to the composition of Genesis. We find ourselves at issue with Mr. Cross at many points, but none the less do we acknowledge the interesting character of the volume and its helpfulness in many directions in the region of Biblical Science.

It may be well to place alongside the foregoing another volume (6) which meets many of the Rationalistic arguments of the day in a simple fashion. Mr. Redford, in his *Prophecy*, exposes the false critical test which many critics employ in dealing with the subject of Prophecy, and expounds its true nature and spirit. He contends that the predictions of the prophets were simply messages from Jehovah, and therefore simply a part of the prophetic teaching and mission. He has grasped the only satisfactory explanation of the whole history of the Bible in his adoption of the proposition, "The Messiah is the soul of Prophecy." While not presuming, as so many of the so-called higher critics do, to say what God wholly intended by the announcements of prophecy, he is careful to deny that it is fair to first postulate what all true prophecy should do, and then, because the prophecies of the Bible do not square with their human estimate and standard, to affirm that these are not *bona fide* prophecies at all. "That the human is the measure of the Divine" is the inverted principle which dominates the reasoning and decides the inference of many rational-

(5) *Introductory Hints to English Readers of the Old Testament*. By the Rev. John A. Cross, M.A. London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1882.

(6) *Prophecy: its Nature and Evidence*. By the Rev. R. A. Redford, M.A., LL.B. London: The Religious Tract Society.

istic and irreverential essayists in their studies of prophecy. This book exposes the folly of such a line of study, and, unlike the critics on the other side, while it destroys the airy fabric, constructs a more substantial and satisfactory resting-place for faith and hope.

Now that the *Revised New Testament* is "an accomplished fact," naturally we look and long for the promised *Revised Old Testament*. Several attempts are made to anticipate the latter, or to assist the constituted Company of Revisers with advice more or less worthy or weak. But besides this craving after honour on the part of some who are really, or who only imagine themselves to be, competent critics and translators, we have the craving of the consumers, as we may call them,—the weary, hungry, longing of readers to enjoy the fruit of the labours of the Revisers. Professor Roberts of St. Andrews, in *Old Testament Revision* (7), provides, not an instalment, for he acknowledges that he does not know the adopted readings of the Company, but a substitute, in the form of a handy and useful book, detailing some corrections of the Authorised English Version. Along with this, which may be called the major theme of the volume, there are chapters on the various versions of the Old Testament both before and after Christ. Dr. Roberts also returns to his favourite contention as to the language in which our Lord ordinarily spoke. In our Lord's habitual use of Greek he finds a solution to many New Testament problems. But notwithstanding all the probabilities and reasoning, we cannot give up the strong argument—"The common people heard Him gladly,"—for our Lord's use of the Aramaic *patois* of the day. We need hardly, in passing, add that this volume conveys a great deal of information concerning the Old Testament, and is most deserving of a very wide circulation.

Similar in scope and arrangement to many others is the volume of Dr. Lumby's *Introduction to the New Testament* (8).

(7) *Old Testament Revision: a Handbook for English Readers*. By Alexander Roberts, D.D., Professor of Humanity, St. Andrews, and Member of New Testament Company of Revisers. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

(8) *A Popular Introduction to the New Testament*. By J. Rawson Lumby, D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

It is an additional evidence of the truth of an introductory observation, that the study of the Word of God is not yet a thing of the past. Here we have presented to us a beautifully simple and well-arranged introduction to the New Testament. We do not wonder that as the papers originally appeared in the *Gentleman's Magazine* they were highly valued, and suggested the wish, on the part of admirers, of a wider circulation and a more permanent form. We most heartily second the hope for a large constituency of readers, and we believe those whom we may induce to look into this book will be grateful to us as well as to the author.

More polemical as well as more extensive than the above is the work on *The Bible*, by Dr. Robson (9), whose standpoint is the point of contact with the Sacred Books of the Hindus and the Mohammedans. This volume will well repay perusal, and in almost every part is suggestive. The first three chapters, though arranged as i. ii. iii., are logically constructed in the plan of the author, iii. ii. i. In this way he is led back from the question of Inspiration to the basis of Revelation. We believe, however, the top of the pyramid so constructed is too narrow, and that although the natural may be wholly present, there must also be in some manner conjoined with it the supernatural. Only in such a combination can we find a worthy basis of religion. For if the ultimate ground of the manifestation of God be humanity pure and simple, with nothing of the Divine in it or about it, we cannot logically refuse the inference that to humanity belongs any worship which the highest affections may demand.

We mark with much satisfaction the reverential spirit of the inquiry, and acknowledge the high value Dr. Robson places upon Christianity in contrast with other religions. We also mark his rejection of the critical theory of Professor Robertson Smith, while he is ready to admit the force of the arguments by Ewald and others in favour of the later origin of the books of the Bible.

The one difficulty in this whole series of questions is—as is

(9) *The Bible: its Revelation, Inspiration, and Evidence.* By the Rev. John Robson, D.D., author of "Hinduism and its Relation to Christianity." London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

admitted by all, except, perhaps, those who on one side have no difficulties and no perplexities, and those on the other who see through everything with the clear spectacles of their own imaginations—to give or frame a theory of inspiration which will at once account for the facts and satisfy the questioning mind. We confess that within the whole range of Biblical science we see no signs of the discovery of such a definition, and, in fact, know of no such theory.

The nearest approach Dr. Robson makes to the discovery of such a definition is put in the interrogative form at p. 61: "Had Moses a power of knowing the will of God which other Israelites had not? That was the question for the Israelites. Had the writers of the Bible a power of knowing the will and purpose of God which we have not? That is the practical question for us, which must determine the authority we assign to the Bible, and to the Revelation which it contains.

"The power thus called in question is Inspiration."

Having simply stated the question, he then proceeds to "first of all consider the Revelation of the Bible in its historical and written form, and then see what we may learn from it as to its inspiration." Having thereupon examined the contents of Revelation, he finds these have no mere reference to the past; they are no mere records of the dealings of God with men; no mere gatherings of historical details. The Bible "reveals the fulfilments of the past as a basis for present life, in view of an inevitable future." Then the question recurs, What was this power? And the answer is threefold: (1.) Insight or power of apprehending revelation; (2.) constraint or obligation to communicate the revelation; (3.) guidance, or inspiration of the words. It is not our part to enter into the details of the exposition and illustration of this threefold strand, but we may notice how Dr. Robson satisfies himself as to the discrepancies and difficulties that arise under the third head. His idea of the guidance of Jehovah is that of a considerate, compassionate, and modest King, who is anxious above all that his subjects understand and obey His will, while He does not himself personally declare it, but allows or impels another to do so for Him—He himself all the while standing by, and overlooking all slips, alike of language and of fact, which do not interfere with the end in view, viz.

the knowledge of His will. Hence Dr. Robson accounts in a human way for all the defects, and even contradictions, we find in the utterances of the human authors of the Bible. "Any defects, then, which we may find to exist in the inspired words must be due, not to any invincible imperfections of human language and human nature, but to His permission, as not being inconsistent with His purpose in inspiring them." We rather suspect there is evidence here that even Dr. Robson has neither cleared the ground nor met the case.

The latter part of the book (Part IV.) is taken up with a discussion of the three common classes of evidence,—prophecy, miracles, and the self-evidencing truth of the Bible.

We would again testify to the reverent handling of this most sacred and difficult theme, and although we cannot accept some of the arguments and inferences, we are at one in strong desire for the paramount influence, as well as in our estimate, of the peerless position of the Bible. We wish also to add that the language and style of Dr. Robson in this book are simple, clear, and beautiful.

The Great Memorial Name (10) is full of solid reading. It is the work of one who has been given to much thought upon the great central truth of Redemption. Mr. Grant did good service in his former apologetic work, *The Bible Record of Creation true for every Age*, and his character as a sound and accomplished Biblical student is maintained in this rich and river-like production. The grandeur of the revelation of God in Christ is exhibited, and the fine spirit and tone of the writing make one almost involuntarily ejaculate a response to the burden of the exposition. We very cordially commend this volume to the notice of all who in the contemplation of the grace and wisdom of God would have their feelings of adoration and gratitude heightened and intensified.

We welcome cordially a volume of Sermons (11) by Dr. Fürst of Strasburg. There are twenty-six very excellent practical discourses in this volume.

(10) *The Great Memorial Name; or, the Self-Revelation of Jehovah as the God of Redemption.* By P. W. Grant. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1883.

(11) *Christ the Way, and other Sermons.* By Rev. A. Fürst, D.D., Strasburg, Alsace. London: R. D. Dickinson.

The Household Library of Exposition (12), inaugurated by Messrs. Macniven & Wallace, is supplemented by the three volumes now before us—viz. *The Galilean Gospel*, by Alexander Balmain Bruce, D.D.; *The Lamb of God*, Expositions in the Writings of St. John, by W. Robertson Nicoll, M.A.; and *The Lord's Prayer*, by Charles Stanford, D.D.

In the good and sincere work of Dr. Bruce we have a striking illustration of the rebellion against conservatism in religion, and of the adoption of a form of religious radicalism, actually—shall we venture to say, unrecognised by our author?—changing sides. However Professor Bruce may protest against that conservatism, which goes only a little way back in the history of opinion,—say only to the Westminster Standards,—and whatever occasion he may give to Pharisees and Scribes and Sadducees to rejoice, we have faith enough in the foundation upon which Dr. Bruce stands in his expositions, as presented here, to see that his radicalism, so called, and so greatly misunderstood by many ecclesiastical opponents, is really the true conservatism. He would conserve the truth which is in Jesus, and he is rather careless about the truth, whether partial or perverted, as it appears in the opinions and discussions of the sects. We can fancy no better service done to the Church of Christ in these days than to seek with heart and soul its Christianisation, when so many are content to seek only its ecclesiasticism. Anything that brings back to the fountainhead the rationalising mind of man is to be welcomed. Professor Bruce does not believe that Christianity was polluted at or near its source, but rather far down the stream; and his great aim here is to lead man back to the fountainhead to drink of the pure wells of truth. The principles formulated and enunciated by Jesus, the doctrines taught and illustrated in many actions of the Man of Nazareth, are here relieved of the dust and cobwebs of the Fathers and the formularies, and are exhibited in their original light and beauty. True, Dr. Bruce is not particularly anxious to avoid misunderstandings or to seek favour from the Scribes and other traditionalists. Perhaps he sometimes rudely shocks them with his plain speaking, rather than disenchant them and wins them over to his way of thinking and looking at the lessons from the words and actions

of Jesus. But was not his Master usually in the same relation to His audience, and who will venture to affirm that He should have been more conciliatory? Half the battle, and not seldom the better half of the battle, is with those who magnify doctrine while they minimise the value of the life which, it may be, refuses to express itself in the stereotyped forms which are the holdfasts of a lifeless religion—a religion at best often quite selfish, and at least seldom outgoing in evangelistic efforts. This book of Professor Bruce we hail therefore as a real help towards the introduction of new life into religious minds, and although we might take exception to some of his views, yet we believe he is more orthodox at heart than either he or his opponents would admit. Let this volume circulate among the households of the land, let it fall into the hands of those who are turning away from the lifeless and dry discourses of such as are trying to meet the needs of the nineteenth century with only the provision and the manner of service of the sixteenth or the eighteenth, and we do not hesitate to hope and believe that both alike will say, "Here is a preacher indeed: this is what we want to hear and to read, and if all preachers so spoke to our necessities, and so expounded the words and illustrated the life of Jesus Christ, we would crowd the churches and seek a place among the religious. For then we would see the Christ of God in Jesus of Nazareth, and find in Him a Brother and a Saviour."

In *The Lamb of God*, Mr. Nicoll of Kelso has given us a book which will stand frequent reading, and upon the production of which he has spent much toil. The volume presents the Lamb of God in the various aspects of His character and work and relations which are met with in the writings of the apostle John. We miss, however, from the printed page the winning manner of the preacher, and as we believe half of Mr Nicoll's fame and power depends upon the sort of antique grace with which, though apparently a youth, he utters his discourses, we hardly think this volume will give a stranger a fair, and certainly nothing like a perfect, idea of his all-round capability.

Dr. Stanford's volume on *The Lord's Prayer* is another instalment of the *Household Library of Exposition*. We need only say that here we have one more proof of the perennial freshness and fruitfulness of the teachings of Jesus. The Prayer that teaches to pray has had many expounders. Keeping in

full view Maurice and Dr. Marcus Dods, who have given to the public excellent expositions of this sublime prayer, we regard Dr. Stanford's work as second to none in regard to compactness of thought and motives, and rich, illustrative, and powerful style. This book ought to win its way into many homes; we highly recommend it, and are confident that those who take our advice will often thank us for it.

Messrs. Clark's *Handbooks for Bible Classes* are multiplying. The two we mention below (13) are not the least worthy. Some who read the advertisement of the publishers of Principal Brown's book on Romans might be precluded from looking into the book by the idea that this was but a reprint of his former work on the same Epistle. This idea is a mistake. We have here a new book from the scholarly and able pen of the learned Principal. The older commentary was and is highly prized, and we are sure that the more recent will meet with even greater favour.

Mr. Macpherson has already established his reputation as an ecclesiastical writer by his former handbook on the *Confession of Faith*. In this little volume on Presbyterianism, the same grasp, range, and lucidity are apparent. All who wish a full and clear and fair statement of this form of church-government will find here what they want, while for the drill of class-work it is admirably suited.

Very much is being done to set before young aspirants to the ministry the nature of the work that lies before them and of consequence the qualifications that are necessary to carry on that work with success. Lectures have been delivered frequently of late years within the Universities of Scotland to the theological students of the Established Church, by clergymen appointed to that duty by the General Assembly. These lectures are being published by Messrs. Blackwood & Sons, and we would take this opportunity of saying that the volumes, as they come from the publishers, are beautifully printed and altogether got up in excellent fashion. But we cannot always extend the compliment to the contents of the books. It is a fair question whether the end of the lectures is not served in

(13) *Romans*, by Rev. Principal David Brown, Aberdeen; *Presbyterianism*, by Rev. John Macpherson, M.A., Findhorn.

the oral delivery. If, however, the students who hear them have the series presented to them in print, it will at any rate keep the kindly manner of the lecturer in mind, and may often furnish the mind through the eye, if at some distance, with a reminder of some of the wise and weighty counsels so paternally and in good faith offered, as well as provided, by the Assembly. In this light we think the publication of all the lectures may be justifiable, though we cannot help thinking that there are standard works on the duties of the Pastor already in existence, and which can hardly be excelled. In the book now before us (14) there is a well-arranged division of the subject in hand, a good deal of common sense, and many practical hints as to the attitude a young minister should maintain towards his life-work and his surroundings.

The third volume of the *Clerical Library* is entitled *Pulpit Prayers* (15). The value of this book will depend upon the standpoint of the man who prays. He may read one or more of those ready-made prayers for his own benefit, or he may use them as a mere form in the pulpit, but we fancy the best help to public prayer in the congregation is to know the needs of the people and one's own needs. There are many, we believe, who will welcome this book as a real help, and it would not perhaps become us to say anything that would tend to the withholding of such benefit.

Mr. Dickinson does not weary in his specialty of reproducing in this country some of the better class of the religious books of America. He has just issued a volume of Sermons by Dr. Richard Newton on *Covenant Names and Privileges* (16). The name of the author is enough, we should imagine, in this case, to command a large circulation, while the practical discussion on the favourite names Jehovah-Jireh, Jehovah-Nissi.

(14) *The Life-Education and Wider Culture of the Christian Ministry: its Sources, Methods, and Aims.* Being Lectures delivered at the Universities of Aberdeen, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and St. Andrews, by James Stuart Wilson, M.A., Minister of New Abbey. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1882.

(15) *Pulpit Prayers*, by Eminent Preachers. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

(16) *Covenant Names and Privileges.* By Rev. Richard Newton, D.D., author of "The King's Highway," etc. London: R. D. Dickinson, 1883.

etc. etc., are certain to interest young and old. Christian privileges are here illustrated with the author's usual graphic power.

A marvellous little commentary on the *Gospel of St. Mark* (17), at the marvellous price of fourpence, has been produced by Professor Lindsay. Besides expounding the whole Gospel, it is illustrated with two maps. No Bible-class need now be without a text-book on this subject, and all who take up this one will acknowledge the benefit to themselves as well as the striking ability of the author. We will long for the larger text-book on the same Gospel promised by the Professor.

Surely it is true the busiest man has the most leisure. No preacher of the present day pretends to rival Mr. Spurgeon in good works, and no author may hope to outvie him in the fertility of his pen. It almost looks as if his fingers could not be idle, and when, perforce, he is compelled to yield his fingertips to the rack, he takes care that a substitute will be found elsewhere. He too can say, "My tongue is the pen of a ready writer." Even when he retires to the restoring sunlight and beauties and perfumes of Mentone, he will not idly enjoy the rest of change of scene; rather, he actively enjoys it, and, with willing glad mind and brain, finds his rest and delight in ministering to the pleasures and good of others. Witness his recent volume of *Illustrations* (18). In this most interesting compilation of beautiful flowers from Dr. Manton, and the suggested meditations thereupon by himself, Mr. Spurgeon is always fortunate and fruitful. Many preachers and private persons will delight to walk in his company through this garden, which is so select and well-arranged and fragrant.

If Mr. Spurgeon always takes us out into the open air, and gladdens us with the freshness of nature, Dr. Macduff throws us back into the region of sorrow in his *Early Graves* (19).

(17) *The Gospel of St. Mark*. By T. M. Lindsay, D.D. Glasgow: Blackie & Son.

(18) *Illustrations and Meditations; or, Flowers from a Puritan's Garden*, Distilled and Dispensed by C. H. Spurgeon. London: Passmore & Alabaster, 1883.

(19) *Early Graves, a Book for the Bereaved*. By J. R. Macduff, D.D. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1883.

This artistic volume is very creditable to the Messrs. Nisbet, and its very beauty will help to dispel the gloom which naturally envelops the sorrowful heart. If the fertile author carries us down into the depths, he does not leave us there, but, with much consideration and thoughtful love, seeks to light up the eyes and the heart to regions of hope and joy.

We welcome the refreshment and the shade of *Wells of Water* (20). Mrs. Simpson, a name-granddaughter of Mrs. Stewart Sandeman of Springland and Bonskeid, has inherited much of the latter's love of nature and grace combined. *Wells of Water* is a prose poem, or rather, every chapter is a poem. The elliptical style tells of the rich spirituality and capacity of the gifted authoress.

Rev. Jackson Wray has in a little volume given excellent practical thoughts on the Parable of the Vine (21). Mr. Wray is a lucid, interesting, and suggestive writer.

The *Christian Visitor's Handbook*, by Rev. Charles Neil, M.A., Poplar (22), is a useful book for district-visiting as conducted by the Church of England. *Holy Footprints*, by the Rev. Frederick Whitfield, M.A., Hastings (23), is a call to decision and faithfulness in the Christian life. *Follow the Leader, and other Papers*, by the Rev. George Everard, M.A. (24), is another useful volume. Mr. Everard's recent works have met with much deserved favour, and we trust these counsels on the Christian life may be willingly circulated and taken.

We hardly know what to make of *The Knell of Time*, by the author of "Life and Truth" (24). It is a volume of poetical effusions, mainly on Scripture topics, but it begins before Genesis and goes further than Revelation. We fancy it is intended to be a drama of Time, but time is evidently not long enough for the study.

(20) *Wells of Water*. By Margaret Stewart Simpson. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1883.

(21) *A Noble Vine; or, Practical Thoughts on our Lord's last Parable*. By J. Jackson Wray. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1882.

(22) London: James Nisbet & Co., 1882.

(23) London: James Nisbet & Co.

(24) London: James Nisbet & Co.

Everything we hear or read, of Archbishop Tait only increases our admiration of the man. *A Sketch of his Public Life* (25) is now within the reach of all, and is well worthy of the study of young and old.

The Messrs. Nelson are famed all the world over for the beauty of the volumes published by them. We have in Stalker's *New Song* (26) an excellent specimen of their solid work, which will enhance the volume to the young. These sermons are bright and practical, and as delivered would probably be telling; however, we are inclined to think Mr. Stalker has made a fable of the Parable of the Ten Virgins, in his great zeal to endow the young ladies (!) with life and character. Shall we venture in this paper to give an illustration or two of what we affirm? Take one of the wise and one of the foolish. "One of them was the shyest girl in the whole village. When she was going along the streets, she used to walk swiftly with her eyes on the ground, and if any one spoke to her it made her blush and get confused. . . . Her name was Humility." Then here is Vanity's sister, Envy: "Her sister was not a good-looking girl. Her face was thin and sallow, and her shoulders were high." And so on the everyday girls are pictured, and the good and bad girls of the period are supposed to be the representatives of the wise and foolish virgins. This sermon is most entertaining, but we are not so sure of its power to edify or even educate the young. The boys of the period would also enjoy it. It would not be fair, however, to say that all the sermons are of this character: the greater number are very excellent specimens of the mode most likely to interest and instruct young people. The danger that lies near all such efforts is in adopting one style of address in the pulpit to the young and another to the old. The difficulty is how to speak God's message that old and young alike may profit, and the solution of the problem lies in "going forth in the footsteps of the flock, and feeding the kids beside the shepherds' tents."

(25) *Archibald Campbell Tait: a Sketch of the Public Life of the late Archbishop of Canterbury.* By A. C. Bickley. London: James Nisbet & Co.

(26) *The New Song, and other Sermons for the Children's Home.* By the Rev. James Stalker, M.A. Thomas Nelson & Sons, Edinburgh, London, and New York.

From the Religious Tract Society we have received *Present-Day Tracts on Subjects of Christian Evidence, Doctrine, and Miracle*, by various writers, vol. i. The Tract Society purpose to issue one volume half-yearly, and this is the first of the series containing the first six numbers. The writers are Principal Cairns, who contributes three; Prebendary Row, two; and Professor Blaikie, one. The object of these papers is the maintenance and defence of Christianity, and the arguments adduced are well put and seasonable. The lectures are admirably edited.

From the same Society we have also received *The Laws and Polity of the Jews*, by E. W. Edersheim,—a very concise statement of the polity, and an excellent synopsis and exposition of the laws, domestic and moral, of Israel.

A beautiful volume, which may also be called a memorial volume, likewise published by this Society, is *Parables of the Spring: or the Resurrection and the Life*, by Professor Gausson of Geneva. A brief memoir of the late lamented author is given. The sweet tone of the book is sure to soothe and comfort mourners and strengthen believers.

The war in Egypt has given a great impetus to the interest of the English-speaking race in that ancient country. Many secular volumes have seen the light during the last year or two. But no volume which overlooks the connection of Egypt with Scriptural history can survive ephemeral fame. We have before us now a very fresh and interesting record of a visit to Egypt, Palestine, and Phœnicia, by a Frenchman, M. Felix Bovet (27). The style is charming, and the record of observations is full and minute.

The present age is not wholly engrossed with itself. We have many evidences of this. Nor is it simply utilitarian in its tendencies or in its actions. The past is loved and studied for its own sake. Certainly no one dreams of coining this gold dust into currency. The archæological world is greatly indebted to Dr. Anderson for his studies, theories, and

(27) *Egypt, Palestine, and Phœnicia: A Visit to Sacred Lands*. By Felix Bovet. Translated by W. H. Lyttelton, M.A., with a Biographical Sketch of the author by Prof. F. Godet, D.D. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1882.

researches in relation to Scotland in very ancient times. In the Rhind Lectures for 1881 (28) we have a sequel to his *Scotland in Early Christian Times*. Perhaps the use of the word "sequel" may be misunderstood, but if we remember that the advance is not into the future but into the past, we will agree to leave behind with our author for a time all that is Christian, and examine the remote Pagan life of Scotland. He maintains that "the whole extent of the Pagan period" is "resolvable into three great divisions, characterised as the Ages of Iron, of Bronze, and of Stone." The present lectures do not overtake the whole three ages, but are devoted to the investigation of the remains of the Iron Age only, the other two being left to be dealt with in the succeeding series of lectures. There are six lectures in all:—1. Christian and Pagan Burial, Viking Burials; 2. Northern Burials and Hoards; 3. The Celtic Art of the Pagan Period; 4. The Architecture of the Brochs; 5. The Brochs and their Contents; 6. Lake-dwellings, Hill-forts, and Earth-houses. The book is full of illustrations and figures, and is altogether a most interesting study.

We would also notice here a small *brochure* entitled *Historical Sketches of Scone* (29), which gives in a small compass the history of the Abbey, Palace, Coronation-Stone, and villages of Scone. The book does credit to its amateur author and to the local publishers. It will be of value and interest to tourists and others.

The next book that comes to hand is also full of Scotland, but it is written, or, we should say, compiled and arranged by an Englishman. The Rev. Paxton Hood has long been known to the literary world, and in his most recent work, *Scottish Characteristics* (30), he gathers up many of the jokes and humorous stories that are scattered here and there in Scottish

(28) *Scotland in Pagan Times—The Iron Age*. By Joseph Anderson, LL.D., Keeper of the National Museum of the Antiquaries of Scotland. Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1883.

(29) *Historical Sketches of Scone*. By J. D. Urquhart. Perth: John Bruce. Edinburgh: Menzies & Co., 1883.

(30) *Scottish Characteristics*. By Paxton Hood. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

literature. He does not profess to have searched after original material. As a consequence, there is an absence of freshness, but there is still the old flavour which is always welcome. In one or two instances, however, the point of the story is lost—at least to a Scot—probably through a variation in the reading or rendering. But this is a small matter in the presence of such general excellence. Any one who takes up this book will not find it dull, and he will also find that there is a good deal of wisdom in oatmeal philosophy, and both wit and humour in the composition of a Scotchman.

Eastern tales have always had a fascination for many who are not young. *The Epic of Kings* (31) is an attempt by a lady to popularise the tales that are to be found in the work of the Persian poet Firdusi. We have not presented to us a direct translation, but a well-executed re-setting from the French translation of Mohl of the interesting and characteristic stories of this poet.

A memoir of *Sir Charles Reed*, by his son, Charles E. B. Reed, M.A. (32) is not merely a tribute of affection; it is rich in details of his active work, and, among other labours, his efforts in connection with the London Post-Office and School Board, of which latter he was Chairman. Accordingly there are many guiding hints in the life of such a man, and these appear in this volume luminously set forth.

Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton have published a *History of the Jews in Rome*, B.C. 160 to A.D. 604, by Miss E. H. Hudson, which was written with the hope that it might be used for family reading. While not in the least imagining that this volume will take high rank, we are confident it will be found useful and interesting.

The same publishers have sent us *Moravian Missions, Twelve Lectures*, by Augustus C. Thomson, D.D. These lectures were delivered at the Theological Seminary, Andover, and again at Boston University. The study of these Missions is calculated

(31) *The Epic of Kings*. Stories retold from Firdusi, by Helen Zimmern, with two Etchings by L. Alma Tadema, R.A., and a Prefatory Poem by Edmund W. Gorse. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1883.

(32) London: Macmillan & Co., 1883.

o give a strong impulse to the missionary spirit. "So fully is the duty of evangelising the heathen lodged in their inmost thought, that the fact of any one's entering personally upon that work never creates any surprise; it falls in with acknowledged obligation and general expectation, for no one is ever urged to undertake the foreign service, nor is urgency ever required." We would hope that within our own circle the able article on Moravian Missions which appeared in our last number awakened interest afresh, and we can cordially recommend this volume as fitted to satisfy that interest and give new reasons for gratitude to God in raising up such an apostolic Church.

One of the most interesting and stimulating books on Missions we have lately seen is an American reprint, or, we should rather say, reproduction, as it is "printed from plates by special arrangement with the American publishers." *The Life of Adoniram Judson, D.D.* (33), is a remarkably clear and well-constructed biography of this noble missionary, whose epitaph in the Boston Baptist meeting-house contains these words: "Maldon, His birthplace. The Ocean, His sepulchre. Converted Burmans and the Burman Bible, His monument. His Record is on High." One of the gems of this volume is the letter which Dr. Judson sent to Mrs. Boardman on the death of her husband. It will be found at p. 374. Out of the depths, as well as from the heights, he brings support and consolation to the bereaved widow.

If in the case of books on Missions the demand regulates the supply, we would congratulate the age on its revival of missionary spirit. But as we are not quite sure of this, and as many literary flowers are born "to waste their fragrance on the dusty shelves, we suspend our judgment in the meantime. We hope for the best, however, and in the case of *Modern Missions and Culture* (34) we trust the discriminating public will agree with us in homologating the opinion of the translator,

(33) *Adoniram Judson, D.D.: his Life and Labours.* By his Son, Edward Judson. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

(34) *Modern Missions and Culture: their Mutual Relations.* By Gustav Varneck, Pastor at Rothenachirnbach, near Eisleben. Translated from the German by Thomas Smith, D.D., Professor of Evangelistic Theology, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: James Gemmel, 1883.

that here we have an able and valuable discussion of the question of the relation of Missions to culture. Dr. Smith in his preface controverts the position of Dr. Warneck, and vindicates with all his might the system of Dr. Duff, but we confess to a feeling of surprise that even great theologians and Bible students should fail to see that the controversy is not as between cultured and evangelistic methods, as such and in opposition, but as to the relation of the one to the other. Does not the Scriptural method seem to be that the cultural comes not before—never before, but always after—the evangelistic? Teaching and preaching go together, say our modern apostles, but they do not imagine the fallacy that lies in the going together. While they go together, the one goes before the other—does it not? the preaching before the teaching—otherwise do we not build without a foundation? do we not present something only to the blind? do we not try to feed the dead?

There are, here and there, in the quiet parishes of Scotland many eminent scholars who are for the most part contented with their lot. They have chosen the service of the Christian ministry, and they work among the people with devotedness and self-denial. Among these is the excellent Hebraist, John Gemmel, D.D., minister of the Free Church of Scotland at Fairlie, a beautiful watering-place on the Firth of Clyde. Dr. Gemmel has written a poem on the *Atonement* (35), which, not merely in well-constructed lines, expounds the doctrine, but enforces and illustrates it by examples of its power over men's hearts. This little book will be very useful, and we bespeak for it a large circulation. Indeed, where there is a prejudice against the formal manuals of theology, or dogmatic treatises on this cardinal doctrine, we know of nothing better to recommend than this rich and harmonious poem.

In the circumstances of the present dissatisfaction, on the part of some, with the Standards of the Church, and their relation to the admission to office within the Church, we cannot have too much light thrown upon the history and acts of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. The Baird Lecturer in Scot-

(35) *The Atonement: a Poem in Two Parts.* By John Gemmel, D.D. Glasgow: Dunn & Wright, 1883.

land for 1882 chose this subject, as he was somewhat familiar with it from previous study, and the result is the volume noted below (36). Dr. Mitchell writes in full sympathy with the Puritan theology and the Presbyterian order, while catholic and generous in his tone.

The third series of Lectures delivered in St. Giles' Cathedral, Edinburgh (37), is of variable value. Knox, Melville, Rutherford, Leighton, Erskine, Robertson (Principal), Irving, Chalmers, Robertson (Dr. James), Ewing, Lee, Macleod :—of all these, we would especially instance two or three. *Leighton*, by Principal Tulloch, is an excellent study, and might almost lead one to believe that many of Dr. Tulloch's own opinions, especially in the matter of Church order, have been moulded after the cast of Leighton. *Thomas Chalmers*, by Donald Macleod, D.D., editor of *Good Words*, is a glowing and noble tribute to the worth and power and prescience of that great man. Dr. Macleod does not lose by his generous reference to Chalmers as the leader and Chancellor of the Exodus of 1843. The Churches in Scotland would be nearer each other, and perhaps nearer to the consummation of an external, as well as a real union, were all the clergy to write of others who differ from them as the Queen's Chaplain does. The only other we would mark for special reading is *Norman Macleod*, by Professor Flint. The large and intense heart of the first editor of *Good Words* is here lovingly exhibited, and his many works follow with due appreciation. Norman Macleod, if any man ever did, knew how to open the purses and empty the pockets in behalf of a worthy cause. It is no secret that the evident apathy and poor responses given to his earnest pleading in behalf of Indian Missions broke his heart, and sent him to a premature grave. The marvellous sympathy of the man, and its power over himself, and consequent power over others, is well illustrated by the simple appeal that once fell from his lips in Hope Street Church, Glasgow, when he concluded a most

(36) *The Westminster Assembly: its History and Standards*. Being the Baird Lecture for 1882. By Alexander F. Mitchell, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1883.

(37) *Scottish Divines, 1505—1872*. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace, 1883.

touching statement of the needs of destitute Highlanders in that city, by the irresistible and passionate enforcement, "For God's sake, give!"

Alongside the previous lectures there runs another series from a rather higher though parallel line (38). Several of the studies in this series are the same as in the above, but the great aim in this volume is to trace the history of evangelical principle as it unfolds itself in the life and times of the most outstanding divines of the ages. Here we have papers on Calvin, Knox, Henderson, Rutherford, Leighton, Baxter, Zinzendorf. We have been specially delighted with the studies of Calvin and Rutherford.

It is not often we take up a memorial volume, written by one so near the departed as to be within the central circle of home, which possesses the rare tact and discrimination we find in Mrs. Main's tribute to her husband's worth (39). Twenty-two sermons are added to the memoir of his life.

The Dean of Westminster has published the three lectures delivered in Edinburgh during November 1882 (40) on recollections of his predecessor. Many of those who heard these appreciative lectures will be glad to have them in permanent form, and many south of the Tweed will enjoy this loving tribute to a friend.

Natural Law in the Spiritual World. By Rev. HENRY DRUMMOND. F.R.S.E., F.G.S. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1883.

One of the principal lessons which modern science has taught us is the lesson of continuity; that a law of continuity pervades and embraces the whole physical universe. There are no gaps, no abrupt transitions, no sudden leaps anywhere. In

(38) *The Evangelical Succession.* A Course of Lectures delivered in St. George's Free Church, Edinburgh, 1882-83. Second Series. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace, 1883.

(39) *Memorials of the Life and Ministry of Thomas Main, D.D.* By his Widow. Edinburgh: Macniven & Wallace, 1883.

(40) *Recollections of Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, late Dean of Westminster.* By George Granville Bradley, D.D., Dean of Westminster. London: John Murray, 1883.

our own world we find that the forces of nature are all interchangeable in quantity and quality. The forms of nature cannot be separated from each other. There are no distinct lines of demarcation between the three kingdoms. The highest fixed forms of certain species correspond with different stages of development of other species still higher in the scale; and the highest of all mount to their perfection by the successive steps of a ladder of transitionary forms that constitute distinct species outside. The heart and brain of man himself pass through the successive types of the brain and heart of the fish, the reptile, the bird, and the mammal, before they assume the sublime character of the human organs. In geology the old ideas of convulsion and revolution causing sudden and startling effects on a grand scale have been abandoned in favour of uniformitarianism—of a theory of slow gradual development of the earth's crust by forces and modes of operation similar to those which exist at present. And when we ascend beyond our own earth to other worlds we have indubitable evidence of the same law of continuity. Astronomical science is showing to us more and more every day that the substances of the stars are identical with those of our own globe. That wonderful instrument the spectroscope has not yet discovered, in the remotest stellar ray subjected to its scrutiny, a single new or unknown element. This law of continuity is the grand theme of Mr. Drummond's book. He traces this law from the physical to the spiritual world, and shows that as the Creator has bound together in a bond of correlation the forms and forces of the visible universe, it is most reasonable to conclude that a similar correlation extends to the forces and principles of that part of God's government which, though not seen, is revealed. He gives us an interesting account of how he was led by his practical work in conducting a mission station to apply the lessons of science to the teachings of the Bible, and thus establish a profound harmony between them. In this respect we are inclined to think that he acted in a wiser way than the great Faraday, who dissociated his science from his religion, and did not allow the one sphere to touch, let alone coalesce with, the other. Such a course, on the part of Faraday, was highly commended at the time by scientific men. But though no harm was done in his case, owing to the depth of his piety

and the simplicity of his nature, in most cases both departments of study would suffer considerable injury by such a procedure. For one thing, such an unnatural divorce would foster the idea that there is a duality of operation in the universe. Science, apart from religion, becomes truncated, and loses its crown of perfection; and religion, apart from science, is like a rock in the air, an island in space, without any base, any relation to its surroundings. Science is thus apt to become material, and theology is apt to be regarded as a separate isolated province of human knowledge and experience, as a stereotyped, unprogressive study, having but a small and unimportant share in the interests and activities of the times. Mr Drummond has found out a more excellent way, and in this book of his particularly has done much to give theology its proper position as the queen of the sciences, as the highest generalisation, connecting all the truths of the other sciences with the revelation of Him for whom, and to whom, and by whom are all things.

The Rev. Mr. Pritchard in his Hulsean Lectures upon the "Analysis in the Progress of Nature and Grace"—delivered in 1867—was among the first to break up the fallow ground of this new field of study. Mr. Drummond has dug deeper into, and carried the same method of research over, a wider area, and the conclusions at which he has arrived are extremely interesting and important. The wonderful investigations of modern science have been made by him subservient as indirect evidences of the Christian faith. He has demonstrated in the most admirable manner that the principles of Revealed Religion are based upon the laws of the natural world, and the same methods of operation are common to both. The latest conclusions of science are made in his hands to harmonise in the most striking manner with the earliest truths of Revelation. The guns of the enemy have been pointed at themselves; and the truth of the Bible is made more solemn and convincing by being shown to be, not the truth of a book merely, but the truth of the universe.

Mr. Drummond's volume is exceedingly valuable from an apologetic point of view. It is a great advance upon former works of Natural Theology of the Paley school. One of its special recommendations is the intensely practical way in

which the lessons of science are applied to the conduct of life ; while its elucidation of general principles is all that could be desired. The introduction gives an historical account of the growth of the idea of law, and its gradual extension throughout every department of knowledge—with the exception of religion—shows why this exception was made, and proves the value of analogies of law as well as of analogies of phenomena, meeting the scientific demand of the age,—introducing greater practical clearness into religion, and resting religion, not upon authority merely, but also upon nature. It then traces the application of the law of continuity throughout the spiritual and natural worlds. We would specially recommend this Introduction for its deep thoughtfulness and suggestiveness. In the body of the work he embodies separate essays on Biogenesis, Degeneration, Growth, Death, Mortification, Eternal Life, Environment, Conformity to Type, Parasitism, and Classification, all dealing with the wonderful generalisations of science in connection with the still more wonderful generalisations of grace. In these essays new and vivid light is shed upon truths of Scripture that through familiarity have become commonplace ; and the doctrines of revelation are brought home to the conscience and the intellect with additional force by the confirmations of science. No quotations can give an adequate idea of a work like this, where the reasoning is so concise and so well sustained throughout. The book must be carefully read through, with frequent pauses for reflection upon the new and striking ideas it calls forth, in order to do justice to it. And no one who has perused it in this manner, but must feel under a great debt of obligation to Mr. Drummond for his most valuable addition to the stock of the Christian Evidences. The style is clear, forcible, and compact, and is admirably expressive of the fresh thought with which the book abounds. We are sure that it will be much appreciated everywhere, and we expect to see it ere long pass through many editions.

We are glad to find that the English translation of Naville's *Study of Modern Atheism* (41) has reached a second edition.

(41) *Modern Atheism ; or, The Heavenly Father.* By Ernest Naville. London : James Nisbet & Co.

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There are few books on the subject more clear and cogent in argument, and we do not know another so eloquent and rousing in appeal.

A second series of *Sermons for Boys and Girls* (42), reprinted from American sources, will be welcomed by all who are conscientiously seeking to make the Gospel interesting to children. We have examined the *matériel* provided in this volume, and have found it well fitted both for instruction and for winning the attention of the young.

When an author follows Herbert Spencer in Philosophy, and Charles Finney in Theology, his book is likely at least to contain some curious statements, and to reach peculiar if not valuable results. Mr. Smyth, in writing upon Divine Government, accepts Evolution as a scientific doctrine, and contends strenuously for the most extreme doctrine of human liberty of action (43). His earnestness we respect, but we cannot say that he has added aught worth preserving to the stock of our information.

Principal Fairbairn, who has already arrested the attention of his contemporaries by the freshness of his style and the vigour of his thought, can always command an audience. In the discourses before us (44) we are charmed by the fitness of expression, while we are instructed by the fulness of information. There are some indications of an historical theory with which we have no sympathy; but on the whole, both in matter and method, this volume is entitled to the highest commendation. It ranges over a wide and interesting field embracing such subjects as Faith and Modern Thought; Theism and Science; Man and Religion; God and Israel; The Problem of Job, etc.

Probably the new volume of Hefele's *History of the Councils*

(42) *Sermons for Boys and Girls*. Second Series. By Eminent American Preachers. London: R. D. Dickinson.

(43) *The Government of God, embracing Agnosticism, Evolution, and Christianity*. By William Woods Smyth. London: Elliot Stock.

(44) *The City of God: a Series of Discussions in Religion*. By A. M. Fairbairn, D.D., Principal of Airedale College. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

of the Church will prove the most interesting yet published (45). It covers the period from A.D. 431 to A.D. 451, and throws fullest light on the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies. No one who seeks to know the action of the Church in the formation of a Christian creed, in one of its most fundamental articles, can afford to leave this volume unstudied. It is marked by great candour, wide research, and exact investigation.

The number of Handbooks on special subjects is legion, and on the whole we do not seek to limit their publication or their circulation. But it is somewhat vexatious, at times, to have to search for a small thin book amidst the mass of such that lie everywhere in our study. If we could only get, we used to think with weary longing, the old-worldly and wordy volumes of other days reduced to a quintessence, we should be happy indeed. But alas for the vanity of human wishes, and their incapacity to fulfil our expectation! Nay, it seems as if we were to be laughed at by a mocking demon who has the tantalising vice of Tartarus. For no sooner are we congratulating ourselves upon changes for the better in the issue of small handy volumes than they come upon us like a shower of hail-stones, and we are inclined to long for the old thick volumes. Still we wish (for we are always wishing) to get our instruction condensed and compacted together, so that, without much trouble, we may gather knowledge and verify recollections.

This has been often attempted in recent years, and we congratulate the Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh on the good instalment they have just issued of a really great, useful, and compact work. The two volumes now before us of Schaff's *Religious Encyclopædia* (46) are marvels of constructive and condensed toil. This Encyclopædia is no mere reproduction of Herzog's very voluminous work. Dr. Schaff has extracted what is best in Herzog—making free, and we might say arbitrary, use of the material provided therein; we must add

(45) *A History of the Councils of the Church, from the Original Documents.* By the Rev. C. J. Hefele, D.D., Bishop of Rottenburg. Vol. iii. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

(46) *A Religious Encyclopædia; or Dictionary of Biblical, Historical, Doctrinal, and Practical Theology.* Based on the Real-Encyklopädie of Herzog, Plitt, and Hauck. Edited by Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D.; Associate-Editors—Rev. Samuel M. Jackson, M.A., and Rev. D. S. Schaff. Vols. I. and II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1883.

also, that he has taken this liberty with the full leave and thorough approval of the generous author and publisher.

Of the advantage of this new work from the work-room of the New York Bible House we cannot speak too highly. Being the latest biblical and theological dictionary, it may well be supposed that in such competent hands it would be up to date, and of real merit; and having tested it in many places, we can conscientiously certify it to be almost all that could be desired in both these respects. Notices of living theologians are excluded, and for this allowance must be made; but take the work on its own plan, and very very few indeed will have reason to regret the purchase of this *standard* Encyclopædia. We emphatically adopt the adjective in speaking of these volumes, for we believe the work will live and remain as a standing monument of excellence, skill, and patient industry. We have noticed here and there a few *literal* slips on the part of the printer and the proof-reviser, as, *e.g.* when Hugh Miller is said to have "received a *band*-appointment at Cromarty;" but the wonder is that in such a work the mistakes are so rare.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1883.

ART. I.—*Proposed Substitutes for Christianity.*

IN his latest work Strauss propounded two questions: Are we still Christians? a question to which he returned a negative answer; and, Have we still a Religion? to which his reply was, after a fashion, affirmative. He claimed to speak on behalf of the cultivated laity of the European nations, and, as their self-constituted representative, repudiated all that is supernatural in religion, retaining, however, an intellectual respect and admiration for the cosmical order, an emotional interest in art, and a habitual effort after an improved morality—these together being deemed sufficient to replace abandoned Christianity.

More especially within the few years which have elapsed since Strauss's death, the possibility has been openly considered, by literary and scientific authorities, of breaking, not only with the Christian religion, but with everything which has hitherto been denominated religion in any sense. These are outspoken days; and the question is freely debated: Is it possible for "a man of his century," who accepts the conclusions of physical science and of historical criticism, any longer to remain a believer in the supernatural and Divine

origin of Christianity? And there are many who consider this question to have been long ago decided in the negative, and who put forward questions more fundamental still: Is it reasonable to believe in a Divine Originator of the universe? in a supernatural order and relations? in a spiritual realm? Have we any power of knowing what does not address itself to the senses? Are God, morality, the future life, anything more than illusions of the imagination? Is Religion anything more than a fast-perishing survival of other times, of other states of society, of other and antiquated habits of thought? And if Agnosticism is destined to be the philosophy of the future, is there any modification of religion which enlightened men may regard as tolerable, in some liberal and elastic form, if but as a transition from what was to what will be, and must be?

Now, it is not questioned that Christianity has been a mighty factor in the intellectual, social, and moral life of Europe throughout long centuries. No one, indeed, denies that it has been associated, in the character and life of many of its adherents and supporters, with very much that can only be reprehended and regretted; and many will admit that, as a religion, it has been largely and often overgrown by foreign and noxious growths. Still, Christianity itself commands no small measure of respect from many even of the most revolutionary, amongst those whose respect is worth having. It has a great past to appeal to. It claims to be a Revelation from God, and a Law for man. Its revelation is incomparable for sublimity; its law is incomparable for purity and for power. Its measureless influence over individuals, over social relations and usages, over national policy, has been exercised, with beneficial effect, through successive generations. It is fair to remember that Christianity, as a religion, must not be judged merely by the church or churches which have professed it. Just and discerning advocates contend that it must be discriminated from the merely human factors with which it has intermixed. As a religion, Christianity has been a restraint upon the passions of the great and powerful, and an influence to ameliorate the condition and redress the wrongs of humanity. It has been more than a guide and impulse to the active, the energetic, the heroic: it has been the support and consolation

of the feeble, the sorrowful, the hopeless, the martyred, the dying.

By candid opponents all this must be admitted. Still, notwithstanding all this, allowing all this,—if Christianity be not *true*, it must and will be abandoned. Nothing will save it except the verification of its claims. These must, no doubt, be decided upon grounds of free inquiry. We have no fear of the result, when science, criticism, and philosophy have fully done their work.

Meanwhile, it is permissible, it is almost necessary, to ask : What is the alternative if Christianity be rejected? Will any system, or doctrine, or law, or fellowship, take its place? If there are formidable rivals, where and what are they? What do they promise to do for man? Are they likely to perform the promises they give? Supposing that they are, will any compensation be afforded for all that we are expected and required to renounce? In a word, *What are the proposed substitutes for Christianity?*

Let us, for the sake of argument, grant that we, or our children, constrained by the irresistible logic of science, of criticism, of events, must needs abandon the religion of our fathers. Let us assume, for the moment, that the inevitable destiny of Christianity is to disappear; that, as some of "the cultivated" have already quitted the camp, the whole host of them will sooner or later prove deserters. Suppose that, whether or not the old name continues venerable, all that is specially and distinctively Christian comes to be regarded as effete, incredible superstition. This is indeed a difficult and distressing supposition for us to make. Yet the possible future may and should be faced; and we are persuaded that the endeavour will be helpful to the Christian thinker, and indirectly confirmative of his faith. The very interesting inquiry emerges: Is any belief or spiritual power prepared to take the place supposed to be vacated? to ascend the throne of the human heart? to become the guide, legislator, inspirer, of the more developed race? If our sun is soon to set for ever, what sun is about to climb the eastern sky?

The grounds of dissatisfaction with Christianity, on the part of many who claim to represent and embody modern thinking

are clear and simple. There are grounds of a very fundamental character common to all opponents of religion as religion. The views taken both of man and of God, by materialists and atheists, are such as to exclude all conceptions of human nature as spiritual and immortal, all convictions of a supersensual system, all confidence in a Ruler distinguished by wisdom and other attributes of personality. It is undeniable that the tendency of the popular unbelief of our times is towards the rejection of what may be called the essentials of all religion. Agnosticism and Atheism are practically one.

The *radical* opponents of religion are antagonists of human accountability,—in any moral sense of that word. Civilised man is indeed subject to the laws of society, and mankind is necessarily confined within the rigid boundaries of natural law. But these limitations are by no means the same as the amenability of man to the restraints of Divine government,—as moral responsibility. It is on this ground that well-wishers to humanity, even when not themselves of distinctively spiritual habits, view with alarm the possibility of the disappearance of religious faith; hitherto, at all events, such faith has been an important element in the constitution and order of human society. But the self-denying morality of the Christian faith is meaningless to the repudiator of the spiritual nature of man.

On the other hand, there are opponents of Christianity who are sincere, and even passionate supporters of Religion. In their view, the true dignity of man lies in his spiritual, and probably immortal nature, their great hope for the future is the extension of the higher and nobler view of human nature amongst all classes and all nations. And to such the idea of God is as precious and as sacred as it is to the Christian. Nay, the very distinguishing language of Christianity is common property to them: God is the moral Ruler, the heavenly Father, and His presence and fellowship are to them the sacred meaning of the spiritual life.

Yet many of these high-toned Theists are utterly opposed to much that has been, and is, generally cherished by Christians as part and parcel of their system. In their view, miracles are incredible, and any evidence on their behalf is unworthy even of consideration. Prophecy, as prediction of future events, is an impossibility. Special Revelation was a fable of

earlier, more susceptible, and less critical times. And, of course, in their view, Christ was a human teacher merely, though peerless in moral excellence and in spiritual wisdom. Accordingly, the doctrines which have been so prominently held in the Church from the early ages, are repudiated: the Trinity, Redemption, Renewal, etc., are accretions, fictitious accretions, to be removed from the simple "religion of Jesus"!

It has been, and is, contended, by students of human nature and human history, that man must and will have a religion. The more philosophical among our opponents recognise this fact. Whereas the ignorant and brutal among the infidels treat religion with scorn and ridicule, as the offspring of superstition, or as the device of priesthoods, the well-informed and thoughtful acknowledge that human nature and human history agree in supporting the very general conviction that, by the necessity of his nature, man is, and will be, and ought to be, religious. Philosophy analyses the constituents of our nature, and finds there what has been termed a religious consciousness, or impulse, or tendency. History, under the guidance of the light which has dawned upon our own century, investigates humanity in its wonderful diversity, and finds in it a still more wonderful unity. The science of comparative religion is almost as developed and as authoritative as the science of comparative grammar. The study of the individual, combined with the study of the race, has conduced to the conviction that man irreligious is man maimed, mutilated, undeveloped, abnormal, monstrous. Endeavours have indeed been made to represent certain debased tribes of savages as destitute of rudimentary religious ideas and observances, but these endeavours have been unsuccessful in proportion to the thoroughness of ethnological investigation. And it is certain that, in many instances, the higher we ascend the stream of time, the less is what is called natural religion corrupted by superstitious beliefs and practices.

But then our age, given above all things to revert to first principles, asks, What is religion? Have we not mistaken some accident of religion for its substance? May we not hold fast by the importance and necessity of religion; and yet, by rejecting what is proved to be immaterial, retain all that is valuable? Whether we are still to call ourselves Christians,

and to refuse to break with old habits and associations, or are to make an altogether new beginning from foundations hitherto unrecognised,—in any case, we are still to be religious men. Whether the name be rejected or retained, Christianity, as a distinctive doctrine, is to be outgrown, and some substitute of human invention is to take its place.

When a great change is imminent in human affairs, there may usually be discerned in the intellectual or social atmosphere some intimations and forebodings of the approaching change. Look, for instance, at the vast change which has been, now for almost a century, proceeding in Europe, affecting the political rights and social privileges of the people at large. Who can doubt that the monopolies, the class legislation, the inequality, the oppression, which have largely characterised the past, are disappearing, and are destined in the not-distant future to be replaced by an amelioration of the lot of the multitude, and by the extension of equal rights to men of all classes? He who should doubt this would prove his want of political insight and sagacity. Details we cannot predict; but we can foresee which principles will triumph in the new social order.

Is not the same the case with regard to religion? Is there no evidence as to what is to be the religion, if any, of the coming generations? Just as absolute monarchy and oligarchy are certain to disappear before the progress of the democratic movement, just so shall we say that Christianity must fade away, and that another religion, in succession to Christianity, will prevail among the leading races of mankind? What is that religion to be?

An attempt to answer this question will lead to a strange conclusion. The variety of the replies, and their utter inconsistency with one another, will not only bewilder the imagination; it will drive the intelligence back from the road which invites exploration, but rewards it with no defined and certain issue. If the inquirer is led to despondency, and to contentment with ignorance, the result of the inquiry will be an evil and not a gain. But if he comes to recognise the common unsatisfactoriness and the mutual destructiveness of the proposed theories, doctrines, systems, modes of cultus, etc., he may very properly ask himself whether he is upon the right track,

and whether, after all, it is reasonable to expect, and right to hope that Christianity will ever be superseded !

In classifying the proposed substitutes for Christianity, we are here dealing only with such as have been put forward in our own country, and have obtained some measure of recognition and support. In some cases the seed has been sown by foreign hands, and the harvest has been reaped here. Anything like an exhaustive enumeration and classification it would be absurd to attempt within the limits of this article ; we are content to take into consideration such "substitutes" as are proposed in ordinary English society and in current English literature.

Agnosticism is undeniably one of the great and fashionable doctrines of our day, and has its powerful advocates. Such philosophers as Mr. Herbert Spencer, and such critics as Mr. Matthew Arnold, naturally carry weight with the educated public. And accordingly many unbelievers in Christianity are content to talk of the infinite and unknowable Power which is behind all phenomena ; of the Power, or stream of tendency, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness ; as if these were more philosophical conceptions than the Christian's Deity. But as the philosophies in question have offered no practical substitute for religion, further notice of them does not seem called for here. The same may be said of Mr. J. S. Mill's position, viz. that the Being of God and the claims of Christianity are not established, and are supported only by an undefined measure of probability.

Furthest removed from Christianity among its assailants, who aspire to become its successors, is SECULARISM, or the system which would ignore all religion of every kind, and would substitute for it absorption in the interests of this earthly life, and devotion to all that can promote bodily pleasure and comfort, and consequently external social well-being.

There is an energetic section of the working class in this country, who have not merely forsaken Christianity, but who regard our religion and all that distinctively belongs to it with bitter hatred. Political and social grounds may be discerned beneath the form of infidelity which has for many years been known as Secularism. The indifference of the Anglican clergy

to Reform, the hostility of the upper classes generally to the introduction of Free-trade, the want of sympathy displayed by religious people towards the elevation of the labouring and artisan classes,—these have, with some justice, been put forward in explanation of the enmity to religious institutions and their supporters, which grew up in our large towns more than a generation ago, but which has certainly attracted more attention since the election of Mr. Bradlaugh as member of Parliament for Northampton. Many of the leading Chartists were atheists, and some of them suffered for their irreligion as well as for their violence. Lately, however, there have been no symptoms of desire to appeal to physical force, and in this sense it would be unjust to denominate the infidel party as revolutionary. The propaganda has been carried on chiefly in two ways: by public discussions, and by the circulation of very cheap literature, chiefly of a periodical kind.

There are two parties among the Secularists: a more moderate party, led by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, an honourable man and a fair controversialist, whose life has been devoted to the improvement of his order; and a more extreme party, led by the well-known Mr. C. Bradlaugh. A discussion has been carried on between these champions of the Secular theory, as to whether or not atheism is of its essence. Mr. Holyoake does not lay so much stress upon atheism as upon the diffusion of secular knowledge. To quote his own words:—

“Atheism really appears to me a little thing compared with the mightier knowledge and secular uses of the universe. As we can judge of the tenantableness, beauty, and excellence of a house without knowing of its ownership, so we can judge of the splendour and teachings of Nature, though special knowledge of its origin be not vouchsafed to us.”¹

What, according to this thoughtful writer, is to replace the laws, the motives, and the hopes of Christianity? It is certainly remarkable to find such a man content to limit human interest to this present life, to live with no thought of a Creator and Judge, with no conscious relation to a supramundane sphere of being! Yet that such is the case appears from such passages as the following, in which Mr. Holyoake exalts justice, mutual service, and natural science, into the position hitherto assigned to religion:—

¹ *The Trial of Theism*, Preface of 1877.

"I sum up the Logic of Life in four interdependent things, easy to remember, essential to practise, . . . namely, Freethought, Truth, Independence, Courtesy. . . . These are personal qualities that must underlie all manly character. . . . Of the connection of these views with the future life little need be said. He who lives a life of truth and service is always fitted to die. . . . It is delusive to pull down the altar of superstition, and not erect an altar of science in its place. To pack up the household gods of superstition and leave the fireside bare will hardly answer. Affirmative Atheism must teach that Nature is the Bible of truth, work is worship, that duty is dignity, and the unselfish service of others consolation."¹

The other school of English Secularists consists of more violently antagonistic and destructive minds. At the head of this is Mr. Bradlaugh, formerly known by the significant *nom-de-guerre*, "Iconoclast." These atheists are, like Milton's Moloch, for open war. They are engaged in a constant assault upon all that Christians hold sacred and dear. It is a distressing and nauseous task to read the profane, scurrilous, obscene, and slanderous publications, which are poured out from the atheistic press, by authors whose shamelessness has gained them an unenviable notoriety. We cannot complain of any reticence on the part of these defiant Secularists. Their leader says: "It is perfectly true that Secularism is without God." He holds, as we Christians hold, that it is absurd to deny a God, and yet to profess a religion. An examination of the writings of several of this school enables us to say, that in their view all religion and worship are superstition, that the welfare of humanity may be secured without any acknowledgment of the supernatural, that the Bible is in many parts altogether incredible, and that Christianity mixes up with some good moral teaching not a little of heathen superstition and of error.

But is this system—so widely spread among our artisans—a merely destructive system? The intention of its supporters is to make it something much more than destructive. To quote Mr. Bradlaugh: "I shall endeavour to demonstrate that Atheism affords greater possibility for human happiness than any system yet based on, or possible to be founded on, Theism, and I contend that the lives of true atheists must be more virtuous, because more human, than those of the believers in Deity."² This is, indeed, an astounding claim, but it is one

¹ *The Trial of Theism*, p. 247.

² *Plea for Atheism*.

which has been advanced by other supporters of the atheistic doctrine,—one of whom, a somewhat prominent man of science, has declared that he did not know how morally beautiful human life could be until he joined the ranks of the disbelievers in God! The writer above quoted maintains that, in pulling down Christianity, his party are really constructing what is far more valuable. "Atheism," says he, "properly understood, is no mere disbelief, is in nowise a cold barren negative; it is, on the contrary, a hearty, fruitful affirmation of all truth, and involves the positive assertion and action of highest humanity."¹ It is not easy to understand what is meant by such language; is it anything more than a substitution of scientific knowledge and social comfort for faith in God and hope of heaven? One of Mr. Bradlaugh's colleagues professes a belief in the duty of worship, by which, however, he explains that he means, "the deep reverence and admiration for nature and for man."

Strauss, as the title of his book, *The Old Faith and the New*, implies, believed himself to retain a certain kind of faith. In fact, he maintained that the essential doctrine of all true religion is equally open to him with the Christian. He had learned from Schleiermacher to place the essence of the religious life in a conscious dependence upon a higher power; and, in giving up belief in a personal God, he simply, as he thought, transferred that feeling of dependence to the Order which rules in the physical universe. "We have retained," he says, "the essential ingredient of all religion—the sentiment of unconditional dependence. Whether we say God or Cosmos, we feel our relation to the one, as to the other, to be one of absolute dependence."

But what can this COSMICAL religion do to meet the practical necessities of the human heart, the practical emergencies of the human lot? Strauss frankly acknowledges that Christianity offers great advantages to those who admit her claims. And he evidently feels that the competition is scarcely an equal one. In his view, poetry, music,—in fact, what we should call the divinely-appointed ornaments and pleasures of life,—are to be regarded as the solace of human care and sorrow. These, however, it is admitted, aid the heart only in some fleeting moments, and can scarcely be regarded as

¹ *Plea for Atheism.*

constant and life-long resources. His words are worth quoting:—

“In mitigation of the pain which the consciousness of these stains, which the qualms of conscience prepare for us, Christianity offers the *atonement*; it opens the sheltering arms of belief in *providence* to the timorous feeling of abandonment to the rude chances of this world, while at the same time illuminating the dimness of this terrestrial night by the prospect of an *immortal life* in heaven. We have seen that the sum-total of these consolations must irretrievably vanish on our standpoint, and this must be perceived by every one who has placed himself on it, though but with one foot. He will ask, however, what it is we on our side have to offer him instead.”

What is the substitute proposed? Strauss proposes: 1. Instead of forgiveness of sin, “an incessant and earnest endeavour,” i.e. to do better; 2. Instead of providence, the conviction that “Necessity is Reason herself;” and 3. Instead of immortality, a hope that others will benefit by each man’s life, and a willingness to perish and to be no more! This is a combination of Cosmism with Morality.

It does not seem that any decided line can be drawn marking off the position of such Secularists as Messrs. Holyoake and Bradlaugh from that taken by the author of *Natural Religion*. The latter book is indeed the production of an accomplished scholar, but it presents for acceptance a view of religion which cannot be specifically discriminated from that already explained. The author is convinced that, even if we reject the supernatural, we are not reduced to a merely animal life, devoted to the pleasures of sense, and the acquisition of mammon as a means thereto. In this, however, the better natures among the coarse atheistic party are at one with the learned and eloquent Professor.

It is certainly a sign of the times that such a book as *Natural Religion* should have proceeded from the pen of the author of *Ecce Homo*. It shows that (as already stated), in the view of many, the question of the day is no longer, Are we Christians? but one more fundamental and revolutionary, viz. Have we any religion? The influence of Strauss’s last work is very painfully evident in the author’s line of inquiry. It is true that, according to the profession of the writer, he merely aims to show that, at the very worst, so to speak, the progress of science and of “the Revolution” does not leave us merely

to sensual pleasure and to secular interests. But the gloomy prospect is too plainly set before us as the inevitable; the time is represented as fast approaching when science, art, and the excellencies of the human character will constitute the domain of religion. Instead of worshipping a Being of infinite moral excellence, men will take to admiring what is very big, very regular, or very pretty,—will, in fact, revert to the polished Paganism of ancient Hellas. It is painful to write it, but the accomplished Professor takes a position religiously only half a step above the Bradlaughs and Wattses of the secular press.

That Christianity is to be abandoned is assumed; that is to say, the Resurrection of Christ, and all that is miraculous, is to be disbelieved, the future life of man is to be rejected, and the existence of a personal Divine Ruler is to be denied. It must surely be the irony of the author which professes that his tenets are both Christian and Biblical! However, according to his view of the matter, to give up the beliefs mentioned, which seem to us central and vital to Christianity, is to give up what is quite immaterial, and not worth contending for. We are not left without a substitute for Christianity, without a religion; we have something quite as good, nay, better, inasmuch as it is something our hold upon which cannot be loosened by the inevitable progress of human thought.

Upon this theory what have we left? "The substance of religion is *culture*, and the fruit of it the higher life."¹ We are by no means to become atheists; an atheist is a man who does not believe in the regularity of the laws of nature! Only accept the conclusions of science, and believe in the law of gravitation, in the laws of chemical combination, etc., and you are no atheist! In addition to the contemplation of scientific laws, we have, as a religious exercise, the admiration of form and colour as they are blended in works of art. To our minds this aspect of religion is less just, less elevating, than the so-called picture-worship of the less enlightened among the Roman and Oriental Catholics. When we see a poor peasant woman, in the chapel of her parish church, prostrate before a picture of the Virgin or of the crucified Redeemer, we presume, and in most cases justly, that her devotion and grateful affection are not

¹ *Natural Religion*, p. 145.

directed to the picture, but to the gracious and benevolent Person of whom it is a symbol. There may be superstition, but there may also be, with the superstition, true worship. But the Cambridge Professor would have the devotee worship, not the tender and mighty Saviour, but the technical skill of the painter, the harmonious combination of the figures, or the picturesqueness of the landscapes! In our judgment culture here retrogrades to fetichism! We see signs of the tendency to debase religion to the level of sensualism, a tendency unmistakably manifest in the lascivious productions of the "fleshly" school of poetasters, so much read in the *dilettante* society of our day. If woman is to be worshipped instead of God, far rather would we see such worship under the form of Comtism than under this debasing form of mere voluptuousness. For Comte regarded woman as an ennobling and refining power in human society, not as the mere minister to sensual pleasures. It is with deep regret that we observe in the author of *Natural Religion* a disposition to encourage a tendency which seems to us to need not encouragement but repression. There is one consolation: such a bias will certainly repel all high-minded and spiritual natures from the doctrines advocated.

A great step in advance appears to us to be taken when we pass from the Cosmic Atheism of Mr. Bradlaugh, and the religion of human culture, of science and of art, to the "WORSHIP OF HUMANITY" as introduced by Comte, and as vigorously maintained, though not successfully promulgated, by the English Positivists. The several varieties of atheism pass from absolute materialistic Secularism up to the Nature-worship which is scarcely to be distinguished from Paganism in its nobler forms. But the religious Positivists, zealous as they are in the prosecution of scientific knowledge, nevertheless reserve their reverence for spiritual beings and for spiritual qualities. There may be (we think there is) a variance between their philosophy and their religion, but this inconsistency should not blind us to what is elevating and beautiful in their avowed belief and worship.

The Positivist of the higher English type professes, and with unquestionable sincerity, the utmost indignation against the enemies of religion. The controversy some few years

since, in which Mr. Harrison and Professor Huxley took opposite sides, brought this repugnance very vividly before the reading public, and more recent controversial writings of Mr. Harrison have marked still more emphatically, because more argumentatively, the attitude of the English Comtists upon this great question.

The Positivist leaders very clearly recognise man's need of religion of some sort. Thus Dr. J. H. Bridges represents Comte as saying to the scientific world, not in so many words, but substantially—

"So long as you confine your scientific researches to the physical world around you, or to man's animal nature,—so long as you refuse to enter into the domain of the social and moral nature of man,—so long will the world refuse to regard you as its spiritual leaders. For though the world wants steam-engines and electric telegraphs, there are other things which it wants yet more. It wants to be taught what to believe, what to worship, what to hope; how to act, how to suffer. So long as your science declines to enter upon this field, so long will it have to remain content with a very secondary and subordinate place among the influences which act on the European mind."¹

Mr. Frederic Harrison is equally pronounced in his representation of the religious side of Positivism. His system, he maintains,

"not only admits into its studies the spiritual life of men, but it raises this life to be the essential business of all human knowledge. All the spiritual sentiments of man, the aspirations of the conscious soul in all their purity and pathos, the vast religious experience and potentialities of the human heart seen in the history of our spiritual life as a race—this is, we say, the principal subject of science and of philosophy. No philosophy, no morality, no polity can rest on stable foundations if this be not its grand aim; if it have not a systematic creed, a rational object of worship, and a definite discipline of life."²

Perhaps the strongest words which a Positivist has written concerning the necessity and nobility of religion are from the pen of Mr. Harrison:—

"We mean by religion a scheme which shall explain to us the relations of the faculties of the human soul within, of man to his fellow-men beside him, to the world and its order around him; next, that which brings him face to face with a Power to which he must bow, with a Providence which

¹ *Religion and Progress*, p. 14.

² *The Soul and Future Life*, pp. 27, 28.

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he must love and serve, with a Being which he must adore—that which, in fine, gives man a doctrine to believe, a discipline to live by, and an Object to worship.”¹

It is well to realise what is the Positivist conception of religion. In his Address for 1880 Mr. R. Congreve says :—

“Religion in its full and natural sense will imply—first a sober, scientific, and practical body of knowledge ; a constant reference to busy life as we know it in modern civilisation ; a lively sympathy with all the interests of our fellow-men ; and a consistent life of quiet, happy, useful work. It will be religion, inasmuch as it will infuse a grandeur and a unity into all these by filling them with all the light of duty, and the warmth of a social affection. Worship and adoration are only a part of religion, and a part which must be entirely akin to the rest. In every part it will be a human religion, a perfectly practical and mundane religion, grounded in thought, and issuing in act ; beginning on earth, and ending in man.”

Mr. Congreve anticipates the spread of the worship of Humanity. “Some time or other,” says he, in the Annual Address for 1882, “be we well assured, there must come the direct worship of Humanity, direct addresses to her, her complete recognition as a living and real power. . . . I should greatly regret the cessation for a time of some such mode of outward worship as we practise here, domestic rather than public ; yet, whatever it is, the distinct assertion, under all defects, in the face of our London world, that we are not mere thinkers, but men bent on practical objects, with a religious service before us, our sense of obligation to which service we quicken by weekly meetings.”

We give these lengthy extracts because we wish to do full justice to the high aims of a small, but able and high-minded, body of men, and because we wish to fortify our own position as to the indispensable necessity of religion, by calling in the evidence of those whose views so very decidedly differ from our own.

Objections against the substitution of Humanity for God as the supreme object of admiration and worship are obvious enough. Let us see in what manner they are dealt with by the Comtists.

If it be objected against the claims of Humanity upon our reverence that the records of Humanity are records of

¹ “Modern Symposium,” *Nineteenth Century*, April and May 1877.

ignorance, error, vice, and crime,—a very obvious objection to every instructed mind,—what is the answer? It is, that just as when we speak of England with pride and affection, we really think of what in England is good and noble, “so with Humanity. It is the triumph of good over evil, that is the object of our reverence; and to a conscience not wholly seared, the strongest impulse to repentance for a life of selfishness will be the thought that, so far as in one man may lie, he has hitherto not forwarded, but delayed that triumph.”¹ “The chief business of the Religion of Humanity is to gather together the noblest traditions of our race, to preserve them, and to hand them down, a steadily increasing store, to those that shall come after.”²

If it be objected that Humanity, judged by the records of history, is scarcely fitted to awaken enthusiastic admiration, the Positivist points to what past generations have endured for our sake, who enter upon the inheritance their sacrifices have secured. The blemishes of Humanity are compared to the sufferings and humiliation of the Messiah, who had no form or comeliness, and who underwent scorn and anguish for our gain.

But is not Humanity an abstraction, with no vividness and reality? What is the reply of the Positivist?—

“If we are asked, Is not Humanity a mere figment? how does Humanity differ from any other theological or metaphysical abstraction? our answer is, Humanity is the assemblage of these noble lives [i.e. of the illustrious dead]; of these, and of the countless multitude of those who have laboured for the common weal without leaving any record of their name.”

If, again, it be objected against the Religion of Humanity that it has no sufficient sanction, inasmuch as it holds forth no expectation of a future life, the Positivist answers: “The Religion of Humanity brings its own sanction along with it,” i.e. in giving all human beings enough to live for, calling forth their highest powers, satisfying their aspirations, and presenting the noblest principles and aims of action, and holding forth a prospect of moral improvement. “If the Religion of Humanity helps us to subdue the paltry cravings of selfish passions by inspiring us with the hope of

¹ *Religion and Progress*, p. 18.

² *Ibid.* p. 20.

working for such a prospect as this, we need ask for no further sanction."¹

The Positivist conceives his view of death to be the worthiest and noblest. "As we *live for others* in life, so we *live in others* after death. . . . The difference between our faith and that of the orthodox is this: we look to the permanence of the activities which give others happiness; they look to the permanence of the consciousness which can enjoy happiness. Which is the nobler?"² The reply is obvious: all which the Positivist looks forward to as the fruit in others of effort and devotion, the Christian anticipates as fully as he does; whilst the Christian has the prospect of a continued existence of obedience and of service hereafter.

It is right to observe that a great recommendation of the Positive school is their application of the principle of justice to politics, and especially to that department of politics which is among all nations so largely handed over to selfishness and expediency,—the international relations and the policy of civilised with regard to uncivilised races.

There are certain respects in which Positivism cultivates continuity with antecedent religious systems. Thus the Positivist Church has its sacred formula: "Love our principle; order, the basis; progress, the end;" it has its canons of conduct: "Live for others. Live openly." It has its prayers and its collects, its ascriptions of praise and responses; and it has the following benediction, with which the services, commemorations, or celebrations, are brought to a close:—"The Faith of Humanity, the Hope of Humanity, the Love of Humanity, bring you comfort and teach you sympathy, give you peace in yourselves, and peace with others now and for ever. Amen." There is an Advent Collect, in which Auguste Comte takes the place occupied by our Lord in Christian prayers and thanksgivings!

After all, it must be admitted that the Positivist Religion is rather an object of curious interest than of practical concern. In France the prevalent style of Comtism is rather that represented by the late M. Littré, who accepted the scientific classification and the materialistic bias of the master, but rejected his religious notions. And in this country there are

¹ *Religion and Progress*, p. 22.

² *Ibid.* p. 38.

many who are to a certain extent disciples of Comte, who have no sympathy with his worship and his "Church of Humanity." In fact, there seem to be only two or three small congregations, all of which evidently experience that "struggle for existence," to which their eccentricity and unpopularity would appear necessarily to doom them.

It is a relief, almost amounting to a pleasure, to turn from the negations and travesties of religion hitherto considered, to systems more reverent in themselves, and more in correspondence with the dignity and unique grandeur of human nature. THEISM is opposed to Atheism, to Polytheism, and to Pantheism. In dealing with Theistic systems we have nothing, strictly speaking, to oppose. The ground they occupy is common to them with Christianity. They are right in what they affirm, and only wrong in what they deny. Their insufficiency must be made manifest; but it must be cordially acknowledged that the path of the Theist and the path of the Christian coincide, as far as the Theist accompanies the Christian. That he is logically wrong in pausing where he does, we are convinced. That it is difficult for him neither to advance nor to recede, appears from the tendency of Theists either to fall back upon Pantheism, or to proceed towards a full, rich, and living Christianity.

Although the words "Deist" and "Theist" are strictly synonymous,—the only difference being that one is from the Latin, and the other from the Greek,—they are not in usage convertible. "Deist" was a term applied in the last century to the school of thinkers and writers who questioned the reality and the necessity of Revelation, but who held to the belief in the existence of a Divine Creator and Ruler, and considered the Light of Nature, *i.e.* Reason, a sufficient guide for men, whilst they rejected what is supernatural in the Christian scheme, treating its doctrines with more or less of disrespect. Professor Redford thus summarises their teaching:—"They attempted to show (1.) that all that was true and valuable in Christianity was a republication of the law of Nature; (2.) that the supernatural element in the Scriptures was not credible; (3.) that a critical study of the history of the canon deprived the sacred books of all special authority over faith."¹ It is well known that the English Deists called forth some of the

¹ *The Christian's Plea against Modern Unbelief*, p. 31.

great apologetic works of the last century, of which Butler's famous *Analogy* is the chief. The Theists of our own time are less destructive than constructive. Considering that criticism and science have already destroyed what is special to Christianity as a professedly supernatural revelation, they address themselves to the task of building anew a simple and majestic edifice, in which the enlightened and rational may dwell in safety and with honour. The things which are shaken are removed, in order that the things which cannot be shaken may remain. It is held by this class of religionists, that, whilst the miraculous element in the Scriptures must be given up, and whilst everything must be subjected to a critical investigation, there are beliefs which are in nowise affected by the renunciation of the credibility of the history, or by the application of the freest criticism to the doctrinal and ethical teaching of the books of Scripture. Theists, accordingly, account it a great advantage that their position enables them to contemplate without alarm the progress of historical, philosophical, and scientific inquiries, however revolutionary; for they are confident that no such inquiries can ever touch their faith in what they deem the essentials of true and spiritual religion.

The Theistic school may be traced to two sources: 1. To the writings of the vigorous and eloquent Theodore Parker, who has given to this mode of religious thinking a currency in America which it has not obtained in this country, and who has carried over a large section of the New England Unitarians into Theistic territory. 2. To the writings of Francis W. Newman, in this country, who, starting (like his more famous brother, the Cardinal) from the Evangelical standpoint, like his brother became dissatisfied with that position, and diverged from it, but in an exactly opposite direction,—the one falling back upon ecclesiastical authority, the other going forward in the path of independent inquiry and reaching the position of rationalism. A generation since, the writings of Francis Newman, always distinguished by a lofty and spiritual tone, exercised considerable influence over a limited but thoughtful class of readers. His *Phases of Faith*, and his *Soul, her Sorrows and Aspirations*, were eagerly read by young men open to freshness of thinking, and panting for an atmosphere more free than that to which their education had accustomed them.

The three doctrines which our contemporary Theists are

concerned to maintain are: the existence of a righteous and merciful God, the sacredness of morality, and the prospect of a future life. Mr. Greg has not the same confidence in the doctrine of immortality as in the sway of a benevolent Deity; still, his faith is evidently a faith to which he clings with a quiet enthusiasm, and his bold speculations upon future retribution have occasioned controversy and criticism.

The writers who have exercised most influence in our own time in the direction of Theism are, perhaps, Mr. W. R. Greg and Miss Cobbe. The temperate wisdom of the former, and the ardent enthusiasm of the latter, have commended their works to minds of different orders. Mr. Greg, though not learned and not profound—writing as an educated and thoughtful layman, and a man benevolently interested in the social wellbeing of the community,—has secured a respectful attention from readers of the most diverse schools. His *Creed of Christendom* has been much quoted, if it has not enjoyed a large circulation. His *Enigmas of Life* has had a very extensive sale, a fact which must be attributed rather to its treatment of social questions than to its theological deliverances. Mr. Greg holds that we are still Christians, although accepting only the spirit of Christianity, and rejecting the miraculous narratives of Scripture, and refusing assent to the doctrine of inspiration. He denies Christ's resurrection. He considers certain precepts of Jesus to be impracticable, and even noxious: *e.g.* Non-resistance, Almsgiving, Improvidence, and Communism. His position with reference to the substance of Christianity is thus stated:—

“The *thought*—the nucleus of inner meaning—is sacred still, and of enduring truth. . . . We may use our freedom of penetrating to the true spirit and meaning of Christ's teaching through its casual or disguising letter, with the more boldness that it is only this spirit as to which we can feel absolutely certain.”¹

Again:—

“We are, and may remain, Christians, and we can and ought to obey the Christian rule of life; but in order to do either we must deal with the kernel, not with the husk; we must penetrate to the true mind and temper of Jesus through the accretions which have overlaid it, the literalism which has disfigured it, and (be it said with all reverence) the Orientalism and the incompleteness, if not the imperfection, which mingled with and coloured it.”²

¹ *The Creed of Christendom*, p. lxxxiii.

² *Ibid.* pp. lxxxvii, lxxxviii.

This writer has no sympathy with modern efforts to substitute the universe, or man, or any abstraction, for the Divine Father, whom Christians make it their endeavour to worship in spirit and in truth. Witness these inspiring confessions :—

"My own conception . . . approaches far nearer to the old current image of a personal God than to any of the sublimated substitutes of modern thought. Strauss's 'Universe,' Comte's 'Humanity,' even Mr. Arnold's 'Stream of Tendency that makes for righteousness,' excite in me no enthusiasm, command from me no worship. I cannot pray to the 'Immensities' and the 'Eternities' of Carlyle. They proffer me no help; they vouchsafe no sympathy; they suggest no comfort. It may be that such a Personal God is a mere anthropomorphic creation. It may be—as philosophers with far finer instruments of thought than mine affirm—that the conception of such a being, duly analysed, is demonstrably a self-contradictory one. But at least, in resting in it, I rest in something I almost seem to realise; at least I share the view which Jesus indisputably held of the Father whom he obeyed, communed with, and worshipped."¹

This elevated Theism is in the case of this author combined with what he would deem a dispassionate eclecticism with reference to all the documents of Christianity, and with reference to the teaching of our Lord and of His apostles. Mr. Greg regards all that is in the Bible as "subject to the scrutiny of reason." Still, his appreciation of Christianity is warm and cordial :—

"I value the Religion of Jesus, not as being absolute and perfect truth, but as containing more truth, purer truth, higher truth, stronger truth, than has ever yet been given to man. Much of his teaching I unhesitatingly receive as, to the best of my judgment, unimprovable and unsurpassable—fitted, if obeyed, to make earth all that a finite and material scene can be, and man only a little lower than the angels."²

With respect to "our feelings towards God and our conduct towards men," he accepts Gospel teaching as the purest expression of religious truth and duty. He dissents from Christian teaching as to the efficacy of prayer, the duty of resignation, the pardon of sin, and what he deems the ascetic view it takes of life. Yet, on some of these points, his belief is not, perhaps, incompatible with a liberal interpretation of the New Testament. He rejects some Christian beliefs regarding Heaven, and the Christian proof of it, and relies upon the

¹ *The Creed of Christendom*, xc, xci.

² *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 192, 193.

soul's own faith and hope with regard to immortality. In his latest work, Mr. Greg renews with an impressive emphasis the confession of Theistic faith already described. He says:—

"The existence of a wise and beneficent Creator, and of a renewed life hereafter, are still to me beliefs—especially the first—very nearly reaching the solidity of absolute convictions. The one is almost a Certainty, the other a solemn Hope."¹

Miss Frances Power Cobbe is known as a practised and effective writer on subjects connected with the wellbeing of humanity, and especially with the progressive elevation of her own sex. Her recent work, *The Peak in Darien*, proves that she retains the faith professed in former years. She may be regarded as one of the most popular English advocates of a purely Theistic religion. If her creed is a somewhat short one, it is definitely formulated and tenaciously held. We have it in these brief sentences:—

"Faith in the existence of a righteous God,—faith in the eternal Law of Morality,—faith in an Immortal Life,—this triune faith is the great treasure of the human race which each perceives to be threatened, and which each would, in his own manner, and to the uttermost of his power, secure for ever against the dread invasions of doubt."²

It is held by this writer (we think without sufficient reason) that Christianity as a whole may be repudiated, and yet this simple Theistic creed may be preserved. In Miss Cobbe's view, Christianity is a dead-weight upon religion, of which it would do well to disencumber itself. She divides religionists into those who base religion on Revelation, History, Tradition; and those who base it upon individual consciousness. She blames the Unitarians for conceding to Christ the office of Moral Lord and Future Judge, and thinks this compromise with Orthodoxy the secret of their weakness. The outlook appears to her a bright and radiant one. We question whether our readers will share the sanguine spirit in which she contemplates the disappearance of the august faith of Christ, and the emergence of a faith, in her judgment, simpler, more credible, and better adapted for universal acceptance.

"If Traditional Religion be indeed on the wane, if the hour be approaching when it will have become a thing of the past, then it will but have passed away to give place to a yet purer light, a yet warmer and brighter Faith,

¹ *Enigmas of Life*, Preface, p. v.

² *Broken Lights*, p. 3.

which shall remain with us for ever. . . . Christianity may fail us, and we may watch it with straining eyes going slowly down from the zenith where once it shone : but we need neither regret that it should pass away, nor dread lest we be left in the gloom. *Let it pass away*—that grand and wonderful faith ! Let it go down calmly and slowly, like an orb which has brightened half our heavens through the night of the ages, and sets at last in glory, leaving its train of light long gleaming in the sky, and mingling with the dawn. Already up the east there climbs the Sun.”¹

In the prospect of a substitute—a Theistic faith—replacing Christianity, this author at the same time looks back with gratitude upon that Christianity which she deems destined, not so much to be superseded, as to be purified and consecrated afresh to higher service. For example :—

Christ was “the great Regenerator of Humanity. His coming was to the life of humanity what regeneration is to the life of the individual. . . . What Christ has really done is beyond the kingdom of the intellect and its theologies ; nay, even beyond the kingdom of the conscience and its recognition of duty. His work has been in that of the heart. He has transformed the Law into the Gospel. He has changed the bondage of the alien for the liberty of the sons of God. He has glorified Virtue into Holiness, Religion into Piety, and Duty into Love.”²

Miss Cobbe believes Theoretic Theism will be the religion of the future :—

“Negatively, it will reject all doctrines of Atheism or Pantheism, on the one hand, and of a plurality of Divine Persons, on the other. Affirmatively, it will assert not only the Unity and Eternity, and Wisdom and Justice, of God, but above all, that one great attribute which is our principal concern, His Goodness. Here lies the essence of Theism—its practical difference from every other creed in the world.”

With this monotheistic faith are associated a profound reverence for morality, and a bright hope of blessing for all mankind. “These three great principles,—the absolute goodness of God, the final salvation of every created soul, and the Divine authority of Conscience,—are the obvious fundamental canons of the Faith of the Future.”³ It is contemplated that prayer shall be perpetuated, that contrition for sin shall be required, that humane conduct shall be enjoined ; and that these exercises shall have all the obligation and sanction attaching to strictly religious acts.

The spiritual Theists are wont to look to the religious con-

¹ *Broken Lights*, p. 100.

² *Ibid.* pp. 132, 133.

³ *Ibid.* p. 173.

sciousness, to the intuition of the heart, for the authority upon which to base their convictions as to God, the right, and immortality. Miss Cobbe thinks that Mr. J. S. Mill was altogether astray in his treatment of the problem, Is there a God? It is well known that his inquiries into Nature led the philosopher to the hypothesis that there may be a God, limited in wisdom and in power, who has not the ability to make the human lot better than it actually is. According to Miss Cobbe, Mr. Mill had not the organ of religion, which his father had in his youth extirpated from his heart. It is not to Nature that we must look for God. "Spiritual things must be spiritually discerned, or we must be content never to discern them truly at all. In man's soul alone, as far as we may yet discover, is the moral nature of his Maker revealed, as the sun is mirrored in a mountain-lake." Then, from our own personal consciousness and experience an instinctive inference is made: and what God is to us, He is seen to be to all His creatures. In proportion as we share His moral qualities shall we attain to a conviction of their reality and universality.

"It must be enough for us to learn what God bids us to be of just and merciful and loving, and then judge what must be His justice, His mercy, and His love. That Being whom the sinful soul meets in the hour of its penitence—and the grateful heart in its plenitude of thanksgiving—and every man who really prays in the moments of supreme communion—that God is One concerning whom the very attempt to *prove* that He is infinitely good seems almost sacrilege. It is *as* Goodness, as Holiness, Love, and Pity ineffable, that He has revealed Himself."

Miss Cobbe thinks that both Religion and Morality are closely connected with belief in Immortality. She bases the hope of a future life upon Faith—"Faith in its true sense of Trust in Goodness, and Justice, and Fidelity, and Love, and in all these things impersonated in the Lord of Life and Death." The Theist's creed and law may be thus summed up:—Justice must be done. The purposes of a good and wise Creator must be worked out. Man must be developed. Love is eternal. Those whom God loves must be deathless. A conscious, endless relation to God is the true privilege of man.

We have dwelt at some length upon the exponents of the Theistic system, chiefly because of its intrinsic interest. But our readers are probably aware that this is a form of religion

which has neither a large nor an increasing following. Whatever may be the cause, Theism does not lay hold of the popular mind. The alternative at present appears to be between Christianity and Agnosticism, or some form of Pantheism which is practically undistinguishable from Agnosticism. The mind that escapes the wretched trammels of materialism and rises into Theistic faith is not likely to find a full satisfaction short of the pure, bright atmosphere of Christianity. It seems to us that the Theist has broken with a merely phenomenal and sensational life, and that there is no sufficient reason for him to stop short of the fuller and the richer faith of the Gospel.

In addition to the criticisms which have been added to our brief expositions of some of these systems which compete with Christianity for the empire over the human heart and human society, the following objections should be fairly considered; they will all bear amplification, which our space will not allow:—

1. Some of the proposed substitutes for our religion do not deal justly and satisfactorily with human nature. This objection is valid against all systems which treat man as a merely sensitive nature, or as capable of knowing only phenomena. Let man be represented as constituted only for animal enjoyment, as susceptible of nothing higher than pleasure, as merely an animal with a larger range of sensuous capacity,—and the judgment and conscience of humanity will rise in rebellion against such treatment as this. Or let it be granted that man is formed for perception, for knowledge, but that he can only know phenomena and their groups, and can have no knowledge of substance, of cause, of personality,—and, however our *savans* may persuade themselves that they have analysed human nature, that nature will reject and resent the pretended analysis. No system can prove a substitute for our religion which denies man's rational and personal nature, and which, by making him incapable of knowing himself, necessarily would render him altogether powerless to arrive at any cognition either of a fellow-creature or of a Creator.

2. Generally speaking, the systems proposed to replace Christianity fail to take a just view of sin, and to provide for its forgiveness and for contending with and vanquishing it. Optimism refuses to recognise sin; Pessimism holds it impos-

sible to reduce or eliminate sin ; Fatalism admits no real distinction between vice and virtue. But although the philosopher in his study may make light of this awful factor in human life, the world cannot be blind to its enormity. Account for the existence of moral evil we cannot ; but we must not therefore ignore it, or even palliate its seriousness. Christianity, as becomes the greatest among human religions, boldly recognises and faces the problem. And Christianity provides an atonement, and proffers a combative and purifying moral power,—a two-fold provision which constitute its vindication before the court of conscience and of society. Systems which tell us sin is an unpleasant fact that had better not be mentioned, or which represent sin as the creature of a morbid imagination, or which flatteringly assure us that man's unaided efforts, and the natural progress of society, will make an end of sin,—such systems put themselves out of court, as unworthy of a serious hearing. As a personal stain, sin needs a cleansing and pardoning power to deal with it ; as a debasing tendency, it calls for a counteractive force mightier even than itself. We look in vain for either of these to the several substitutes for Christianity set forth by human wisdom or unwisdom.

3. The several systems which men would substitute for Christianity fail to satisfy man's conscience as a witness to moral responsibility. We hold it to be a fundamental fact in human nature that man is under moral law, a moral Governor, moral retribution. This is not in the same degree contradicted by all rival doctrines ; but it is not fully recognised by any of them. Revelation, alike in the Old and in the New Testament, accredits itself by its harmony with the moral reason, by the honour it sets upon the "categorical imperative," if the language of Kant may be allowed. Conscience, we have been taught, and believe, is God's vicegerent in our nature, and conscience witnesses to Christ.¹

4. With the exception of the last-mentioned of these "substitutes," they all proceed upon an explicit or virtual denial of God : and this denial is compatible neither with the satisfaction of the soul nor with the welfare of society. The greatest philosophers of antiquity and of the modern world have based their systems upon a belief in Deity ; and to reject this belief is to go back to the Pantheism or the Materialism, with which

¹ *Vide Wace, Bampton Lecture, Lect. i.*

the nobler spirits have never, in any age of the world's history, been content. The ancient grounds for a Theistic faith have never been shaken, and the development and experience of humanity have added to their efficiency, if not to their validity.

5. The alternative systems all come immeasurably short of Christianity, in their darkness or dimness, with regard to immortality, with respect to which the revelation of Christianity is so full, clear, and bright. The purest Theism is only able to look forward to a future life with a venturesome and yet timid hope; whilst the Christian's faith rests upon Him who hath "abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light by the gospel."

6. One and all, the systems which have been considered ignore the evidences of Christianity itself. The question is not, What consideration and tolerance are you prepared to show for the faith of the New Testament? but a very different question, viz. What have you to allege against her mighty claims to reverence, against her continued occupation of the throne of human hearts and human society? The documents which record the origin of our faith are a stubborn fact, and a fact with which infidelity has not yet shown itself capable of dealing. The history of Christianity in the world is another fact, to which an enlightened generation cannot and will not close its eyes. Religious questions may not be treated as if Christianity did not exist; as if such questions were to be decided by abstract arguments.

In conclusion, let it be borne in mind by those who are disposed to listen to all voices, to adjust rival pretensions, to consider conflicting claims, that we are *practical* beings, who have to make up our minds, who have to act, and that without delay. It is easy to disparage Christianity in its actual embodiments; it is easy to criticise Christianity itself when it is—as probably it will be—partially apprehended by minds not altogether capable of grasping its majesty and symmetry. But, after all, what is the alternative? Where is the substitute against which considerations, far more numerous, far more weighty, may not be brought? There is no feasible alternative, no admissible substitute. The religion of Christ stands apart from, and above, all religions beside, commands our reverence, and constrains our hearts.

J. RADFORD THOMSON.

ART. II.—*Canon Cook's Criticism of the Revised Version of the Three First Gospels.*¹

THE superficial and fragmentary criticism of the Revised Version of the New Testament, with which the public were inundated for the first few months after its appearance, have wearied many sensible people of the whole subject. But a thorough sifting of the principles on which this work has been executed, and of the results attained, will always be welcomed both by scholars and by cultivated students of the New Testament of every class. It were well, however, if the *text* adopted and the *translation* of the text were handled separately. As for the textual criticism of the New Testament, it is a subject of so much technicality, complexity, and difficulty, that those who have spent the longest time in the study of it will be the readiest to own that they have much yet to learn, and that they must keep themselves open to fresh light from whatever quarter and be prepared to bow to its legitimate results. In the translation of the text, it was required of the present Revisers, by the terms of their appointment, that, along with strict fidelity to the sense of the original, they should show a just appreciation of those qualities in the version they had to revise which have charmed the English ear in every land and caused it to "authorise" itself, including such a regard for its idiomatic proprieties and well-understood archaisms, that nothing in the New Version should be felt to jar upon the ear, as out of keeping with the genuine ring of the old one.

To determine how far this has been attained in the Revised Version is the legitimate business of criticism. But to mix up in such criticism both text and translation is to distract the reader and to do injustice to the subject itself. Yet this has to a large extent been done by adverse critics. Not that any solid criticism is to be slighted, however conducted; but writers like the Quarterly Reviewer²—so well entitled to be heard on the text of the New Testament—though naturally

¹ London: Murray, 8vo. 1882.

² October, 1881; January and April, 1882.

anxious to warn the public without delay against what they deem the fallacies and failures of this work, do themselves and their subject serious injustice by their mode of treatment, not to speak of their temper. The learned Dr. Malan of Broadwindsor, in his *Seven Chapters of the Revised Version Revised*, and *Select Readings in the Greek Text of St. Matthew*, lately published by the Rev. Drs. Westcott and Hort, Revised,¹ has made some good contributions to the subject of both text and translation. But Canon Cook is the first scholar who has formally and systematically handled the whole subject. In his volume on *The Revised Version of the Three First Gospels* he challenges the Revisers in respect both of the work they have done and the principles that have guided them. On this latter branch of the subject I say nothing here. In another form I may elsewhere give my own reasons for having come to substantially the same conclusions as Canon Cook himself; but the first part of his volume, which deals with the Revised Version of the Three First Gospels, is pervaded by such reflections on the whole Revision Company—as faithless to their trust, if not even disloyal to the truth itself—as one was scarcely prepared for from the Editor of the Speaker's Commentary; while the criticism itself is painfully one-sided, not always accurate in its statement of facts, and in its grounds of decision narrower than one had a right to look for from Canon Cook. The object of the present paper is to justify these statements, by vindicating a number of the changes both in text and translation which Canon Cook condemns, and pointing out the unfairness with which not only the changes themselves, but the whole Company for adopting them, have been treated in this volume.

I. Beginning with matters somewhat minor and preliminary, the following criticisms are singularly unpromising:—

“I must now call attention to another point in the same verse (Matt. i. 18) of very grave importance. The marginal note tells us that ‘*the Holy Spirit*’ may be substituted for ‘*Holy Ghost*’ throughout this book, a note which is repeated in St. Mark. Does this imply that the marginists object to the word ‘*Ghost*?’ If so, it must be asked, on what grounds? Certainly not as an archaism. The word is in every Churchman’s mouth continually.

¹ Hatchards, 1881 and 1892.

For the sake of consistency? Dr. Vance Smith complains bitterly of the inconsistency of his colleagues in reference to this very question (see *Facts and Margins*, pp. 7, 8, 45). I would not suggest a doctrinal bias; but to prove that it had no influence, a strong, if not unanimous, declaration on the part of the Revisers is called for. Dr. Vance Smith alleges this notice as one of the clearest proofs that the Revision ought in consistency to discard the word as '*a poor and almost obsolete equivalent for Spirit*'" (pp. 25, 26).

With such a criticism it is difficult to deal seriously or even patiently. (1.) Canon Cook knows very well that the marginists, who are no other than the Company itself and responsible for the notes as well as the text, have retained the word "Ghost" wherever it is preceded by the word "Holy," save in certain cases, and there on a principle which they carefully explain in their Preface. (2.) In thus retaining "the venerable archaism," they simply kept in view the first two "Principles and Rules" laid down for their guidance by the Committee of Convocation—"to introduce as few alterations as possible into the text of the Authorised Version consistently with faithfulness" and "to limit as far as possible the expression of such alterations to the language of the Authorised and other English Versions." (3.) In retaining this archaism—an archaism "in the mouth of" a good many more than "every Churchman"—they had the hearty concurrence of the present writer for one, who would have regretted any alteration here. For the same reason I should have regretted the change in the Lord's Prayer of "which" for "who" in the first clause. Cases there are, no doubt, where there can be no good reason for retaining this latter archaism, and the Revisers did well, I think, in discarding it in a number of cases—substituting "who" or "that," as the case might be. But (4.) since it is known that some think there is no sufficient reason now for keeping up this archaism "Holy Ghost" in a version intended for permanent use—while the American brethren, as will be seen by their list of "preferred renderings" (No. III.), were decidedly against retaining it—it was deemed only fair that it should be stated at the outset that "Holy Spirit" was the full equivalent for the phrase which was retained, in order that every one might choose for himself the term which he preferred. And is this the point of such "grave importance" that nothing less than "a strong

if not unanimous, declaration on the part of the Revisers will suffice" to prove that "a doctrinal bias had no influence" in occasioning this margin? Canon Cook "would not suggest" such a bias; but it looks extremely like it when he demands such a declaration to the contrary. The very suggestion is ludicrous, but it is something worse. For (5.) the way in which the name of Dr. Vance Smith is introduced, not here only, but over and over again, is extremely offensive. What is Dr. Vance Smith's opinion about this word "Ghost," as "a poor and almost obsolete equivalent for 'Spirit'?" It is simply Dr. Smith's opinion, and probably even he will be surprised at the alarm which he has succeeded in creating—making it imperative on the Revisers to come forward with a declaration that his opinion is not theirs.

But Dr. Vance Smith's name is obtruded upon us in a form even more offensive in the "Preliminary Considerations:"—

"I trust the Revisers will bear in mind that, although Churchmen who have attacked the Revisers' work have invariably abstained from any imputation of doctrinal prepossession, and though their freedom from such prepossession has been testified in *The Guardian*, *The Church Quarterly*, *The Churchman*, and other periodicals of high character, by writers who may be regarded as true representatives of Anglican orthodoxy; yet that a formal allegation to the contrary has been advanced by one of their own body. Referring to the statement that 'the doctrines of popular orthodoxy remain unaffected, untouched by the results of the Revision,' that Reviser says formally: 'To the writer, any such statement appears to be in the most substantial sense contrary to the facts of the case' (see *Revised Texts and Margins*, by Dr. G. Vance Smith, p. 45). Such an assertion, if not met by an indignant repudiation, and refuted by substantial arguments, is calculated grievously to affect the reputation of the Revisers" (pp. 19, 20).

Was this opinion of Dr. Vance Smith, one may well ask, founded on something unknown to all outside the Jerusalem Chamber, that it should shake public confidence in the orthodoxy of the whole Revision Company, unless they "indignantly repudiate, and by substantial arguments refute" it? Why, he tells us himself, that his appeal is simply to "the facts of the case," in other words, the version itself, of whose character every reader of it is as competent to judge as Dr. Vance Smith. Canon Cook has here drawn us on very delicate ground; but I suppose I do that gentleman no

injustice, and reveal no secret, when I say, what he himself takes care to let everybody know, that on all questions affecting what he is pleased to call "the doctrines of popular orthodoxy," Dr. Vance Smith in the Revision Company represented simply himself.

One other such reference I must note before passing from a subject so unpleasantly forced upon us:—

"In Mark i. 9 the margin tells us that the Greek has '*into the Jordan*.' This statement must be perplexing to a reader, who might naturally refer to the last words in St. Matthew's Gospel, where *into* is rightly used, if taken in the full doctrinal sense. To '*baptize into a river*' is not an English idiom."

No, certainly it is not, and therefore the Revisers did not so translate the passage. But since the preposition here used certainly implies that both the baptizer and the Baptized went *into* the river, and the following clause says they "*straightway came up out of the water*,"—which some think has an important bearing on the mode of baptism—the Revisers rightly deemed it proper to state the *fact* in the margin, leaving every one to draw from it his own conclusion, or no conclusion at all. But how any one could suppose this to have the smallest connection with the odd circumstance that the opposite side of the printed page happened to have the same Greek preposition in the rendering of the Baptismal Formula—a thing, of course, unknown to the Revisers themselves till they saw it in print—I cannot imagine. Canon Cook is pleased to tell his readers that "*into*" is the right word in the Baptismal Formula, provided it is "*taken in its full doctrinal sense*." With this the Revisers had nothing to do, their business being simply to translate the word properly, though I have no reason to doubt that others apprehended as well as myself what a richness this "*into*" gave to "*the full doctrinal sense*" of the Formula.

But what, it will be asked, had Dr. Vance Smith to do with this very petty criticism? Nothing, save that it enabled Canon Cook to drag in another of those unsavoury allusions to that gentleman which disfigure his pages, in the following footnote:—"One of the Revisers, however, Dr. Vance Smith, welcomes the alteration [of "*into*" for "*in*"] in that most important text, as obliterating the evidence for Trinitarian

doctrine. Such certainly was not the intention of his colleagues, who are surely bound to protest against his inference." Of this I will only say, that the absurdity of Dr. Vance Smith's inference is only equalled by the absurdity of Canon Cook's comment upon it.

II. On "The Genealogy of our Lord" I note one small criticism, merely for the purpose of calling attention to the character of our author's criticism.

"For Asa the Revisers tell us that the Greek has Asaph, and for Amon, Amos. See Matt. i. 7, 8, 10, 11. But by 'the Greek' must, of course, be meant the Gospel as it came from St. Matthew. If the Revisers intended readers to understand either that the text is not the production of the Evangelist, or that by such an expression they simply mean the text which they have seen fit to adopt, they were bound to state their view clearly. . . . This margin tells us positively that the Greek, *i.e. the original Gospel*, has Asaph and Amos. Now it is certain that no one familiar with the original Hebrew or the Septuagint could have committed such blunders. It is quite conceivable that an officious scribe, who was familiar with the name of Asaph in the inscriptions to the Psalms, and of Amos as that of a great prophet, should foist them into his manuscript; but it is to me perfectly astonishing that any critic should throw the responsibility for so positive a misstatement on St. Matthew. . . . I do not see what excuse can be suggested for the Revisers. They were bound either to reject the new reading as a *plain and clear error*, or if, as their margin implies, they held it to be the original reading, they were bound to introduce it into the text. As it stands, it is *one plain and clear error*, whichever alternative is taken" (pp. 23, 24).¹

The gravity of these charges against men, the majority of whom are his fellow-Churchmen, is only equalled by their utter baselessness. (1.) What the Revisers meant by their margins, of which Canon Cook makes such a mystery, they state clearly in their Preface. Claiming no infallibility either in the text they selected or the translation of it, they simply used their best judgment in the settlement of both. (2.) That the proper names of the Old Testament are variously spelled in the Hebrew MSS., is what every reader even of the English Bible may see for himself. As for this "Asa"—whose name to print it "Asaph" is thought so scandalously to misrepresent it—why, in 2 Chronicles his father's name is spelled "Abijah"

¹ The italics in all our quotations are the author's, unless otherwise stated.

(with final $\pi=h$), while in 1 Kings it is spelled "Abijam" (with final $\pi=m$). Also, in 2 Kings and in Ezra we have "Nebuchadnezzar" (with π), while in Jeremiah and Ezekiel the same man is called "Nebuchadrezzar" (with r). Had our Evangelist copied his list of our Lord's ancestors from the Old Testament, the form would likely have been "Asa," the only form in which it appears in Kings and Chronicles. But plainly he did not, since all the names from Zerubbabel to our Lord's legal father—eight in number—are unknown to the Old Testament; just as in Luke's list not one name from Joseph backwards to Nathan is found in the Old Testament. Clearly, both lists must have been taken from the family registers, which were kept with such religious care through all Jewish history, that after the captivity certain "children of the priests," whose ancestral register had gone astray during the confusion of the seventy years, were not held as admissible to office until some attestation of their sacerdotal descent should be divinely given. Suppose, then, that in the register of Asa's family, the name was spelled "Asaph," which the family in course of time might prefer as a strengthened form, why should the Evangelist not write it as he found it? I am not saying it was so—that is a question purely of textual criticism—but because the Revisers, judging that the best text read the word "Asaph," thought it right to state this in the margin, leaving, however, the spelling of the Authorised Version untouched, are they to be held up as charging the Evangelist with a gross "misstatement"? I am ashamed even to put the question. But (3.) let the reader observe the four words here italicised—*"plain and clear error."* Upon these words the changes are rung in almost every page of this book, and sometimes oftener. With what object is this done? Those who have not read the volume, but have paid some attention to the Revisers' Preface, will read with surprise the following piece of information. On the 10th of February 1870, the motion for a Revision Company, made by the Bishop of Winchester (Dr. S. Wilberforce), and seconded by the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, was adopted on the 10th of May following. In his speech, when seconding this motion, Bishop Ellicott, it seems, used the following words:—"We may be satisfied with the attempt to correct plain and clear errors, but there it is our duty to

stop." (Canon Cook, from whom we take this, refers us to the *Chronicle of Convocation*, February 1870, p. 83.)

Now, that the Revisers have gone considerably beyond the correction of "plain and clear errors" is evident enough. But what had the Revision Company to do with this expression of individual opinion by one member of the Upper House of Convocation? Was it one of their instructions? or would the Chairman have thought of imposing his own individual opinion as a rule for the Company to be guided by? For myself, I never heard of it till I read this volume of Canon Cook's. For aught I know, as the Bishop's own views of what might fairly be aimed at, once the work was undertaken, began to enlarge, he may have hardly remembered what he had expressed in Convocation. Be that as it may, such words could be no rule to those whose printed instructions lay before them. But Canon Cook persists in holding all that exceeds the correction of "plain and clear errors" as a breach of trust on the part of the Company itself. In fact, in this one criticism these words occur three times. Whether this indicates a strong or a weak cause the reader will judge for himself.

III. When brought to Jerusalem at twelve years of age, "the child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem, and (says the Authorised Version) Joseph and his mother knew not of it"—for which the Revised Version has "his parents knew not of it." "This change (says Canon Cook) is not important, since St. Luke has 'parents' in ver. 41; but it is displeasing. It would almost seem that St. Luke avoids repeating an expression which might be misunderstood" (p. 33). Such remarks are most reprehensible. If the Evangelist had felt as Canon Cook supposes, why did he say "his parents" at all? And had not His Virgin mother said to Him, "Behold, thy *father* and I have sought thee sorrowing"? Was Joseph not His legal father, as His mother's betrothed husband, and was He not ever recognised as "Joseph's son"? So far from its being "unpleasing" to find the Evangelist saying without scruple "his parents," it should be regarded as a delightful illustration of the fact that—so long as His miraculous conception was unknown to the public—He who doeth all things well did, by this known

relation of His mother to Joseph, protect unquestioned the reputation both of His mother and Himself.

This, however, will not show it to be the true reading here. Meyer thinks it is not, but is a case of assimilation to verse 41. It may be so, and the evidence for the received reading is certainly good. But my object in referring to it at all was not to discuss which was the true reading, but to protest against a sensitiveness about this reading which springs from a false principle, and is discountenanced by the whole tenor of the Evangelical language on this subject.

IV. When, on the same occasion, His mother said to Him, "Why hast thou thus dealt with us? Behold, thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing," He gave her this pregnant reply, according to the Authorised Version, "How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?"—but according to the Revised Version, "Wist ye not that I must be in my Father's house?" On this change of rendering our author says:—

"I cannot think that the Revisers were justified in altering the Authorised Version here, and substituting for it 'in my Father's house.' This may be the true meaning of the Greek, but it is far from certain. With their own marginal alternative, and their somewhat awkward rendering of the Greek before them, it seems a bold thing to condemn the Authorised Version as being a *plain and clear error*. In fact, 'in the things' is a very awkward rendering. The Greek is ambiguous, and I believe it is purposely chosen as a comprehensive expression. Our Lord chooses words which implicitly declared the whole purpose of His life on earth; but that was to be 'about His Father's business,' engaged in His Father's affairs, certainly not in His Father's house, if by the house is meant the temple . . . an unnecessary and unsatisfactory change" (pp. 34, 35).

Now the phrase is elliptical, and reads thus, "in the . . . of my Father;" and as either supplement is grammatically admissible, the intended meaning must be gathered partly from the sense in which they would then be understood, but still more from what actual circumstances would suggest. Now, the learned Dr. Field, whose services to Biblical scholarship well entitle him to be heard here, has shown, in a special paper on this passage,¹ that though the phrase may very well bear the sense of the Authorised Version, "if clearly required

¹ *Otium Norvicense, Pars Tertia*, 4to, Oxford, 1881.

by the context," yet that the sense given to it by the Revised Version is decidedly favoured by classical usage and by that of the LXX, and that the Peshito Syriac and Greek expositors are on the same side.

But independently of this there are three overmastering considerations which a great many years ago convinced me that the meaning given by the Authorised Version can hardly be that which our Lord meant to convey. *First*, what his mother wanted to know was not *what he had been about*, but *where he had been* during those three anxious days. To tell her, then, that he had been doing His Father's business was not quite to the point, if I may so say. *Next*, His Father's business was just what in his nonage He avoided meddling with. After this scene of budding majesty, being, like other sons, "under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the father," He "went down with them to Nazareth, and was subject unto them;" never once meddling, as I believe, during all those years of privacy, with "His Father's business," but awaiting the time when at His baptism the heavens were opened, and the Spirit descended and rested upon Him for the discharge of the work given Him to do, and by the voice from heaven He was formally inaugurated. To me, therefore, it has always appeared a mistake to make it appear, by the rendering of this phrase in the Authorised Version, that at this stage of mere boyhood our Lord had been engaged for three days in His Father's work. Then, mark how, on His first appearance in public at the marriage of Cana in Galilee, when, on the failure of the wine, His mother, presuming on her wonted familiarity with Him, ventured to hint to Him what an opportunity was thus opened to Him, He curtly and almost bluntly repelled her, "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" thus significantly intimating that now the time for doing His Father's business having at length come, He would allow no interference even from her. *Lastly*, only take the view of the matter given by the Revised Version, and see what a beautiful light it throws upon the subject. "Behold (said His mother), *thy father* (small *f*) and I have sought thee sorrowing." "*My Father* (He replies, capital *F*) has not been seeking me: I have never left Him: how is it that ye do not understand?"

Still, in the opinion of some, the Authorised Version may be preferred, or, with Canon Cook, the other rendering may be thought "far from certain." Well, just for that reason the Revisers not only put the alternative rendering in the margin, but in two forms, so careful were they to do justice to the sense Canon Cook contends for. Yet, not content with calling the change "unnecessary and unsatisfactory," he adds, "It seems a bold thing to condemn the Authorised Version as being a *plain and clear error*." But who, save Canon Cook, could so construe the change? and what is to be thought of such criticism?

V. Mark i. 2.—"The Revisers alter the text; instead of 'the prophets,' they have 'Isaiah the prophet,' informing us in the margin that 'some ancient authorities' support the Authorised Version. They ought surely to have said *many*. Now, one thing is certain. The statement which assigns the two prophecies to Isaiah as it stands in the Revised Version is a *plain and clear error*. The first prophecy belongs to Malachi. The question is simply this. Is the error to be attributed to St. Mark, or to a transcriber? . . . It is assuredly strange to impute to the Evangelist an error natural and excusable in the first innovator and in the transcribers. . . . One thing is at least certain. The statement in the text as it stands in the Revised Version is more than incorrect; it is a *plain and clear error*" (pp. 36, 41).

On this reading I must dwell at some length, owing to the nature of the facts, and the important principles which it embraces. Note first the oracular strain of our author. He is "certain" the reading in question is a *plain and clear error*, not only repeating and italicising it each time, but (*more suo*) making the Revisers impute the error to the Evangelist himself. It may be well, therefore, before looking at the textual evidence, to inquire what this reading amounts to. The *matrix* of the prophecy of a forerunner is certainly in Isaiah, and what Malachi does is simply to reproduce it in that more definite form which was to be expected of a prophet living so much nearer the event. Now, be it observed that while both forms of the prophecy are quoted by each of the three first Evangelists, Matthew and Luke quote the one apart from the other (Matt. iii. 3; xi. 10: Luke iii. 4; vii. 27), whereas Mark—the opening verses of whose Gospel are stamped with an abruptness and rapidity which strike every one—quotes them both as one continuous prediction; beginning with the latest

and fullest form of it as in Malachi, and (according to this reading) adding Isaiah's primary form of it, and then attaching to the whole the name of its original author. To call this "a plain and clear error," palmed upon the Evangelist by the Revisers, is a little too much. Whether this is the true reading, however, is another question, and one purely of textual evidence. To this, then, let us come, and all the rather as Canon Cook's statement of it is not very impartial nor quite accurate.¹

For the reading of the Revised Versions there are \aleph , B (C is defective here), D, L, Δ ; 33 and about 20 more cursives, the Old Latin and Vulgate, the Memphitic, the Peshito and Harklean margin, with the Jerusalem Syriac and the Gothic. (To the Fathers I will come presently.) For the reading of the received text there are, of the earliest uncials, only one, \aleph , but nearly all the later ones—E, F, G, H, K, M, P, S, U, V, Γ , Π —and most cursives. With Drs. Westcott and Hort this would suffice to condemn it, but not with me. Of the versions there are the Harklean text, the printed Armenian (though some copies have the other reading), and the Æthiopic.

From this it will be seen that numbers are with the received text and Authorised Version, antiquity with the Revised Version.² But how is the evidence represented by our author? After enumerating the uncials that support the Authorised Version, he says they are "remarkable either for their general

¹ Readers unfamiliar with the working tools of textual criticism—in MSS., Versions, and Fathers—will find our statements in the main intelligible if they will bear in mind the following points. The extant MSS. of the New Testament called "uncial" (those written in capital letters), date from about the 4th to the 9th century; those called "cursive" (written in current hand), date from about the 9th to the 15th century. The five oldest uncials are denoted by our A, B, C, D and \aleph ; B being of about middle of 4th century, \aleph about 70 years later, A and C nearly contemporary with \aleph , while D is of 6th century, and D₂ (of St. Paul's Epistles) same century. The remaining uncials are of various later dates. The chief Versions are the *Old Latin* (middle of 2d century), and the *Vulgate* revision of it (end of 4th century); the Syriac Versions (the *Peshito*, date uncertain; the *Harklean* or *Philoxenian*, a critical revision of the Peshito, about 7th century, and the *Jerusalem*, of later date); the Egyptian Versions (the *Memphitic* or *Coptic*, the Lower Egyptian, and the *Thebaic* or *Sahidic*, the Upper Egyptian, about 3d century); the *Gothic* (4th century), and the Armenian and Æthiopic (5th century).

² Canon Cook thinks, and I agree with him, that the margin should have said, not "some" but "many authorities" read as in the Authorised Version; but this is a matter depending on people's estimate of their relative value.

correctness, or for their general agreement with the Eusebian recension" (meaning the text of \aleph and B). Now this is exactly what, with one or two exceptions, these MSS. (I had thought) did not do. In fact, Canon Cook usually claims them as on his own side *against* \aleph and B. Further, he says, "Two of the best versions"—the Peshito Syriac and the Coptic (or Memphitic) versions—are against the "new" reading. But here he has misread Tischendorf's "p" (in the words "Syr^p text"), which does not mean the text of the *Peshito* Syriac, but the text of the *Philoxenian* or Harklean Syriac. And as to the "Coptic," the curious thing is that it supports not the Authorised Version but the Revised Version, while one copy combines both readings "in the prophets, in Isaiah the prophet," and if Canon Cook finds any comfort in this "conflate" reading he is welcome to it.

On the whole, if the evidence is not preponderant for the Revised Version, it is certainly not conclusive against it, leaving us, therefore, free to inquire which of the two readings is most likely to have displaced the other. Suppose, then, that the scribes found in their copy the words "in the prophets," who can imagine that they would be at all likely to change this into "in Isaiah the prophet"? But if they found a prophecy beginning with the words of Malachi ascribed to "Isaiah the prophet," though they might shrink from changing the name of the one prophet into that of the other, might they not be induced to write "in the prophets" as at least a true statement? Surely this is a case for Bengel's rule, *Proclivi scriptioni præstat ardua*—Other things being equal, "the harder reading is to be preferred to the smooth one."¹

Coming now to the patristic evidence, we should naturally begin with Irenæus, the earliest, and, with Canon Cook, almost conclusive of itself. But as his testimony is matter

¹ Canon Cook thinks the "new" reading is a case of *assimilation*. When the copyist was writing this verse he most likely thought of Matt. iii. 2 (he should have said 3), where he found the words, "the prophet Isaiah," and so was led (he thinks) to assimilate the reading of Mark to that of Matthew. It is "a clear case," he says. It is a noteworthy feature of our author's criticism that where other textual critics see clear indications of assimilation, he not only does not, but very rarely alludes to this as a natural or conceivable explanation of disputed readings; whereas, where assimilation would never occur to others, he sees "a clear case" of it. The reader will judge for himself whether the present is a probable case of it.

of dispute, and will require some sifting, we shall dispose first of those which follow him. "It is admitted" (says our author) "that the greater number of the Fathers in the East and West, from the fourth century downwards, agree with the new text." Well, even this is rather an awkward fact for Canon Cook, who regards the "new" reading as a charge against the Evangelist himself of "ignorance or inconceivable carelessness." But why skip the third century? Was not *Origen* of that century, and partly contemporary with Irenæus himself? Of this great Father it is not a pleasant feature of Canon Cook's criticism, that he seldom names him without trying to lessen the weight of his authority by insinuations about his heretical proclivities. Here at any rate, it is hard to see how his doctrinal views, whatever they were, could affect his opinion on the two readings in question. What, therefore, our critic omits, we shall now endeavour to supply.

In four different places *Origen* quotes our passage, and in all of them he has the "new" reading. Thus, towards the close of his long preface to the Gospel of John—referring to the first words of the other Gospels, to show that the burden of them is "Jesus," as "the Christ of the Old Testament,"—he says that the end of the Old Testament, of which the Baptist was the representative, is the beginning of the New, "as Mark says, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet, Behold, I send,*" etc.¹ Again, in the same commentary on John, coming to the question put to the Baptist, who he was, he points out his subordinate character and position to that of his Master, and then adduces the testimony of the Evangelists to this, and of Mark in particular, of whom he says "he puts the beginning of the Gospel in the mouth of Isaiah in this fashion: *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet, Behold,*" etc.² Again, on his commentary on Romans (Latin only preserved), on the expression, "The Gospel of God" (i. 1), he says, "In other places of Scripture it is called the Gospel of Christ, as the Evangelist Mark writes, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet.*"³ Once more, in his work *Against Celsus* (Book II.), when showing

¹ *Orig. Opera*, fol., Paris, 1759, iv. 15 K.

² *Ibid.* iv. 125 K.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 464 A.

that the Gospel is but the sequel of the Law and the Prophets—after quoting our Lord's words, "If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me," etc. (John v. 46, 47), he adds this:—"And Mark also, one of the Evangelists, says, *The beginning of the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet, Behold,*" etc.¹

All this, however, Canon Cook ignores, not even naming one of "the greater number of the Fathers in the East and West" who "agree with the new text." But what he omits I may in part supply in the case of Jerome, which the reader will probably think enough. How reluctant he was to meddle with the Old Latin Version, though urged to revise it by the Bishop of Rome, is well known. Though he says hyperbolically that the text of nearly every copy of that venerable version differed from that of another, he was afraid of shocking the prejudices of those whose only *Bible* it was. But in doing it, he made no greater changes than he deemed indispensable, and compared not only the best copies of the version he was revising, but the best Greek mss. he could find. What pains he took to get at the true text is evident from remarks which he occasionally throws out in his commentaries. Well, how does he render our passage? Why, just according to the "new" reading—*sicut scriptum est in Esaia propheta*,—which the learned Porphyry, the Neo-Platonic enemy of Christ, and a contemporary of Jerome, casts up against the Christians as a manifest error, inasmuch as it ascribes to Isaiah what is not his but Malachi's; plainly showing that in his day or up to near the close of the fourth century, no other reading of this verse was known. But further, in his commentary on Matthew he has a note on this reading. He says that Isaiah's name came in here by mistake of the copyists ("of which we could produce examples in other places"), or else two prophecies of the same event have been placed under one head.² On this I remark—(1.) That even if Jerome himself was puzzled about this reading, he takes care not to tamper with the text as he found it in the Greek mss., and never alludes to any other reading as known to him; (2.) Though he throws out the suggestion of a possible mistake on the copyists' part, he either did not take that view of it himself, or must have

¹ Orig., *ut supra*, i. 389 κ.

² Hieron. *Opera*, 4to, Venet. vii. 17.

speedily abandoned it; for in two other places he explains it in only one way, the way we have already explained it—the combination of two expressions of one and the same prophecy under one name. Thus, in his commentary on Malachi,¹ he says our Lord “interprets ch. iii. 1 of John the Baptist, and the Evangelist Mark also [let the reader mark what follows], combining the two testimonies of Isaiah and Malachi under the head of one prophet, begins thus, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet*. He then cites the varying way in which these predictions are quoted elsewhere and refers on this subject to his letter to Pammachius² on “the best way of translating out of one language into another;” deprecating the slavish way of rendering word for word (quoting Cicero as of the same mind), and refers to the Old Testament predictions quoted in the New as quite correctly though not literally rendered—variations, however, which such enemies of Christ as Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian make a handle of against the New Testament writers, as if they were guilty of falsehood in so quoting. Of this he gives our present passage as a specimen,—“Mark, the disciple of Peter, thus begins his Gospel: *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet, Behold . . . The voice*, etc. This prediction is made up of two prophecies, from Malachi and Isaiah. But how is it that Mark ascribes to Isaiah what is not in Isaiah but in Malachi, the last of the twelve prophets? I leave the solution of this petty question (*quæstiunculam*) to their ignorant presumption.”³ May I commend this last sentence to Canon Cook’s sober reflection?

I now come at length to *Irenæus*, who, with our author, outweighs all other witnesses. But even if his testimony were as decisive for our author’s reading, as I hope to show it is not, it would only prove that the copy of the Greek Testament which he used read as in the received text and Authorised Version, not that this was the original reading.⁴ But let us see how the case stands.

¹ Hieron. *Opera*, 4to, Venet., pp. 969, 970.

² The letter will be found in Jerome’s works (*ut supra*), i. No. 57; in other copies, 101.

³ *Ibid.* 313, 314.

⁴ For example, *Irenæus* reads Matt. i. 18 in a way which I am sure Canon Cook will not accept as the true reading—“Now the birth of Christ”

The only surviving work of Irenæus is his five books *Against Heresies*, and even of this invaluable work much of the original Greek has been lost, though happily preserved in a very ancient Latin translation. In the Third Book our passage occurs twice. In one of the two places we have it only in the Latin; in the other, both in the original and in the translation. Curiously enough, where we have it only the Latin, we find the reading of the Authorised Version "in the prophets;" where we have both the original and the translation, it is "in Isaiah the prophet." Thus:—

(In the Latin only): "Wherefore Mark, the interpreter and follower of Peter, begins his Gospel thus, *The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as it is written in the prophets, Behold. . . . The voice of one crying,*" etc.¹

(In both the original and the translation): "Matthew [did so and so], but Mark, by the prophetic Spirit descending upon men, began thus, saying, *The beginning of the Gospel, as it is written in Isaiah the prophet*; the winged character of the Gospel being represented by this abrupt and rapid way of announcing it."²

Which, now, of these two readings came from the pen of Irenæus himself? Canon Cook is sure that Irenæus wrote "in the prophets," and he has a theory which he thinks proves it. I will come to that presently; but one fact is enough, I think, to prove the contrary, namely, that up to the fourth century Jerome, as we have seen, knew no other reading of this verse but that of the Revised Version. Nor was Jerome ignorant of the writings of Irenæus; for in his book on *Illustrious*

(not "Jesus Christ") "was on this wise." So much importance does Irenæus attach to this that he appeals to it against those heretics who denied that the "Jesus" of the Gospel was "the Christ" of the Old Testament; bidding them observe how the Spirit, foreseeing how the truth would be corrupted, directed Matthew to write, not "the birth of Jesus," but the birth of "the Christ" (iii. 18, Grabe; Stieren, iii. 16. 2). For this remarkable reading there are the Old Latin, the Vulgate, and the Curetonian Syriac Versions; it was approved by Griesbach, adopted by Tregelles, and by Tischendorf in his 7th edition, but abandoned in his 8th; by Dr. Westcott and Hort it is only "not confidently accepted." But since *all* the Greek mss. (uncial and cursive alike) are against it, besides weighty version authority, this reading of Irenæus, very early though it undoubtedly is, must on all safe textual principles be condemned, as Canon Cook himself will admit.

¹ Irenæi Opera, Stieren, iii. 10. 6, p. 461: Grabe, iii. p. 240.

² *Ibid.* Stieren, iii. 11. 8, p. 470: Grabe, iii. p. 222.

Men he devotes a whole chapter out of 135 (No. xxxv.) to Irenæus, in which, after one or two particulars of his life, he enumerates his writings, the very names of which we know only from his mention of them, and in particular this work, *Against Heresies*, giving more particulars about its contents than about any of the others.¹ And further, in his Commentary on Isaiah (on chapter lxiv. 4, 5), when referring to a number of writings by which the faith of multitudes was in danger of being undermined, and commending those who had courageously and ably exposed them, he says, "Among whom that apostolical man Irenæus, bishop of Lyons and martyr, writes most copiously, explaining the origin of many heresies, especially that of the Gnostics, who, through Marcus the Egyptian, blighted many noble seeds, first among the Gauls around the Rhone, and then among the German," etc.² After this, it will hardly be alleged that Jerome had not this work of Irenæus before him, and of course in the original Greek. And if so, is it conceivable that he should not only never indicate that he knew such a reading, but refer to the sneers of three great enemies against the New Testament for this prophecy being falsely ascribed to Isaiah, and treating it as a contemptible objection?

What, now, is Canon Cook's way of explaining how, although Irenæus wrote "in the prophets," as in the Latin translation, this other reading "in Isaiah the prophet" found its way into the Greek? A surprising piece of argument it is, truly. (1.) The object of Irenæus in the place where "in the prophets" occurs, is to "point out distinctly and fully the drift and purport of the second Gospel." But this is so far from being true, that he passes from the second Gospel in a single sentence, while on the first and third Gospels he dwells at some length. In the other place, where the Greek has "in Isaiah the prophet," "the text is quoted without any special reference to its bearing." But the fact is that the object of Irenæus in both places is exactly the same, to show that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is only the outcome of ancient prophecy. (2.) The Greek of the passage in question was recovered from a book called *Hodegos* ("Guide"), by a monk of the name of Anastasius, in the Convent of St. Catherine on

¹ Iren. *Opera*, ut *supra*, 874, 875.

² *Ibid.* iv. 761.

Mount Sinai, towards the end of the seventh century, and Canon Cook refers to the note on this passage in Stieren's edition, p. 467—the long note, I presume, in p. 461, copied from Grabe's edition, 1702 (which is also copied into Massuet's beautiful folio edition, Paris, 1710). What light this long note throws on our point I am at a loss to discover, but Canon Cook thinks he has got the key to the whole mystery. It was in this convent that Tischendorf discovered his now celebrated ms., hence called *Codex Sinaiticus* (containing besides the LXX, the whole Greek Testament). And since this ms. reads "in Isaiah the prophet," what more natural than that Anastasius, having occasion to quote from Irenæus the passage containing this text, should write it—not as he found it in Irenæus, "in the prophets," but as he found it in the Greek Testament with which he was most "familiar," "in Isaiah the prophet"? In this way it is that it was inserted in the Greek text which we now have in the extant works of Irenæus. Such is Canon Cook's theory. Are we, then, to believe that this monk deliberately altered what Irenæus had written into something quite different? Besides, how do we know that this ms. was the Bible in actual and familiar use in the convent of Mount Sinai? Certainly it was little accounted of by the monks in 1844, when Tischendorf by mere accident prevented a bundle of its leaves from being used to kindle the fire that was to cook his dinner. Dean Burgon, indeed (or the Quarterly Reviewer), throws out the conjecture—wild enough, some will say—that it was just because the text of this ms. was so worthless that it was allowed for so many centuries to go out of sight. If I have dwelt at disproportionate length on this one criticism, it is because of the illustration that it gives of the necessity of sifting statements so confidently made, but which, involving as they do some intricate inquiries, may be too easily taken for granted.

VI. Coming now to THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT, I note the following points:—

"We now come to an omission which for character and extent is perfectly astounding. In chapter v. 44, all these words, *bless them that hate you, do good to them that hate you*, and again, *despitefully use you*, are absolutely, without any marginal notice of course, therefore without

the shadow of apology. . . . I can scarcely realise the feeling of a devout reader, on whose memory those sacred loving words are graven in characters of light. Is it to be taught that some unknown daring interpolator went further than our blessed Lord in enjoining charity" (pp. 50, 51).

Who would not suppose, on reading these words, that the Revisers had *excluded these words absolutely from the Revised Version*? But on finding them identically in the Revised Version of Luke vi. 27, 28, what can we think of that appeal to "the feeling of a devout reader on whose memory those sacred loving words are graven in characters of light," save as an attempt to persuade his readers that such teaching, according to the Revisers, never came from the lips of our Lord, and that their presence in the received text and Authorised Version is due to "some unknown daring interpolator"? The most charitable view of so outrageous a charge is, that Canon Cook, when penning these words, had quite forgotten that in the Revised Version they occur in Luke precisely as in the Authorised Version—an excuse which he ought not to be very comfortable in accepting, though this appears to be the plain fact, when he tell us that "those early Fathers who pass over the clauses," do not omit them "in a way which would justify our saying that *they were unknown to them*." Unknown to them?—how could they be so to one who could read them in Luke, unless, with Canon Cook, they quite forgot themselves?

The one question of real importance is, whether they should stand in both Gospels, or whether, being genuine and undisputed in Luke, they have got into Matthew by assimilation—copyists missing them there, and presuming that they had dropped out by mistake. The latter appeared to the Revisers to be the case, judging from the evidence. The textual evidence appears to me to be in favour of the Authorised Version. All the uncials save \aleph and B (A is deficient here), and (apparently) all cursives save three; nearly all versions—The Latin in both forms, the Peshito and Harklean Syriac, the Armenian and *Æthiopic*. The Fathers seem to favour the Revised Version—Irenæus (in the Latin), Origen, and Cyprian. For the Revised Version there are, as has been said, of uncials only \aleph and B, and of cursives 1, 22, 209, and of Versions only two—the Cureton Syriac and the Memphitic. With Drs. Westcott and Hort, this is sufficient to outweigh all other evidence,

but with none who are not prepared to accept their theory. And as we have no right to assume a case of assimilation except where the evidence is more equally balanced than I think it is here, if our author had contented himself with expressing, however strongly, his disapproval of the exclusion of the words in question and the want of any marginal intimation of the "many ancient authorities for the insertion of the words, perhaps he would have found sympathisers among the Revisers themselves. But by the language he has been so unwise as to use he has deprived himself of all right to sympathy from any quarter.

VII. Matt. vi. 1.—"In this verse we meet at once with an expression which must be singularly perplexing to ordinary readers. They will scarcely be able to conjecture what the words *do not your righteousness* can possibly mean. They stand without explanation, and for my part, I must confess that I do not know what meaning is attached to them by the Revisers. I presume that they adopt, together with the new word, the exposition of the Latin Fathers, who identify *justitiam* with almsgiving; but if so, they were surely bound to explain a phrase at once so novel and ambiguous. It might be made to mean, do not any good works, works of righteousness, in an ostentatious manner—an excellent precept, but scarcely according with the context. . . . The question is (1.) Whether the old reading ("almsgiving") was a gloss, a true one, however, and as such, if not to be retained, yet to be borne in mind and its meaning expressed in any new translation; or (2.) whether the new reading ("righteousness") is not a somewhat pedantic innovation, suggested probably by a critic familiar with the Hebrew and apparently the old Italic usage. It must be admitted that the reading is very ancient and perfectly defensible, on the ground that *δικαιοσύνη* represents מִצְוָה and its Aramaic equivalent, which are commonly used in the sense of 'almsgiving.' But if the reading is admitted, the rendering, as it stands, being either unintelligible or misleading, is indefensible. If the reading is admitted on the ground that *δικαιοσύνη* means 'almsgiving,' it ought to be translated almsgiving. It is precisely a case in which the change in language contravenes a fundamental resolution of Convocation" (pp. 51-53).

This is a miserable criticism. The surprising thing about it is, that the author seems never to dream that the word "righteousness" is capable of any other sense than "almsgiving," at least that the Revisers could have meant anything else by it. And what adds to the surprise is, that while he says the words *might* be understood as meaning "Do not any good works, works of righteousness, in an ostentatious manner,"

he says "this, though an excellent precept, scarcely accords with the context." But what context, pray? For since the chapter starts a new subject with this verse, *it makes its own context*, announcing this subject to be "Ostentation" in the performance of religious duties. Of this three illustrations are then given:—(1.) *Almsgiving* (2-4); (2.) *Prayer* (5-15); (3.) *Fasting* (16-18). According to the reading of the Revised Version, the first verse, it will be seen, is a general heading for this whole section, extending to eighteen verses. So obviously is this the sense in which the Revisers meant the word "righteousness" to be taken, that one whom Canon Cook himself calls "an able scholar" and "an excellent authority," Mr. Prebendary Humphry, in his short note on this reading, thinks it enough to say, "The command is thus of general application, and not limited to almsgiving."¹

But perhaps Canon Cook will listen more deferentially to his own commentator on this Gospel, in the Speaker's Commentary—the late lamented Dean Mansel:—

"The marginal reading, 'righteousness,' is probably correct, and shows the connection between this chapter and the preceding better than the received word 'alms.' In chapter v. 20, the disciples are told that their *righteousness* is to exceed that of the Scribes and Pharisees. This is explained at length in what follows: in the preceding chapter as regards the actions themselves; in the present as regards the motives and manner of performing them. Almsgiving, in the language of the later Rabbis, was especially called *righteousness* (see Lightfoot); but in the present passage it seems rather to mean good works in general, including *almsgiving*, *prayer*, and *fasting*."

Canon Cook dwells on the "singular perplexity to the ordinary reader of the word "righteousness" here, and his inability to conjecture what it "can possibly mean." I had thought that to "do righteousness" was not so unusual a phrase in the "English Bible," that it would need one to hunt for the probable sense of it away in the "old Italic usage." Do we not read, "Blessed are they that keep judgment, and he that *doeih*

¹ *Commentary on the Revised Version of the New Testament* (Cassell, 1882), pp. 14, 15. "Explanatory Notes," however, would have better described this useful volume, which, as a book of reference, will be found to explain and vindicate, in the briefest terms, many things in the Revised Version which have been too hastily condemned, though in vindicating both text and translation it goes much beyond what I am able to concur in.

righteousness at all times;"¹ "Lord, who shall abide in thy tabernacle? . . . He that walketh uprightly, and *worketh righteousness*;"² "He loveth him that *followeth after righteousness*;"³ "Hearken to me, ye that follow after righteousness;"⁴ "Yet they seek me daily, and delight to know my ways, as a nation that *did righteousness*;"⁵ "Every one that *doeth righteousness* is born of him;"⁶ "He that *doeth righteousness* is righteous"?⁷ In all these and similar phrases the Hebrew word is צְדִיקָה or צִדְקָה, and in the LXX. δικαιοσύνη—certainly not in the specific sense of "almsgiving." Even in the very few cases in which almsgiving is the *kind* of righteousness pointed at, it is merely this as one *feature* of that righteousness which is the character of a good man in the sight of God (as Deut. xxiv. 13; Dan. iv. 27—where the LXX. has δικαιοσύνη—and 2 Cor. ix. 9, 10).

The only question, then, should be, Which appears to be the original reading? Of uncials (A and C are defective here), \aleph , B, D, have "righteousness"; of cursives, 1 and 209; of Versions nearly every copy of the Old Latin, and the Vulgate; of the Fathers, Origen, Hilary, Jerome, Augustine. For "almsgiving" there are Z (same age as D), all the later uncials (including L and Δ , which often go with \aleph and B), the Harklean Syriac, the Gothic, and Armenian versions.⁸

So far, then, as external evidence goes, were I to be guided by that alone, I should probably decide in favour of the received text. But internal evidence leaves no doubt on my mind that the word "righteousness" is the true reading here. For (1.) it makes "Ostentation in the discharge of all works of righteousness," or religious duty, to be a general heading for the whole section from ver. 2 to ver. 18—*Almsgiving, Prayer, and Fasting* being merely examples of the thing to be avoided, and of its opposite; whereas by putting "almsgiving" into the first verse, our Lord appears to limit this injunction to the first of those three things. Canon Cook would have his readers to believe that the Latin Fathers all took *justitiam* ("righteousness") in the sense of almsgiving; whereas

¹ Ps. cvi. 3.² Ps. xv. 2.³ Prov. xv. 9.⁴ Isa. li. 1.⁵ Isa. lviii. 2.⁶ 1 John ii. 29.⁷ 1 John iii. 7.⁸ In the Cureton Syriac there is a transposition of the words for "alms" and "righteousness"—the word in the first verse meaning "alms," while in the second verse the word used means "righteousness."

Augustine, in his Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, says, quoting chapter vi. 1 (with the word *justitiam*), our Lord "here uses righteousness as a general term, and then follows it up in detail."¹ (2.) Suppose the scribes had ἐλεημοσύνην before them in their copies, would they be at all likely to change it into δικαιοσύνην? Would they not, if they found δικαιοσύνην in their copies, be far more likely to change this into ἐλεημοσύνην—observing that word no fewer than three times, once in each of the three following verses, and the last six letters of both words in Greek being the very same letters, which in uncial characters would strike the eye the more readily?

VIII.—In the Lord's Prayer I am at one with Canon Cook in deeply regretting the *masculine* sense given to ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ—"deliver us from *the evil one*." This rendered it necessary, for consistency's sake, to translate the same phrase in verse 37, "Let your speech be Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these is of the evil one"—as if our Lord was likely to say to a raw multitude, gathered from every quarter and at so early a period of His ministry, that whatever in their social intercourse went beyond a simple affirmation or negation was of the devil! (See also ver. 39, "Resist not *him that is evil*.") On this subject it seems to me that much that has been written does little to settle the question. That the Greek and Latin Fathers took the masculine sense would be of some consequence if it were a question of Greek. But as the Greek is equally well rendered in both ways, it is purely a question of interpretation, of which we are as good judges at this time of day as they were. Men are, in such matters, insensibly swayed by the moral and religious atmosphere of the times in which they live; and I cannot but think that the outstanding scope and drift of the whole discourse is the chief thing to be considered in determining the sense of this petition. An immense miscellaneous crowd, from all quarters, had hung about our Lord's steps during His first missionary tour in Galilee, riveted by the novelty of His teaching, but little able to grasp its import.

¹ *Generaliter hic justitiam nominavit, deinde particulariter exsequitur.—Oratio Domini in Monte, Lib. ii. 8.*

At this stage sharp, definite doctrinal positions would have been thrown away upon them, and the great general features of that "Kingdom of God," which He had come to set up, with the "righteousness" of it, are all that He puts before them. But how different His later teaching to those whom He was specially training, even when urging the same duties! Thus, on the power of importunity in prayer, He thus speaks in the Sermon on the Mount: "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give *good things* (*ἀγαθὰ*) to them that ask Him?" (Matt. vii. 11.) But when alone with His own, and "praying in a certain place," and "one of His disciples," struck, no doubt, with the lofty strain of His prayer, asked Him to teach *them* to pray, "as John taught his disciples," He replied by first repeating some of the petitions in the Lord's Prayer, adding a parable on importunity, and then reiterates the words we have quoted, but with a marked change—"If ye then, being evil," etc., "how much more will your heavenly Father give (not "good things" now, but) *the Holy Spirit* (*πνεῦμα ἅγιον*) to them that ask him" (Luke xi. 13). Not a word about the Holy Spirit do we find in the Sermon on the Mount—one feels as if there it would be out of place—and I cannot but think that in a discourse so studiously general, and above all, in that briefest, weightiest, and most catholic of all prayers, anything about "the evil one" would have been no less out of place.

But here ends my agreement with Canon Cook on the Lord's Prayer. For, on the question whether the *Doxology* was part of what our Lord then dictated, the opinion I have long formed, and very decidedly, is, that it was no part of it.

That the absence of the *Doxology* from the Revised Version would encounter prejudice in the minds of many devout Christians was fully expected; but that scholars should not only disapprove of its exclusion, as in their judgment contrary to evidence—which they were of course entitled to do—but should join in the outcry against the Revisers, as if they had laid unhallowed hands on all that was most sacred and dear to Christians, is a little humiliating. Did the Revisers mean to direct their readers to say this Prayer *without any Doxology*? Surely not. What they had to do was to judge, on the evi-

dence before them, whether the words in question stood part of the original text of this Gospel. They judged that they did not. What their grounds were I will state presently. But let it meantime be borne in mind that our Lord's primary design was to guide His disciples both on the *subject-matter* and the *style* of Prayer, rather than to fix them down to that Formula. In His subsequent repetition of it, He was so far from adhering to its precise terms that he omits some of its clauses, and certainly the doxology. His own recorded prayers consisted sometimes of a single uplifted cry, while, in one instance, He poured out his heart in an extended form. When Peter and John, after the day of Pentecost, "were let go" from those who were threatening them, and "went unto their own company, and reported all that the chief priests and elders had said unto them," the little persecuted company "lifted up their voice with one accord," in a prayer which came welling up, fresh and warm, from hearts strung to the utmost by the extremity they were come to. In a word, if we look at the recorded prayers of the chiefest of the apostles, they are all of the most varied character, both in matter and form, as the case in hand and his own feelings dictated; and what is noticeable, the actual petitions of the Lord's Prayer seem to come to him here and there, and get interwoven with his own, showing that he had fully realised its design as a *directory*, rather than as any fixed *form*. Why, then, should we be surprised, and why should offence be taken at its seemingly truncated appearance in the Revised Version? No doubt, had there been as much need of a form of doxology as of other parts of prayer, such might have been expected. But the Jewish Church had all along been rich in such forms. As the Old Testament was full of them, so at the celebration of the Passover the disciples, as Jews, were familiar with them. Doxologies, therefore, in abundance, were not far to seek. Although for some time, when using this form as a prayer of their own, the way of closing it would be variously expressed, it got crystallised by degrees into that form with which all Christendom has for ages been familiar with it, and became naturally attached to it. That, in the constant use of the Lord's Prayer, people should grudge to miss it in the Revised Version, ought not to surprise us, nor that scholars should on critical grounds differ from the

Revisers in their judgment on the evidence for its absence in the original ; but, beyond this, surely they ought not to go in prejudicing the public mind against the Revised Version.

Before stating in detail the evidence of MSS., Versions, and Fathers on both sides, I will give here, in the words of another, what I hold to be unanswerable evidence that the Doxology did not and could not have formed part of the Lord's Prayer, as recorded in the first Gospel. I refer to the Rev. T. Sheldon Green's *Course of Developed Criticism on Passages of the New Testament materially affected by Various Readings*.¹ This work, of much ability, advocates principles of textual criticism which I am far from approving—principles which the author himself seems to have greatly modified, if we may judge from his *Twofold New Testament*, published nearly ten years after.² But all the rather do I avail myself of his statement on this subject, as carefully expressed as it appears to me unanswerable:—

“There are peculiar circumstances affecting the Lord's Prayer, as given in this Gospel, which attach in an equal degree to no other portion of the New Testament. By its mode of introduction—the injunction which ushers it in—precise attention would at once be especially drawn to it, and exact recollection secured for it as a model summary of prayer. More than this, it soon began not merely to be regarded as a type, but used as a form. Under these circumstances probabilities are opposed even to the accidental omission of a clause in transcription ; and if an instance occurred, there would be immediate detection, and an instant check to the multiplication of error. And yet, if the clause be genuine, such an error has from the first possessed the entire Latin Church, which has never acknowledged the Doxology. An early and wide-spread use of so brief a form, especially its liturgical employment, must be regarded as a safeguard against a suppression, in any degree or manner, of any constituent portion.

“But liturgical influence, though thus in a manner conservative, might also have a mischievous tendency in a different direction. If the prayer did not originally conclude with a doxological clause, such an appendage would be naturally attached to it in practice ; not put forward as an original portion of it, but as adding a feature which would place it in better keeping with the formularies into which it was introduced. From the service-book the clause would soon find its way into the lectionary, and afterwards into the margin and text of continually multiplying copies.

“It appears then that, from the peculiar circumstances of the case, there is an especial difficulty in reconciling the genuineness of the clause with its

¹ Bagster, 8vo. p. 192.

² *The Twofold New Testament ; being a new translation accompanying a newly formed text, in parallel columns.*—Bagster, 4to.

omission in a few ancient documents, Versions, and Fathers ; while the same circumstances suggest a ready mode of accounting for its presence elsewhere. This later array, therefore, though imposing in appearance, ought not to be allowed in this instance to countervail the former, and an acknowledgment of genuineness cannot be reasonably demanded " (pp. 11, 12).

Leaving this statement to make its own impression, let us now see how the external evidence stands. Dr. Scrivener, who makes the most of all that can be said for the doxological clause, is too candid not to admit the great strength of the case against it. Here are his words : " It is right to say that I can no longer regard the Doxology as *certainly* an integral part of St. Matthew's Gospel, but I am not yet absolutely convinced of its spuriousness. Of the six oldest uncials (A and C being defective here) four omit the doxology —~~A~~, B, D, Z. Hence (says Dr. Scrivener) the burden of the defence is thrown on the later uncials, E, G, L, M, S, U, V, Δ, Π,—L, however, generally siding with B. Of the cursives only five are known to omit the clause, 1, 17 (which have the 'Amen'), 118, 120, 209 ; but one copy (^{h^{scr}}, and, as it would seem, some others) has it obelised in the margin, while the scholia in certain other copies indicate that it is doubtful. All the other cursives insert the clause. . . . Of the Versions, it is wanting in all copies of the Old Latin save a very few, and these not of the best, as also in the Vulgate. It was excluded from the Clementine Vulgate (though an 'Amen' is added), and this, be it remembered, is the *Bible* of the modern Latin Church. In all the four Syriac versions the Doxology is certainly found, but Cureton's omits 'and the power,' while some editions of the Peshito want the 'Amen.' The Gothic has it, but of the two Egyptian versions the Memphitic wants it, while the Thebaic gives it thus, 'for thine is the strength and power for ever and ever. Amen.' Of the few copies of the Old Latin that have the doxology, one omits the 'Amen,' while another gives it thus, 'for thine is the power for ever and ever.'"¹

On these damaging variations let the following closing remarks of Mr. Green be pondered :—" Had the simple and distinct Doxology clause now found in the text existed from the first, it would have been as secure from the fluctuation of form as the other clauses of the Prayer ; and, accordingly, the

¹ *Introduction*, 2d ed., p. 495, slightly abridged. The splendid third edition, just out (1883), varies but in words.

strange variety which is observable on comparing the doxologies exhibited in the Syriac (N), which has nothing corresponding to 'and the power,' in one copy (k) of the Old Latin, and in various patristic passages—is an evidence that the original text of St. Matthew was not their source, but that they are merely the shifting shapes of an artificial appendage."

The testimony of the Fathers has yet to be stated. The later ones certainly recognised the clause. But *Origen*, in the third century, who may be fairly held to represent the text of his day, not only has it not, but seems not to have known of its existence. In his treatise on Prayer,¹ after dwelling on the duty itself, and the fitting style, when he comes to the subject-matter of prayer, he takes up the Lord's Prayer as the model, and comments on every clause of it at such length that this part (§ 22-29) occupies one-half of the whole work. But with the clause "deliver us from evil (or the evil one)" his comment ends, without a word about the doxology clause. Now, had the clause stood in any text in use among Greek-speaking Christians, is it likely that such an able textuary as *Origen* would have taken no notice of it at all? As for *Jerome*, in the fourth century, knowing as we do that no such clause was inserted by him—so conservative a man—when revising the Old Latin version, that no complaint ever arose against him for excluding it, and that it has never been known in the Latin Church, I think the case against the clause, as being no part of the original text, must be held conclusive.

Before leaving this point, it is due to Dr. Scrivener to notice the three ways in which he strives to account for the absence of the Doxology where, if genuine, we might reasonably expect it. His reasoning here seems to me to lack his usual force. (1.) "The silence of earlier writers, as *Origen* and *Cyril of Jerusalem*, especially when expounding the Lord's Prayer, may be partly accounted for on the supposition that the Doxology was regarded, not so much as a part of the Prayer itself, as a hymn of praise annexed to it." *Answer*: Can anything be more unnatural? But even if they did so regard it, how is it that, even in that light, they never refer to it? "Yet this fact," he candidly owns, "is so far unfavourable to its genuineness, and would be fatal, unless we knew the

¹ *Orig. Opera*, i., Περὶ Εὐχῆς.

precariousness of any argument from such silence." But surely there is a silence which is "fatal," and, if anywhere at all, I confidently affirm it is so here. (2.) "The Fathers are constantly overlooking the most obvious citations from Scripture, even where we should expect them most, although, as we learn from other passages in their writings, they were perfectly familiar with them." *Answer* : First, in the case of Origen and Cyril of Jerusalem, this is not a "citation from Scripture," but, if genuine, part of a prayer which they were formally expounding ; to them, therefore, this argument has no application whatever. But second, Can it be shown from any part of their extant works that "they were perfectly familiar with" the Doxology, as part of the Lord's Prayer? As for Jerome, will such an argument, or any argument whatever, account for his omitting it in his Revision of the Old Latin, if he knew that in the Latin Church it was recognised as part of the Lord's Prayer? (3.) "Internal evidence is not unequally balanced. It is probable [on the one hand] that the Doxology was interpolated from the Liturgies, and the variation of reading renders this all the more likely : [on the other hand] it is just as probable that it was cast out of St. Matthew's Gospel, to bring it into harmony with St. Luke's (xi. 4)." *Answer* : Had the MSS. which want the Doxology wanted also, like St. Luke's Gospel, some of the petitions, there might have been some force in this argument. But who can believe that, had this harmonising process been aimed at, it would have been the Doxology alone which would be "cast out"? One could have understood the shorter form being so filled up as "to bring it into harmony with" the longer ; but how any one can bring himself to think that the longer might have been shortened to bring it into harmony with the shorter—and shortened by merely leaving out the Doxology, which does not harmonise the two at all—is what passes my comprehension.¹

¹ There can be little doubt (says Dr. Hort) it originated in liturgical use in Syria, and was thence adopted into the Greek and Syriac text of the New Testament. It was probably derived ultimately from 1 Chron. xxix. 11 (*Heb.*), but, it may be, through the medium of some contemporary Jewish usage : the people's response to prayers in the temple is said to have been "Blessed be the name of the glory of His kingdom for ever and ever."—*Notes on Select Passages*, Introd., p. 9.

IX. Our Lord's DISCOURSE AT NAZARETH.—Luke iv. 18-20.

"In this most important discourse, in which in His native place (*sic*) our Lord formally claimed for Himself the fulfilment of one of the most striking Messianic prophecies, especially precious as describing the characteristic features of His personality, we are startled by the omission of the words 'to heal the broken-hearted,' ver. 19—(it should be ver. 18). . . . Is it conceivable that any one will venture to assert that these most blessed words are '*a plain and clear error*'? . . . It must be borne in mind that while it is certain that our Lord did read those words, St. Luke, of all writers inspired or uninspired, was the very last who would fail to record them. It would be against the whole tenor of this Gospel, of which the special characteristic is prominence given to all indications of deep sympathy, of utter tenderness, and compassionateness" (pp. 71, 72).

This is hardly the style of criticism one would expect from the Editor of the Speaker's Commentary. Canon Cook seems to forget that the Evangelist Luke was not one of our Lord's auditors in the synagogue of Nazareth, nor probably, till some time after the day of Pentecost, even a convert to Christianity. He could therefore only report what passed there from the information of eye and ear witnesses, handed down, no doubt, in a written form. That this written account did not contain all that our Lord uttered is plain on the face of the narrative itself. The only question then is, Have we sufficient evidence that the Evangelist had such a report of the scene as embraced the long quotation from Isaiah, clause by clause, exactly as it stands in the prophet? Looking at all the textual evidence, the Revisers judged that the clause in question was not in the record from which he drew up his account, since the best authorities for the text of this Gospel did not contain it. They therefore omitted it; and for doing this Canon Cook says they have charged the Evangelist with deliberately cutting out one of the tenderest portions of what he knew that our Lord read in the synagogue of Nazareth. Is this becoming language from such a man as Canon Cook? As for the *evidence*, I think the verdict of impartial critics will be with the Revisers.

Of the oldest uncials (C being here defective), only one—A—has the clause, with Γ, Δ, Α, Π and the other later uncials, while, B, D,¹ L, Ξ want it, as do the cursives (3, 33, 69). Of

¹ D more frequently *adding* to the text than omitting.

Versions, nearly all copies of the Old Latin, with the Vulgate, want it, as also the Memphitic, the Ethiopic, and many copies of the Armenian. The Versions that have the clause are the Peshito and Harklean Syriac, the Gothic, and printed Armenian. Of the Fathers, Irenæus inserts it, but Origen (in three places), Eusebius (several times), Athanasius, and Cyril all quote the passage *without* this clause. The question then is, Which is the more likely—that one who had the whole passage before him in his copy of this Gospel, deliberately left out this clause; or, that one familiar with this prophecy as it stands in Isaiah, though the clause was not in his copy of Luke, should insert it as a matter of course, either not observing its absence, or, if he did see it, presuming it had been dropped out by mistake? Surely the latter is by much the more likely. Canon Cook would have us believe that the Egyptian Versions left it out because its absence was not noticed. "In D," he says, "and those early Italic transcribers who omit the clause, I attribute the omission to carelessness and the disgraceful habit of cutting down the sacred text, probably attributable to haste in this instance, on the part of transcribers, or the Editors of the Vatican and Sinaitic manuscripts." I leave this way of disposing of evidence to speak for itself.

X. "In Mark vii. 19 we find the reading *καθαρίζων*, that is in the rendering, "*This he said, making all meats clean.*" I certainly agree with the Revisers as to the high probability of that reading. I had some years previously defended it on my note on the passage in the Speaker's Commentary. But, considering the number and the weight of the authorities adverse to the change of reading and of rendering, and the necessity, if it be adopted, of introducing parentheses, I should certainly not have ventured to do more than give it a marginal note. Granted the improvement, can the change be defended as *necessary*?" (pp. 72, 73.)

What a contrast to this way of writing is the following discussion of the passage from Dr. Scrivener [with the necessary verbal changes], than which I need no other reply to Canon Cook:—

"The substitution of *καθαρίζων* for *καθαρίζον*, so far from being the unmeaning itacism it might seem at first sight, is a happy restoration of the true sense of a passage long obscured by the false reading. For the long vowel [the reading of the Revised Version] there is the overwhelming evidence of

N, A, B (C is defective here) E, G, H, L, S, X, Δ, 1, 13, 28 [and above twenty more enumerated by Dr. Scrivener], and Erasmus's first edition. His second edition has the received text, with K, M, U, V, Γ, Π, and perhaps a majority of the cursives. . . . Will any one undertake to say what is meant by the last clause of the verse as it stands in the English version, and as it must stand so long as καθάριζον is read? If, on the other hand, we adopt καθάρισον [the Revised reading], we must take the Lord's words to end with ἐκπορεύεται, and regard what follows as the Evangelist's comment upon them:—'*This he said, making all things clean.*' Compare Acts x. 15. This and none other seems to have been the meaning assigned to the passage by the Greek Fathers. . . . It is obvious how well the elliptical form of the expression suits this Evangelist's style, which is often singularly concise and abrupt, yet never obscure" (*Introduction*, 2nd ed., pp. 506, 507; 3rd ed., pp. 582, 583).

But perhaps the following from Dean Burgon, in his work, of permanent value, on *The Last Twelve Verses of St. Mark*,¹ will carry more weight with Canon Cook than even Dr. Scrivener's statement, and I quote it the rather because it calls attention to the relation between the author of the second Gospel and the apostle of the circumcision, which to myself has been for many years a delightful study:—

"The last peculiarity of St. Mark to which I propose to invite attention is supplied by those expressions which connect his Gospel with St. Peter, and remind us of the constant traditional belief of the ancient church that St. Mark was the companion of the chief of the apostles. That the second Gospel contains many such hints has often been pointed out. . . . To illustrate my meaning, I will mention one which has, perhaps, never been mentioned in this connection before. Reference is made to our Lord's saying in St. Mark vii., and specially to what is found in ver. 19. That expression, 'purging all meats' (καθαρίζων—this appears to be the true reading) does really seem to be no part of the Divine discourse, but the Evangelist's inspired comment on the Saviour's words. Our Saviour (he explains) by that discourse, *ipso facto* 'made all things clean.' How doubly striking a statement, when it is remembered that probably Simon Peter himself was the actual author of it; the same who, on the house-top at Joppa, had been shown in a vision that 'God had made clean (ἐθεὶς ἐκαθάρισε) all His creatures'" (pp. 179, 180).²

¹ *The Last Twelve Verses of the Gospel according to St. Mark Vindicated against Recent Critical Objectors, and Established.* By John W. Burgon, B.D. (now Dean of Chichester). 8vo. Parker, 1871.

² See also Mr. Humphry's full note, in which he justly refers to the great merit of Dr. Field, who, in his *Otium Norwicense* ("Notes on Select Passages of the Greek Testament"), *Paras Tertiu*, gives the history of this view of the passage, calling attention to it also in his edition of Chrysostom's Homilies on St. Matthew.

XI. One more example of Canon Cook's style of criticism will suffice :—

Matt. xxvii. "In ver. 35 the English reader will be surprised to miss the reference to the Twenty-second Psalm, which, in the received text and in the Authorised Version, occupies a prominent place, which has in its favour internal probability, being in full accordance with St. Matthew's habit of citing prophecies, and in the account of the crucifixion he would have the words of that great Messianic Psalm before his mind. In my own notes, however, I had pointed out the weakness of the external evidence, and the probability that it was taken from St. John's Gospel. It is, however, questionable whether the Revisers were justified in omitting it altogether, without notice in the margin, as a *plain and clear error*" (p. 113).

Of all the cases in which the evidence shows that the copyists have transferred from one Gospel to another matter which did not originally belong to it, this is perhaps the clearest. The quotation from the Twenty-second Psalm stands unchallenged in the fourth Gospel, whereas in the first Gospel not a single Greek ms. in uncial characters contains it save one (Δ), and few cursives have it; six copies of the Old Latin contain it, while of Jerome's revision of it one of the two best copies has it and the other wants it. Singularly enough, in the first Papal edition of the Vulgate (that of Sixtus v.), it is found, along with many other blunders; but it was struck out in the corrected edition of Clement VIII., which alone has ever since been recognised. "It is first heard of," says Dr. Scrivener, "in citations of Eusebius. It seems to be found in no ms. of the Peshito Syriac, though, after it had been translated by Tremellius from the Greek into Syriac, and inserted in the margin of his Syriac Testament, it was most unwisely admitted into several later editions. It appears also in the text of the Philoxenian Syriac, but its margin states that it is not in two [or three] Greek copies, nor in the ancient Syriac. All other Versions and Fathers (except Eusebius and Pseudo-Athanasius, and all Greek MSS.) reject the clause, except [the above-mentioned]. . . External evidence places the spuriousness of the addition beyond doubt" (pp. 504, 505, 2nd ed.; pp. 580, 581, 3rd ed.)

Yet this is the passage which Canon Cook thinks it "questionable whether the Revisers were justified in omitting." May we not venture to remind him of that serious question

(Jer. xxiii. 28), "What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord."

These eleven specimens of Canon Cook's criticism sufficiently illustrate its character and style; and it is with all the deeper regret that I write of it as I have done, because I so largely sympathise with him in the object aimed at in the second half of his volume regarding Drs. Westcott and Hort's textual principles. Even here I should conduct the argument rather differently from Canon Cook, and elsewhere I may state, in my own way, the grounds on which I cannot accept the principles of that school of criticism; but some of Canon Cook's statements on this subject are most valuable, and forcibly put.

DAVID BROWN.

ART. III.—*Studies in Scottish Ecclesiastical Biography.*

I.—BISHOP ROSE—PRINCIPAL CARSTARES.

THE once famous chapters in the second volume of Buckle's *History of Civilization*, devoted to the treatment of the condition of Scotland to the end of the eighteenth century, and an examination of the Scotch intellect during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, are now almost forgotten.

They are, however, in more senses than one, remarkable pieces of writing. They display an extent of reading, and a thoroughness of research, which, in one not a Scotchman, but whose sympathies are all with "the free, the noble, and the high-minded English people," are as rare as they are commendable. The slightest survey of the six hundred pages allotted to Scotland's condition and intellect will show that the writer has spared no pains to acquaint himself with these things. Not only have the standard works bearing upon the history of the people been studied, but the materials employed by these historians have been ransacked and mastered. Acts of Scottish Parliaments, and Acts and Proceedings of General Assemblies from 1560 to 1842; council registers of towns, state papers

and letters, criminal trials, statistical accounts of the country, the publications of all the historical clubs, and guide-books as well as books of travel, the philosophical writings of Hutcheson, Smith, Hume, Reid, Black, Leslie, Hutton, Watt, and John Hunter,—all these have not been merely dipped into, but have been studied, and are quoted at length in the footnotes, with wonderfully accurate reference to volume, chapter, and page. More than that, the ponderous works of Scottish ecclesiastical historians, such as Knox, Row, Wodrow, Spottiswoode, Calderwood, Crookshanks, and Laing, have all been laid under contribution; even the dry dissertations and prolix chapters of such theological treatises as Durham's *Exposition of the Song of Solomon* and *Commentary upon the Revelation*, Hutcheson's *Job and the Minor Prophets*, and Boston's *Fourfold State*, have not proved too hard of digestion for this omnivorous reader, who quotes from them as readily as from the classic pages of Robertson or Hume.

Really, when one meets with such extensive, first-hand acquaintance with Scottish literature, historical, philosophic, and theological, on the part of an English writer, there is an inclination to tolerate a considerable amount of misapprehension and even of misrepresentation.

On the other hand, Buckle's reading of Scottish history and intellect is remarkable for misunderstanding, which may be unconscious, and for misrepresentation, which is certainly unintentional. How impossible it is for one who has only a book acquaintance with his subject to treat it justly is ludicrously displayed by the author when dealing with the proposal of the Scottish clergy in 1853 that there should be a national fast on account of the ravages of cholera. He denounces that proposal as the outcome of dire superstition. That, from his stand-point, is all very well, and what might be expected. But what is his notion of a Scottish fast in this nineteenth century? It is, that "in so superstitious a country" there would be a rigid abstinence from food during the entire day, creating physical exhaustion and mental depression, which would certainly "enfeeble thousands of delicate persons, and before twenty-four hours were passed, prepare them to receive that deadly poison which was already lurking around them, and which hitherto they had just strength to resist."

As "humiliation" was to accompany fasting, Buckle pictures to himself preachers thundering from their pulpits, and proclaiming aloud the sins of the land, "the poor benighted people panic-struck," sitting in awe, remaining the whole day without proper nourishment, and retiring to their beds "weeping and starved." With what horror and indignation must the historian of civilisation have read those pages in Oliver and Boyd's Almanac which chronicle the sacramental fast-days in Scotland, from which he would gather that the observance of what causes physical exhaustion and encourages mental depression is carried on all the year round in that superstitious country, and that in the case of the principal towns it occurs at least twice in the year!

Then Buckle's survey of Scotland's condition, ethical, intellectual, and spiritual, is vitiated by a theory which blinds his vision and warps his judgment. According to him the clergy of Scotland form a priesthood—an intolerant and ambitious priesthood—all the efforts of which are directed to the fostering of the influence of superstition, and the perpetuating of an ecclesiastical despotism. Scotland is as bigoted and intolerant as Spain, and this because the former country, no less than the latter, has allowed the clergy to exercise sway, and has submitted actions and consciences to the authority of the Church, thus giving full play to "one of the most detestable tyrannies ever seen on the earth." The method resorted to in order to make good this formidable indictment is not unknown among controversialists and special pleaders, though it is not one we should have expected to commend itself to a would-be philosophic writer. It consists in bringing together from every possible quarter everything fitted to place the character and conduct in an unfavourable light. All the extravagancies of extreme men; all the violations of good taste on the part of those whose circumstances were not favourable to a study of *belles-lettres* or the culture of "sweet reasonableness;" all the questionable stories, bits of scandal and gossip, and grotesque absurdities to be found in such an unhistorical collection of jottings as Wodrow's *Analecta*, and in such a heap of garbage as the *Scots Presbyterian Eloquence Displayed*, are fitted into a mosaic of fantastic pattern and most sombre colouring. There is nothing of light and shade in the working out, nothing of

perspective in the manipulation. All that could by any possibility suggest another and brighter side of the picture is carefully excluded. In Buckle's pages the preachers deal only in denunciation and woe, never in gracious invitation or tender appeal; the writers chronicle what is puerile, incredible, not what is rational and veritable; the letter-writers fill their communications with what is fitted to terrify and drive to despair those correspondents who depend upon them for their notions of "the God of the Scotch Kirk."

The result is not a picture, but a caricature; not a photograph, but a cartoon of monstrously distorted proportions and lurid colouring.

Scottish Church History is capable of very different handling, and is worthy of very different treatment. Buckle's passion for what he considered grand philosophic surveys misled him. For such specious but deceptive generalisations no better corrective is to be found than in studies of the characters and careers of individual actors, viewed in the light of the surroundings which moulded them, and of the circumstances of the situation which they helped to modify.

Selecting the Revolutionary epoch of Scottish Church History as one which is not too remote to be interesting, nor too recent to admit of dispassionate treatment, we devote this introductory paper to the study of the life-work of two men who had something to do in the making of Church History in Scotland at the close of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The first of these is—

ALEXANDER ROSE, BISHOP OF EDINBURGH.

Personally there is nothing great, there is little that can even be called interesting, in the career of this ecclesiastic; and yet he played a part in the Revolution crisis by no means inconsiderable. He was the only northern bishop William of Orange ever saw and spoke with; the brief interview at Whitehall between the Dutch Prince and the Scotch Prelate went far to determine the future of Scottish Episcopacy. He is, therefore, worthy of a place, even should it not be a conspicuous one, in any study of the Church of the Revolution in Scotland.

The father of Alexander Rose, or Ross, as the name is given in Keith's *Catalogue of Scottish Bishops*, was Prior of Monymusk, who educated his son for orders first at Aberdeen, and then at Glasgow. In the latter of these universities Alexander was appointed Professor of Divinity, when the celebrated Gilbert Burnet resigned the chair. It is here we first get within sight of the future Bishop of Edinburgh, and for this we are indebted to the painstaking accumulation of material furnished by Robert Wodrow in his *History of the Sufferings of the Church of Scotland*. In 1684 a Commission of Justiciary, with Council power, after getting through some work of fining, banishing, and sentencing to death in the shire and town of Ayr, proceeded to hold a Court at Glasgow. Before commencing operations the Commissioners listened to a sermon preached by the Professor of Theology. The text was Acts xxvi., and 28th verse, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian." Not troubling himself or his hearers with any prefatory matter, the preacher set himself at once to deal with the following matters: *First*, The different parties of our divided Zion. *Second*, The malignancy of the national sin of schism. *Third*, The necessity of Episcopacy for supporting the main concerns of Christianity. *Lastly*, The application. With this for his groundwork, the Professor proceeded to descant upon the so-called disfigured faces and hideous tones of the Presbyterians, to bestow vituperation upon the Sanquhar and Rutherglen declarations, to complain of the nation's ruined cathedrals and metropolitan sees, with a side reference to Bishop Sharpe's monument and the usefulness of Episcopacy to remove the schism, the heat and other ill things that had found a place in the Church of Scotland since her alleged reformation by presbyters. His application, not of text but of sermon, takes the form of an exhortation to the judges to adopt severe measures in dealing with "the malignancy of the present schism," not sparing those schismatics who threaten the very extinction of Christianity, and from whom the Church "is like to suffer more than ever she did from Nero and Dioclesian." Over this extraordinary farrago of Professor Rose, the grave historian grows positively facetious, suggesting that, so far as connection betwixt text and discourse is concerned, the preacher might just as well have chosen the first

verse of the first chapter of Genesis for the former, and quoting the line of Cowley as finely applicable to the whole production :—

“He reads his text, and takes his leave of it.”

Both preacher and judicial hearers, however, were highly pleased with the Professor's performance,—so pleased in fact were the latter that at their request the sermon was published and dedicated to them, testimony being borne in the dedication to the incomparable zeal and dexterity displayed in the management of the Court “incredibly to the advantage of a decayed religion and loyalty in that corner.” More substantial tokens of courtly favour flowed rapidly in upon the Glasgow Professor, for in 1686 King James appointed him Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrews; in March of the following year he was consecrated Bishop of Moray, but never entered upon the active duties of that see, as in September of the same year he was translated to the Bishopric of Edinburgh. For this last step in his preferment Rose was doubtless indebted to the interest at headquarters of his uncle, Arthur Ross, at that time Archbishop of St. Andrews. It evoked some opposition from the Archbishop of Glasgow, between whom and his Grace of St. Andrews animosities had arisen, and who complained that the King had in this case departed from the practice hitherto observed of not giving a *congé d'elire* in favour of any one without a recommendation in his favour from four or five bishops. But the Dean and Chapter gave effect to the King's letter, and the uncle had the satisfaction of seeing his nephew Bishop of Edinburgh. Of the uncle at St. Andrews Burnet writes contemptuously, and probably under the influence of prejudice, if not of pique, styling him “a poor, ignorant, worthless man, in whom obedience and fury were so eminent that these supplied all other defects.” He died in 1704, the last of the line of Archbishops in the Scottish Episcopacy; and the title has never been revived, but has given place to the more modest one of Primus, a title which implies no metropolitan jurisdiction, and which designates an office exercised under such restrictions as render the holder of it simply *primus inter pares*, removable at the pleasure of the majority of the bishops, and in no respect

more potent than the Moderator of a Presbyterian Kirk-Session, Presbytery, or Assembly.

After the death of his uncle, Alexander Rose acted as Vicar-General of St. Andrews, and his primacy was acknowledged by the other bishops and the clergy in general, although the only ground upon which he claimed and they conceded the right, was such as arose from his being sole survivor of these bishops, who had been appointed by the Crown.

Although he ceased to be Bishop of Edinburgh *de jure* at the Revolution in 1688, Rose continued to act as such, and to be regarded in that light by the Episcopalians of Scotland for thirty-two years subsequent to that date. During that time we do not see much of him, and we hear very little about him, but the little we do shows a changed order of things from what obtained when he was Divinity Professor in Glasgow. Thus, in 1713, he is consulted by a brother bishop who wishes guidance as to what should be done with those young people who had been baptized by Presbyterian ministers, receiving what an Episcopalian historian terms "lay sprinkling from the Established minister," and who were now applying for confirmation. In attempting to remove the difficulty the outed primate reveals no small perplexity of spirit, unwilling, on the one hand, to counsel anything that would seem to discredit what his own church and the neighbour Church of England, by granting Christian privileges to those who had no Episcopal baptism, seemed to allow, but, on the other hand, averse "to own the validity of what is done without a commission." He can only suggest a compromise of a peculiar nature. In the case of those who have no scruples about their non-episcopal baptism let their baptism be regarded and treated as invalid in matter of right, but valid in matter of fact; but whenever there are those who "scruple the validity of their baptism" let them not be rejected when they crave to have the defect of their former sprinkling supplied. We hope our readers appreciate the fineness of the distinction!

Bishop Rose is next to be seen and heard of as interested in the insurrection headed by the Earl of Mar, and which terminated fatally for the Jacobite cause at the contest called the battle of Sheriffmuir in 1715. The death of "the good Queen Anne" on the 1st of August 1714 seemed to

the upholders of the fallen house of Stuart an opportunity not to be let slip of endeavouring to prevent the Hanover succession taking effect. The movement experienced a series of blows, and of these perhaps the severest was one that at first seemed to the insurgent force an actual godsend—the landing of their exiled Prince at Peterhead. The Episcopal clergy were immoderately profuse in their gratitude to Him who had miraculously preserved the sacred life of their King, and in an address which they drew up and presented to the claimant of the British throne they prayed that his life might be preserved to prosper his aims, and to turn the hearts of the wicked and the misguided to allegiance and duty, and to establish him in the throne of his ancestors in a long and happy reign, blessed with royal progeny. Not content with praying, they betook themselves to praise so gross and mendacious as to be almost incredible, for they scruple not to assure the object of their fulsome flattery—"Your princely virtues are such that, in the opinion of the best judges, you are worthy to wear a crown, though you had not been born to it." That said of one whose frame was shaken through dissipation, and on whose features there played the unmeaning smile of a wellnigh imbecile intellect! If, as is most probable, Alexander Rose signed this clerical address, and indorsed its falsehoods, it must have been with very different feelings that, a few months later, the insurrection of 1715 being quelled, and the Pretender once more on French soil, the ex-bishop set himself to compose a prayer for those who had been "out," to be "said by all the clergy in the course of the forenoon service."¹ In the course of the prayer the defeated and imprisoned rebels are spoken of as "covered with a cloud in the day of the Divine anger, broken sore as in the place of dragons," and should any of them suffer the execution of their death sentence, the petition is offered "that they may every way be enabled thoroughly to leave this naughty and miserable world, being made truly penitent for all their sins, and their souls being washed in the blood of their Redeemer, and so presented unto God without spot or blemish." All the more

¹ The prayer is given at length in the *Episcopal Magazine* for July 1837 from MSS. in the possession of Captain Sangster. Also in the *History of the Church of Scotland*, by Thomas Stephen, vol. iv. p. 130.

feelingly would the ex-bishop draw up this prayer, which is creditable alike to his theology and his heart, seeing that among those for whose benefit it was drawn up his own son was numbered. Of the prisoners taken in Scotland eighty-nine were removed from Edinburgh to be tried in Carlisle. Young Rose was one of them. The quarters assigned them in the border town must have been far from comfortable, as they were crowded into three small apartments, where they slept upon straw, and some of them might be heard "roaring in fits of the gout and gravel." It was natural that in these circumstances the quondam Bishop of Edinburgh should think of endeavouring to secure the good offices of the Bishop of Carlisle for one of those whom the English prelate calls "unhappy wretches." The application met with a somewhat ungracious reception, as the following extract from a letter of Bishop Nicolson to Archbishop Wake testifies, the extract being of value as indicating the light in which the outed Scottish dignitary was regarded by the former:—

"I am heavily pestered," he writes, "with addresses and solicitations from the friends and advocates of these unhappy wretches, who will not believe me when I tell them that I have neither power nor inclination to do them any service. . . . Amongst the rest the Bishop of Edinburgh warmly recommends to my counsel, direction, and favour a son of his taken in actual rebellion at the battle of Dunblane. The father does not pretend to say that he repents of that sin; on the contrary, he gives broad hints of his being persuaded that his child now suffers for righteousness' sake. He will not so much as undertake to keep the boy out of harm's way for the future, should he now be set at liberty, but rather intimates that his present application renders him a proper object of all the good offices that I am capable of doing him. I have dealt very plainly with this mischievous prelate, who (by the way) bemoans the complete desolation of the Scottish Church, and the insufferable hardships (*unde et a quo?*) of her poor clergy. I have let him know that I will no more bestir myself for his son than I would for my own in the like circumstances, but leave him entirely to God's mercy and the King's."¹

What became of this subject of parental solicitude and prelatial indifference does not appear, but this we know that immediate death in Carlisle was not his fate, for of the eighty-nine prisoners not one was executed; many of them were released without trial, while several appear to have compounded for the unenviable lot of transportation to the plantations.

¹ Ellis's *Original Letters*, iii. pp. 367-368.

When he had reached the seventy-fourth year of his age the outed Bishop became subject to fainting fits, and having gone to visit his sick brother in the house of their sister, who lived in the Canongate of Edinburgh, he died in one of these fits on the 20th of March 1720. At and for some time after the Revolution, Episcopalians were not allowed to observe the rites of their funeral service in any of the burying-grounds of the capital, but the prohibitions not extending to Restalrig, in the parish of South Leith, the churchyard of that small village became the favourite place of interment for Edinburgh Episcopalians. In the churchyard of the old and ruinous Restalric of ancient times was buried the last and longest-lived of the ante-Revolution Scottish bishops, his body being laid alongside of that of his uncle, last of the prelatic archbishops of Scotland.

Bishop Keith, compiler of the *Catalogue*, who was for seven years a presbyter of Rose, testifies regarding him that "he had much respect paid him not only by the clergy of his own communion, but by all the laity also of both nations;" and he describes him as being "a sweet-natured man, and of a venerable aspect."

But nothing yet noted of the life and doings of Alexander Rose would entitle him to the representative place we have assigned him in the drama of Scottish ecclesiastical affairs at the Revolution. His claim to such a position rests entirely upon the interview between him and William of Orange, and the results of that interview. To these accordingly the attention of our readers must now be turned.

When, in November of 1688, the landing of the Dutch Prince was only a matter of days, Arthur Ross hurried from St. Andrews, convened all the Scotch prelates, some fourteen in number, and secured their signatures to an address, which was immediately despatched to King James VII. In the course of this manifesto, which Episcopal historians style loyal and affectionate, and Presbyterian writers stigmatise as sycophantish and time-serving, the subscribers prostrate themselves before "the darling of heaven peaceably seated on the thrones of royal ancestors whose long, illustrious, and unparalleled line is the greatest glory of this ancient kingdom." They assure his most sacred Majesty of "their firm and unshaken loyalty,"

expressing amazement at hearing of the danger of an invasion from Holland, which only excites them to pray for "an universal repentance to all orders of men and for the disappointment and clothing with shame of all who invade his Majesty's just and undoubted rights, and disturb or interrupt the peace of the realms, so that on the royal head the crown may still flourish;" and they conclude with "not doubting but that God, in His great mercy, who hath so often preserved and delivered your Majesty, will still preserve and deliver you by giving you the hearts of your subjects and the necks of your enemies."

The first signature attached to this remarkable document is that of "Arthur, St. Andrews," and the third is "Alexander, Edinburgen."

On the 5th of November the Dutch fleet cast anchor at Torbay, and by the 11th of December James VII. was a fugitive. It was time for the Scottish bishops to do something more than concoct addresses, and so between these two dates they determined to send two of their number to London that they might take what steps might seem to them necessary in the interests of Scottish Episcopacy. In the selection of the commissioners the archbishops were passed over as not acceptable to the English bishops, and the choice fell upon Dr. Bruce, Bishop of Orkney, and Alexander Rose of Edinburgh. Owing, however, to illness, the former first delayed, and thereafter abandoned, all thought of going to London, and the latter found himself called upon to carry out the delicate work alone. A quarter of a century afterwards Rose wrote a letter to a friend giving an account of his visit to the metropolis, of the conversation that took place between him and the Dutch Prince. That letter fortunately fell into the hands of Keith when he was drawing up his *Catalogue of the Scottish Bishops*, and he has inserted it in his notice of the last Bishop of Edinburgh as "an original holograph letter." From this authentic document it appears that the first thing Rose did on reaching London was to place himself in communication with such of the English prelates as were accessible. From these, however, he received little encouragement and less help. He waited upon the Archbishop of Canterbury, but Sancroft could only tell him that "matters were very dark," the cloud being "so thick or gross that they could not see through it, they knew not

what to do for themselves, far less what advice to give to others." Then he waited upon the Bishop of St. Asaph, but Stillingfleet was so curt that the Scotch brother resolved to visit him no more. Thereafter he tried his predecessor in the Glasgow Divinity Chair, but Burnet put him off with the protestation that "he did not meddle in Scots affairs" [with what affairs did worthy, officious Gilbert not meddle?] The only advice the perplexed commissioner got came from the Bishop of London and some Scottish peers. It was to the effect that he should present an address to the Prince of Orange; but on inquiring of his advisers if it would be necessary for him in his address to compliment the Prince upon his descent to deliver the nation from Popery and slavery, and on being assured that it would, Rose replied that neither his commission nor his conscience would permit him to go that length. Probably he remembered an address that bore his signature, forwarded little more than a month before, in which mention was made of the necks of the enemies of his most sacred Majesty King James VII.

During what seemed to the northern stranger "a wearisome season" of delay and disappointment, the English Convocation declared that James had abdicated the throne, and called upon William and Mary to take the reins of power. Then it seemed to the Scottish prelate time to set his face homeward. He thought, however, that it might be well to get a passport from the Prince, and as this could apparently not be procured without an introduction at Court, application was made to Dr. Compton, Bishop of London, to bring about the interview. That led to some very plain speaking, in the course of which the Scottish ecclesiastic was told that William, "having thrown himself upon the water must keep himself a swimming with one hand;" that the Presbyterians having joined him closely, and made offer of support, he could not "cast them off unless he could see how otherways he can be served;" but that if the Episcopalians of Scotland would undertake to serve him as those of England were doing, then he would take them by the hand, "support the Church and order, and throw off the Presbyterians."

The poor Bishop was sadly distressed when the issue was thus with rude plainness put before him, protested that neither

he nor his brethren apprehended revolution when he was despatched from Scotland, so that he had no instructions how to deal with such an offer as was now made, but, carefully guarding it as the expression of his private opinion, declared his belief that the Scotch prelates would "not serve the Prince so as he is served in England, that is (as I take it) to make him their king, or give their suffrages for his being king." Next day, about ten or eleven in the forenoon, Bishop Compton brought about the desired interview, which is best described in the words of Rose himself. "Upon my being admitted to the Prince's presence," he writes, "he came three or four steps forward from his company, and prevented me by saying, 'My lord, are you going for Scotland?' My reply was, 'Yes, sir, if you have any commands for me.' Then he said, 'I hope you will be kind to me, and follow the example of England.' Wherefore, being something diffculted how to make a mannerly and discreet answer without entangling myself, I readily replied, 'Sir, I will serve you so far as law, reason, or conscience shall allow me.' How this answer pleased I cannot well tell, but it seems the limitations and conditions of it were not acceptable, for instantly the Prince, without saying anything more, turned away from me, and went back to his company. And as that was the first, so it was the last, time I had the honour to speak with his Highness."¹

Many were the cogitations of the Bishop as he made his way back to Edinburgh, cogitating the report by Compton of what the Prince had said before the interview, cogitating the words and bearing of the Prince toward himself, wondering much if the Prince would have stood by his promise of casting off the Presbyterians and befriending the Episcopalians, supposing him to have so promised. And many have been the speculations since Rose's day as to what might have been had he only acted a different part, taken the hint supposed to have been conveyed to him through the Bishop of London, and made ample promise of Episcopalian support to William. Some are of opinion that had Rose been a little more pliant, and a little less guarded, he might have secured the continuance of State connection and State support for his Church polity, but that owing to his being over conscientious and too

¹ Keith's *Catalogue of Scottish Bishops*, p. 44.

unyielding in his adherence to a lost cause he virtually sealed the fate of the Scottish Episcopal Establishment.

All the evidence points to an opposite conclusion. William of Orange was not only a rigid Calvinist, but had been brought up a strict Presbyterian. As Stadtholder of Holland, he was the head of a Presbyterian Church, in so far as it had any earthly head. Just a year before he left the Hague to claim that crown which fell from the head of one unfit and unworthy to wear it, he had an interview with a Presbyterian minister, which finds a record in the pages of Wodrow's *History*. Emboldened by the frank way in which the Prince spoke to him, Patrick Warner—for such was his name—took the liberty to make this statement:—

“That the Presbyterians in Scotland are looked upon and represented as a very despicable and insignificant party; and those who do so take their measure from the appearance made at Pentland and Bothwell, or the like attempts, reckoning that the whole power and numbers of Presbyterians were there drawn forth and united, but he could assure his Highness that the people who thus reckoned were mistaken, for a great many in the nation who were firm Presbyterians were not fully satisfied as to the grounds and manner of these risings and did not join, and others were borne down with sore persecution; but he was of opinion that, if Scotland were left to their free choice, of three parts two would be found Presbyterians.”

This statement and the appeal with which it was followed up on behalf the persecuted party in Scotland, drew forth from one accustomed to measure his words, this significant reply:—

“I have been educated in that persuasion, and hope to continue in it, and I assure you, if ever it be in my power, I shall make the Presbyterian church-government the Established church-government of that nation; and of this you may likewise assure your friends as in prudence you shall find convenient; and because my wife has not been so bred you may possibly be jealous of her, yet I can give you the same assurance for her as for myself.”¹

That statement may safely be set over-against one, which Rose reports as made by the Prince to Compton for the purpose of being communicated, not above the suspicion of being coloured in the course of transmission, being to the effect that “while in Holland he was made believe that Scotland generally all over was Presbyterian, but now he sees that the great body of the nobility and gentry are for Episcopacy, and 'tis the

¹ Wodrow, *History*, Book iii. chapter 11.

trading and inferior sort that are for Presbytery." William's sources of information regarding the state of ecclesiastical parties in Scotland when he had only been a matter of months in Whitehall were not materially different from what they had been when he was at the Hague. He knew quite well that the prelatie heads of the Church of Scotland were Jacobites to the heart's core, from whom nothing but opposition to his interests could be looked for. Of that there was ample confirmation in what was reported to him as having passed between the Bishop of London and the Scottish deputy, and in the reply which Rose gave to his own expression of a hope that Scotland would follow the example of England. Words were not needed to add significance to the action when he turned on his heel and left Alexander Rose to find his way back to Scotland. As clear as words could make it, he expressed his determination to turn from the Episcopalians to the Presbyterians, from Bishop Rose to "Cardinal" Carstares. It is time, our readers may be thinking, we were doing the same.

WILLIAM CARSTARES, Chaplain and Principal.

In the case of those who figure largely in the history of their times it is always well to know what their enemies thought and said about them.

Here, then, is a description of William Carstares, written in 1703, by John Macky, in his *Memoires of the Secret Services*:—"He is the cunningest, subtile dissembler in the world, with an air of sincerity; a dangerous enemy, because always a hid. He is a fat, sanguine-complexioned fair man, always smiling where he designs most mischief, a good friend when he is sincere." On the margin of his copy of Macky's book Dean Swift wrote this pithy annotation:—"A good character, but not strong enough by a fiftieth part."

So much for the estimate of opponents. What was that of his intimates and friends? William of Orange, who found in Carstares a counsellor and lifelong companion, speaking to his courtiers of his chaplain, testified that he had known him long; that he had known him well; and knew him to be a truly honest man. Calamy, in his historical account of his own life, affirms: "I believe there are none that knew him but

will readily concur with me that he was a man of true honour, strict justice, and solid piety." And Wodrow, the historian, writing to Dr. Cotton Mather of America, and informing him of the death of Carstares, bears this testimony to his worth and weight of character :—"He was a person of great integrity, learning, and candour, and one who had a very great interest with many leading men at court, and of excellent address."

The life-work and public services of the man of whom these things have been written by his enemies and his friends are worthy of our study. They fall naturally into three periods. The first of these extends from 1669, when he was a student at the University of Utrecht, to 1687, when he became one of the chaplains of the Prince of Orange; the second carries us down to 1703, when he became Principal of Edinburgh University; and the third closes with his death in 1716. In the first he is the young Scotchman of political intrigue, for which he suffers imprisonment and torture; in the second he is the confidential adviser of his sovereign upon all Scottish affairs; in the third he guides the affairs and shapes the policy of the Church of the Revolution Settlement.

The exact extent to which, when a student in Holland, William Carstares compromised himself by joining the plots of refugees against the British Government cannot now be ascertained, as even the agony of prolonged torture failed to extract from him a full confession.

He indignantly refused to identify himself with that scheme of Ferguson, the plotter, which aimed at the assassination of Charles and the Duke of York, and which is known as the Rye-House plot. He would only take to do with "men of honour and of public spirit," and both as a man and a Christian he refused to listen to any proposal that contemplated regicide. But into the movement of the Whig party to secure a free Parliament, the redress of grievances, and the exclusion of the Duke of York from the succession, Carstares the student threw himself with great ardour. He soon became the trusted agent of the malcontents, moving between Argyll, Stair, Loudon, and James Stewart in Holland, and those of like mind in England. In addition to this Carstares had for several years been in communication and correspondence with

the agents of the Prince of Orange in the two countries—with, that is to say, Pensionary Fagel at the Hague, and Mr. Bentinck, afterwards Earl of Portland, in London; and should any of the correspondence, even although written in intricate cipher with white sympathetic ink, fall into the hands of the British authorities, the consequences could not but be serious to all concerned. It was therefore a grave matter for the Scottish student when, after the discovery of the Rye-House plot, he was arrested in Kent; a still more serious one when he was sent to Edinburgh to be examined by the Privy Council. Examination by that body was conducted in a low-roofed, ill-lighted chamber in the Parliament House, and it consisted largely in the application of the boot and the thumbkin. Anxious to secure from their prisoner information regarding the plans of Russell and Argyll, the Council asked him if he would answer upon oath such questions as would be put to him, assuring him these would be few and not of such a nature that the answers could be made to tell against him, and warning him that if he persisted in refusing to answer, he might count upon being tortured. Carstares proving obdurate, the Council lost no time in proceeding to extremities. An improved form of the steel apparatus called the thumb-screw or thumbkin, made after a model brought from Muscovy by the inhuman Dalzell, was produced and screwed down upon the prisoner's thumbs, crushing the bones to pieces and causing the sweat of agony to break out upon the brow and stream down the cheeks. With this fiendish torturing of their victim the Council occupied themselves for "near an hour and a half," and were only prevented making application of the boot to his legs, while yet the thumbs were in the grip of the screw, by the bungling of the inexperienced hangman, who, finding difficulty in fastening the wedge that was to be driven into the iron instrument by the force of a mallet, contented himself with giving an additional turn to the screw of the thumbkin. To such an extent did he use the screw, that, when at length "the Lords thought fit to ease" the subject upon which he was operating, he found himself unable to reverse the motion, and not until a blacksmith aided him with the application of the tools of his craft was he able to release the mass of crushed flesh and splintered bone to which Carstares' thumbs had been

reduced.¹ As nothing but a cry of agony had been wrung from the unhappy sufferer, he was sent back to the Tolbooth to toss all night in the fever of his pain, anticipating the morrow, when, as he was informed, another attempt would be made to subdue his obstinacy, at 9 A.M., through the application of the boot by more skilful hands than those of the bungling executioner; and there is every reason to believe the attempt would have been made, in spite of the application of the surgeon in attendance for a brief delay, had Lord Melfort not proposed a compromise to Carstares before he was brought a second time into the torture-chamber. On the part of the Council promise was made that, in the event of his answering certain specified questions, he "shall have pardon for his life, limb, fortune, and estate, that he shall never be brought as witness against any person whatsoever for things contained in his answers, never be interrogate, in torture or out of torture, upon anything preceding the date of this paper."

Having stipulated that these promises to him should be ratified by a deed of Court and recorded in their books, Carstares capitulated, answered a number of queries put to him, and signed a deposition, which purported to contain a faithful version of his replies, and which, in spite of his remonstrances, was afterwards sold in the streets of Edinburgh under the title of *Mr. Carstares's Confession*. To the cruelty which they had inflicted upon him, the Council were not slow to add perfidy. They violated the promise to which Carstares attached most importance by producing his depositions at the trial of Baillie of Jerviswoode, and even sought to make capital out of what they called his "scrupulosity" for his fellow-conspirator.

To a man of honour nothing could be more revolting than the thought that the suspicion of treachery should attach to his name. So soon as the change of Government gave him an opportunity of removing the stigma, Carstares successfully moved Parliament to declare that the Council had been guilty

¹ After the Revolution the thumbkins were presented by the Privy Council to Carstares. King William expressed a wish to see them, and to try them on. They were accordingly fastened on the royal thumbs, and Carstares gave the screw a courtier-like turn. "Harder," said the King, and another was given. "Again," and Carstares turned the screw pretty sharply. "Stop, doctor, stop," cried William, "another turn would make me confess everything."—*William Carstares*, by Dr. R. H. Story, p. 94.

of a foul breach of faith, and that he had been "highly injured contrary to the public faith." One of the Privy Council who, in 1684, spent upwards of an hour in witnessing the agonies of the young Scot was John Paterson, Bishop of Edinburgh. In 1693, his brother, Sir William Paterson, revived the slander against Carstares, not scrupling to affirm that, along with Baillie, the Campbells of Cessnock, and others, he had used imprecations in professing innocence in the matter of the Rye-House plot, and yet, "upon the first application of the thumbscrew—even the first touch of it—confessed all, as may be seen in his printed confession." Unwilling to rest under such a mendacious charge, Carstares placed himself in communication with one of the few then alive who had witnessed the torturing in the Parliament House, and could refute the slander—the Duke of Queensberry. From that Tory nobleman, living in retirement, there came in due time a complete vindication of the maligned sufferer, testifying to his having employed no imprecations, and to his fortitude under torture. Carstares was assured that his quondam judge regarded the account as emanating from "the knave [Bishop Paterson], of design to bring a reproach on the poor man, and as a cunningly devised trick to defame him."

When, on the completion of the Jerviswoode trial, his liberty was restored to him, the first use Carstares made of it was to leave Scotland, and, after securing his passport in London, to set sail for Holland. It was characteristic of the man that he refused to accept a farthing of what was offered as a solatium for the trouble and losses of his imprisonment, and that he declined to act upon the advice of Lord Melfort that he should wait upon the newly crowned King James before leaving. He left his native country not to return to it until he saw things there "go in another channel;" he went back to Holland bearing on his body—especially upon his mangled thumbs—the traces of cruel handling, but carrying with him an unblemished name and a reputation for discretion and reliability which at once commended him to the confidence and esteem of the Prince of Orange.

The second leading period in the public life of Carstares opens with his official attachment to the service of William III., in the capacity of private chaplain, and ends with the

death of his sovereign in 1702. During these fifteen years no man exercised a more potent influence upon the affairs of Church and State in Scotland than the Presbyterian chaplain, who was in close personal attendance upon his royal master in England, in Ireland, and in the Netherlands, and who was known at the public offices and in the ante-chambers of the palace by the significant title of "The Cardinal." There was a rare adaptation of qualities in the case of the sovereign and his chaplain leading to mutual confidence, resulting in the warmth of personal attachment. The Revolution monarch was self-reliant, taciturn, undemonstrative; but he was observant, sagacious, and, in spite of cold exterior and gruff manner, capable of attracting strong natures, and of eliciting tender emotion: the chaplain had all the width of vision required in a statesman, the shrewdness and suppleness of a politician, the incorruptible integrity of a public servant, the self-sacrificing enthusiasm of a patriot—above all he had, what with William must have ranked among the most valuable of human virtues, the discretion to know when to speak and when to keep silence, what to part with as information that would neither criminate friends nor benefit opponents, and what knowledge to keep close as the grave.¹ Not so much to the biographer as to the historian of the Revolution period in Scottish Church History does it fall to chronicle the services rendered by Carstares during the second period of his public career. For in all that was done in the abolition of Episcopacy and the restoration of Presbyterianism, in the securing of toleration for displaced Episcopalians, and directing the policy of the only truly National Church Scotland has ever known, the Presbyterian chaplain had a large share. He could truthfully say of all these things: *Quorum magna pars fui*. One instance of the exercise of power in which the daring is only equalled by the success, and which rises to the height of dramatic vividness, is associated with the intercepting of

¹ It must have been this prime quality of a king's confidential adviser, the possession of which was conspicuously displayed in the torture-chamber at Edinburgh, that led Lord Macaulay to write this of one whom he styles "one of the most remarkable men of that age." "I believe that Carstares, though an honest and pious man in essentials, has his full share of the wisdom of the serpent."—*History of England*, vol. iii. chap. xiii. footnote.

royal despatches, and the interviewing of the King in his bed after midnight, which took place in 1694.

The Scottish Parliament of 1693, not deeming the Oath of Allegiance sufficient to guard against Jacobite insurrections, devised the Oath of Assurance, which required the person taking it to declare William to be king *de jure* as well as *de facto*, and insisted upon the oath being taken by all ministers, Presbyterians equally with Episcopalians, before they took their seats in the ensuing Assembly. The Episcopalians resented the imposition of a formula that violated their belief that James and not William was the rightful King of Great Britain; while the Presbyterians had strong objections to what they alleged was the first instance of an oath and declaration being imposed upon the Church by the State—"it was Erastianism in an earthly monarch to fence the door of the Assembly with such an oath."¹ The ferment thus created, so far from being allayed, was intensified by another Act of the same Parliament, bearing the pacific name of "An Act for Settling the Quiet and Peace of the Church." In this Act their Majesties, besides being asked to instruct the Assembly to admit all Episcopalian ministers taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Assurance, subscribing the Confession of Faith, and acknowledging the Presbyterian government to a place in the ecclesiastical judicatories, were requested to call a meeting of the General Assembly for ordering the affairs of the Church.

As Lord Carmichael, the Royal Commissioner, had dissolved the last Assembly in anger without fixing a day for a future one, and the Assembly had appointed a day of its own, and that day was now close at hand, a collision between the civil and the ecclesiastical judicatories seemed imminent. Taking advantage of a temporary absence of Carstares from Kensington such advisers of the King as Lord Tarbat and the Master of Stair, not over well affected to the Presbyterian cause, urged him to give effect to the request of the Scottish Parliament, and, accordingly, Carmichael was despatched to Edinburgh with a summons to the Assembly to meet on the twenty-ninth of March, and with instructions to impose the double oath, and in the event of the ministers refusing to take it, then to

¹ Dr. John Cunningham of Crieff, in *Church History of Scotland*, vol. ii. chap. xxi.

dissolve the gathering. When the Commissioner reached the Scottish capital he soon saw how serious the outlook was, both for William's interests in Scotland and for the Church's peace, if not its existence, and so he despatched a flying packet to London representing the gravity of the crisis, and requesting fresh instructions. He calculated that the messenger would return with the King's determination the night before the Assembly was appointed to meet. His Majesty, not accustomed to give way, remained firm, and renewed his instructions to his Commissioner, and sent them off in the afternoon of the day upon which the messenger had reached him. At this juncture Carstares arrived upon the scene, reaching Kensington on the very day upon which the flying packet had arrived from Scotland. On reading his letters, which included a memorial from friends in Scotland urging him to help in the crisis, and on ascertaining the nature of the despatches that had left the King's hands he saw no time was to be lost, found the messenger just setting off, and demanded in the King's name that the despatches be delivered up to him. What followed can best be told in the summary of the narrative given by Carstares' grand-nephew and first biographer, to be found in the brightly coloured pictures in the *Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland*, executed by Her Majesty's limner for Scotland—Dean Stanley :—

"It was now late at night ; not a moment was to be lost. He ran to the royal apartment, and was told by the lord-in-waiting that the King was in bed. He insisted on entering, and found William fast asleep, drew the curtain, threw himself on his knees by the bed-side, and awakened him. The King, startled, asked what had brought him, and for what he knelt? "I am come to ask my life." "What can you have done," said William, "to deserve death?" Carstares told what had occurred. The King was furious ; Carstares begged only for a few words to explain. The King listened, was convinced, threw the despatches into the fire, wrote a new one at the dictation of Carstares ; the messenger set off, and, in consequence of this delay, arrived only just in time on the very morning of the fatal day."

When the hour for the Assembly meeting arrived, Lord Carmichael was able to inform the members that it was his Majesty's pleasure to dispense with the oaths, and that he would interpose no obstacle in the way of their proceeding to business. Well might one who rendered such a service when charged, years afterwards, on the floor of the Assembly with

want of zeal for the interests of the Church of Scotland, give utterance to the noble vindication that such a reflection came with a very bad grace from any man who sat in that Court which, under God, owed its existence to his interpositions; that if ever, in any one instance, his zeal had carried him beyond the bounds of discretion, it was in favour of the Church of Scotland; that he never had received a frown from the greatest and the best of masters but one, and it was on her account.

Fifteen years of court life and royal favour, of holding the reins of power and influencing the destinies of the proud but poor feudal families of Scotland could not spoil the simplicity nor corrupt the integrity of this honest Scot. He never became a cold-hearted politician, a dried-up, wily churchman; but carried about with him all through the busiest part of his life a kindly disposition, a loving heart, a strong feeling of family affection, and a touching faithfulness to the claims of kindred. He would leave a room filled with noblemen and officers of state gathered to transact business of importance in order to embrace a widowed sister, assure her that the present was the most convenient time for him to see her, and, after a short prayer ("I never pray long"—prefacing the devotions), and fixing the time for a longer interview, would return all in tears to the company. He tries to induce his brother-in-law, Principal Dunlop, to join him in London in the interests of Glasgow University, assuring him that his doing so would be for his own delectation, as "you shall have nutmeg for your punch." A married man, but without children, he dearly remembers in his correspondence, whether from Loo or from London, the circle at home, inquires after uncles, aunts, and sisters, takes note of the fact that "nephew Johnnie is a pleasant boy, and hath the nose of the family;" writes his sister, Mrs. Dunlop, that brother Alexander is crowing over him, "for he hath a John Carstares who I know will be a darling of yours;" and when the said Alexander's family numbers both a William and a Betty, he writes the father, on the birth of the latter, expressing all good wishes, and adds:—"Give little Will a kiss for me; he is just such a name-son to me as your little Betty is a name-daughter to my wife." To kind-heartedness and open-heartedness which sometimes

severely strained his modest allowance as Chaplain Carstares, united a simplicity and contentment of character which rendered him incapable of using the influence he wielded in high places for self-aggrandisement. Among the many grasping and dubious men of his restless age he stands conspicuous, clean of hands and pure of heart, not lifting up his soul to vanity, not swearing deceitfully. Fortunate the sovereign who had such a state-ecclesiastic to serve him: happy the Church that had such a friend at court.

When Carstares became Principal of Edinburgh University, in May 1703, he entered upon the third period of his public life and services. With the death of William III. and the accession of Queen Anne, the chaplain for Scotland, while still retained as such, ceased to have direct connection with the conduct of Scottish affairs. For while William was a Liberal and a Presbyterian, Anne was a Tory and an Episcopalian, and, as such, not disposed to admit to her counsel the adviser of her predecessor. But although removed from that place so near the throne where he had formerly stood, the influence of the Edinburgh Principal upon affairs in Scotland suffered no decay, showed no diminution. In the negotiations that preceded the Union of 1707, Carstares had a large share, being, as his state papers and letters show, in receipt of communications from such men as Argyll, Seafield, Mar, Stair, Portland, and Harley, who did nothing of importance without consulting him. With perfect truth could Lord Seafield, writing to Carstares, report to him that he had told Lord Portland, "You govern the Church, the University, and all your old friends here."

To allay the suspicion with which incorporation was generally regarded in Scotland and to overcome the opposition of the clergy, who dreaded danger to "the kirk government" which said the Earl of Marchmont, "they are beyond expression fond of," was no easy task for any one, however influential, no matter how diplomatic he might be.

What service Principal Carstares rendered as an adviser of the Scottish Parliament and as leader in the General Assembly is amply testified in his correspondence of the period, the testimony of all that had to do with the transaction being that the Union could never have had the consent of the former

body had the Presbyterian ministers persisted in opposing it, and had Carstares not acted the part he did in persuading them to withdraw their opposition. Testimony to the value of his services was given in the highest quarter when, upon the Principal presenting himself at Court some months after the conclusion of the treaty, the Queen granted him a private interview, personally thanked him for his assistance, and presented him with one of the very few silver Union medals she had caused to be struck for bestowal as marks of royal favour. It is, however, to Carstares the divine and ecclesiastic, that we naturally turn in this period of his life with greatest interest. Shortly after his appointment to the Principalship he became one of the city ministers, officiating first in Greyfriars, and thereafter in the High Church. His sermons being written in a short-hand of his own constructing, have never appeared in published form, but were spoken of in terms of warm appreciation by those who had the means of forming a judgment. It is no small praise for any preacher to have it said of him that he had an admirable gift both of prayer and of preaching, that he never failed to fix the attention of his hearers and greatly to promote their edification, that his sermons were of that sort as to be understood by the meanest capacities and admired by the best judges, and that his delivery was warm and animated, his style combining strength and nervousness, chasteness and correctness. All these things are testified regarding the Greyfriars and High Church minister. We are content that it should be all we know of him as such, when to this we have added the scene witnessed in Greyfriars Church, when his colleague, James Hart, a violent opponent of the Union, took advantage of his position as forenoon preacher to make a fierce attack upon the promoters of it, stigmatising them as traitors to the Church of Scotland, although some of them were ministers of that Church and had unhappily too great influence over their brethren. The reference was unmistakable, and drew all eyes upon Carstares, who was seen to be turning over the leaves of his Bible with unruffled composure. In the afternoon a crowd, gathered from all parts of the city, assembled to hear how he would take up and dispose of the challenge. For text he gave out the words of the Hundred and forty-first Psalm: "Let the righteous smite me;

it shall be a kindness, and let him reprove me, it shall be an excellent oil, which shall not break my head." After pointing out that difference in opinion was the natural effect of the weakness and corruption of the human mind, the preacher proceeded, with great calmness of temper, to vindicate his colleague from any suspicion of want of regard for him, and wound up with declaring his determination to consider any admonitions or rebukes James Hart might deliver from that pulpit as the strongest expressions of his love. Thus was the colleague vanquished, the congregation edified, and the attacked minister greatly raised in the esteem of all.

Now that he was resident in Scotland and a minister of the National Church, the striking figure of Principal Carstares was to be seen in regular attendance at the meetings of the General Assembly. Four times in eleven years was he raised to the Moderator's chair; and on each occasion that he occupied that post of honour and responsibility he acquitted himself in such a way as to draw forth the admiration of all parties and disarm all opposition.

As a leader of the house he cultivated to purpose his old gift of silence with reference to all matters of lesser moment; when he did speak it was at the close of the debate, none adventuring to speak after him, and when he thought fit to "declare himself with openness," says Edmund Calamy, who was present at the sittings of the Assembly of 1709, "he for the most part drew the rest into his opinion." No thrust of irate temper could break the fence of courtly dignity, no ungenerous aspersion could make him forget the chivalry with which he treated every opponent. The English Nonconformist tells how upon an occasion, when he was seated upon the bench at the foot of the Commissioner's throne, on the right hand of the Moderator, he heard an angry old parson attack Carstares in an insulting manner, and insist upon the withdrawal of the members of the Synod of East Lothian while a reference from that Court was before the House, while to Carstares the withdrawal seemed unnecessary. "I, Sir," said the choleric member, "am as good a man as yourself, bating that you have a sprinkling of court holy water, to which I must own myself a stranger. I tell you again, Sir, you shall withdraw, or we'll go no further." The Principal was evidently

"a little put to it," but most men will think he did more than get "easily through" when they read the noble reply: "Dear brother, I can more easily forgive this peevish sally of yours than you perhaps will be able to forgive yourself when you come sedately to reflect upon it." Carstares then withdrew. Sedate reflection came in due course, and then the passionate presbyter could not rest till he had asked and obtained the forgiveness of his generous antagonist.

The passing of a Toleration Act and the restoration of Patronage gave Carstares an opportunity of serving for the last time the Church he loved so well and ministered to so faithfully. To oppose these measures he went to London, accompanied by Blackwell, Professor at Aberdeen, and Baillie, minister at Inverness. The Presbyterians of Scotland opposed the toleration of Episcopalians proposed by the Queen Anne Government, on the same ground that the so-called toleration policy of King James was opposed, the belief being that, behind what seemed equitable, there was a Jacobite endeavour to encroach upon the rights of the Church of Scotland, secured by the Revolution Settlement, and the opposition intensified when it became known that to the bill there was to be added an abjuration oath, the formula of which embodied the condition that the successor to the British throne must be a member of the Anglican Church.

The bill for restoring Patronage was opposed by the Scottish Commissioners on the ground, since become historical, that the Church of Scotland has always reckoned patronages a grievance and a burden, and had protested against them till by law abolished, and that the Act abolishing them was secured in perpetuity by the Treaty of Union. In their opposition to these measures the Scottish Commissioners met with no success, for the Toleration Act received the royal assent on the 3d of March 1712, and the bill for the restoration of Patronage, having passed the House of Lords by a majority of 51 to 29, became law on the 22d of May in the same year.

From one of statesmanlike breadth and foresight of vision such as Carstares possessed, the trouble these measures—the Patronage restoration one in particular—would bring upon the Church of Scotland could not be hid; but he did not live to witness even the immediate results. On the return of an apo-

plectic seizure in December 1715 his strength sunk, and, having given expression to his amicable relation to God and the grounds of it, in the last words he was heard to utter—"I have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ,"—he fell asleep in the sixty-seventh year of his age.

Towards the outed Episcopalian clergy, he who had suffered so cruelly under Episcopacy when in power ever acted with tenderness and generosity, welcoming them to his house, relieving their wants with carefully concealed beneficence, and constituting some of them his pensioners for life. How he exercised his ingenuity in discovering methods for conferring his benefits so as not to hurt the feelings of the most sensitive, the story of Calder or Caddell and the suit of clothes well illustrates. On one occasion this country curate paid his periodical visit in a suit so worn as to be actually threadbare. Carstares, professing to have some commission for his rural visitor, requested him to repeat the call in two days. Meanwhile, having taken with his eye the measure of his pensioner as accurately as he could, he instructed his tailor to have a suit of clothes ready in that time such as would suit, not his own portly figure, but the spare dimensions of his poverty-stricken friend. Returning at the time appointed, Cadell found the Principal denouncing his tailor for having made coat, waistcoat, and breeches preposterously tight. "They are lost," he exclaimed, "if they don't fit some of my friends;" and then, as if a happy thought had struck him, he turned to Cadell and remarked, "By the way, I am not sure but they might answer you; be so good as try; it is such a pity they should be thrown away." The clothes were found to fit as if made to order, and so were packed up and sent to the town quarters of the astonished curate. When he came to put them on next day he was still more astonished to find a ten-pound note in one of the pockets, and immediately went to the College in order to have it restored. "By no means, Cadell," said his benefactor, "it cannot belong to me, for when you got the coat you acquired a right to everything in it."

As he thus befriended them in life it was a fitting tribute to his worth and generosity that was paid by ejected Episcopalians at his open grave in the churchyard of Greyfriars, when two mourners were observed to withdraw from the com-

pany and burst into tears. They were Episcopal Nonjurors whose families he had for years supported.

It is wellnigh impossible to laud too highly the beauty and nobility of character displayed by William Carstares, or to over-estimate the services he rendered to his country and his Church. It is possible, however, in the endeavour to do justice to the latter, to form an erroneous judgment regarding the relation in which he stood to Church tendencies and Church parties of a later period. And this has actually been done, first by Dean Stanley, in his pictorial *Lectures on the History of the Church of Scotland*, and then by Dr. Story, in his otherwise reliable and valuable biography, and also in the St. Giles' Lecture on *The Revolution Settlement*.

In his third lecture the Dean reaches "the momentous period when the Church of Scotland witnessed the full ascendancy of that great philosophic virtue and evangelical grace, of which the name has in these latter days been used as though it were the title of a deadly heresy, but which the Apostle has employed to designate one of the most indispensable duties, in the impressive precept, 'Let your moderation be known unto all men'¹ In this virtue, grace, or Christian duty, the lecturer describes "the true Revolution Settlement, to which, on the whole, the Church of Scotland from that time since has remained faithful; and the first great preacher of this new National Covenant was, in his estimate, none other than "one of the most illustrious benefactors of the Scottish Church and nation—the real Presbyterian Primate of the Church of Scotland, William Carstares." In his biography and lecture, Dr. Story does not consider it necessary to prove the existence of a Moderate party in the Church of Carstares's day, or to define precisely the relation in which he stood to it. He takes all for granted, and so writes about "Carstares and the Moderate party," also about the establishing of what "was to last for more than a century—the predominating control of that great Moderate party

¹ In a footnote at this stage of the lecture as published, the Dean admits that the original word [*ἐντρίκετος*] has that deeper meaning which an accomplished critic [Matthew Arnold] has rendered "sweet reasonableness." It must have been matter of regret to him, if he was aware of the fact that, under the manipulation of the Revision Company meeting in his beloved Jerusalem Chamber at Westminster, the term "moderation" disappears from the English New Testament altogether, giving place to "forbearance," and, in the margin, to "gentleness."

which he had largely helped to consolidate, and which he now led."

In thus associating with the Moderatism of the eighteenth century one who died in 1716, both the Anglican dean and the Presbyterian minister are largely influenced by the fact that Carstares employed the influence alike of his position and of his practice in the way of keeping in check the tendency to severity and intolerance which the ministers of the Revolutionary epoch who had suffered with him when Episcopacy was dominant undoubtedly manifested. This certainly entitles him to be regarded as more tolerant in spirit, more comprehensive in his policy than many of his day less favourably situated for the culture of sweet reasonableness, the manifestation of sweetness and light; but it proves nothing as to the alleged consolidation, control, and leadership of a Moderate party, which the selection of Carstares to be a Commissioner to London to oppose the passing of the Toleration Bill of 1712 places in a peculiarly dubious light. But those who claim Carstares as the founder and first leader of Scottish Moderatism, found upon something more explicit than his admitted toleration of spirit and charity of conduct. The Dean of Westminster and the minister of Roseneath go back to the Assembly of 1690, and to the King's message given through the Commissioner, Lord Carmichael, in which they find these striking sentences, and this significant word: "We expect that your management shall be such as we shall have no reason to repent of whatever you have done. A calm and peaceable procedure will be no less pleasing to us than it becometh you. We never could be of the mind that violence was suited to the advancing of true religion; nor do we intend that our authority shall ever be a tool to the irregular passions of any party. MODERATION is what religion requires, neighbouring churches expect from you, and we recommend to you."¹ This royal message is supposed to have been inspired by Carstares, and the word "Moderation" chosen by him, and then, Moderation being taken to be synonymous with Moderatism, the process is complete, and Carstares becomes the father and founder of Scottish Moderatism. This identifying of moderation with Moderatism

¹ Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, 1638-1842, p. 222.

will not commend itself to lovers of accuracy in the use of terms, or indeed to any one even *moderately* acquainted with the history of the period. The mere employing of the terms "moderation," "moderate," "moderate men," has in truth no bearing whatever on the matter. We can point to several of the correspondents of Carstares who used these terms, but who were certainly innocent of any reference to or any prophetic anticipation of Moderatism, whether in Church polity or in pulpit treatment of the doctrines of grace.¹ Nay, so far as that goes, the matter can be carried further back than the days of Carstares and his contemporaries. In 1687, as is well known, James VII. issued a proclamation giving "a royal toleration to the several professors of the Christian religion after-named, with and under the several conditions, restrictions, and limitations aftermentioned." In this abrogation of penal laws by a Popish king, an exception is made in the case of field conventicles and those who take part in them; but, provided nothing is said or done of a seditious nature, that no meeting-houses are built and no out-houses or barns are used, then "MODERATE PRESBYTERIANS" are tolerated "to meet in their private houses, there to hear all such ministers as either have or are willing to accept of the indulgence allenarly [only] and none other." This toleration was rejected with scorn by the Hillmen of the Cargill and Renwick type, who wrote about those who accepted it in terms scarcely less severe than those which they applied to the "apostate Papist, fiery bigot, zealous sworn votary and vassal of Antichrist," from whom it emanated. Alexander Shields, in his *Hind let Loose*, writes contemptuously of the "Moderate Presbyterians," who received and accepted the indulgence as "Royal Dawties," and intimates that from that category all the zealous and faithful Presbyterians are excluded.

It is not to be supposed that such enthusiastic admirers of Moderatism as Dean Stanley and Dr. Story would care to trace back the germs of that lauded policy to the times of the indulged ministers, who joyfully accepted a toleration extended to Presbyterians only to benefit Papists, and who sent an address to the King thanking him for granting them the liberty of the public and peaceable exercise of their ministerial func-

¹ See *State Papers and Letters*, pp. 75, 734, 753.

tions. And yet this would not be a greater anachronism than is committed when the moderation of Carstares and his contemporaries is identified with the Moderatism of Dr. Patrick Cumming, Principal Robertson, and "Jupiter" Carlyle.

In thus refusing to confound what others would fain treat as identical, we are glad to find we have the valuable support of Sir Henry Wellwood Moncreiff, who, alike on ancestral and personal grounds, is entitled to be heard on such a question. In the supplementary lecture of his Chalmers Lectures on *The Free Church Principle: its Character and History*, the judiciously minded and historically equipped baronet disputes the accuracy of the identifying:—

"Whatever," he says, "have been the merits or demerits of the Moderate party in the Established Church of Scotland since 1750, the word *moderation* used by King William's Government, or by Principal Carstairs, cannot be proved to have a true relation to the history or principles of that party. There is no good reason to be gathered from an accurate survey of the historical facts, even so far as stated by Dr. Story himself in his interesting *Biography*, for the supposition that the predominating control of a great Moderate party, consolidated and led by Carstairs, was established in his time, so as (according to Dr. Story in his St. Giles' Lecture) to last for more than a century."

Sir Henry Moncreiff considers it doubtful in the extreme if Principal Carstares would have admitted that he formed the party which Principal Robertson led; and he puts the pertinent questions: "Did the spirit of Carstairs animate them [the Moderates of the eighteenth century] in their course between 1750 and 1800? Did it rule them when the question of missions to the heathen was brought before the General Assembly in 1796?"

There is another lecturer upon whose judgment Dr. Story may be supposed to place more reliance than upon that of the Free Church Senior Principal Clerk, who has also expressed himself in such a way as clearly indicates that his reading of Scottish Church History is very different from that of his fellow-lecturer in St. Giles', Edinburgh. For in the winter of 1880-81 Principal Tulloch followed up Dr. Story's lecture on *The Revolution Settlement* with one on *The Church of the Eighteenth Century*. In the course of that lecture the St. Andrews Principal states it as his conviction that "so far back as the close of the first quarter of the eighteenth century" the spirit

of the age and the circumstances of the Church brought about a change, and gave rise to "a new race of clergy—men to whom the troublous times before the Revolution were a dim retrospect, and who were animated not so much by an enthusiasm for Presbytery as by what they deemed a sober and enlightened regard to the peace and good of the country, both in Church and State." This change and this new clerical departure the lecturer dates "definitely from about 1720." He admits that at that date the terms *Popular* and *Moderate* were not in use, that it was at least twenty years later before they came into vogue, and "much later before they assumed the characteristics by which they are generally distinguished," but he thinks "the germs of the divisions were perceptible at this earlier time, to which time [1720] we are to trace back the formation of distinct parties within the Church."

At a subsequent stage of his lecture Principal Tulloch divides the history of Moderatism into two epochs, the first extending to 1751, and having Patrick Cumming of Edinburgh for its leader;¹ the second dating from the turn of the century, when Moderatism took a "new and decisive shape in the hands of Robertson, Carlyle, and others." If this be accepted as a correct version of the genesis of "what is known as Moderatism," what becomes of the alleged paternity of William Carstairs, who died when the first leader of the Moderate party was a youth of twenty-one?

This matter of the rise and development of Moderatism in the Scottish Church is one of great interest and practical value in its bearing upon the character of the Scottish people and the policy of the Scottish clergy; it is also one that stands in need of being cleared up.

But beyond the point now reached we cannot at present travel. Should it be permitted us to continue these studies, we undertake to prove that while *Moderation* is not a word of "evil omen," as Dr. Story would have us to believe, the same cannot be affirmed of what resembles it only in verbal form—Dean Stanley's "great philosophical virtue and evangelical grace"—*Moderatism*.

CHARLES G. M'CRIE.

¹ Dr. Cumming was not born till 1695. He died on 1st April 1776, in the 81st year of his age, and 56th of his ministry.

ART. IV.—*Was Aërius a Heretic?*

ON the banks of the Halys, a river often named by Herodotus, and at the distance of a hundred miles from its source, stood in the fourth century the town of Sebaste, now known as Siwas in Asia Minor. The province to which it belonged was Pontus, near where it touches Cappadocia, in a district usually designated by ancient writers the Lesser Armenia. Connected with this spot, between the years 340 and 380 A.D., were two remarkable men, both of whom have found a place in history. One of them was bishop of the place, and was called Eustathius; the other was a presbyter named Aërius. They had been school-fellows, and for some time after were warm friends; but in course of time they parted from each other, and went their separate ways.

Of Eustathius we do not intend to say much. In his youth he introduced, for the first time, the monastic life into that remote part of the country, and gathered round him a number of followers, who adopted certain peculiarities of ritual and behaviour that drew down upon him and them smart ecclesiastical censure from the Synod of Gangra. Eustathius was wiser than many. He submitted to reproof, renounced his error, conformed to the Church practices of the age, and was restored to office. He regained the confidence of his brethren, and became bishop of Sebaste. But he never became a safe and steady ecclesiastic. He took the side of the semi-Arians in the great doctrinal controversy of the fourth century. He was deposed from his office and restored; and then deposed and restored again. He signed creed after creed drawn up in the attempt to find some common standing-ground for men who differed essentially on the vital question. He went to Constantinople on a deputation to the Emperor Constantius, and to Rome on another to Pope Liberius. After a life of controversy and storm, he died, probably before 380, because we find in that year at Sebaste another bishop—Peter, the younger brother of Basil of Cæsarea, occupying his chair.

To his school-fellow Aërius, much more interest attaches. His name bears a strong resemblance to that of the arch-heretic

—Arius of Alexandria, the originator of the Arian controversy; but they were entirely different men. At the time of which we speak Arius of Alexandria was dead, though his work remained and carried fruit; and at no time had he any connection with Sebaste in Pontus. Aërius of Sebaste was in youth, as we have said, the friend of Eustathius, and joined him in the ascetic discipline to which he was so much devoted before he became a bishop. All we know of him is from Epiphanius,¹ a zealous but not over-discreet ecclesiastic, who was bishop of Constantia in Cyprus, and who, from mere theological antagonism, seems unable to speak of his contemporary Aërius with any moderation. He seems to have some such knowledge of the person he condemns as a minister residing in the Bermudas, at a time when printing and the post-office, steam and electricity, were as yet undiscovered, might be supposed to have of some obscure sect which had recently made its appearance in Central America, or in the Highlands of Scotland. In regard to Aërius, the historians Socrates and Sozomen are both silent. We can therefore get no help from the cross-lights of history, and as we derive all our information from one authority, and that authority neither well informed nor free from prejudice, we must in justice take it with a little allowance.

The account of Epiphanius is, that Aërius felt hurt when Eustathius was chosen to be bishop of Sebaste. Perhaps he was vexed to see his friend renounce the ascetic principles he had formerly professed, by accepting a position which he regarded as inconsistent with them. Epiphanius, however, can think of no motive actuating him except jealousy—because the choice had not fallen upon himself. The bishop, he tells us, did his best to soothe the wounded feelings of his old friend, by making him a presbyter, and the governor of a hospice—that is, a public institution set up at Sebaste for the entertainment of diseased persons and strangers. But the attempt was in vain. Aërius spoke of him with bitter words. The bishop reproved and praised, threatened and flattered, but without any good result. Eventually the offended presbyter resigned charge of the hospice, separated from the bishop, and accused him of being covetous and greedy of gain. Epiphanius admits

¹ *De Hær.* lxxii.

that there was something plausible in this, for the bishop, he says, had to provide for all the wants of the church, and this could not be done without money. But Aërius was sharp of tongue and ready of speech. The company of men and women who adhered to him were driven out of the churches, the cities, the villages, even the fields, and had to prove the sincerity of their convictions by living in the open air, taking shelter in the woods and in the clefts of the rocks, and enduring alike the summer's drought and the winter's snow. But Aërius is charged with being an Arian—a charge which in those days it was common to bring against everybody who was not prominent in support of the Nicene Creed. Epiphanius states nothing in proof, and the charge is not confirmed by the fact that the great quarrel of his life was waged against a semi-Arian bishop. Having nothing in evidence but the unsupported statement of an enemy, we are not in a position to judge how far the accusation may be true or false. The objections specially taken by Epiphanius to his orthodoxy, however, do not turn on his views as to the Trinity, but on his opinions on four other topics, to which opinions Epiphanius gives importance by stating them in detail, and attempting to overturn them by argument. Let us notice them in order.

1. Aërius asserted that stated times of FASTING were not appointed by the authority of God. It had been the practice in the Church, from early times, for Christians to fast on Wednesdays and Fridays. Aërius said that this rule was Jewish, and that its tendency was to bring men once more under that yoke of bondage from which Christ had delivered them. He said that if Christians fast, they should choose the time themselves, and thus fast with their own free will, not because it is the law or the custom. It must have been to show his disregard of the ordinary ecclesiastical rule in this matter, that he and his adherents sometimes fasted on the Lord's Day, which all other Christians regarded as a festival. But surely there is no heresy in this. Under the Jewish system, one day in the year—the great Day of Atonement—was indeed prescribed as a fast, but there is no day appointed for this purpose under the Christian system. While the practice, as the expression of sorrow for the absence of the Lord, has Divine approval, the time, the length, and the circumstances

of the fast are not enjoined, but are left to the conscience and discretion of the individual. If a Christian, of his own choice, fast on the Lord's Day, there is no law to forbid him, however incongruous the act may be with an institution intended to commemorate the joy of the Lord's resurrection; but if he make his own practice in this respect a rule to bind others, he himself commits the error against which he protests. We have no evidence that Aërius in this matter did more than exercise his Christian liberty, when he refused to be bound by any canon or custom in regard to a point which Christ had left open. Epiphanius has nothing to say in reply, except to urge the authority of the Church. Opposition to the authority of the Church, except for very sound and strong reasons, is indeed not justifiable; but even when most unjustifiable, it is a very different thing from opposition to the authority of God.

2. Aërius further objected to PRAYING FOR THE DEAD. His language on the subject was:—

“A living man can pray and do service, but how are the dead profited thereby? If the prayer of people in this world can profit those who have entered the other, one need not in that case either worship or do good; he has only to obtain friends in any way he pleases, either by paying them money, or rewarding them at death, and let these pray for him, that he may not suffer in the next world, and that what he did may not be reckoned to be incurable transgressions.”

Time has justified this reasoning of Aërius. The result which he pointed out has actually occurred, and is actually occurring. Dying men often bequeath money to pay living men to pray for them, and to have masses said for their souls, in hope of obtaining after death that precious salvation which during life they failed to secure.

How does Epiphanius attempt to reply to the statement of Aërius? He advocates the practice of the time, and asks what could be more reasonable and admirable than for those who are present to believe that those who are gone are still alive, and are not out of existence, but are in being, and are living with the Lord; and that this most holy doctrine should be declared:—“That they who pray have hope in regard to the brethren that they are in another country, and that the prayer for them does them good though it may not remove all their offences.” He goes on to argue that it is right to pray

both for dead sinners and for dead saints, in order to show that Christ, for whom we do not pray, is superior to the highest of the saints. He falls back again on the tradition that the Church has received from the Fathers, and states that this is one of the bonds appointed in the Church itself, which bonds "are right in themselves, and are all admirable."

But it is obvious that this reasoning is beside the question. We all believe in the future life and in the Deity of Christ on grounds which are at least satisfactory to ourselves; but we are not required to show our belief in either by doing any act which the Word of God has not enjoined; and the Church has no right, in compliance with the traditions of the Fathers, or for any other cause, to impose upon the human conscience bonds which God has not imposed. She has no right, like the Pharisees of old, to "teach for doctrines the commandments of men." The commission of the Christian preacher is to teach men to observe all that Christ has commanded, but not necessarily to observe all that the Church has commanded.

Aërius had been one of the Eustathians up to the time of his separation from their leader; and probably this disapproval of prayers for the dead lay at the root of the opposition given by that party to the practice of holding meetings for worship at the tombs of the martyrs, for which opposition the Synod of Gangra condemned them in its 20th canon. The Synod denounced any who from pride and scorn censured these martyr services. Time, however, has gone against the Synod, and has proved that however innocent these services at the grave appeared at first, those who censured them were right. They led on gradually to prayers for the dead, to the worship of saints, to the veneration for relics, and to other errors prevailing in some Churches till the present time.

3. Another error alleged against Aërius is that he objected to keeping EASTER. Our Lord, as is well known, suffered at the Feast of Passover, and when afterwards the custom grew up among Christians of keeping as a feast the anniversary of His resurrection, it was kept at the same time as the Jewish festival, and was by a natural figure called the Christian Passover. This festival among Christians dates from the middle of the second century. Aërius condemned the observance of this Christian Passover, or Easter, as we are in the

habit of calling it. Epiphanius represents him as asking:— "What is Easter that is observed by you? You cling still to Jewish fables; it is not necessary to keep Easter, for 'Christ our passover' was sacrificed." Giving effect to the principle that Christ is the true Passover, and that Christians do not need any other, Aërius and his followers were in the habit of eating flesh and drinking wine on the fast days preliminary to Easter. Epiphanius in his theological hate would have us believe that they over-indulged on these occasions; but it is not easy to suppose that men who, by his own account, were hunted from society, and driven forth from their homes to live in the caves and forests amid the rigour of the Armenian winter, had it in their power to err much in this respect.

What is the answer of Epiphanius to this reasoning? He answers that Paul kept the Passover, for we read how on one of his apostolic journeys he hurried forward that he might reach Jerusalem before Pentecost; so that if he kept Pentecost he must have kept Easter, for Easter occurs at the Passover, and it is from the Passover that Pentecost is counted. Further, he appeals to the so-called *Apostolic Constitutions*, a compilation of Church law attributed to the apostles, but in reality put together by some unknown person about the beginning of the fourth century, and he appeals to it for the purpose of proving that the apostles appointed that for six days before Easter Christians should use no food except bread, salt, and water. Once more the bishop falls back on Church authority: "The Church has received it, and in all the world it [Easter] has been agreed upon before Aërius and the Aërians were in existence." Lastly, he puns upon his name: "He has received an *aërial* spirit out of impurity, from the wicked spirits of the *air* which dwell in him, against the Church." Such is the reasoning of one of the best known and most literary bishops of the fourth century. An absurd and erroneous inference from Scripture, the authority of an anonymous compilation falsely attributed to the apostles, the custom of the Church, and a pun, constitute the whole proof that Epiphanius advances against Aërius, in order to show that Christians ought to keep Easter.

But supposing Aërius to regard Divine revelation as the only rule of Christian faith, how could he come to any other

conclusion than that the observance of Easter is unnecessary? That festival is not instituted by Divine authority; it is named once in King James's version of the New Testament, but that only in consequence of a mistranslation, now corrected in the Revised Version; the Christians of the apostolic age observed no feast, except the Eucharist, in honour of the Lord's death; nor any festival, except the Lord's Day, in honour of His resurrection; the observance of any other commemoration of either event is unnecessary; Easter is a festival entirely human in its origin; and there is no evidence of its existence or observance anywhere in the Church prior to the middle of the second century. A practice found then to exist for the first time in the Christian community can have no binding force upon after times.

4. But the doctrine which has mainly drawn down upon Aërius the ire of the Cyprian bishop and the denunciation of prelatie writers in after ages, is his opinion that THERE WAS ORIGINALLY NO REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PRESBYTER AND A BISHOP. The language which Epiphanius attributes to him on this subject is as follows, and he introduces it with the remark that it is "more that of a maniac than of one in the condition of a man." "What," says Aërius, "is a bishop to a presbyter? The one in no respect differs from the other; their rank, honour, and reward are the same. A bishop ordains; so also does a presbyter. The bishop baptizes; so likewise the presbyter. The bishop conducts divine worship; so also does the presbyter. The bishop sits on a throne; so also does the presbyter." To prove this position he used the scriptural arguments that are used by very many at the present time. He referred to the fact that the apostle, when referring to the qualifications of church officers, mentions only elders and deacons, and passes over bishops, leaving us to infer that the bishop must be included either under the one designation or the other; and he appealed to 1 Tim. iv. 14 to show that Timothy, the bishop so-called whom Paul was addressing, had been ordained by a presbytery. By this language, says Epiphanius, "he deceived many," which expression we, from our point of view, understand to mean that many were led by Aërius to understand the truth of the matter as opposed to the general practice of his own time.

It is worthy of note what Epiphanius says in reply. He answers that in the apostolic age matters were only gradually arranged. Some places had presbyters before they had bishops, and others had bishops before they had presbyters. Presbyters and deacons were appointed from the first, but "where none was found worthy of the episcopate, the place remained without a bishop." "No institution," he adds, "has everything at first, but as time advances everything is arranged for the complete supply of its necessities." But he does not explain why it is that no church that the apostle addressed had the three distinct orders—the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons—all at the same time; and if the prelate did not appear until the apostles had passed away, the case of Aërius requires no more to prove it. Next, Epiphanius infers from the admonition to Timothy, "Rebuke not an elder, but entreat him as a father," that a bishop was superior. But the legitimate inference is that Timothy was superior, and he has no right to assume, without proof, that Timothy was a prelate; he may have been, on the contrary, an evangelist or presbyter, to whom an apostle had for a time delegated his special powers. Besides, the argument would be quite as convincing to say that Timothy was not superior to the elders, because he was expressly told *not* to rebuke them. His third argument assumes what it is his object to prove. It is, to use his own words, that "bishops beget fathers, and presbyters beget children for the Church." Stripped of figure, this means that bishops ordain, but that presbyters baptize. That difference certainly did exist in the time of Epiphanius; but the fact that it existed in the fourth century does not prove that it existed in the first. That it did not exist in the first is clear, as we think, from Acts xiii. 3 and 1 Tim. iv. 14.

The doctrine that there was originally no distinction between a bishop and a presbyter, for holding which Aërius has been so well abused, is not among the opinions ascribed to Eustathius and his followers by the Synod of Gangra. The inference is that it was taken up by the presbyter of Sebaste after his quarrel with Eustathius, and after the elevation of the latter to the episcopate had drawn his attention to the subject. Though bishop and presbyter filled different offices in the fourth century, it is now almost universally admitted that in the first century they were only different names for the same

church officer. This is known from the fact that in Scripture the same duties are prescribed, the same qualifications required, the same reward promised to both, and also that their names are used interchangeably. The power of ordaining is not said in the New Testament to be the prerogative of a prelate; it was the prophets and teachers of Antioch who ordained Saul, and it was the presbytery that "laid hands" on Timothy.

We come therefore to the conclusion that in the four points of government and ritual, in regard to which Aërius differed from Epiphanius, and from most of the Christians of his own time, he was in the right, and they were in the wrong. Even if he was wrong, there was no heresy, judging by the standard of Scripture, in any of the four opinions stated to be his. In every one of them he anticipated the doctrine held by the purest section of the Protestant party since the Reformation. It was, however, his avowal of the belief of the identity of presbyter and bishop which set him most strongly in antagonism to the prelates and to the most influential Christians of his own age. That doctrine struck Prelacy at the root, and probably did most to draw down persecution upon himself and his adherents at Sebaste, as it excited against him the ire of Epiphanius, who lived at such a distance from him as Cyprus. His subsequent history is unknown. He was alive in the year 376, when Epiphanius was engaged at his work on *Heresies*, and we have no reason to believe that the courageous presbyter recanted any doctrine that he ever professed. His opinion that presbyter and bishop are in the New Testament different names for the same officer could not be very acceptable doctrine to a prelate, and it is on that account that the bishop of Constantia loads him with such unmeasured abuse. He attributes to him motives the most unworthy. He speaks of him as one whom the devil has made to stumble. He calls him a deceiver. As if that was not strong enough, he speaks of him as "an insect," a "blister-fly," a "poisonous beetle," one that ought to be crushed by the authority of the Church and by the power of God. Such is the manner in which a literary prelate of the fourth century permits himself to speak of a contemporary clergyman, the head and front of whose offence was that he called in question the scriptural authority of the prelate's office.

Modern defenders of Prelacy have not forgiven Aërius for

the great ecclesiastical sin of saying that at first there was no difference between the presbyter and bishop. Certainly, says Palmer,¹ "Aërius has always been accounted a heretic in the Catholic Church." Archbishop Potter says, "Aërius was reckoned among the heretics of this age, chiefly because he gave presbyters power to ordain, and consequently made them equal to bishops."² And the "judicious Hooker" allows himself to use these words :—

"Are we to think that Aërius had wrong in being judged an heretic for holding this opinion? Surely if heresy be an error falsely fathered upon Scripture, but indeed repugnant to the truth of the Word of God, and by the consent of the universal Church in the Councils, or in her contrary uniform practice throughout the whole world, declared to be such; and the opinion of Aërius on this point be a plain error of that nature; there is no remedy but Aërius so schismatically and stiffly maintaining it, must even stand where Epiphanius and Augustine have placed him."³

The most eminent Anglican defenders of Prelacy thus seem all to agree with Epiphanius, who regarded as heresy any departure from the common opinion of his own time, and with Augustine, who on this point copies Epiphanius, and says that Aërius was a heretic. But if he was so, what are we to say of Dr. Lightfoot, the learned and justly esteemed Bishop of Durham, who in his Essay on the *Christian Ministry* defends by unanswerable argument the doctrine of Aërius,⁴ and afterwards uses these words: "The name of the presbyter then presents no difficulty; but what must be said of the term bishop? It has been shown that *in the apostolic writings the two are only different designations of one and the same office.*"⁵ Heresy, says Dean Hook, "means an arbitrary adoption, in matters of faith, of opinions at variance with the doctrines delivered by Christ and the apostles, and received by the Catholic Church." If the definition be accurate, we do not believe in the heresy either of the presbyter of Sebaste or of the Bishop of Durham. The doctrine which they teach in common is not at variance with anything delivered by Christ or His apostles, however it may be accepted in the Catholic Church.

THOMAS WITHEROW.

¹ *On the Church*, Part vi. ch. i. §.

² *On Church Government*, ch. v. p. 199, 7th ed. 1839.

³ *Ecclesiastical Polity*, vii. §.

⁴ *Comment. on Philipians*, p. 95.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 191, 3d ed.

ART. V.—*The Nature of Physical Causes and their Induction.*¹

IN our previous sketch of the History of Inductive Reasonings,² we found that the chief (and the difficult) question, the great problem of this species of logic, which continually emerged, was this: How does the inference seemingly made from the some, or the many, to the all, become valid for the all?

The settlement of this, as of the other fundamental doctrines of logic, must proceed upon right postulates as to psychology, and especially as to its highest branch, the original powers of the reason. In our criticism of the *Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century*,³ a parallel question as to the Deductive Logic is considered (see pp. 265-272). That question was the old one between the assailants and defenders of the utility and fruitfulness of the syllogism, with which the students of philosophy are acquainted. The followers of Locke, from his day to ours, have argued that, since a syllogism which concludes more in its third proposition than is predicated in its major premiss is confessedly faulty, all such reasonings must inevitably be either sophisms, or worthless, only teaching us what we must have known before in order to state our premiss. Yet we saw Mill, after echoing this objection, confessing, what all men's common sense must concede, that the syllogism is the full expression to which all deductive reasoning is reduced. How was this paradox to be solved? It was shown that the solution is in recognising the *a priori* necessary and universal judgments of the reason. Admit that the mind is entitled to other judgments than the empirical, the intuitive namely, and that they are universal, then the synthesis of truths becomes a valid and fruitful source of new knowledge.

A similar resort to the doctrines of a true psychology must be made, again, to explain the Inductive Logic. This necessity has been disclaimed, on the ground that logic is a critical art, whose whole and only business is to test the validity, not of the contents, but of the forms of our elenctic thought.

¹ *Southern Presbyterian Review.*

² *B. and F. Evang. Review*, July 1883.

³ Published by T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh.

This might be admitted ; and yet it would remain true that these processes, which it is the business of logic to criticise, are psychological processes, and that the critical acts are also psychological processes. Moreover, as in the world of matter the substance determines the form, so in the realm of thought it is the quality of the contents of thought which determines the logical framework. The science of logic, therefore, must be grounded in a correct psychology.

That psychology must not be the sensationalist. We must hold that the mind has original powers of judging *a priori* necessary truths ; powers which, although they may be awakened to exercise on occasion of some empirical perception, yet owe the validity of the judgment formed, not to sense-perception, but to the mind's own constitutive laws. This, then, is the metaphysical doctrine assumed as the basis of this discussion : that while the senses alone give us our individual idea of objective things, it is the original power of the reason which gives us our universal necessary judgments about objective things and their relations ; and these same powers furnish the forms according to which we connect them into general knowledge. Those necessary and universal truths are primitive judgments, intuitively seen to be true, and not dependent for their authority upon the confirmation of observed instances, be they many or few. For these first truths and laws of the reason must be, in their order of production (though not in their date), prior to the observations of the senses and to all deductions therefrom, because they are necessary to construe the individual perceptions intelligibly, and to connect them for any purposes of reasoning. But it is our purpose here to postulate, and not to argue, this view of the mind's powers. For the latter, the reader must be referred to the work mentioned above (*Sens. Phil. of the Nineteenth Century considered*, Chap. x. and xi.).

We have seen J. S. Mill's correct position, that the *law of causation* is the foundation of every inductive demonstration. We have also seen his inconsistent assertion, that our belief in this law is the result of an induction from experience. We have proved, on the contrary, that it is a necessary intuition of the reason. Whenever we observe a *phenomenon* or a new existence, the law of the reason insures our assigning for it an

adequate cause. It is impossible for us to think a thing or event as arising out of nothing. To think it as producing itself, would be the contradiction of thinking it acted before it existed. Nor can we avoid ascribing to the cause *power* efficient of the effect. The old objection, that we have no right to assume anything else than what the senses observe, a regular or uniform sequence between a certain antecedent and a certain consequent, is worthless to any one who has learned the true doctrine: that the reason is itself a source, and not a mere passive recipient, of cognitions. As, when sense-perception gives us only a cluster of properties belonging to body, the reason must supply the supersensuous notion of substance underlying and sustaining them, so when the senses perceive a cause preceding its effect, the reason compels us to supply the rational notion of efficient power in the cause. It is this, and this alone, which enables and qualifies the antecedent to be cause. And this power must be thought as efficient of the effect. This judgment involves the further belief that, wherever the cause is present, under the same conditions, the efficiency of its power insures the same effect. Such is obviously the nature of the necessary judgment: "Same causes, same effects." A simple examination of our consciousness convinces us that our rational notion of substance involves the assurance of its continuity of being and permanency. As the rise of that substance *ex nihilo*, without any cause, is a proposition which cannot be rationally thought, so the cessation of that substance's continuity of being, or its return into *nihil* without a cause efficient of its destruction, is equally incredible. This intuitive confidence in the permanency of true substance, as thus defined, is not an inference from any observations, but a phase of the intuition, a source and premiss of all our reasonings about substances; and a regulative law for construing every observation experiences give us about them. So we have a similar intuitive confidence in the persistency and uniformity of power, wherever it inheres. So long as power qualifies any being, it is, in its own nature, efficient of the same effect which it is once seen to produce. If we see the agent and the recipient of the effect again present, and do not witness the rise of the same effect, we intuitively and necessarily believe that some other power, whether visible or

invisible, is intervening to modify or counteract the known power. This is the explanation of our belief in the "uniformity of nature" when the belief is legitimate. Nature is uniform just so far as the same powers are present, and her uniformities are nothing but the necessary results of the permanency of substances and powers. What we call laws of nature are only the regular methods of the actions of natural powers. We believe in those laws only because we intuitively judge that each power or energy is, under the same circumstances, efficient of the same effects.

But this conception of regular laws in nature implies an assurance not only of the permanency of substances, but of their essential properties. That substances have two classes of properties, distinguished as *attributa* and *accidentia*, is obvious; and it is according to their permanency or mutability that we ascribe a quality to the one class or the other. How is it that we are authorised to entertain this assurance of the permanency of essential properties? The answer is, *because these properties make themselves known to our reason as powers*. If we reflect, we see that what we call a property of a body is only revealed to us by its emission of a power, producing an effect either on some other body, or on our own percipient senses, and through them on our own spirits. This truth has been seen by Dr. McCosh, for instance (in his *Divine Government, Physical and Moral*, p. 78). The evidence assigned for the proposition seems inadequate: that we observe no body acts on itself, but only on another body in a certain relation to itself. The same writer, very singularly, excepts from his assertion those properties which affect our senses. Of all the properties of external things, he should have said that those which affect our senses directly are most certainly powers. For it is only by some effect on our senses, propagating a perception, that we learn an effect has been produced on another body. What is perception? How do we convince ourselves of the reality of the external world? Consciousness, a subjective faculty, can of course only testify to the subjective part of the perceptive function. What, then, is the rational ground of that judgment of relation which, as we know, we all make between the perceptive cognition and the external source? Reflection convinces us that this ground is in the necessary and *intuitive judgment of cause*. We are conscious of a perception; we are also con-

scious we did not affect ourselves with it. But there can be no effect without a cause; therefore the object perceived must be a reality. It is frequently said that we derive, or at least we first see, the rational notion of power and efficiency in our own conscious volition; that we are conscious of the will to emit efficiency; that we see the effect, and that we thus form the notion of efficient power in cause. We have no disposition to dispute the fact that this may be one of the occasions upon which the reason presents her intuitive notion of power. But, whatever the change which she may observe, constituting a new *phenomenon* or state, whether in the subjective or objective sphere, she must supply the notion of cause and of efficient power. For the necessary law of her thinking is, *ex nihilo nihil*. The new effect could not have been, except there had preceded a sufficient cause. But when is cause sufficient? Only when it possesses power efficient of the new change.

Now, then, the first cognition which the mind can have of any objective thing, is *through experiencing an effect therefrom*. Is it not obvious, thence, that what we call properties of things are *only known to us as powers*? They are, simply, what are *able to affect us* with the perceptions. And since every perception is an effect, we only learn that any body has the property (or power) of affecting another body, by experiencing its power of affecting us. Hence, we should say that we know the properties of bodies which affect our senses as powers primarily; and those which we see affecting other bodies we know as also powers secondarily. Instead of saying that properties are powers, it would be more correct to say that powers are the only true properties. The notion of power is in order to the idea of property. Here, then, is the ground on which we expect a permanency in any essential property, as immutable as that which we intuitively ascribe to substance; it is because "the same causes produce the same effects."

But there are properties which are not permanent; and yet they can produce effects on us, and on other bodies. The distinction of "attributes" and "accidents" made by the scholastics is just. The solidity of congealed water, for instance, is certainly not an essential property of that substance; yet it has power to affect our tactual sense, and it also has a power of impact on other bodies which the liquid has not.

Here is an apparent inconsistency—that we should infer the permanency of essential properties from the fact that they are causes; that the same causes produce the same effects—and yet concede power to properties which are not permanent. But the inconsistency is only seeming. The explanation is, that the change or state which was just now an effect, may in turn become a cause, and may not only depend on its cause, but have another effect depending on it. While its own prior cause propagates it, it may also propagate its effect; with the suspension of the action of its cause, it and its effect cease. The original cause has thus its progeny, not only of the first, but of the second and subsequent generations. Now, what is an “*accidens*,” a property not permanent, except a mutable effect of some other property, which is a permanent cause?—mutable, because, while the power of essential property has no change, the conditions for its action may change. While the more original power or powers of the essential property is acting, its effect, the accidental property, is propagated; and this in turn may become cause, so long as it subsists. Thus, solidity is not an essential property of water; for this substance often exists uncongealed; the solidity is the result of a molecular energy, which is an essential property in the substance, and which is allowed to come into action by the departure of the caloric out of it. To understand this truth, we must avail ourselves of the old distinction between *active* and *passive powers*. Essential properties are active powers. Accidental properties are the results of passive powers in the bodies which exhibit them; of susceptibilities or powers of reciprocity, by means of which the more original powers of the essential properties, either simple or combined, show through and give themselves these new and mutable expressions.

We remark, again, that it is obvious the permanency of the properties which we predicate of a class, or of a general term by which we name it, is essential to the validity of all general and scientific propositions. This, to the logician, needs no arguing. Hence it follows that it is all-important we shall be able to distinguish, in classifying, between permanent or essential properties and “*accidentia*.” How do we effect this? Here the rule quoted from Sir Isaac Newton comes to our aid. If we find that a given property is always present whenever

the body is present, and that it is not affected with increment or diminution whatever other effects are wrought on the body, we may safely conclude that it is an essential property. This rule should be qualified by the following admission: It may be that the energy which we invariably see expressing itself through this property, is not the original energy, but is itself the next effect of a latent and undetected energy. If this were surely discovered, we should feel constrained to carry back the name and title of essential property to that original energy. For instance, we have been accustomed to regard caloric as an original energy in matter. Should it be that caloric is itself a result of a peculiar molecular motion in matter, or in some latent *medium*, we must give the name of original energy to that hitherto undetected cause. This, we suppose, Newton would have freely conceded. But this concession does not practically derange our inductive conclusions. For if there is the latent energy, and yet it always expresses itself through the known property, and if it is its necessary law to do so, any practical conclusion from it is as solid as though the latent cause had been seen. We are, in fact, reasoning from it, while we only leave it anonymous. But, it may be asked, does the fact that a body always exhibits a certain property *as often as we have observed it*, prove that property to be essential, and therefore permanent? Is not this the defective induction *per enumerationem simplicem*? We concede that it is nothing more. Hence it is all-important that we employ the other part of Newton's rule also, that upon frequent observations we see the property takes no increment or decrease, whatever changes are made upon the body. If the property stands that test, it is essential. But the application of this test is, as we shall see in the subsequent discussion, but an employment of the canon of "corresponding variations," one of the methods of induction by which a valid is distinguished from an invalid inference. It may be asked, Does the process of inductive reasoning begin so far back in our thinking, in the very formation of our concepts, as well as in deducing from them? We answer, Yes; the rational function must come into play, not only at an early stage of our processes of logical thought, but along with their very beginning. This is the very principle of true metaphysics.

We shall see that this is not the only case of inductive inference, which takes place in the very processes of generalisation. It has been too long and too heedlessly repeated, that the generalisations which give us our general concepts are *preliminary* to our processes of inference, and therefore cannot be inferential. Dugald Stewart, in repeating this statement, seems to have a view of its inaccuracy; for he immediately qualifies it by remarking that, while a given inferential process has no concern with the question whence or how the premisses employed came, but only with the question whether they are correctly related; yet one or more of these premisses may be itself an inference from a previous illation. This is the vital concession. A general proposition cannot be correctly affirmed, save of general terms. Hence it is also essential that the concepts named in those general terms be correctly framed. The question of their correctness may require to be settled by a logical process. Let it be considered now, that when we frame a general term, it must be understood to connote all the properties essential to the species. For instance, the general term horse must be held to signify each and every property essential to that species of quadrupeds. Let us suppose that, in a place new and strange to us, as the Shetland Isles, we meet with an individual quadruped, which we wish to classify. We see that, along with some quite striking differences, as of size and such like, it has several of the more obvious qualities of the horse species. May we refer it to that species? On the one hand, unless this individual quadruped has all and each of the properties essential to the species horse, we are not authorised to class it there. On the other hand, we have not seen all the possible properties of the Shetland individual. For instance, we have not dissected it; we have not yet satisfied ourselves, ocularly, that it may not be a *ruminant*, or that it may not present specific differences in its osteology. Yet we refer it to the species horse. It is obvious that in doing this we make an induction, and it is an induction from a part to the whole. We know by observation that the individual has some of the equine properties; we infer that it has the rest of the essential properties. But all logicians agree that the induction from some to all is not necessarily valid. Are our general concepts themselves, then, only partially correct? How much uncer-

tainty must not this throw over all our general reasonings? If we are not certain that a given thing really belongs to its class, we cannot predicate certainly about it what we have proved concerning the class.

Now, on this question, it may be remarked, first, that our references of individual things to their classes are often supported by only probable evidence, or incomplete inductions. And, therefore, our propositions, when applied to those individuals, have only probable truth. But in practical life probabilities are far from valueless; if they are not universally accurate as guides of our action, they are generally so. But for the construction of a *science* they do not suffice; for science claims *truth*, and not mere probability. Second, we all practise, in our customary generalisations, certain mental expedients to guard ourselves against erroneous classifications; expedients which we learn by experience, and which are, in fact, approximate uses of logical canons of induction; although we have not distinctly analysed and explained to ourselves the rules which we virtually employ and trust. This is that practical sagacity which the mind acquires in the process of its own self-education. By its help we greatly diminish the probabilities of error in our generalisations. This may be explained by the instance already mentioned. An inexperienced child and a shrewd observing adult, neither of whom is a trained logician or natural historian, see for the first time the Shetland pony. The child, impressed by the puny size, shaggy coat, and bushy fetlocks of the quadruped, may exclaim that it cannot be a horse. The experience of the man tells him that these peculiar appearances may be but *accidentia* of the Shetland variety, striking as they are; and he at once directs his observation to other characters in the little animal, which convince him that it is, nevertheless, a true horse. The more discriminative marks, the uncloven hoof, the character and number of the teeth, the relations of the limbs to each other, furnish him with the inference that the rest of the equine properties would all be found in it if it were thoroughly dissected. Third, this observer, although not a naturalist, makes a practical application of a general principle to guide his induction. His reason has told him that *the ends* of nature cannot but dictate morphologic laws, which insure the associating of certain characters

together; so that where some of them are seen, the rest may be safely inferred. He does not call himself a philosopher; he does not name those ends "final causes." But, none the less, his reason has the partial guidance of the universal principle. He does, semi-consciously, a similar thing to that which Cuvier did, when he argued that no quadruped having graminivorous teeth would ever be found with claws on its feet, because the final cause of the Creator would never lead him to provide an animal with the instruments for seizing prey, which was ordained, in other parts of its structure, to live without prey. And when the philosophic naturalist's classifications are made with scientific certainty, by inferring the whole number of essential properties from the knowledge of a part of them, it is because he has converted the invalid induction into a valid one by the help of a necessary principle which he makes his major premiss.

POWERS AND PROPERTIES PERMANENT.

But it is time we had returned to another point in our explanation. If essential properties are powers, and if, as such, they must be permanent, why are not their effects continuous? Whereas, it is notorious that properties are not always active in the production of effects. A property, like the attractive energy of a loadstone, may remain for ages without effecting the actual motion towards itself of the bit of iron which lies in an adjacent drawer of the cabinet. This demands explanation at our hands. The explanation is, that properties of created things are causes only potentially—in themselves only powers *in posse*. In order to the effluence of the actual power, a certain relation or relations must be established between the thing possessing the property and another thing. Thus, the loadstone is always potentially an attractor of iron; but a certain proximity must be established for the effect, motion, to take place. Such instances may be multiplied until we convince ourselves that the essential condition for all physical effects is the instituting of some particular relation between two bodies. Not until the appropriate relation is instituted, is the potentiality of the causal property released, so as to become an actual power. Until then the property remains quiescent. If this doctrine is correct, the action of an elastic spring held

in a state of compression, is the parallel to the powers of natural things. The elasticity is doubtless in the compressed spring all the time, and expresses itself in a steady pressure upon the bolt or key which holds it. Let that bolt be withdrawn, and the elasticity is released, and produces the visible motion of the body propelled by the spring, hitherto quiescent. The condition of the action of every natural property is, then, its release from some restraining energy; the condition of the cessation of action is the restoration of that restraint. Is not this strictly conformed with the recognised relation in science between Statics and Dynamics, action and reaction?

The instances of the beginning and cessation of effects which we are best able to read, seem to be conformed to this view. The rise of the mercury in the tube of the barometer is ascribed to the counterpoising pressure of the atmosphere. This is a force which really exists perpetually; but it cannot produce this particular effect until a counteracting force is taken away from the top of the column of the mercury. As soon as this is removed the mercury rises in its tube; when it is replaced the atmosphere is no longer able to support the column: but the atmosphere has not lost a particle of its weight. Again: chemical affinities are deprived of many of their customary effects when organised bodies are presented to them. This is because there is another energy in the organism, the vital energy. Just so soon as this departs, the carbon, water, and nitrogen of the organism yield to the chemical energies, like other carbon, water, and nitrogen. Those energies are there, but cannot work "until that which letteth is taken out of the way."

This theory may be no more, as yet, than a probable hypothesis. But it substitutes another theory which has recently grown into much favour, and which is also only a plausible hypothesis. That is the theory of "the equivalency and transformation of energy." The conclusion from this doctrine, which is aimed at, is, that there is really but one kind of energy in the material universe; that as the caloric, for instance, which disappears from the sensible to the latent state in the volatilisation of water into steam, is transformed into an equivalent amount of elasticity in that steam, so caloric and elasticity are but two forms of the same energy. Now, much is yet lacking before this supposition is proved.

The instances in which a body may be infused with a high degree of one form of energy, and then again deprived of it, while another energy in the same body remains constant, seem fatal to the inference that those energies are equivalent and transformable. Thus, a mass of metal may be greatly heated, and then refrigerated, while its gravity remains unchanged. Gravity, at least, then, cannot be thus correlated to caloric. The same argument seems to hold of all parallel cases.

Another seemingly fatal objection to the theory of the "equivalency and transformation of energy" has been urged by Clausius. What transformation and reflection of a force can take place, which is emitted on the exterior limit of the universe, and on a line of action away from existing bodies? Let the energy be, for instance, that of heat or light. Its reflection back into the universe in the form of the same, or of a transformed energy would appear equally impossible, since nothing exists, outside the universe, to be the medium of its reception or reflection. Hence, it would seem that, as a wedge of heated iron placed in a winter atmosphere must continuously lose its caloric until as cold as the surrounding medium, so a universe, a system of bodies energised under natural laws, must continually diffuse its energies until its motions declined into universal quiescence. The favourite corollary of the theory under debate is: the permanency and equality of the aggregates of cosmic forces through all time. But this corollary, we here see, cannot be true on that hypothesis. Yet, if it be not true, how shall the physicist maintain his fundamental position, the uniformity of nature? The alternative hypothesis we suggest solves the difficulty. The powers of nature are not all equivalent and transformable the one into the other. But the powers of nature are permanent; because true powers are essential properties, and essential properties are permanent. The *forms* of matter change; but the matter, whose are the essential properties, is indestructible.

But the only *a priori* argument advanced for the new theory, so far as we are informed, is this: That reason forbids us to suppose that a power which we see now existing and active, can anon, upon the completion of its effect, be annihilated and pass into nonentity. It has disappeared in that form; but they argue, it cannot be extinct. Hence, they conclude that

it has reappeared in the form of its effect. There has been, not an annihilation, but a transformation of the energy. Now, this argument seems wholly neutralised by the view which we have suggested.

Grant that reason requires our believing in the permanency of powers, as much as of substances; this energy, which we see acting temporarily, has not gone into its effect, but has retired into potentiality in the matter which it inhabits. The conditions of its release have terminated; it is again remanded from its active to its potential state. The same energy is in matter still, in the form of essential, permanent property; and is again able to emit the same power and propagate a similar effect, whenever the conditions of release take place again. This theory of power, then, instead of reducing all the energies of nature to a single one, recognises as many distinct kinds of energy in material things, as there are certainly distinct and essential properties in matter. We may not have concluded accurately as to which properties are really distinct and essential. We may be mistaking two properties for essential ones, which will turn out to be two effects of some more latent essential property of matter. We may find that what we call heat, light, and electricity are but three phases of some one molecular energy, transformable into these equivalent effects. But we return to the more natural and obvious theory of Newton and his great contemporaries, that matter has more than one real, essential property, and more than one power. This theory of power is encumbered with none of the difficulties besetting the newer one. It coheres with the rational view which, as we have seen, compels us to regard essential properties of substances as nothing else than powers *in posse*, because we have cognition of them only as we see them producing effects.

THE AIM OF REAL INDUCTION.

But the main use of the inductive logic is to enable us to anticipate nature. Our beneficial power over her can only be gained by learning her ways. To be able to produce the given effect we desire, we must know the natural law under which that effect arises. Bacon has tersely expressed this truth at the beginning of his *Nov. Org.* "Human knowledge and power

coincide, because ignorance of the cause maketh the effect to fail. For Nature is only conquered by obeying her ; and that which in our contemplation hath the aspect of Cause, in our working hath the aspect of Rule." The thing we need to do is to predict what sequent will certainly follow such or such an antecedent. For only thus can we know these two things, the knowing of which constitutes all practical wisdom : how to produce the effect we desire, and how to foresee what shall befall us. Our first impulse is to attempt to learn nature's secret, by the mere observation and summing up of what we see occurring, with the circumstances of the occurrences. But when we have done this, and recorded our enumerations, experience speedily teaches us that we cannot yet certainly interpret and predict nature ; since the same antecedents may not be relied on always to bring in the same sequents. Sometimes they may, and oftentimes they may not. The problem, then, is to distinguish between those observed sequences which certainly will hold in the future, and those which will not. *And between the antecedent and consequent of the former sort, there must be known to be a necessary tie ; for it is self-evident that only a necessary tie can insure the certain recurrence of the second after the first.* But it is equally evident, both to the human reason and experience, that nature has no necessary tie between her events, except that of *efficient cause*. Hence it appears that the sole remaining *problem of Induction is to distinguish the causal sequences we observe, from the accidental.* Whenever we see what we term an effect, a change, a newly beginning action or state, this necessary law of the reason assures us that it had its cause. Had not that cause been efficient of that effect, it would not have been true cause. It must, then, have communicated power. That power will always be efficient of the same effect, when it acts under the same conditions. Hence, when we have truly discriminated the cause from the mere antecedent, the *propter hoc* from the *post hoc*, we have found therein a certain and invariable law of nature. We have read nature's secret. We are now enabled to predict her future actions ; and so far as we can procure the presence of the discovered cause and conditions, we can command nature, and produce the effects we desire. This, and this alone, is *inductive demonstration*.

He who ponders the last argument thoroughly, will see that there is no consistent explanation of the inductive demonstration possible upon the plan of Mr. Hume's metaphysics. Let the *a priori* rational notion of efficient cause and power be discarded; let our judgment of cause be reduced to the mere observation of invariable sequence, without any supersensuous tie between antecedent and consequent supplied by the law of reason; let the vain distinction between efficient cause and physical cause be established, and the aim of science restricted to the inquiry for the physical cause, while the search after the efficient cause is discarded; and let the rational distinction between true cause and *conditio sine qua non* be obliterated; then, obviously, no necessary truth remains, from which any argumentative process can be constructed, to lift any series of observations above the uncertain level of an *inductio enumerationis simplicis*. Mr. Mill himself, while making the fatal denials enumerated above, is driven by the force of truth to say that such necessary, universal truth must be introduced from some whither, in order to give to *induction* the solid character of science. Whence can it be obtained, if not from the intuitive judgment of efficient cause? Experience, without this, only tells us that this has come after that a great many times. But the number of instances in which experience has not been, and will not be, able to observe whether the same consequent comes after that antecedent, is infinitely greater than the number of instances which have been experimentally observed. Hence we can never conclude by that method, whether the sequence we observe is the certain one in the future. The introductory citations showed the reader how the writers on this branch of logic waver and confuse and contradict each other. Is not the reason now disclosed? That so many of them have disdained the guidance of correct metaphysics.

The reader is now brought to the proper point of view to understand why the induction from a mere enumeration of agreeing instances can never rise above probability; and why it does, as we admit, raise a probable expectation of recurrence in the future. *So far as the observed presence of a given antecedent seemingly next before the consequent raises the probability that we see in that antecedent the true efficient cause, just so far*

have we probable evidence that the consequent will follow it in future. Now, inasmuch as our rational intuition tells us that cause always immediately precedes effect, the *phenomenon* which is seemingly next before another may be in many cases taken for the nearest antecedent, and, therefore, the cause. But even this rule of probability is liable to many exceptions, which we are taught to make by our practical sagacity. We have invariably seen darkness preceding dawn; and that immediately. But we have never felt the least inclined to see the faintest probability therein, that the darkness was the cause of the dawn. Why not? Because our observation showed us a species of heterogeneity between the two events, which made us disinclined to look for the probable, or even the possible, cause of light in darkness. But in many other cases, as, when the tides were seen always to follow the rise of the moon to the meridian, the probability that the moon's coming was the true cause appeared; and as soon as Newton's theory of mutual attraction was stated, that probability appeared very strong.

But ordinarily the observed sequences can only raise a probability that we have found in the antecedent the true cause; for this reason: *that we know there are often such things as unobserved or latent or invisible causes.* For instance, the old empirical chemists knew that something turned the metal, when sufficiently heated, into the calx. They talked of an imponderable agent which they named *phlogiston*. They had not suspected that oxygen gas was the cause; for this gas is transparent, invisible, and its presence in the atmosphere had not been clearly ascertained. Had the frequently observed sequence, then, led them to the conclusion that *heat* was the efficient and sufficient cause of calcination, they would have concluded wrong. Further experiment has taught us this error; some metals, as potassium, calcine rapidly in the midst of intense cold, if atmosphere and water be present. None of the metals calcine under heat, if atmosphere and water are both excluded, as well as all other oxygen-yielding compounds. Here, then, is the weakness of the induction by the mere enumeration of agreeing instances: *We have not yet found out but that an unobserved cause comes between the seeming antecedent and the effect, the law of whose rise we wish to ascertain.*

And here is the practical object of all the canons of inductive logic, and of all the observations and experiments by which we make application of them to settle that question, *whether between this seeming antecedent and that effect, another hitherto undetected antecedent does not intervene?* Just so soon as we are sure there is no other, whether it be by many observations or few, we know that the observed antecedent is the true efficient cause; and that we have a law of nature which will hold true always, unless new conditions arise overpowering the causation. Not only is it possible that we may be assured of the absence of any undetected cause between the parts of the observed sequence by a few observations; we may sometimes reach the certainty, and thus the permanent natural law, by a single one. To do so, what we need is, to be in circumstances which authorise us to know certainly that no other antecedent than the observed one can have intruded unobserved. Such authority may sometimes be given by the testimony of consciousness. For instance, a party of explorers are travelling through a Brazilian forest, where every tree and fruit is new and strange to them. One of the travellers sees a fruit of brilliant colour, fragrant odour, and pleasing flavour, which he plucks and eats. Soon after, his lips and mouth are inflamed and swollen in a most painful manner. The effect and the anguish are peculiar. His companions, who have eaten the same food, except this fruit, and breathed the same air, do not suffer. This traveller is certain, after one trial, that the fruit is poisonous, and unhesitatingly warns his companions with the prophecy, "If you eat this fruit, you will be poisoned." What constitutes his demonstration? His consciousness tells him that he has taken into his lips absolutely nothing, since the previous evening, that could cause the poisoning, except this unknown fruit. He remembers perfectly. He has tasted nothing except the coffee, the biscuits, and the dried beef which had been their daily and wholesome fare. But, *no effect—no cause.* This fruit, the sole antecedent of the painful effect, *must therefore be the true cause*; and must affect other human lips, other things being the same, in the same way. His utter ignorance of the fruit does not in the least shake his conclusion. The traveller has really made a valid application of the "method of residues." He has argued validly from a *post hoc* up to a *propter hoc*.

This is so important that it will not be amiss to illustrate it in another instance of inductive argument—that of the metals and calxes. The first observations seemed to show that heat was the cause of calcination. But when heat was applied to a metal excluded from atmosphere it did not calcine. And when the metallic bases of the stronger alkalies, as potassium, were identified as metals, it was observed that this one of them calcined violently on a lump of ice. Hence the belief that heat was the efficient of calcination had to be given up—chemists had to confess that the apparent antecedent, heat, in their first experiments, could not be the nearest antecedent, but that this, the true cause, was still latent. They had really corrected their erroneous induction by the joint method of “agreement and difference.” It was reserved for Sir Humphrey Davy to show them the true efficient of calcination, in the invisible, undiscovered, but all-important agent, oxygen-gas.

Once more; when the observed antecedent is of a character which our previous conclusions have not condemned as heterogeneous from the supposed effect, and therefore not very unlikely to be its cause; as we increase the number of the agreeing instances observed, we feel that our probable evidence that we have found the true cause, grows also. Why is this? It is because reason has assured us that this effect has its efficient cause next before it; and as this antecedent seems to appear again and again before it, and no other has yet been detected between them, it becomes more probable that there is no other intervening antecedent. If such is the case, then this antecedent is the cause.

THE METHODS OF INDUCTION.

We are now prepared to advance to the correct definition of the inductive demonstration. It may be, in form, an enthymeme, but always, in reality, is a syllogism, whose major premiss is the universal necessary judgment of cause, or some proposition implied therein. This view of the inductive proceeding corresponds with that conclusion to which the reflection of twenty centuries has constantly brought back the philosophic mind: that all illative processes of thought are really syllogistic, and may be most completely stated in that form; and that, in fact,

there is no other process of thought that is demonstrative. The history of philosophy has shown frequent instances of recalcitration against this result, as those of Locke, of Dr. Thomas Brown, and of their followers; but their attempts to discard syllogism, and to give some other description of the argumentative process of the understanding, have always proved futile. The old analysis of Aristotle still asserts its substantial sway; and successive logicians are constrained, perhaps reluctantly, the more maturely they examine, to return to his conclusion—that the syllogism gives the norm of all reasonings. If our definition of the inductive demonstration, then, can be substantiated, it will give to logic this inestimable advantage: of reconciling and simplifying its departments. The review of opinions given by us at the outset revealed this state of facts: that logicians felt, on the one hand, that no reasoning process could be conclusive, unless it could be shown to conform, somehow, to syllogism; and, on the other, that the custom and fashion of distinguishing induction from deduction as different, or even opposite, kinds of argument, had become prevalent, if not irresistible. Consequently, the most of them, following the obscure hints of their leader, Aristotle, endeavoured to account for induction as a different species of syllogism, in which we conclude from the some to the all, instead of concluding from the universal to the particular or the individual. And then immediately they were compelled, by the earliest and simplest maxims of their logic, to admit that such syllogisms are inconclusive! And they have to confess this in the face of this fact: that this induction is the *organon* of nearly all the sciences of physics and natural history; sciences whose results are so splendid, and so important to human progress! Such a result is not a little mortifying and discreditable to philosophy. But we hope to show that it is a needless result. It will appear that induction is not only syllogistic, and therefore within the pale of demonstrative argumentation, but regularly and lawfully syllogistic. Mill has had a sufficiently clear conviction of the necessity of accomplishing this, to teach (vol. i. pp. 362-365) that the conclusions of this species of reasoning can only become solid when grounded in a universal truth. This, he thinks, is our belief in the invariability of the law of causation. But he then

(p. 345) very inconsistently adds, that this universal truth itself is but a wider induction, which approaches universal certainty sufficiently near, by reason of its breadth. This universal and necessary truth, we hope to show, is the intuition of cause for every effect, along with the truths involved therein.

To effect this, the methods of induction must be explained. When we speak of observed sequences, we mean a set of observed resembling cases where one state or change seems immediately to precede another change, or "effect," which we are studying. These cases may be observed by ourselves, or witnessed to us by others. The *fact* of the sequence is the only material thing. But, first, one's own observation must be honest and clear, and his record of the case exact. He must not see his hypothesis in the facts, but only what occurs there. And, second, a case taken on testimony should be fully ascertained by a judicial examination of the evidence. Having now this set of agreeing instances, more or less numerous, which gives us, as it stands, only an induction *per enumerationem simplicem*, our task is, so to reason from it as to discriminate the *propter hoc* from the *post hoc*. The result of this task, when successfully performed, is to give us a "law of nature," which is such because it is a law of true efficient causation. It is to effect this we need the methods of logical induction. In stating them, the chief guide will be Mr. Mill, whose discussion in this point seems the most complete and just.

1. The "Method of Agreement" is the following. Observation usually gives us sequences of this kind, viz., Not one antecedent, but a cluster of them appear to stand next before an effect or (more commonly) a cluster of effects. Such observation, no matter how often the like case recurs, fails to tell us which antecedent, or which combination of them, contains the efficient cause of either effect. We must observe further, and compare cases. Like the algebraist, we will use letters as symbols, for the sake of clearness, calling the antecedents by the first letters of the alphabet, and the consequents by the latter. Let us suppose that the cases agree in this: one antecedent remains the same in each, and the same effect appears after each cluster of antecedents, however the other antecedents may change. Thus, in case 1st, $A + B + C$ are followed by X .

In case 2d, $A + D + E$ are followed by X . In case 3d, $A + F + G$ are followed by X . Let it be postulated that these are all the antecedents: then the true cause of X must be among them. But in case 1st, neither D , nor E , nor F , nor G , could have caused X , for they were absent. In cases 2d and 3d, neither B nor C could have caused X , for they were absent. Therefore A was the true cause of X each time. The canon, or rule of elimination, or exclusion of seeming but false causes, then, is this: Whichever antecedent remains alone unchanged next before the same effect in all the known cases of sequence, is the true cause. The law of nature gotten in this case is, that A will always, *cæteris paribus*, produce X . The necessary universal truths on which we have proceeded are, that every effect must have some cause, and that, to be efficient cause, it must be present.

The converse process is also practicable. Let the cases observed be in the *a posteriori* order: several clusters of effects $X + Y + Z$, $X + W + V$, etc., are found to agree only in that among the antecedents A is constant. The counterpart canon will teach that X is the effect of A .

As an example of this method may be taken the earlier and simpler reasoning by which the tides were connected with the presence of the moon on the meridian. In one case the flood tide was observed, we will suppose, at the bottom of a bay penetrating the land towards the west. The observed antecedents were the passage of the moon over the meridian, and also a strong east wind. It did not appear whether the moon's attraction or the wind's force was the main cause. At the second observation the flood-tide was preceded by the moon's coming to the meridian, and by a calm; at the third, by the moon and a south wind. The argument concludes that the moon is all the time the main cause.

But, simple as this process of exclusion seems, it is not yet a perfect demonstration in every case. This arises from three truths, which must be candidly admitted. First: Usually, we cannot know that the observed antecedents, $A + B + C$, are all the antecedents really present; because often true causes remain long latent. Second: The same effect, X , may be caused at different times by different true causes. For instance, fulminate of mercury explodes under heat; it also

explodes under percussion. Sensible caloric is emitted by the solar rays ; by compression of a gas ; by friction ; by chemical actions. If, then, we were safe from the presence of a latent cause among the antecedents, all that we should prove by the method of agreement would be : A is one cause of X (while there may be others). But this would be no mean result, for it would give us thus much of power over nature, that we should know (whether or not X could be produced by other means) we could always produce it when we could, *cæteris paribus*, produce A. Third : One effect may be the result of the combination of two or more causes. And this single effect may be the total of what would have been the two separate effects of the two causes, acting severally ; as when two mechanical forces moving in different lines propel a mass along the diagonal of the "parallelogram of forces." Or the mixed effect may present itself in a new form, concealing, by its apparent heterogeneity, both the causations ; as when the affinities of an acid and an alkali form a neutral salt, which exhibits neither acid nor alkaline reaction. In view of this third truth, it is evident the "method of agreement" may not tell us absolutely whether A is the cause of X, or A with which other antecedent combined. Again, since A may itself be, along with X, one of a pair of effects of a latent cause, all we can conclude is, either A is cause of X, or is an invariable function of an unknown cause of X. The method of agreement, then, does not give us an absolute demonstration, unless we have means of knowing that the observed antecedents, A + B + C, A + D + E, etc., are the only antecedents present in each sequence—that no causal antecedent is left undetected.

2. The "Method of Difference" is applicable to the following case. A set of sequences is ascertained, in which, when a given antecedent is present, a given consequent is also present ; but when that antecedent is absent, that consequent is also absent. Thus, A + B + C are followed by X + Y + Z. But B + C are only followed by Y + Z. Here the reasoning proceeds on this premiss : because this antecedent A cannot be excluded without excluding the effect X, it must be the efficient cause of X. The canon derived may be thus stated : Whenever the absence of a given antecedent is followed by the absence of the effect, all the other circumstances remaining the

same, that is the true cause. The law may consequently be inferred, that A will always produce X, *cæteris paribus*. For instance, let the problem be to ascertain the true cause of the corrosion or calcination of a metal, as iron. It is found that sometimes heat and atmosphere are present; at other times heat without atmosphere. In the former cases corrosion always followed, but when the atmosphere was excluded there was no corrosion. The cause of corrosion must, then, be in the air; further experiment confirms this, by showing it is in the oxygen of the air.

So far, then, as we can *know* that the second set of sequences, in which the effect failed, *differed* from the former set in which it had place, *only in one circumstance*, we know that the true cause is in that circumstance. This is the canon on which most of our experimental inductions in practical life proceed. It is the one of which *experiment* usually seeks to make use. For it is this feature which experiment is most often able to realise; the reproduction, namely, of the identical sequence, abating one single known circumstance, which has been observed before. Hence the method of difference is both more feasible and more definite in its conclusions than the method of agreement. Indeed, the chief value of the latter is to suggest a probability which points to the hypothesis indicating the experiment which will test it. By the experiment thus suggested, an appeal is made to the method of difference, and the probability of the law of cause is either established or exploded.

But the method of difference, when most rigidly applied, only proves that A is one cause of X. It does not prove that X may not be also produced, in other times and places, by other causes. It may, however, be again remarked, that this gives us so much, at least: that A, given similar conditions, will always produce X. Reflection will show, also, that this method may be used in the counterpart, or a *posteriori* way. Whatever antecedent is always absent when the effect X fails, all other circumstances remaining the same, is a cause of X. But, because this canon proves that A always produces X, it does not follow by the converse that every X was produced by A. To the heedless mind, the two propositions may seem almost identical; but they are really different, and the second may be

false. Its falsehood appears from the admission that similar effects are often produced at other times by wholly distinct and independent causes. Observation may have proved that all solar rays directly produce calefaction; but it is entirely erroneous to say all calefaction is from solar rays directly. Few cautions are more important than this, which reminds the inductive reasoner, that while like causes give like effects, like effects do not prove like causes.

In this reasoning, we, of course, use the word cause in the sense of concrete causal antecedent. If it is taken in the more abstract sense of the efficient energy present in the concrete causal antecedent, it may be a probable hypothesis, that the energy is the same in these several concrete causes. Thus, let the effect be calefaction. It may be caused by the sun's rays, or by combustion, or by some other form of chemical action, or by friction, or by percussion, or by a modified current of galvanism. This proves beyond a doubt that the same effect does not always come from the same (concrete) cause. But the physicist may claim that the molecular energy, causing the sensible effect of calefaction, may be the same energy in all these different antecedents. If so, there is an abstract sense in which the effect, calefaction, proceeds from the same cause all the time. To affirm or deny this is equally unnecessary to our purpose.

3. The third method may be regarded, from one point of view, as a double application of the first, or as a combination of the first and second. The method of difference, as we saw, is the one to which our intentional experiments usually appeal. Having observed a number of cases in which a cluster of antecedents, $A + B + C$, is followed by several consequents, X, Y, Z , and having surmised that A causes X , we construct a designed sequence, in which the cluster of antecedents is in all respects the same, except the exclusion of A . If X disappears out of the consequents, we reason that A is a true cause of X . But in the study of nature, instances may well arise in which we cannot control the antecedents $A + B + C$, so as to procure the rise of $B + C$ without A . What can we do? The third method answers: observe and record all the instances in nature where $B + C$ occur without A , and probably with some other phenomenon, as $B + C + D$, or $B + D$, etc. If we find

that all these clusters of antecedents, however else they may differ, agree in the omission of A and also in the failure of X, the probability is increased that A is an efficient cause of X. We have made two different applications of the method of agreement, one affirmative and the other privative, and they concur in pointing to A as a real cause of X. As an example: the question was, Which is the real efficient of the anodyne effect in crude opium? This is known to be a complex gum. It is also known to contain, as one of its "proximate principles," the alkaloid known as morphia. Every time the crude gum is given, including the morphia, an anodyne effect follows. This is no demonstration. Let us now suppose that organic chemistry has not yet given us the ability to extract the morphia alone from the crude gum; with an exact certainty that we took out nothing else and left the opium, in all other respects, what it was before. This inability prevents our resorting at once to the definite method of difference. But we may collect all known gums anyway akin to opium, containing other proximate principles which it contains, and administer them. If we find that among the various effects of the various drugs, the anodyne effect fails in all which lack morphia, we adopt the probable opinion that this is the real anodyne agent. But the wise physician will remember that this is short of demonstration. The uncertainty always attaching to the method of difference may be diminished, but cannot be annihilated by doubling the testimony. Thus, in the instance taken, the first set of cases would still leave some doubt whether some undiscovered element in the crude opium, or some combination thereof with known elements, might not be the efficient; and in the second set of cases, where morphia was absent, and the anodyne effect also failed, it would not be demonstrated but that the new drugs given contained some element counteracting an anodyne effect, which, but for this, might still have been emitted in the absence of morphia.

4. The fourth method has been termed that of residues. Cases which present a plurality of antecedents, followed by a plurality of consequents, are analysed by it until one pair is left unaccounted for. This may then be concluded to be cause and effect. The result observed is, that $A + B + C$ are frequently followed by $X + Y + Z$. Now, if, in any valid way, it

has been proved that A is the cause of X, and, if single, produces only X, and that B produces only Y, then, although we may not experimentally insulate Z in any separate case, it may be concluded that C is the true cause of Z. For, the causal efficiency of A having been traced into X and of B into Y, there is no source to which to ascribe Z, except to C. Every effect must have a present cause. Obviously, to render this method a complete demonstration, we should be able to know that A, B, and C are the only possible causes present. For if a fourth antecedent, D, remains in addition to C, it may be proved that A has expended its efficiency in producing X, and B in producing Y; and it will still be an unsettled problem, whether C or D, or a combination of the two, produces Z. The elimination is incomplete.

5. Another method remains, which may be applicable where, in consequence of the inability to experiment, the exact application of previous methods may be impracticable. This may be called the inference from *corresponding variations*. A given state or change, which we call A, is often seen to be followed by a change called X. This suggests, as has been so often said, only a probability that A is the efficient cause of X. But if a variation in the action of A is seen to be followed by a corresponding variation in the occurrence of X, the probability strengthens. If a second and a third variation in A is followed by still other corresponding changes in X, the evidence grows rapidly towards certainty. This variation in the antecedent may be not only in quantity, but also in direction of its action, or in some other circumstance; and still it gives us this inference. The nature of the proof is this: if a given antecedent had no power over a consequent, a modification of that antecedent would have no influence on that consequent. Hence, when the modification of the one is invariably accompanied with a corresponding modification of the other, it seems plain that there must be some causal tie. But it is not, therefore, certain that the tie is direct; the two circumstances which change together may be connected as two functions of some more recondite cause. Until we are able by some experiment or reasoning to exclude this hypothesis, our induction by observing corresponding variations is not complete.

Examples of this method may be found in the conclusion

that increments of heat are the causes of the successive expansions of the mercury in the thermometer. We observe that, the more heat, the more expansion; the less heat, the less expansion. Another application of this induction led to the discovery of the causes of the variations in the height of the tides. It was observed that when the conjunction or opposition of the sun and moon was most complete, the spring-tides occurred; when they were less complete, the tides were lower; and when the two luminaries were farthest from a conjunction or opposition, a whole quadrant apart in the ecliptic, the least, or neap-tides, occurred. Hence, we concluded that the concurrence of the traction of the moon's force with the sun's, in the same line, is the cause of the higher tide.

If the corresponding variations in the antecedent and consequent are variations in quantity, and especially if they maintain an exact proportion in their increase or decrease, such as can be measured by numerical *ratios*, the induction is very clear. The doubling of A results in the doubling of X, the effect; the quadrupling of A in the quadrupling of X, for instance. Then A is clearly the cause of X, or, at least, a regular function of a cause of which X is an analogous function. And the latter conclusion enables us to predict the future result as certainly as the former. But the variations may be in other circumstances than quantity. For instance, if a given body is surmised to be the cause of motion in another body, and if the direction of the produced motion changes regularly in correspondence with the changed direction of the first body, we conclude that our surmise is correct. Or else, again, both motions are functions of some force not yet detected, to which they are both related by a causal tie; so that the regularity of the observed law of motion is safely assumed.

These five methods of interpreting nature, with their canons, appear to present all the valid means in the possession of science. No other are suggested. But the following reasoning seems to show that there can be no other. If the antecedent, which seems to be next the effect, could be surely known in every case to be really the nearest antecedent, no canons of induction would need to be applied. The simple observation would directly show us the causal tie, and, therefore, the natural law. (It is only necessary to say, that by *nearest*

antecedent is not meant the one nearest in time or space; for in this sense an inefficient may be as close to the effect as an efficient antecedent; but we mean the nearest in the sense of efficiency.) The whole problem, then, is to make sure that, between the effect and the nearest visible antecedent, some invisible or unnoted antecedent has not come. Now, the only ways to test this, in man's power, are by some elimination of parts of the sequences, or some variation of parts. The methods of agreement, difference, and residues, if applied in their direct and converse modes, exhaust all the eliminations practicable, whether of causal or non-causal antecedents, or of essential or non-essential sequents. The method of corresponding variations completes the use of the remaining resource. These methods are but the effectuating of that task which the sagacity of Lord Bacon pointed out: the separation of the irrelevant instances from our observed sequences, so that the truly causal ones may be disclosed. That which he foreshadowed, the slow and painstaking care of other philosophers has carried out to its details, and presented with more exactitude. It may be rash to assert that no other method for separating the *post hoc* from the *propter hoc* will be added by the future advancements of logic. Thus far this critical science has advanced in the ablest hands of our day.

Dr. Whewell impugns, indeed, these methods as artificial and fruitless. He questions whether it is by them truth is really discovered, and challenges Mr. Mill to name the important physical laws which the discoverers have professed to reach by either of these methods. The answer to this view is, first, to deny Whewell's allegation. All the valid inductions of common experience and of inductive science have been virtually made by these "methods." And, as we remarked, experiment, the great lever of induction in the physicist's hands, is both a virtual and a formal appeal to the "method of difference." The second answer is, that a logical science, in one sense, has not for its end the discovery of truth in the sense of the invention of it, but the proper function of logic is *to test* the processes of invention after they are suggested. Logic is the critical science. The syllogism, in its other or deductive aspect, is not the inventive *organon*. Its office is to sit as judge on the processes of deductive thought which claim to

lead to truth. The function of the syllogism is to hold up its form as a standard of those relations of propositions which make illations valid, that the professed reasonings presented by the inventive faculty, suggestion, may be tried by that sure rule. So, the rules of the inductive syllogism are not claimed to be valuable because they are suggestive of unseen truths, but because they try and discriminate, in the suggestions supposed or claimed to be inductive, between the valid and invalid. The processes which are active in leading to the unknown truth are observation, hypothesis, and the "scientific imagination," with experiment. Again, it is but seldom that the vigorous minds which have reasoned deductively to valuable truths, have expressed their arguments in formal syllogisms. Even geometers do not do this, with all the exactness of their noble science. The reasoner does not usually proceed further than using *enthymemes* or *sorites* in the formal statement of his arguments; often he is not even so formal as this. But none the less is the syllogism the full form of each valid step; and the test of its validity is, in the last resort, whether the step can be stated in a syllogism of lawful mode and figure. So it may be true that a Galileo, a Newton, a Franklin, a Maury, may not have expressed his inductive argument in the technical form of either of the five methods. But if his induction is demonstrative, *he has virtually*, if informally, *employed them*. The test of its validity is, in the last resort, whether his inductive process can be expanded into one of them, and find in it its full and exact expression.

But it has been admitted that even these methods of induction do not always lead to absolutely demonstrated results. The insufficiency of the method of agreement was clearly evinced: either one of three contingencies would vitiate the conclusion. Even the method of difference, the most exact of all, we found only gave an absolutely certain result, on condition we could know positively that, between the two sequences, $A + B + C$, followed by $X + Y + Z$, and $B + C$ followed by $Y + Z$, we had made no difference among the antecedents except the exclusion of A . But, obviously, that is a thing very hard for us, in most cases, to know positively, and in many cases impossible to know. Yet, if it is not known, our inference that A is the efficient of X , is not absolutely sure,

because the possibility remains that the failure of X to appear among the second set of effects may be due, not solely to the absence of A from among the antecedents, but to that other unnoticed change which was made among them when removing A. Hence, another work remains before an inductive demonstration is complete. This is *Verification*.

Now, obviously, one approximate method of verification is to apply a second method and canon of induction, or a third, in addition to a first. If they give the same result, the probable evidence mounts up towards certainty with a multiplying ratio. But in many cases only one method is applicable. The most complete verification is obtained by experimenting backwards. Having reasoned to the conclusion that X is the effect of A, the student of nature constructs an experiment, in which A is made to arise alone. If X follows, and the conditions of the case are such he can know that no other antecedent capable of producing X has been present, his induction is verified. Of this the method of Franklin is an instance, when he completed the inductive argument that the lightning of the clouds is electricity. His experiments on electrical bodies, and his observation of the lightnings, had suggested the belief that the causal energy was the same. This was, so far, only an induction by comparison and simple enumeration of instances. The lightnings were apparently followed by some of the consequences of the electric energy. Now, if the two are in reality the same energy, the lightning should experimentally produce all the known effects of the electric excitement. To verify this, as is known, Franklin availed himself of the ingenious expedient of the kite. He thus found that a conductor, excited no otherwise than from the energy of the lightning cloud, emitted the spark, communicated the muscular shock, charged the Leyden jar, and did all that the electrical machine had done. Thus, an only probable induction was verified and raised to the rank of a certainty.

Verification is not confined to experiment; but sometimes a sagacious observation of nature will detect her giving the confirmation. Of this the most splendid instance is the confirmation of Sir Isaac Newton's hypothesis of the orbital movements of the planets by the force of gravity. He had these data of probability. The law of *inertia* seemed to give a cause

for a tangential motion absolutely constant. But Copernicus and Galileo had taught that the planetary motions were orbital around the sun as a centre. There was the great mechanical law of the parallelogram of forces, which teaches us that the mass acted on by two *momenta* in two lines will move in the diagonal. Add to the inherent tangential *momentum*, then, a centripetal force, and the orbital motion seems accounted for. Of this orbital compound motion, the centripetal element appeared as real a *falling to the centre* as that of the stone (or the famous apple) falling to the earth. But now our terrestrial experiences had taught him most familiarly how this falling to the earth is the effect of gravity. The lines pursued by all falling bodies tend to the earth's centre. Obviously the earth draws them to her centre. Now, this attraction of gravity acts not only at the earth's surface, but above its surface to the highest distances attained by mountains and balloons. It obviously acts on the clouds and their contents. *Why suppose it limited at all?* Make the supposition that it is universal, though diminishing in intensity with distance, and why may not this be the very reason of all these centripetal motions? Can one guess by what ratio the force of gravity will diminish with distance? If it expands itself in every direction around its centre, it would appear that its intensity in each point should diminish by the same ratio by which the surface of a sphere increases; that is, with the square of the *radius*. May it not be, then, that while the tangential motion of each planet is but the original impulse in a straight line, preserved absolutely constant by *inertia*, the centripetal or falling motion compounded therewith, is just the effect of this gravitation, acting with an energy inversely as the squares of the distances?

Such was the dazzling hypothesis. (We profess to state it, of course, not in the very words of Newton, but in the tenor of his expositors.) But he was too good a logician to assume it as proved; he had a probable induction thus far, nothing more. Verification was needful. He first established the law of planetary attraction, using Kepler's facts (or so-called laws) as his minor premisses. Knowing thus the attraction between the moon and the earth, he supposed a piece of the moon brought to the surface of the earth, and from the established law of its attraction, computed the quantity and direction of

the descent this piece would make in one second when it came to the tops of the highest mountains. He found that this was identical with the descent, both in direction and amount, of a piece of the mountain, as acted on by *gravity*. From the identity of behaviour he inferred (by Rule II. of his *Regula Philosophandi*) that the force which makes the planetary attraction is identical with the force of gravity. Thus the grandest hypothesis ever constructed by a scientific man was converted by this verification (afterwards extended to the other planets) into an established truth.

Thus it is successful verification which completes the inductive demonstration. Where no verification is possible, many, or even most, of our inductions may remain but probabilities. But they are not therefore wholly useless; for, first, they may guide the investigator in the invention of tentative hypotheses; and, second, as we have seen, they may lend to practical life a guidance which, though not certain, has its value. But such an induction has no right to be set up as a proposition in science.

INDUCTION IS SYLLOGISM.

It is now time that we returned and redeemed our promise to show that induction is but the old syllogistic logic, inasmuch as each demonstrative process is but an enthymeme, whose real major premiss is the intuitive judgment of cause, or some corollary thereof. We are glad to have the powerful and very emphatic testimony of Mr. Mill to this doctrine. In Book III., chap. 21, he says:—

“As we recognised in the commencement, and have been enabled to see more clearly in the progress of the investigation, the basis of all these logical operations is the law of causation. The validity of all the inductive methods depends on the assumption that every event, or the beginning of every phenomenon, must have some cause—some antecedent on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent. In the method of agreement, this is obvious, that method avowedly proceeding on the supposition that we have found the true cause as soon as we have negatived every other. The assertion is equally true of the method of difference. That method authorises us to infer a general law from two instances: one in which A exists together with a multitude of other circumstances, and B follows: another, in which A being removed and all other circumstances remaining the same, B is prevented. What, however, does this prove!

It proves that B, in the particular instance, cannot have had any other cause than A ; but to conclude from this that A was the cause, or that A will, on other occasions, be followed by B, is only allowable on the assumption that B must have some cause ; that among its antecedents in any single instance in which it occurs, there must be one which has the capacity of producing it at other times. This being admitted, it is seen that, in the case in question, that antecedent can be no other than A ; but that, if it be no other than A, it must be A, is not proved, by these instances at least, but taken for granted. There is no need to spend time in proving that the same thing is true in the other inductive methods. The universality of the law of causation is assumed in them all."

Let us submit this assertion to a more critical examination ; and first as to the method of agreement. In the first case, or cluster of cases, we saw $A + B + C$ followed (possibly among other effects) by X. In the second, $A + D + E$; and in the third, $A + F + G$, are also followed by X. The reasoning, rigidly stated, now proceeds thus (and that it may proceed strictly, it is necessary to make the supposition that no other causal antecedents are present except A, B, C, in the first case, etc., which, in practice, it will usually be very difficult to know) : In the first case, the cause of X must have been either A or B or C, or some combination of them. Why ? Because it is a universal *a priori* truth, that there is no effect without a cause. This step thrown into a formal syllogism will be :

1. No effect can arise without a cause.
2. But X arose preceded only by $A + B + C$;

Therefore A or B or C, or some combination of them, must be cause of X.

So, we prove that in the second case, $A + D + E$, and in the third, $A + F + G$, must have caused X. But next we construct another syllogism :

1. A cause must be *present at the rise* of the effect (immediate corollary from the intuition of power and efficiency in cause).

2. B and C were absent in the 2d and 3d cases ; D and E were absent in the 1st and 3d cases ; F and G were absent in the 2d and 3d cases, while yet X was always present ;

Therefore, none of these, but only A was cause of X each time.

But why the last part of our conclusion ? Why may we not conclude that A was cause of X at one of its occurrences,

and D at another, and G at another? A third syllogism precludes this :

1. "Like causes produce like effects."
2. None but A could be possible cause of all the Xs;

Therefore A was only cause of each X.

The method of difference proceeds thus : In one case, or set of cases, $A + B + C$ are followed by $X + Y + Z$. In another case, or set of cases, $B + C$ are followed only by $Y + Z$. As we saw, to entitle us to proceed rigidly, we must know that in the second case, the absence of A is the only differing circumstance in the cluster of antecedents ; that no other change in them has been made. We then conclude certainly that A caused X. The proceeding is a syllogism :

1. Like causes produce like effects.
2. But in the second case $B + C$ did not produce X, which was present in the first case ;

Therefore, neither B nor C is cause of X. And, since there is no effect without its cause, A must be cause of X.

The third method of induction was a combination of the two first, in which the affirmative result of the method of agreement was strengthened by the privative result of the method of difference. The syllogistic of the first part has been already given. In the second part, the process is like that of the method of difference.

1. Like causes always produce like effects.
2. But neither $B + C + D$, nor B, D, E, in the second class of instances, produced X ;

Therefore, neither of them is cause of X. But, as there can be no effect without a cause, A was the true cause of X.

The fourth method is that of residues. What observation gives us is a cluster of antecedents, $A + B + C$, usually followed by a cluster of effects, $X + Y + Z$. We prove that A produces only X, and B only Y. The inference which remains is, that C is the cause of Z. The syllogism is the following :

1. Like causes always produce like effects.
2. But A produces only X, and B only Y ;

Therefore neither is cause of Z. But as there can be no effect without a cause, the remaining antecedent, C, must be cause of Z.

This formulation of the inference enables us to see with great clearness what are the conditions necessary to make it

demonstrative. We must know, first, that A, B, and C are all the antecedents present which could be causal of Z; or, in other words, that there is no possible cause latent. We must know, first, that A or B produce only X and Y, and that Z is not also another effect of one of them or of their combination. For it is not impossible in itself that a cause may, under changed conditions, produce a second effect different from the first, or at least differently conditioned. The intuition, Like cause, like effect, is only a universal truth while the cause is conditioned in the same way.

The last method of induction is that by noting the corresponding variations of antecedent and consequent. If a change in the circumstance of A is invariably followed by a corresponding change in X, we infer that A causes X. What is the analysis of this inference? Our intuition of cause is of that which has *efficient power* over its effect. This intuition involves the consequence that only an efficient cause could thus invariably propagate corresponding change in a sequent. But to make this consequence rigid, we must know that nothing varies in the cluster of antecedents, except that one of them which we suppose to be connected with the varying sequent. For, if other things among the antecedents vary, those other things may have to do with the variations in the sequent. But, with this caution, we may frame this syllogism:

1. Whatever sequent varies always with a given antecedent must receive its causal power.

2. But X varies always as A varies, no other change causal of X concurring;

Therefore X is the effect of A.

Thus, by the successive examination of all the methods of induction, it is shown that they are all virtually syllogistical. The simple and satisfactory conclusion is thus reached, which unifies our theory of logic, and which also secures for careful and sufficient inductions that apodeictic character which is so essential to make them scientific propositions, and which we yet saw denied to them by so many great logicians. Induction and deduction are not two forms of reasoning, but one and the same. The demonstrative induction is but that species of syllogism which, getting its minor premiss from observed sequences of fact, gets its major premiss from the intuition of cause.

R. L. DABNEY.

ART. VI.—*The Doctrines of the Buddha and the Doctrines of the Christ.*¹

IT is a familiar fact of our times that a large and increasing class of writers on religious topics deny, ignore, or seek to minify to the utmost the differences between the religion of Christ and other religions. Of this the necessary and already manifest effect has been to weaken and break the force, for many, of those high and exclusive claims which the Gospel makes to the faith and obedience of all mankind. Hence it is that the comparative study of the various religions of men has come to hold a place of very high importance in modern apologetics. As a contribution to this subject it is proposed in the present article to compare, in particular, the teachings of Buddhism with those of the Christian religion, as regards the fundamental topics of the being of God, the nature and character of man, the doctrine of salvation and of the future, both of the individual and of the world.

As regards this matter there are many who seem to have persuaded themselves, and would fain persuade others, that the difference between the Christian and the Buddhist religions concerns not fundamental doctrines, but merely questions of unimportant detail. This is assumed or argued by different parties upon different grounds. In the first place, there are those who—whether on atheistic, pantheistic, or deistic assumptions—deny the possibility of any supernatural revelation from God to man. This being granted, evolution is called upon to explain the origin and the relations of all religions. All alike are merely products of the human mind, working under various environments. Christianity and Buddhism thus appear to be—like all other religions—systems purely human. Of these, indeed, one may be more perfect than the other; one may have more, the other less of error; but in neither have we absolute divine truth. Both are made up of reasonings and speculations purely human, wherein there is much, no doubt,

¹ From *The Presbyterian Review*.

that is true, but no less certainly much that is erroneous and is to be rejected.

Others profess to occupy a different position. They adopt the language of orthodox Christianity and speak of the Christian religion as a revelation from God. But they insist that for us to regard Christianity as the only religion which may be truly so described is altogether wrong, and can only serve to evince a narrow and unscientific spirit. Christianity, we are told, is no doubt from God, and—more than that—the clearest and fullest revelation of His will that has yet been given. But so also, and none the less, are the other religions of the world, each in their measure, revelations from him. We are forbidden to contrast non-Christian religions with the Christian as the false with the true, or the natural and human with the superhuman and divine. That may have done for a former and less enlightened age, but not for these days of education and progressive thought. Rather are we to think of Buddhism, for example, as standing to Christianity in a relation analogous to that of Judaism. Both are from God; both are, or have been, in their time and place, as lights to the world. Only, in both and in all cases, the truth which other religions set forth imperfectly and incompletely, Christianity reveals in its fulness, or at least in greater fulness than any religion yet made known to man. Thus, Prof. Max Müller¹ complains that “we have ignored or wilfully narrowed the sundry times and divers manners in which God spake in time past unto our fathers by the prophets;” and again tells us that “if we believe that there is a God, and that He created heaven and earth, and that He ruleth the world by His unceasing providence, we cannot believe that millions of human beings, all created like ourselves in the image of God, were in their time of ignorance so abandoned by God that their religion was a falsehood, their whole worship a farce, their whole life a mockery. An honest and impartial study of the religions of the world will teach us that it was not so, . . . that there is no religion which does not contain some grains of truth. . . . It will teach us to see in the study of the ancient religions more clearly than anywhere else, the divine education of the human race.”²

¹ *Science of Religion*, p. 103.

² *Ibid.* pp. 105, 106.

In this we shall all admit that there is much that is true. No Christian apologist will feel called upon to dispute his assertion that "there is no religion which does not contain *some grains* of truth." No less true is it that we are to regard all the religions of the nations, according to the very teaching of the Christian Scriptures themselves, as serving a divinely ordained purpose in the education of the race. But surely it is not involved in either of these facts that all religions alike must be revelations from God, so that no one of them can be called false. That individual truths are wrought into a system either of scientific or religious truth, surely does not prove that such a system is true as a whole. We may admit, what is true, that Buddhism recognises and insists upon many indubitable truths and unquestionable duties, in full accord with the teachings of the religion of Christ, and yet it may be none the less just that speaking of it as a system—we should call it, as contrasted with Christianity, a *false religion*. Nor does the presence of such truths and the injunction of undoubted duties in the Buddhist or any other religion prove that in those instances, at least, there must have been a supernatural revelation. Revelation is not the only way by which men may come to know moral and spiritual truth. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth forth his handiwork."¹ So, also, according to the teaching of the New Testament, in full accord with what we may learn by our own observation, those who have not the law "are a law unto themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts."² But this argues no revelation in any supernatural way from God. No more does the admitted fact that God uses all religions alike for the education of the race, warrant any one in concluding that therefore they must all have God in some true sense as their author. A parent may, and often does, teach a child no less truly and effectually by withholding direct instruction than by imparting it. In this way very often the child will learn better than was possible in any other way, from the consequences of his own errors, the extent of his ignorance, and his great need of that instruction which perhaps he had before despised. Yet, while this should all be quite plain to any ordinary mind, it is evident that these *false*

¹ Ps. xix. 1.² Rom. ii. 14, 15.

and anti-Christian conceptions concerning the non-Christian religions and the religion of Christ—supported as they are by the influence of not a few great names—powerfully influence very many of those who write in our days on the subject of comparative religion.

The general confusion of thought on the subject is the more increased by the constant use of English terms expressing various Christian conceptions, to express ideas peculiar to one or another false religion. In this way it comes to pass that the doctrines characteristic of these erroneous systems are made to appear to the ordinary reader, uninstructed in the technicalities of Oriental theology, as only slightly variant renditions of the most fundamental and essential truths of the Gospel of Christ. Especially is this true with regard to the religion of the Buddha. English terms, which in the Christian religion have come to have a very precise and definite meaning, are employed by such word-mongers to translate Buddhist terms, with the actual historical sense of which they have little or nothing in common, while often not a hint is given of the foreign meaning which has been attached to the words. Hence arise in the minds of very many the most woful and mischievous misapprehensions as to what the Buddhist religion really is. From such misconceptions, again, such persons commonly draw one of two equally erroneous and anti-Christian conclusions. Either, holding on to the old faith in the Gospel as a divinely-given revelation, men conclude that it is not, after all, as once had been supposed, the only supernatural revelation of the will of God to man; or, on the other hand, assuming that Buddhism is not a revelation from God, it is inferred that if so many of the distinctive truths of the Gospel are to be found also in the Buddhist scriptures, where undeniably they must be regarded as a product of mere human thought, then there is no reason any more to attribute a supernatural origin to anything that we find in the New Testament. Practically, Christianity, in either case, is taken to be simply a Jewish form—as Buddhism is an Indian form—of the one universal religion.

It needs no argument to make clear the immense importance of the comparison of doctrine to which we are thus challenged. Is there, then, between Christianity and Buddhism such a degree of doctrinal agreement as to compel us to infer that they must

have had a similar origin? Is it such as to force upon us—as some insist—the alternative either of a supernatural origin for both, or, a supernatural origin for neither? This is the question before us. Buddhism has been lately held forth to the admiration of the English reading public as “the Light of Asia.” If Christianity is the light of the West, in Buddhism we are asked to behold the light of the East! But if Christianity is the light of the West, it is so only because it is a revelation of the truth of God. Falsehood is not light, but darkness. In like manner, if Buddhism be the light of Asia, it must be so because it also is a revelation of the truth of God. Furthermore, since truth is one, whether in the East or in the West, it follows that if Christianity be the light of the West and Buddhism be justly called the light of the East, then the fundamental teachings of the two religions must be identical. It is indeed true that the same doctrines might quite conceivably be expressed in the two religions in widely different forms; it is also true that it is quite possible, on this assumption, that of two religions, both true, like ancient Judaism and Christianity, the one may be a much fuller revelation of the truth than the other. But, for all this, they cannot in any matter contradict each other. If contradiction be proven, then it is utterly irrational to speak of both of them as being revelations, in any sense, from God.

Should this prove to be the case as regards the religion of the Buddha and that of Christ, then if any one will still hold Buddhism to be “the Light of Asia,” he must make up his mind to let Christ go. While, on the other hand, if we admit that the Gospel of Christ is the Light, because it is the truth, then in such case of proven contradiction, it will follow that Buddhism, so far from being the *Light* of Asia, is, instead, very *darkness* and death.

Now we affirm and expect to prove that precisely this is the real state of the case. We affirm that the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism, when rightly understood, are not in agreement with those of Christ, but in direct contradiction to them. We affirm that the difference between the two religions does not lie in a more or less full and clear enunciation of truth, but in the difference of affirmation and denial, of point-blank contradiction. We affirm, moreover, that these contradictions have

to do, not with unessential details, but with the most fundamental matters conceivable,—matters which must be considered in any and every religion, if it is to be called a religion at all. These are strong affirmations, but it will not be hard to make them good. Indeed, so clear and unmistakeable are the facts, that it is matter for ever-growing astonishment that any who have had any opportunity to acquaint themselves with the facts, should have ever been able to persuade themselves that Buddhism, like Christianity, might be rightly set forth as a "light" for erring men, divinely given for human salvation.

1. First of all, we have to do with the question whether there be a God or not? Assuredly no question can be of more fundamental consequence. If there be a God and I fail of knowing this, I must therefore fail of serving Him. If there be a God and He has revealed Himself, even in ways of nature, so that I might know Him, then not to recognise Him and my relation to Him must be nothing less than fatal. Failure to know and recognise God, if there be a God, must inevitably vitiate all doctrine and all practical ethics as well. For if there be a God, then all truth must exist in relation to Him ; and—since His will must be law—all right action must be to Him and for Him. What Jesus taught on this question we all know. He said : " God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."¹ And so had taught the Old Testament prophets before Him. They spoke of a God who formed the earth and made it ; who " measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance."² So also, according to the apostles of the New Testament, it is God who created all things and upholds all things, and will at last judge the secrets of all men; and reward every man according to his works.³

Now, Buddha, we are told, was " the Light of Asia." What, then, does he teach on this vital question? The answer does not seem to be even a matter of dispute with competent authorities. " There is no God," is the initial assumption of Buddhism. To this effect is the testimony of all the Buddhist

¹ John iv. 24.

² Isa. xl. 12.

³ New Testament, *passim*;

books, and in this respect it is generally agreed that the authorities, however late, do not materially misrepresent the opinions of the Buddha himself. The Light of Asia has thus no light at all to give on this most momentous of all questions! It is true that some have questioned whether the Buddha himself went so far as to deny in so many words the existence of a God, and have thought that his actual position might better be described by the term "agnostic" than "atheist." Some representations that we find in the Buddhist books seem to favour this, as some also the other opinion.¹ Thus the Rev. Mr. Hardy tells us in his *Manual of Buddhism* that "when Malunka asked the Buddha whether the existence of the world is eternal or not eternal, he made him no reply; but the reason of this was that it was considered by the teacher as an inquiry that tended to no profit."² Still further, in his chapter on the Buddhist Ontology in the same work, Mr. Hardy translates a yet more explicit statement from a Buddhist authority, thus: "All being exists from some cause; but the cause of being cannot be discovered."³ Other Buddhist authorities, however, go further, and formally deny and argue against the possibility of the being of a God. But whether we call the doctrine of Buddhism atheism or agnosticism, it makes little difference. Agnosticism—whether it be that imputed by some to the Buddha, or that of Mr. Herbert Spencer—is virtual atheism. All agree, moreover, that, in any case, the Buddha constructed his whole system without once introducing in any way the idea of God. We read much of "the law" which he preached, but he did not regard it as the law of God. What he called sin was not conceived or represented as having anything to do with a God or our relation to Him. We read, indeed, in the Buddhist books, much of "the gods," but never once of God. As for these imaginary beings which Buddhism calls gods, none of them are held, either singly or jointly, to be

¹ Compare words attributed to the Buddha, translated by Oldenberg from the *Samyutta Nikāya*: "Ye disciples, think not thoughts, as the world thinks them: 'The world is eternal or the world is not eternal. The world is finite or the world is infinite.' . . . If ye (so) think, ye disciples, ye might thus think: 'This is the sorrow;' ye might think: 'This is the origin of sorrow;' ye might think: 'This is the removal of sorrow;' ye might think: 'This is the way to the removal of sorrow.'"—*Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, p. 258.

² *Manual of Buddhism*, 2d ed., p. 389.

³ *Ibid.* p. 414.

creators or rulers of the world. They are only beings of a higher order than man, but like man, subject to impermanence and death, as also to sin and moral infirmity. Of any Being, even in the most general way corresponding to the ordinary theistic conception of God, Buddhism knows nothing. To the correctness of this assertion the most abundant and unimpeachable testimony may be adduced. Professor Monier Williams tells us: "The Buddha recognised no supreme deity. The only God is what man himself may become."¹ Prof. Max Müller assures us: "Difficult as it seems to us to conceive it, Buddha admits of no real cause of this unreal world. He denies the existence not only of a creator, but of any absolute being." Archdeacon Hardwick says: "Of Buddhism . . . we need not hesitate to affirm that no single trace survives in it of a supreme being."² Köppen is no less decided. He assures us that Buddhism recognises "no God, no spirit, no eternal matter as to be supposed antecedent to the world. Only . . . the act of movement and change is without beginning,—is eternal; but matter . . . is not eternal,—has a beginning. In other words, there is only an eternal *Becoming*, no eternal *Being*. . . ."³

Among the very latest investigators of Buddhism is Prof. Oldenberg. Scholars will generally agree that no one can be held higher authority as to the real teaching of Buddha than he. He has expressed himself in terms of the same purport as the foregoing. Contrasting Buddhism with Brahmanism, he says: "The speculation of the Brahmans laid hold of the Being in all Becoming; that of the Buddhists, the Becoming in all apparent Being. *There* we have substance without causality; *here*, causality without substance. Where the sources lie from which this causality derives its law and its power, this Buddhism does not inquire. . . . Where there is no being, but all is a coming to pass, there can be recognised as the First and the Last,—not a substance, but only a law."⁴ To the same effect as this testimony of eminent scholars in Europe, is that of missionaries in Buddhist lands. Thus the Rev. Mr. Hardy, long a missionary to the Buddhists of Ceylon, tells us

¹ *Indian Wisdom*, p. 57.

² *Christ and other Masters*, p. 163.

³ Köppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, p. 230.

⁴ *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, p. 257, 258.

that "by Buddha all thought of dependence on any other power outward to man . . . was discarded." He writes that although there are some among the Buddhists of Ceylon, "more especially among those who are conversant with the truth of the Bible, who believe in the existence of one Almighty God, while others confer upon the *devas* the attributes of God," yet "the missionaries are frequently told that our religion would be an excellent one, if we could leave out of it all that is said about a Creator."¹ To the same effect is the testimony of Dr. Edkins, missionary to China. He says: "Atheism is one point in the faith of the southern Buddhists. By the Chinese Buddhists each world is held to be presided over by an individual Buddha, but they do not hold that one supreme Spirit rules over the whole collection of worlds."² But it is needless to multiply witnesses. Such beyond doubt is the teaching of Buddhism as to the existence of a Supreme Being.³ Christianity tells us of an almighty, most wise and most holy personal God, who is the Creator of the world and the Father of our spirits. Buddhism, on the authority of its founder, denies that there is any such Being. It declares that there is no God. The world had no maker; the idea of a Father in heaven is a delusion and a dream. And we are asked to recognise *this* as "the Light of Asia," and are even called upon by some to admire the marvellous *agreement* between the teachings of the Buddha and the doctrine of the Christ! Truly, in the presence of this momentous contradiction, all agreements upon other points, if such there be, seem little worthy to be mentioned.

2. But the contradictions between the two religions by no means end here. It were indeed impossible that they should. For if according to Buddhism there is no God, it follows by necessary consequence that there can be, according to the Buddhist doctrine, no such thing as *revelation* or *inspiration*. To speak of the inspiration of the Buddhist scriptures, as many do, were, according to those scriptures themselves, to use

¹ *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 221.

² *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 191.

³ In the light of the facts it is truly incomprehensible how Mr. de Bunsen, in his *Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*, could assert as he does, that "the doctrine of Gautama Buddha centered in the belief in a personal God." See *The Angel-Messiah*, etc., p. 48.

words without meaning. Without a God inspiration and revelation are alike impossible and inconceivable. Hence all the Buddhist authorities with strict consistency represent the doctrine they contain, *not* as having been revealed to Buddha by any superior power, but as having been thought out by the Buddha himself. Thus—to illustrate—we are told in the *Niddna Kathā*, that the Buddha spent a week seated in a house of gems, thinking out the *Abhidhamma Pitaka*, both generally and in respect of the origin of all things as therein explained.¹ So also in the *Abhinishkramana Sūtra*, the Buddha is declared to be “the supreme teacher of gods and men. . . . In him alone can be found the source of the true faith.”²

So again in the *Abhinishkramana Sūtra* we are told that the Buddha, after his victory over the Evil One under the Bo-tree, remained there seven days and nights. “On the first night he considered in their right order the twelve *Nidānas*, and then in a reverse order. He identified these as one and the same; he traced them from the first cause and followed them through every concurrent circumstance.”³ All this he did, we are expressly told again and again, not as a god or as a superhuman being, or as a man under some special influence unattainable by other men. On the contrary, what the Buddha became, all may become; what he attained is attainable by all, and that through the mere persevering exercise of our native powers. Thus we are told that when the Rājā Bimbāsara asked Gautama who he was, he “answered plainly and truthfully, ‘Maharājā! I am no god or spirit, but a plain man seeking for rest.’”⁴ To the same effect, in the same work, the Buddha is represented as saying in reference to his own attainment of supreme wisdom:

“Let a man but persevere with unflinching resolution.

And seek supreme wisdom, it will not be hard to attain it.”⁵

Such words, it is clear, entirely exclude everything like revelation or inspiration from any superhuman source whatever. How marked the contrast here again, with the Lord

¹ Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth-Stories*, p. 106.

² *The Romantic Legend of Śākya Buddha*, from the Chinese Sanscrit. Prof. S. Beal, p. 246.

³ *Ibid.* p. 236.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 182.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 225.

Jesus, with the apostles and prophets, scarcely needs to be illustrated. Whatever any may think as to the *fact* of a revelation in the Christian Scriptures, there can be no doubt that they *profess* to contain a revelation from God to man; that the writers profess to be speaking, *not* by their own unaided powers, but by the Holy Ghost. We read of Scripture which is given "by inspiration of God,"¹ *lit.* "God-breathed." Buddha expressly professed to come in his own name; Jesus as expressly claimed to have come in the name of God the Father.² The former is said to have proudly claimed that his doctrine was his own; the latter as explicitly claimed that He spoke not of Himself, and that His doctrine was not His own, but the Father's which had sent Him.³ Here then, again, is a full and explicit contradiction between the word of the Buddha and the word of Christ. The one declares that not only is there a God, but that He has spoken to man. The other, as it denies the former, denies of necessity the latter also. No wisdom higher than the wisdom of man has ever found a voice in this world.

3. Again, it is agreed by the highest authorities on the subject, almost without exception, that Buddhism, according to the teaching of the Buddha himself, does not admit the existence of the soul. There are indeed a very few who doubt or deny this. Thus, *c.g.* Professor Beal refers disparagingly to "numerous writers on Buddhism who, in their lectures and articles, tell us that it teaches . . . atheism, annihilation, and the non-existence of the soul." He says on this subject that such statements "are more easily made than proved," "and that it were well if they were not so frequently repeated in the face of contradictory statements made by those well able to judge."⁴ Proof of the opinion thus suggested, he does not, however, offer. Professor Max Müller admits that certain of the Buddhist scriptures do undoubtedly teach the non-existence of the soul, but does not think that this could have been the teaching of the Buddha himself, but a later corruption. . . . His argument is briefly as follows: He admits that the orthodox metaphysics, as contained in the third *Pitaka*,⁵ denies any

¹ 2 Tim. iii. 16.

² John v. 43.

³ John viii. 28.

⁴ *Romantic Legend*: Introduction, p. x.

⁵ The Buddhist canonical writings are known as the three *Pitakas*, called respectively *Vinaya*, *Sutta*, *Ashidhamma*.

substantial reality to the soul. He urges, however, that passages occur in the other two *Pitakas*, which are not to be reconciled with this utter nihilism, and also refers to the asserted fact that the doctrine in question does not appear in its crude form in the first and second *Pitakas*, and refers to the opinion of some ancient authorities that the third *Pitaka* was "not pronounced by the Buddha." He also urges that not only is this true, but that certain passages occur in the first and second *Pitakas* which are in open contradiction to this metaphysical nihilism. According to him, therefore, the Buddhist scriptures contradict themselves on this most weighty question of the existence of the soul. The Buddha himself, he thinks, could not have taught the doctrine of the non-existence of the soul; he argues that if the sayings which teach the other doctrine have maintained themselves, in spite of their contradiction to orthodox metaphysics, the only explanation, in his opinion, is "that they were too firmly rooted in the tradition which went back to Buddha and his disciples."¹

To our mind, the Professor, however, does not prove his point. As to the alleged absence of the doctrine in question from the first and second *Pitakas*, he appears to have been mistaken; for Mr. Davids has given two lengthy extracts from two different portions of the second *Pitaka*, which *formally* teach that man has no soul.² And even if we admit that the Buddhist scriptures in this matter contradict themselves, instead of arguing—for the reason given by the Professor—that the doctrine of the existence of the soul must needs be the original teaching of the Buddha, we should rather argue that such a preposterous doctrine as the contrary—flatly denying, as it does, the testimony of our own consciences—was not likely to have gained currency at so early a date, except it were under the influence and personal authority of the Buddha; and that the intimations of the being of the soul, which are supposed by a few to be scattered through the Buddhist books, are most naturally to be explained as simply the protest of the human consciousness against the nihilism with which the religion began. The unanswerable testimony of the consciousness was too much even for the authority of the Buddha himself.

¹ "Lecture on Buddhist Nihilism:" in *Science of Religion*, pp. 140-143.

² *Buddhism*, p. 94, et seq.

The direct and positive testimony to the fact, however, that Buddhism, according to its own highest authorities, does deny that there is a soul, seems unanswerable. Mr. Davids sums it up as follows :—" In the first place, the *Pitakas* teach the doctrine directly and categorically. Thus we are told in the *Sutta Pitaka* : " From sensation . . . the sensual, unlearned man derives the notions ' I am,' ' this I exists,' ' I shall be,' etc., etc. But the learned disciple of the converted . . . has got rid of ignorance and acquired wisdom ; and therefore, . . . the ideas ' I am,' etc., do not occur to him." So also he refers to another passage in this first *Pitaka*, wherein the Buddha is said to have enumerated sixteen heresies teaching a conscious existence of the soul after death ; then eight heresies teaching that it has an unconscious existence after death ; and, finally, eight more which teach that the soul exists after death in a state neither conscious nor unconscious. It is truly difficult to see how the doctrine of the non-existence of the soul could be more explicitly set forth than by these two passages. But in the second place, Mr. Davids argues that this understanding of the teaching of the Buddhist scriptures is confirmed by what they indirectly teach as bearing on the same subject. In particular, he calls attention to the fact that the Buddhists have two words in their religious vocabulary expressly denoting as a *heresy* the doctrine that man has a soul. These words are *sakkāyaditthi*, "*the heresy of individuality*," and *attavāda*, lit. "*saying self*," i.e. the doctrine of soul or self. Another proof that Buddhism denies the existence of soul is found in the fact that their opponents, the Brahmins, so understood them to teach. Finally, the parables and illustrations used by the Buddhists themselves to set forth and explain their meaning, show that they themselves so understood the doctrine of their sacred books. For example, it is argued, that just as a chariot is made up of various parts, no one of which is the chariot, but which by their union form the chariot, while yet there is no separate existence, separate and distinct from these, which constitutes them jointly a chariot ; so also is man made up of various parts, and when these are united we say " This is a man ;" while yet it does not at all follow there is any essence separate from these which we should call the soul or man.¹ So Professor

¹ The argument in full will be found in Mr. Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, pp. 94-100.

Oldenberg, in the recently published work already cited, expresses himself to the same effect. He says that "while we are wont to regard our interior life as only comprehensible if we are allowed to regard its changing content, every individual act of will as in relation to one and the same abiding ego, to think in this manner is in total opposition to Buddhism. . . . A seeing, a hearing, a becoming self-conscious, above all, a suffering takes place; but an essence which is that which sees, hears, suffers,—this the Buddhistic doctrine does not recognise." He gives several illustrations out of the Buddhist texts, of which we may instance the following:—

"Māra, the tempter, who strives to confuse men with error and heresy, appeared to a nun, and said to her, 'Thou art the one by whom personality is created, the creator of the person; the person which comes into being, thou art that; thou art the person which ceases to be.' She replies: 'How meanest thou, that there is a person, Māra? False is thy doctrine. This (which thou callest a person) is only a mass of changing forms:¹ there is no person here. As where the parts of a wagon are combined, the word 'wagon' is used, so where the five groups² are, there (we apply the word) 'person.' That is the catholic doctrine. Suffering alone it is that comes into being: suffering, that which exists and ceases to be: nothing else than suffering comes into being; nothing else disappears again.'³"

Yet other testimony might be added, no less weighty, as, *e.g.* that of Oldenberg,⁴ and St. Hilaire,⁵ but this should abundantly suffice to show how baseless, in the judgment of the highest

¹ Pāli, *sankhārā*, is a term very difficult to translate. Mr. Rhys Davids renders it "tendencies," "potentialities;" Oldenberg, "Gestaltungen."

² Pāli, *Skandha*, including *Rūpa*, *Vedanā*, *Saññā*, *Sankhārā*, *Viññāna*, rendered by Rhys Davids, "material qualities," "sensations," "abstract ideas," "tendencies of mind," and "mental powers." Man is regarded as the sum total of these. See Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, p. 90, *et seq.*

³ *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, p. 259, ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258-269.

⁵ *Le Buddha et sa Religion*, p. 4. Mr. J. F. Clarke—if we understand him—seems to regard St. Hilaire as admitting the existence of the soul as a doctrine of Buddhism, because he emphasises the doctrine of transmigration as one of the *principia* of Buddhism. For, he says, if there be no soul, there can be no transmigration (*Ten Great Religions*), p. 167). But Mr. Clarke omits to note the fact that St. Hilaire, while emphasising the place of transmigration in the Buddhist system, was nevertheless convinced that Buddhism did not teach the existence of soul, and asserts this in the most explicit terms. St. Hilaire's words are: "Le texte à la main, je soutiens que le Bouddha n'admet pas plus l'âme de l'homme qu'il n'admet Dieu. Je ne crois pas qu'il soit possible de citer un seul texte bouddhique où la distinction la plus simple et la plus vulgaire de l'âme et du corps soit établie, ni paraisse même soupçonnée."—*Le Bouddha et sa Religion*, Paris, 1866, p. vi.

authorities, is the opinion of a few, as Mr. James Freeman Clarke,¹ Mr. De Bunsen,² and a few others, that Buddhism teaches the existence of the soul. If any still doubt such testimony as the above, surely special reliance is to be placed upon the statements of missionaries who have lived their whole life in intimate association with Buddhists, in daily conversation with them on these very matters. And while they tell us that many Buddhists, constrained by the testimony of their own consciousness, believe in the existence of the soul, they also agree that those who thus believe, believe not according to their scriptures, but in opposition to them. Just in the same way is it also true that while, as all admit, Buddhism, as such, knows nothing of a God, yet men, urged on by the inextinguishable instincts of the soul, have made Buddha himself into a god, and have even—as in Thibet—imagined a Supreme Buddha out of which, as they fancy, all the human Buddhas, by a kind of emanation process, have proceeded. But this no one would take to prove that the doctrine of a God properly belonged to Buddhism as a system.

Of missionary testimonies may be instanced the following :—The Rev. Mr. Hardy tells us that “the belief in a soul is perhaps general among the Singhalese, *though so contrary to the teaching of Buddha.*”³ What Buddhism, by its highest authorities, teaches its votaries on this subject he very clearly tells us. He says : “To prove the impossibility of the existence of a soul, many a long and weary conversation is recorded in the *Abhidhamma*. All thought is regarded as a material result. The operation of the mind is not different in mode from that of the eye, or ear.”⁴ The teaching of the Chinese Buddhists Dr. Edkins gives us in the following citation from the *Leng-yen-king*, one of their chief authorities. Buddha, we are therein told, taught as follows :—

“The mind . . . is without substance, and cannot be at any place ; . . . that the mind is unsubstantial can easily be shown,” etc.⁵ And Bishop Bigandet, of Burmah, tells us that the same is the teaching of the Burmese Buddhists. In the

¹ *The Ten Great Religions*, p. 167.

² *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*, p. 48.

³ *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 220 (*italics ours*).

⁴ *Legends, etc.*, p. 211. See also *Appendix*, note Z.

⁵ *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 299.

end of his volumes on the *Legend of Gaudama*, he gives us an abridged translation of a Burmese work, entitled *The Seven Ways to Neibban*, which he tells us may be looked upon as a faithful exposition of the tenets of Buddhism as they are held both in Siam and in Burmah. Therein we read that "in the five aggregates constituting man . . . there is nothing else to be found but form and name. We are thus brought to the materialist conclusion, that in man we can discover no other element but that of form and name."¹ Here, then, we have explicit testimony, not from scholars at a distance, and acquainted with Buddhism only at second-hand, but from missionaries who have had everywhere the advantage of ascertaining from the Buddhists themselves what they understand their scriptures really to teach. The testimony cited comes from each of the three great Buddhist countries—China, Farther India, and Ceylon, and from men whose names are of high authority. They all agree that the teaching of Buddhism is understood by the people, alike in China, Siam, Burmah, and Ceylon, to deny the existence of a soul.

It is indeed true that, as Professor Max Müller asserts, much may be produced from the Buddhist authorities which—if understood as we in the West naturally understand it—appears to teach, or at least imply, the existence of the soul. This is especially true as regards what is written in the *Jatakas* and elsewhere touching the transmigrations and previous existences of the Buddha and others. The Rev. Mr. Hardy notices this difficulty, and in the Appendix to his *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, gives at length an extract from the writings of another learned missionary, his predecessor, the Rev. M. R. Gogerly, with the remark that among the Buddhist priests of Ceylon "there are none of authority who now dispute his conclusions." Not to give the whole of his argument, we are told that the King Milinda inquired "if a living soul is received upon transmigration; and the priest replied, 'In the higher or proper sense of the word, there is not.' . . . The king inquired further, 'Is there any body or being—*satto*—which goes from this body to another body?' 'No, great king, . . . by this *nāmarūpa*² actions are performed, good or bad, and by these

¹ *The Legend of Gaudama*, vol. ii. p. 213.

² Lit. "name (and) form"—that which is the sum-total of the man.

actions another *nāmarūpa* commences existence.'” From these and other like explicit statements of the Buddhist authorities, Mr. Hardy concludes—in full accord with the eminent European savants above cited—that “Buddhism denies the existence of a soul,—of anything of which a man may rightly say, ‘This is I myself.’” The unanimity of the testimony of missionaries upon this subject surely ought to be decisive. What, in fact, is to be understood by the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration, if the existence of an abiding soul is denied, Mr. Davids, in the Preface to his translation of the book of *Jatakas*, or tales of the experiences of Buddha in what we should call his previous births, has clearly explained. He says:—

“The reader must of course avoid the mistake of importing Christian ideas into the conclusions (of these several birth-stories), by supposing that the identity of the persons in the two stories is owing to the passage of a ‘soul’ from the one to the other. Buddhism does not teach the transmigration of souls. Its doctrine . . . would be better summarised as the transmigration of character, for it is entirely independent of the early and widely prevalent notion of the existence with each human body of a distinct soul or ghost, or spirit. The *Bodisat*,¹ for example, is not supposed to have a soul, which on the death of one body is transferred to another, but to be the inheritor of the characters acquired by the previous *Bodisats*. . . . The only thing which continues to exist when a man dies is his *karma*, the result of his words and thoughts and deeds, *lit.* ‘his doing;’ and the curious theory that this result is concentrated in some new individual is due to the older theory of soul.”²

And in the Preface to his translation of the *Sabbāsava Sutta* he sums up the case as regards the Buddhist position on this question as follows:—

“Buddhism is not only independent of the theory of soul, but regards the consideration of that theory as worse than profitless, as the source of manifold delusions and superstitions. Practically this comes, however, to much the same thing as the denial of the existence of the soul; just as agnosticism is, at best, but an earnest and modest sort of atheism. And we have seen above that *anattam*—the absence of a soul or self as abiding principle—is one of the three parts of Buddhist wisdom and of Buddhist perception.”³

We have been thus full in the discussion of this subject,

¹ *i.e.* Buddha, that-is-to-be.

² Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth-Stories*: Translator's Introduction, pp. lxxv. lxxvi.

³ *Sacred Books of the East*, edited by Max Müller, vol. xi. p. 294.

because on nothing, as it seems to us, is Buddhism more commonly misunderstood than on this point. Those who are anxious to reduce to a minimum the contrasts between Christianity and other religions, or ignore them altogether, seem especially loath to admit the clear teachings of the authorities on this subject—teachings utterly fatal to their pet theories. To sum up the case, so far is it from being true that “the soul’s immortality is a radical doctrine in Buddhism,” and this doctrine “one of its points of contact with Christianity,” as has been asserted,¹ that even the existence of the soul is not admitted, and the affirmation of its being is specially stigmatised as a *heresy*. There is nothing but name and form,—that is all. No God! No revelation! No soul! And we are told that Buddhism is the *Light* of Asia! Truly the words, to one who has learned from Him who is the Light of the World, seem to have a ring of irony!

4. But, obviously, having gone so far, the Buddhist cannot stop here. We have next to compare the teaching of Buddhism concerning *sin*. We hear much of the high morality of Buddhism, and, by consequence, it seems to be commonly imagined that however the Buddhist and the Christian religions may differ in other respects, they must be very much at one in their teachings as to sin. What, for example, could sound more like Christian teaching than the following words from the *Dhammapada*:—

“Rise up! and loiter not!
Follow after a holy life!
Who follows virtue rests in bliss,
Both in this world and the next!
Follow after a holy life!
Follow not after sin!”²

Such words as these, however, greatly mislead those who will read into the essential terms their Christian sense. The Buddhist idea of sin is as far as possible from the conception which Christianity holds forth. What the Bible teaches on this subject is sufficiently clear. We may define sin, with the Divines of the Westminster Assembly, as “any want of con-

¹ *Ten Great Religions*, p. 167.

² *Dhammapada*, 168, 169. We follow Mr. Davids’ translation in his *Buddhism*, p. 65.

formity to, or transgression of, the law of God," or, with others, as "the voluntary transgression of known law;" or in any other way that any Christian theologian has adopted: as regards the present point, it will make no difference. For all these various definitions agree in this, that they affirm sin to be a disorder in the normal relation of the soul to God. As John the Apostle puts it, all, "sin is the transgression of law," and that law is the law of God. Even where the sin, as to its outer form, is a sin against one's neighbour, it is none the less, in its innermost essence, sin against God. Thus while, as to its outer form, the sin of David, which he laments in the 51st Psalm, was adultery and murder, yet in his confession the thought which above all others burdens him is this—"Against thee, thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in thy sight."¹ Although this conception of the nature of sin finds its fullest expression in the Christian Scriptures, it is by no means peculiar to them. On the contrary, it is found among all those who—whatever of error they may hold on other subjects—have at least held fast their faith in a personal God. Granted the existence of such a Being as the Creator and moral Ruler of the world, this idea of sin follows by necessary consequence.

But it is no less plain that, in the very nature of the case, such a conception of the nature of sin can have no place in Buddhism. It presupposes a personal God, who is at once the giver and the executor of law; whereas Buddhism knows nothing of any such Being. It follows from this of necessity that if there be no Being above man whose will, imposed as law, is the standard of action for man, then law, i.e. the ultimate standard of moral action, must be found in the will of man, and sin can only be defined as an evil having a certain relation to the will of man. Now, in fact, this is the highest conception of sin which is to be found in any Buddhist book. Nowhere do we meet with the slightest intimation that sin has to do with any but man. That which Christianity regards as the essence of all sin is the revolt of the will against the authority of God. That which Buddhism regards as the essence of sin is as different as possible from this. The one element, which is present in all sin, is always represented as *tanha* or

¹ Ps. li. 4.

trishnd, lit. "thirst." The word, in English translations of Buddhist works, is often rendered "lust," and thus, again, is the teaching of Buddha made to seem very like that of the New Testament; for has not the Apostle James said, "When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin"?¹ But "lust," in the mouth of a Buddhist, has no such meaning as *epithumia* in the mouth of James or of Paul. In the New Testament, it is hardly necessary to say—it is not desire, *as desire*, which is declared to be sin and the parent of sin, but desire, *as desire of that which God has forbidden*. In Buddhist books, however, the *tanhd*, "lust," or "desire," which is stigmatised as *sin*, and the source of all evil, is not merely the desire of anything supposed to be by any power or law forbidden, but desire, *simply as desire*. The desire may be of that which is good, or it may be of that which man regards as evil; in either case the desire is evil, *because* it is desire, and to be rid of it—rid of *all* desire—is to be rid of sin. Everywhere in the Buddhist books we meet with this teaching. Thus, we read:

"He who fosters no desires for this world or for the next, has no inclinations and is unshackled, him I call a Brahman."

"He who, having no desires, travels about without a home, in whom all concupiscence is extinct, him I call a Brahman."²

To the same effect is the interpretation which Professor Max Müller gives of the Buddhist terms *āsrava*, rendered in the *Lalitā Vistāra* and elsewhere, "vices." He defines the essential idea of the word to be a "running toward or attending to external objects," and quotes with approval the explanation of Colebrooke, that "*āsrava*, 'vice,' is that which directs the embodied spirit toward external objects."³ How wide asunder is this conception from the New Testament idea of sin needs not to be pointed out. Thus the man who, wherever he meets in Buddhist writings the word "sin" or its equivalents, understands by it what in Christendom is meant by sin, reads into the text an idea which has no place there whatever. What the Buddhist really does understand in such cases is well put by the Rev. Mr. Hardy, from whom again we quote:

"The proper idea of sin cannot enter into the mind of the Buddhist. His

¹ James i. 15.

² *Dhammapada*, vv. 410, 416.

³ *Buddhaghosha's Parables*, by Capt. Rogers and Professor Max Müller, p. lxviii.

system knows nothing of a Supreme Ruler of the universe. . . . There is no law because there is no law-giver,—no authority from which law can proceed. Buddha is superior in honour and wisdom to all other beings ; but he claims no right to impose restrictions on other beings. He points out the course to be taken if merit is to be gained ; but he who refuses to heed his words does the *Tathágato* no wrong. Religion is a mere code of proprieties, a mental opiate, a plan for being free from discomfort, a system of personal profit. . . . As there is no infinite and all-worthy Being to whose glory we are called upon to live, when we commit evil the wrong is done to ourselves and not to another.¹ . . . Hence the impossibility of making the Buddhist feel that he is a sinner, when the commandment is brought home upon his conscience. A native has been heard to say that he never committed sin since he was born, unless it were in catching fish !”²

And this is what the “*Light of Asia*” has taught men as to the nature of sin !

5. It follows, both logically and actually, from all the above, that the Buddhist doctrine of *salvation* stands in no less open contradiction with that which was taught by Christ. This is true as regards every point involved in the Scriptural doctrine of salvation—as to its nature, its ground, the means thereto, and the author of the salvation. In each and every one of these points the teaching of the Buddha stands in the most unqualified antagonism to that of the Christ. The teaching of the Scripture is so clear as scarcely to need a statement here.

As to the *nature* of the Salvation, all agree that the Salvation which is offered by Christ is a salvation, not, primarily, from suffering, but from sin, and from suffering only in that it is the penal consequence of sin. In other words, Christ in His salvation proposes to deliver man from sin and death, and give him everlasting life in holiness. The formation of an eternally holy character is the objective point of Christ’s work as regards the individual man.³ As regards the *ground* on which any man receives this immeasurable blessing, Christ uniformly taught that His *death* was the ground. He gave His life “a ransom for many.”⁴ His blood, He declared, was “shed for many for the remission of sins.”⁵ So also His

¹ One is reminded of Feuerbach’s definition of religion as “the relation of a man to himself.”

² *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, pp. 213, 214.

³ Rom. v. 9 ; Eph. v. 25-27.

⁴ Matt. xx. 28.

⁵ Matt. xxvi. 28.

apostles taught that this salvation, being wholly on the ground—not of what the sinner had done, or could do, or become—but wholly and exclusively on the ground of what Christ had done for us, was all of grace and not of works.¹ As regards the *means* of salvation, we are everywhere told that it is received by faith, and maintained by the believing use of all the ordinances appointed by the Lord for this end.² As regards the *author*, it is everywhere taught in the Christian Scriptures that whether we regard salvation as *objectively* wrought out for us on the cross, or as originated and carried on for us *subjectively* in regeneration and sanctification—in every point of view the author of our salvation is Christ.³ Salvation is not of man in any way; he neither saves himself, nor helps to save himself; “salvation”—wholly and absolutely—“is of the Lord.”

Now this doctrine of salvation taught by Christ, so far from having any similarity or analogy with that set forth by the Buddha, as some would persuade us, stands contrasted with it in every particular. As to the *nature* of salvation, whereas Christ makes it to consist essentially in salvation from *sin*, Buddhism makes it to consist, *not* in deliverance from sin,—not even from that which the Buddha calls sin,—but in salvation from *sorrow*, and that, ultimately, through salvation from *existence*. It is quite true that the Buddhist books are full of exhortations against sin, and many of these, according to the letter, are, as all will agree, most excellent. But none the less is even the highest and purest morality represented, *not* as an end in itself, but only as a means to an end, which end is, to bring to a final termination that line of personal existence of which the life I now live is the present manifestation. Thus, even if the Buddhist conception of sin were identical with that of the Christian—as it is not,—still there would be a *vital* difference as regards the nature of salvation, in that *character* is made—*not* the *end* of salvation—but merely a *means* to an end.

For, according to the Lord Jesus, the supreme evil is sin; according to the Buddha, the supreme evil is not sin, but *existence*, as necessarily involving pain. Hence their respective

¹ Rom. xi. 6; Eph. ii. 8.

² Rom. iii. 28; John xv. 1-10.

³ Tit. iii. 4-6.

teachings as to the nature of salvation differ utterly. The whole doctrine of the Buddha as to salvation is summed up in what are called the four words of truth, namely : *Dukkha*, 'pain,' *Samudaya*, 'origin,' *Nirodha*, 'destruction,' and *Mārga*, 'road.' The signification of these four words, which expanded form what are known as "the four noble truths," is set forth in the following verses from the *Dhammapada* :

"He who with clear understanding sees the four holy truths ;

"Pain ; the origin of pain ; the destruction of pain, and the eightfold holy way that leads to the quieting of pain :

"That is the safe refuge, that is the best refuge.

"Having gone to that refuge, a man is delivered from all pain."¹

Prof. Max Müller correctly expounds these verses as follows :
 "The four holy truths are the four statements that there is pain in this world, that the source of pain is desire, that desire can be annihilated, that there is a way shown by Buddha, by which the annihilation of all desires can be achieved, and freedom be obtained."²

Thus we have the highest authority for affirming that not the removal of *sin*, but the removal of *pain* is the objective point of the whole Buddhist system of salvation. And it is also of the greatest importance to observe that even pain is misunderstood. For pain is not in Buddhism regarded as merely the necessary effect of sin, but as the necessary condition of *all existence*, alike in earth and hell and heaven, in bird, beast, worm, or man or god. For pain, argues the Buddhist, is because of *tanhā*, *trishnā*, 'desire.' By this, as already noted, is intended, not desire after that which is morally evil, but desire as desire. It denotes that state of mind which is usually enkindled by the contact of the mind or the senses with the external world. Wherever this state of mind exists, continued existence is made necessary. For desire is the cause of 'action,' or in Buddhist phraseology, *karma*. I die and pass away, but my *karma* lives on, and renders necessary the production of another being after me to reap the fruit of my action. And so long as this chain of existence is continued, so long is there with existence the continued liability to new desire and therefore to new pain. I see, I hear, I feel, I taste, I remember, and because of this

¹ *Dhammapada*, vv. 190-192.

² *Buddhaghosha's Parables*, p. cxiii.

arises desire; and because so much that I perceive seems good, I desire to live and I love the world. And this desire—whether it be of that which is evil or of that which is good—even desire to live in heaven, as well as the desire to live on earth—is the root and source of pain and sorrow. It is so because desire implies the non-possession of that which is desired; and not to have what we desire of necessity means pain and sorrow. The desire may be of that which is good, but except it be at once completely satisfied, it must become a cause of pain. This is by no means saying that all desires are equally reprehensible. *Gautama* clearly saw that certain things were evil in a sense in which other things were not. Conscience, despite the power of a false philosophy, never becomes extinct. Hence the Buddha freely admitted that certain desires having an intrinsic evil character, brought more pain than others, and therefore were to be the more carefully avoided. Hence lying, hatred, and anger are denounced as being in an especial sense occasions of pain and sorrow. Thus we read :

“The fields are damaged by weeds, mankind is damaged by hatred.

“The fields are damaged by weeds, mankind is damaged by vanity.”

All this is true, but then we also read in the next verse :

“The fields are damaged by weeds, mankind is damaged by wishing.

“Therefore a gift bestowed on those who are free from wishes brings great reward.”¹

“Wishing” is the root of all evil, and hence is inferred the third of the noble truths, namely : that since desire is the cause of all pain, the extinction of all pain will follow the extinction of all desire. And thus we are brought to the fourth and last of the four noble truths, that this end—the extinction of desire—can only be attained by walking in what is called “the eightfold way.” What that way is we need not consider just here. At present we are to note the contrast between the Christian and the Buddhist doctrine as to the nature of salvation. Salvation, as regards the individual man, consists in the extinction of sorrow by means of the extinction of desire. Its relation to what we call sin is merely casual and incidental.

Here we do well to observe that the Buddhist salvation in

¹ *Dhammapada*, vv. 357-359.

this sense does not consist in the cessation of existence. This is plain, to go no further, from the Buddhist doctrine as to the nature of man. For, according to the Buddhist authorities, when a man dies, his body having perished, there remains no other part of him which can continue to exist. This is as true of the worldly as of the religious man. It is plain from this alone that when the Buddhist speak of *Nirvāna* as the object of salvation, they cannot mean the extinction of the individual personality. This befalls every one, whereas *Nirvāna* is the attainment of comparatively few. That *Nirvāna* is not to be understood as meaning "annihilation," is further manifest from the use of the term in the Buddhist scriptures. Prof. Max. Müller, in his Lecture on *Buddhist Nihilism*,¹ cites various passages where *Nirvāna* is described as something which is attained and enjoyed before death, and in this world. Thus we read :

"When a man can bear everything without uttering a sound, he has attained *Nirvāna*.

"Desire is the worst ailment, the body the greatest of all evils. Where this is properly known, there is *Nirvāna*, the highest bliss."

The truth is, the Buddhist authorities seem to represent the salvation, to the attainment of which the religion of the Buddha professes to direct men, as of a twofold sort. In the first place, *Nirvāna*, as Prof. Max. Müller has clearly shown, sometimes denotes a mental and spiritual state, attainable in this present life. It denotes the condition of the man who has succeeded in overcoming desire, and thus is victor over "the ten sins." In this sense of the word, *Nirvāna* or salvation refers to the attainment of a certain state of mind, which being reached, the man is in this life freed from pain. But to use the term "holiness," as some have done, to express this state of mind, is utterly misleading. Such a use of the word cannot be too severely condemned. It naturally produces an impression of agreement between Buddhism and Christianity, where, in fact, no agreement exists at all ; for the Biblical idea of holiness—like that of sin—never loses sight of a person. It is not mere morality, which is rightness toward men ; it is more than this : it is rightness toward God, which indeed implies morality, but is yet much more. Shall we then say that the Buddhist idea

¹ See his *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, p. 142.

of salvation is the attainment of an ideal morality? This neither can we do, though he who has attained *Nirvāna* will be a moral man. To reach the Buddhist idea of salvation, we must recur to the Buddhist doctrine concerning sin. Not only does the Buddhist idea of sin have nothing at all to do with a man's relation to God, but also,—along with many acts which are sins—either against ourselves or against our fellow-men, it includes many other acts and states of mind which in fact have nothing sinful in them, and in yet other instances, even stigmatises as evil that which is good. A sufficient proof of this we have in the common enumeration of “the ten sins.” While among these are counted “hatred,” “pride,” “selfishness,” we also find enumerated with these, “belief in the existence of the soul,” “desire of life on earth,” and “desire of life in heaven.”¹ Since the saved man, the *Nibbuta*, is a man “who has overcome the ten sins,” he will, therefore, without doubt, be conceived of as a man who has been freed from hatred, pride, and selfishness and all unlawful lusts, and thus will be, according to the theory, what we call a moral man: and yet that is not a full account of him. To be kind, humble, chaste, this alone is not *Nirvāna*. Not until a man has also extinguished the delusion of the existence of a self, the desire of life on earth and even the desire of life in heaven, has he attained *Nirvāna*. The truth is, that even taken in the best sense possible, that of deliverance from what the Buddhist holds as sin, *Nirvāna* or “salvation” is something utterly diverse from the Christian idea of deliverance from sin. To use, therefore, such Christian terms as “salvation,” “holiness,” “saved,” and “holy,” in describing the nature and result of the Buddhist salvation—except the reader be put on his guard—is only to lead the common reader, unfamiliar with the technicalities of Buddhist theology, utterly astray. Buddhism, indeed, makes salvation to involve deliverance from what it calls sin, though always as a means to an end; but as its idea of sin differs almost *in toto* from that of the Christian Scriptures, its salvation, in the best construction, is a very different thing from that which is offered us by Christ.

But is this all that Buddhism presents as involved in salvation? We think not. While this is a true account of the

¹ See Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, pp. 109, 110.

Buddhist salvation as far as it goes, and explains all those passages which speak of *Nirvāna* as a present possible attainment of the living man, it is not all that the word involves. It does not bring before us the absolute ultimatum of the Buddhist system. For while it is true that, according to the Buddhist scriptures, there is after death no surviving soul of *any* man, yet though my soul does not survive me, my *karma*, or my works, do survive me. And if I die, with the craving after life still unextinguished, then the power of this, my *karma*, will necessitate the birth, in heaven, earth, or hell, of a being—*another* being, according to Western metaphysics, the *same*, according to the Buddhist—in which this unextinguished *trishnā* or “desire” will burn on, and so continue all its possibility of woe. But it is the blessed issue of the state of mind described as *Nirvāna*, that—desire being now at an end—nothing now remains in the man, which could entail any moral necessity for the production at his death of a being who should reap the fruit of his *karma*. In other words, that particular continuous chain of personal existence in which I, for example, as now existing, am a single link, is thereby brought to an end. And this, according to Mr. Davids, is what the Buddhists call—by way of distinction—*Parinibbāna*,¹ the supreme *Nirvāna*. While, then, the extinction of the *individual* as such is not the essence of salvation, seeing that the individual perishes at death in any case, yet Buddhism does hold up as the ultimatum of salvation an annihilation of existence far more sweeping and comprehensive, namely, the eternal extinction of that particular line of sentient being which I represent. And that is brought about by the annihilation of the generating power of my works, through the extinction in me of all desire for existence.

And this is the highest ideal of salvation that Buddhism has to offer. This was the salvation which we are told the Buddha found—for himself first of all—under the bo-tree. This was the gospel the discovery of which, according to Mr. Arnold, made that morning after the great temptation, “break gloriously,” “radiant with rising hopes for man”! This is the nature of that great salvation over the discovery of which Mr. Arnold waxes so enthusiastic, when he tells us in

¹ *Nibbāna* is the Pāli form of *Nirvāna*.

language as far from the descriptions of the Buddhist books themselves as it closely approaches blasphemy, that even in nature—

. . . "The Spirit of our Lord
Lay potent upon man and beast."¹

This is what he calls

. . . "That life which knows no age,
That blessed last of deaths when death itself is dead."²

Bliss indeed it may be, but the bliss of extinction and absolute unconsciousness, better described by Mr. Arnold himself elsewhere as "*lifeless, timeless* bliss,"—a bliss which has its final and uttermost expression in eternal lifelessness, absolute and everlasting cessation of existence. Even this most beggarly salvation, we are told, can be attained by scarcely any, and by none except those who give up the world, put on the yellow robe, and enter a Buddhist monastery. Only two laymen are said ever to have attained this salvation, and even among the monks, only one or two since Buddha. And all the morality, the conquest over the ten sins, and the renunciation of all the best of what men naturally hold dear, comes to this in the end! And yet Mr. Arnold has the assurance to tell us, not in the enthusiasm of the poet, but in the plain language of the prose of the Preface to his *Light of Asia*, that Buddhism has in it "the eternity of a boundless hope," and "an indestructible element of faith in final good!" Could words be chosen which should be further from describing the actual state of the case? Could there well be a contrast more profound than between the salvation which the Buddha proclaims, and that which is offered to us in the Gospel of Jesus Christ?

It is indeed true that there are a few who refuse to admit that this is the doctrine of Buddhism. Thus we must do Mr. Arnold the justice to say that he will not admit that nothingness is the final goal set before the Buddhist. While claiming in the Preface to *The Light of Asia*, that the views of the Buddha, set forth in his poem, "are at least the fruit of considerable study," he adds, frankly enough, that they are not derived from the study of the authorities alone, but "also of a firm conviction that a third of mankind would never have

¹ *The Light of Asia*, Book vi.

² *Ibid.*, Book viii.

been brought to believe . . . in nothingness as the issue and crown of being." We venture, however, to suggest that a correct judgment as to the actual teachings of a religion cannot be easily attained by either the exclusive or the partial use of the *a priori* method. Whether or not nothingness seem to Mr. Arnold a desirable issue of life, it is absolutely certain that to a very considerable proportion of our fellow-men the case appears quite otherwise. The proven increase of suicide in modern Christendom, concurrently with the growth of atheism and disbelief in a hereafter, is an ascertained fact which must not be lost sight of, and which may be set over-against Mr. Arnold's *a priori* assumption. But even if we should grant what some urge, even against the highest authorities, that Buddhism *does* teach the existence of a soul, and its survival after death, therein agreeing with the Brahminical doctrine which preceded and in India has outlived it, yet, practically, the case is not altered. *Practically*, it is still true that death ends all. For no one, either among the Brahmans or Buddhists, maintains that in the transmigration of the soul, memory and the consciousness of personal identity go over into the life after death. For, as in the present life, I have no memory of the life before the present, so it is freely admitted that there is no reason to believe that in the life after this I will have any memory of the present, or any recognition of myself as the same person. So far from teaching that the sense of personal identity commonly survives death, the Buddhist scriptures clearly teach the contrary. They teach that the power of thus looking backward through the series of bygone lives—whatever the phrase may mean—was one of the *special* attainments of the Buddha. In this respect it was, among others, that he, as "the enlightened one," was distinguished from other men. But if it is believed that personal consciousness ends with death, then it is plain that this must have the same practical effect as a belief in the most absolute annihilation. To me, *as a self-conscious person*, existence will come to an end. And that this cessation of *personal* existence seems to multitudes of our fellow-men a blessing to be supremely desired, of this—Mr. Arnold and others to the contrary notwithstanding—we have no doubt. It may indeed be hard for us, under so different and more tolerable conditions of existence, to understand

how the principle that existence is *per se* an evil can be assumed as fundamental in so many Oriental religions and philosophies. But under conditions such as prevail in India and China, the case is very different. Through the overcrowding of population the phrase "struggle for existence" comes to have an intensity of meaning which it has not in America, or even in Europe. Moreover, the various public philanthropies which do so much to mitigate the evils of poverty in Christian lands are wanting there. Finally, the conception of a kind and good God, a Saviour, and a hope of a blessed immortality beyond death, which lightens for millions among us the burden of life, is absent from the mind of the Hindu and the Buddhist. And if even in Christian lands, at this late day, the question has been soberly raised, and has been earnestly discussed in our leading reviews, whether, even at the best, life be worth living, how is it inconceivable that to millions living as the great mass of the population have lived for ages in India, the assurance that "nothingness is the crown of being," should come as a kind of gospel? If it bring nothing better, it at least brings the faith that suffering is not—or at least *may* not be—everlasting; and to millions there is a sad comfort even in that. And howsoever our Western *littérateurs* and professors, writing in their comfortable studies—surrounded from their earliest recollection with all the external blessings that Christianity brings with it, even to those who reject it—may think it inconceivable that life should not seem sweet to all, yet it is the stubborn fact, that annihilation—if not of the essence, yet at least of self-consciousness and personality—has been the *summum bonum* offered in all the great Indian religions and philosophies.¹ The form in which it is taught may vary: it may be pantheistic, as among the modern populations of India; or atheistic, agnostic, or materialistic, as in other Indian philosophies, and especially in the religion of the Buddha; but the essential idea is ever the same.

¹ Professor Oldenberg's remarks (referring to Professor Max Müller's opinions on this same subject) are quite to the point. He says:—"We do not follow the renowned investigator, when he seeks for the limit between the possible and the impossible in the development of religion. In the sultry, dreamy stillness of India thoughts arise and grow,—every anticipation and speculation grows in another way than in the cool air of the West." —*Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, p. 274.

The eternal extinction of personal self-consciousness is the best that any of them has to offer as the end of life, and to attain this is the supreme object of religion. In this the gospel according to the Vedantist, and the gospel according to the Buddha are at one, and thus in the very nature of the salvation which they promise, they alike stand in direct contradiction to the Gospel of Christ. Where Christ promises "eternal life," they agree in promising eternal extinction of life as the highest end of being and of all religion. Call it what they will, *pari-nibbana*, *mukti*, *nistara*, it all comes to this. The long, long chain of births and deaths shall end, and in one way or another man may help to speed the issue. And that is the gospel alike of Buddhism and of Brahmanism. Existence is *per se* an evil; for so long as there is existence, there is no security from pain. Hence salvation must have cessation of personal existence as its ultimatum. To be is to suffer. The thought finds an expression singularly sad and touching in the following words of a Canarese song:—

"A weary and broken-down man,
With sorrow I come to thy feet :
Subdued by the fate and the ban
That hides the long future I meet.
I suffer, without ceasing, the pain
Of sorrowful, infinite life."¹

Does it appear as if the extinction of existence which Mr. Arnold finds so inconceivable as an object of desire, seemed wholly undesirable to the man who wrote those words?

But higher authorities than Mr. Arnold have sought to convince their readers that the Buddhist ultimatum of salvation could not be imagined to lie in this final extinction of existence. Thus, while Prof. Max. Müller admits that "no person who reads with attention the metaphysical speculations on the *Nirvāna* contained in the Buddhist canon can arrive at any other conviction than that expressed by Burnouf, namely that *Nirvāna*, the *summum bonum* of Buddhism, is absolute nothing,"² he yet pleads, in part on grounds which have been already reviewed, that this could not have been the teaching of the Buddha himself. To the arguments previously criticised, how-

¹ *Folk-Songs of Southern India*, p. 39.

² "Lecture on Buddhist Nihilism," in *Science of Religion*, p. 140.

ever, he adds another consideration which shows us that his judgment also was determined in part by considerations purely *a priori*. He says: "If the soul becomes quite extinct, then religion is not any more what it ought to be—a bridge from the finite to the infinite, but a trap-bridge hurling man into the abyss, at the very moment when he thought he had arrived at the stronghold of the eternal."¹ But this argument plainly rests on the assumption that every religion *must* be "what it ought to be," namely, a means of salvation to those who hold it, or, in the language of the Oxford Professor's theology, "a bridge from the finite to the infinite."² But what warrant has any one for this assumption? It will certainly not be accepted by any who hold the teachings of Christ to be the unerring standard of faith. And yet as regards the special point of the present argument, it will not be weakened even if we should assume the views of the Buddhist salvation which are held by Mr. Arnold and Professor Müller to be correct. For, even in that case also, it were still true that the salvation which was preached by the Buddha, was not, as to its nature, the salvation which Christ preached, but something totally different. There is no evidence that the Buddha ever so much as had an idea of such a salvation as that which the Lord Jesus proclaimed and which He claimed to have secured for men.

But, assuredly,—as so often remarked before,—the conclusions of missionaries who, through years, have had daily converse with the votaries of Buddha, whose very object it must needs be, in order to their work, to find out if possible what the people for whom they labour really believe, are above all others deserving of consideration. And their testimony is unanimous and unmistakeable. Thus, the missionary Bishop Bigandet, of the Romish mission to Burmah, says:

"The rôle of Buddha, from beginning to end, is that of a deliverer, who preaches a law designed to secure to man deliverance from all the miseries under which he is labouring. But by an inexplicable and deplorable eccentricity, the pretended saviour, after having taught man the way to deliver himself from the tyranny of his passions, only leads him, after all, into the bottomless gulf of total annihilation."³ The Bishop tells us that

¹ *Lecture*, etc., p. 140.

² See Prof. Oldenberg's criticism on this argument of Prof. Müller, quoted in footnote, p. 528.

³ *The Legend of Gaudama*, Preface, p. x.

his information "has been derived from the perusal of the religious books of the Burmans, and from frequent conversations on religion, during several years, with the best informed among the laity whom he has had the chance of meeting."¹

Who in this matter is more likely to be right—the missionary bishop, or the Oxford Professor who quotes this testimony and goes on to show that the Bishop must be mistaken? If we turn to Ceylon we have the same testimony as to the belief of the Ceylonese Buddhists, from the late venerable missionary Hardy, of the English Wesleyans, already cited, one for more than a quarter of a century in daily converse with that people. He quotes from the *Suttanta* called *Sāmānya Phala*, the paragraphs which end with these words: "He knows I have overcome the repetition of existence, all that I have to do is done." He thereupon makes the following pertinent comment:—

"Here I pause; and I ask myself, in bitterness of soul, is this all? With all his reputed wisdom, can Buddha lead his followers to nothing higher, nothing superior? . . . For what is the next stage in the supposed uprising of this privileged priest? He has done all that he has to do. . . . The goal, the long anticipated reward, the final consummation of the whole series of births and deaths is now attained. But what is it? *Nothingness*. In the whole story of humanity, . . . in all the conclusions to which disappointed man has come in his far wanderings from God, there is nothing more cheerless, more depressing, or more afflictive, than the revelations of the *Suttanta*, in which Buddha tries to set forth the highest privilege of the highest order of sentient beings."²

To the same effect Dr. Edkins of China, enumerating "some of the most prominent doctrines of Buddhism, names first, the happiness of the *Nirvāna* or state of unconsciousness which frees him who attains it from the miseries of existence." We repeat, then, the conclusion which is inevitable, that as in the former particulars, so, again, as regards the nature of the salvation which man needs, Buddhism not only differs from the doctrine of the New Testament, but differs from it in the way of direct contradiction. If the one is true, the other must be false. Christianity affirms that salvation consists in eternal salvation from *sin*; Buddhism, that it consists in eternal salvation from *existence*. While the former offers us eternal *life*, the latter holds forth, as its *summum bonum*, everlasting *death*.

¹ *The Legend of Gautama*, p. xiii.

² *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, pp. 183, 185.

And we are asked to recognise in "this venerable religion," "the eternity of a universal hope," "and an indestructible element of faith in final good;" and, because of "this gospel of the Buddha," to revere the Buddha as "the Light of Asia"!!

But the contrasts between the two religions as regards this vital matter of salvation do not end with this, though that were indeed enough. For even if all the above argument be set aside, and the fatal difference as to the nature of salvation be ignored, yet no less momentous contradictions still remain, as regards the *ground* and the *means* of salvation. As to the *ground* of our salvation, the Gospel declares first, negatively, that "by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified."¹ "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us."² Positively, the Gospel everywhere asserts that we are saved by the works of another, even Jesus the Christ, who has by His death made atonement and "propitiation for our sins."³ "Christ hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust."⁴ "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us."⁵ Nor is this the teaching of Paul or the other apostles only, as it is the fashion of some to assert. For according to the Gospel of Matthew, the Lord Jesus himself said expressly that He came "to give his life a ransom for many,"⁶ and all the synoptists testify that when He instituted the Holy Supper, He declared that His blood was shed for us sinners "for the remission of sins."⁷ This, then, according to the Gospel, is the sole meritorious ground of our salvation. All reliance on any works of our own, however excellent they may seem, is everywhere denounced in the most unsparing terms, as sure to end in utter ruin. "As many as are of the works of the law are under the curse."⁸ But what does the Buddha say? All who have ever given the least attention to the subject know that the Buddhist scriptures as constantly insist on the exact reverse of all this. The idea of salvation by the merits of another does not more emphatically distinguish Christianity, than salvation by one's own merits distinguishes Buddhism. The following passages from the *Dhammapada* will illustrate Buddhist teaching on this question :—

¹ Rom. iii. 20.² Tit. iii. 5.³ 1 John ii. 2.⁴ 1 Peter iii. 18.⁵ Gal. iii. 13.⁶ Matt. xx. 28.⁷ Matt. xxvi. 28.⁸ Gal. iii. 10.

"By one's self the evil is done ; by one's self one suffers ; by one's self evil is left undone ; by one's self one is purified. Lo, no one can purify another."¹

"O Bhikshu ! empty this boat ! if emptied, it will go quickly ; having cut off passion and hatred, thou wilt go to *Nirvāna*."²

The *Parables of Buddhaghosha* were composed in exposition of the meaning of the *Dhammapada*. In them the doctrine is expounded, for example, as follows : "Whoever shall do nothing but good works will receive nothing but future excellent rewards."³ Again we read of twenty-one kinds of evil actions, concerning which it is said that among those who commit them "there are nineteen who, if they see to their ways, perform good works, listen to the law,⁴ steadfastly observe *Saranāgama* and the five commandments, and keep good watch over their bodies, shall be released from their sins."⁵ Personal merit is, then, according to the Buddhist teaching, the sole and exclusive ground of our salvation. But this merit is not made to consist merely in the practice of moral duties. Great emphasis is laid on the performance or non-performance of actions which have no moral quality whatever. Thus he who seeks the destruction of all desire and thereby his salvation, is exhorted to practise "the duty of eating alone and sleeping alone."⁶ He is told that "if a man has ceased to think of good or evil, then there is no fear for him while watching," and that he will be saved who is "without thirst or desire ;" that meditation on the formula called *Saranāgama* has the "power to destroy all evil emotion." Of atonement for sin by any manner of vicarious suffering or sacrifice, Buddhism knows absolutely nothing. Yet Mr. Arnold could write as follows of the Buddha, making him to say on his renunciation of his home :—

"This will I do who have a realm to lose,
Because I love . . .

. . . these that are mine and those
Which shall be mine, a thousand million more,
Saved by this sacrifice I offer now."⁷

¹ *Dhammapada*, v. 165.

² *Ibid.* v. 369.

³ *Buddhaghosha's Parables*, p. 123.

⁴ The repetition of the formula, "I take refuge in the law, the Buddha and the brotherhood."

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 183, 184.

⁶ *Dhammapada*, v. 305.

⁷ *The Light of Asia*, Book iv.

The parallel with the work and even the words of Christ which these words are plainly intended to suggest, has absolutely no existence save in the imagination of the poet. Such writing is worse than fatally misleading. Even Mr. Arnold himself elsewhere puts in the mouth of the Buddha words which contradict the Christian sense of the above citation. No language could more explicitly deny the possibility of a vicarious atonement than the following :

"Nor, spake he, shall one wash his spirit clean
By blood ; nor gladden gods, being good, with blood ;
Nor bribe them, being evil.
. . . Answer all must give
For all things done amiss or wrongfully,
Alone, each for himself, reckoning with that
The fixed arithmic of the universe
Which meteth good for good, and ill for ill,
Measure for measure, unto deeds, words, thoughts."¹

Language such as this, however inconsistent with what we find elsewhere in the poem, is in full accord with what we find in the *Abhinishkramana Sûtra*, wherein the Buddha is made to argue with the sacrificing sages of Vaisali, thus : "I will ask you, then, if a man in worshipping the gods sacrifices a sheep, and so does well, why should he not kill his child, his relative or dear friend, in worshipping the gods, and so do better? Surely then there can be no merit in killing a sheep! It is but a confused and illogical system, this."² On this point of the impossibility of atonement by another, Buddhism is so explicit that there is no dispute among authorities upon this subject. Even Mr. de Bunsen, who has so boldly endeavoured to connect the doctrines of the Gospel with Buddhism through Jewish Essenism, is constrained to admit, with regard to this most essential and characteristic feature of the teaching of Christ, that "Buddhism knows absolutely nothing of the idea of an offended God who requires reconciliation by vicarious suffering,"³ and that the doctrine of atonement, by vicarious suffering is "absolutely excluded by Buddhism."⁴ As to

¹ *The Light of Asia*, Book v.

² *Romantic Legend*, p. 159.

³ *The Angel-Messiah of Buddhists, Essenes, and Christians*, p. 49.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 50.

the ground, then, of our salvation, no less than as to its nature, the doctrine of the Buddha directly contradicts that of the Gospel. The latter affirms vicarious atonement as that ground; the former declares that vicarious atonement is impossible.

It follows that there must be no less total contradiction between the two religions as to the *author* of salvation. According to the Gospel the author and efficient cause of our salvation is the Lord Jesus; according to Buddhism the author and efficient cause of salvation is the man himself. Buddha, therefore, stands in no such relation to his followers as Christ to His. To speak of him as a saviour, a deliverer—if it be understood that these terms mean what they do when applied to Christ—is wholly to misrepresent the case. As for Christ, however a certain class of writers may ignore the fact, He certainly claimed to be much more than a mere preacher; He claimed to be Himself a *Saviour*. He said that He came “to seek and to save that which was lost,”¹ and that by laying down His life.² He promised further to send the Holy Spirit of God to renew the inner nature of man.³ He therefore did not come, as so many seem to imagine, to show men how to save themselves, but in His divine power, to save them Himself alone. And this and nothing less is what Christ meant when He called Himself a Saviour, a Redeemer. But we open translations of the Buddhist books and often find these terms applied, without note or explanation, to the Buddha. Naturally those who are uninstructed as to the facts of the case hastily infer that the claims of the Buddha were identical with those of Christ, whereas, in point of fact, they have nothing in common. So far from professing to have power to save others, the Buddha professed to have been a seeker for salvation, as he understood it, for himself. Thus, for example, we read in the *Abhiniskramana Sūtra*, that the Rájá Bimbisára asked the Buddha, while he was yet living as an ascetic seeking for enlightenment, “Who or what are you? Are you a god or a Nāga, or Brahma, or Śakra, or a man, or a spirit? Then Bodhisatwa, having entirely got rid of all crooked ways, answered plainly and truthfully, ‘Maharájá! I am no god or spirit, but a plain

¹ Luke xix. 10.

² John x. 11.

³ John xiv. 16, 17, *et passim*.

man, seeking for rest, and so am practising the rules of an ascetic life.'"¹ Nor does Buddhism teach that the Buddha, after he had himself attained enlightenment, then gained the power to save others, or ever claimed it. On the contrary, the *Dhammapada* says plainly :—

“ You yourself must make an effort. The Tathagatas (Buddhas) are only preachers.”²

To the same effect we are told in the *Parables of Buddhaghosha* of certain disciples of the Buddha who, on account of a sin formerly committed, although they had reached the state of holy men, fought among themselves, and all killed each other, and *Para Taken* (the Buddha) had no power to prevent their suffering this punishment of their sin.³ To the same purport the writer gives still other examples to show the absolute powerlessness of the Buddha to save men who have committed sin.

This naturally leads us to a consideration of the doctrine of orthodox Buddhism as to the person of the Buddha. Even Professor Beal has referred to the Buddhist doctrine of the pre-existence of the Buddha as having an analogy with the Christian doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ. In point of fact, it is certain that there is no such significant similarity as has been suggested. There is, indeed, no difficulty in believing, in view of the early and extensive prevalence of a belief in transmigration in India, that the Buddha probably believed in some sort of transmigration, and by necessary consequence in his own pre-existence. It is quite certain that the Buddhists themselves, on the authority of their scriptures, believe that the Buddha existed before he appeared in this world. But as to how the Buddha pre-existed or any other man has pre-existed, as to that we have seen that there are two opinions. Whichever view of the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration we adopt, in neither case is there any real analogy between the alleged pre-existence of the Buddha and the pre-existence of Christ as taught in the Scriptures. For, first, if we accept the view argued by Mr. Davids and so many of the most eminent specialists in Buddhist studies, that Buddhism does not admit

¹ *Romantic Legend*, p. 182.

² *Buddhaghosha's Parables*, p. 154.

³ *Dhammapada*, v. 276.

the existence of the soul as separate from the body, then plainly enough there was no pre-existence of the soul of the Buddha in the Christian sense of the word at all, for there was no soul to pre-exist. As thus understood, the many stories ascribed to the Buddha, in which he tells what he was and what he did in former lives, cannot refer to a pre-existence of his personality, but to the various manifestations of that pre-existent *karm*, or line of moral activity, which in due time necessitated the existence of Gautama Muni. But it needs very little knowledge of the Bible to see that *this* theory has nothing in common with the Scripture doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ. Neither, if we reject this interpretation and understand the Buddhist scriptures to teach what no doubt multitudes of Buddhists, unskilled in metaphysics, believe—that the soul of the Buddha existed before his appearance in this world,—is this a doctrine such as the Scriptures teach concerning Christ. What Christ taught is, according to the Gospel, plain enough. He taught, without doubt, that He had existed before He came into this world. He said, for example, that He had come from the Father and come into the world, even as again He left the world and went unto the Father.¹ He declared of Himself, "Before Abraham was, I am."² In the second place, He no less clearly taught that in this respect His case was, among men, alone and peculiar. For He said again in so many words: "No man hath ascended to heaven but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of Man which is in heaven."³ In contrast with this the Buddhist books teach us that whatever was the nature of the pre-existence of the Buddha, in this he had no peculiar pre-eminence above others, but simply shared the common lot of all men, and indeed of all organic beings. Moreover, Christ taught that until the time of His incarnation, He had lived a life of changeless glory in the fellowship of the eternal God-head. The Buddha, on the contrary, is represented as teaching that, previous to the last occasion, he had existed, not only in heaven, but also on earth, and that again and again. Neither had he on these previous occasions always existed as a Buddha, or in any condition of either earthly or heavenly glory. For

¹ John viii. 42; xiv. 28, *et passim*.

² John viii. 58.

³ John iii. 13.

although the Buddha when he appeared in the world the last time is represented as having descended from heaven, yet the same books represent him as having lived previously in no less than 530 different forms, on earth and in heaven. Eighty-three times he had been an ascetic, fifty-eight times a king, twenty-four times a Brahman, twenty times the god Sakka, forty-three times a tree-god, five times a slave, once a devil-dancer, twice a rat, and twice a pig!¹ And Professor Beal, and others with him, think that they can discover an analogy between the doctrine of the pre-existence of the Buddha and the pre-existence of the Christ!²

It is indeed true that the Thibetan Buddhists have a doctrine of the pre-existence of the Buddha which in its external form at first sight seems much more like the Christian doctrine. They tell us of an *Adi-Buddha*, or Primal Buddha, infinite, self-existent, and omniscient. From this Primal Buddha all things that are, have in order come forth. Hence it is true that in him the Buddha Gautama Muni pre-existed, and from him came forth. And yet even this corrupt form of the Buddhist teaching has only the most superficial resemblance to the doctrine of the pre-existence of our Lord. The true analogy of this theory is not with anything that the Church has ever understood the Gospels to teach, but with the ancient Gnostic doctrine of the "emanations," of which Christ was supposed to be one. And it is of significance to note that this doctrine,—with whatever of superficial likeness it may have or seem to have to the Christian doctrine,—does not appear in any of the old Buddhist authorities, nor seems to have existed until about the tenth century of our era,—some fifteen hundred years after the days of the Buddha!

6. Last of all, we have to note the Buddhist eschatology. We shall find that in its doctrine as to the future, the teachings of Buddhism are no less in direct antagonism to Christianity than in all the foregoing. Two fundamental questions come up in eschatology. First, What is to be the future of the individual? and second, What is to be the future history of the world?

¹ Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, 2d ed., p. 102. The list is given with some variations in the numbers in Fausbøll's *Buddhist Birth-Stories*, p. ci.

² *Romantic Legend*, Introduction, p. viii.

As regards the first of these questions, the Holy Scriptures, as understood by the great body of Christians in all ages, answer that men after death are consciously happy or miserable, according to their works. It is further agreed that they will continue after death in a disembodied state until Christ shall come the second time : and that when Christ comes, He will come to judge all who have ever lived ; that He will raise the dead, and change the living into bodily forms, adapted to an unending state of being. Finally, it has been the general understanding of Christ's teaching that from that time the ultimate destiny of all individuals thus raised or changed and judged shall be eternally fixed ; that the wicked shall go into everlasting punishment, and the righteous into life eternal.

But what is the teaching of Buddhism on this subject ? The answer has been already anticipated, and we need to add but little. That answer is twofold, according as we take one or the other interpretation of the Buddhist scriptures. If we take the view which is maintained by Burnouf, St. Hilaire, Rhys Davids, and others, then we must answer that Buddhism teaches that death is the end of man. Since there is nothing to man but *Namadrûpa*, 'name and form,' there is nothing substantial remaining when we die which shall continue after death. Nothing survives us but our works. My works indeed will necessitate the immediate production of another being, god, man, or beast, to reap the fruit of my doings in reward or retribution ; but that new being is not, according to our common use of language, I myself, but another and distinct being. Its connection with me is not by identity of essence, but is only moral and ideal. There is, therefore, if we rightly understand the Buddhist scriptures, no existence of the human personality after death. Death ends all.

But the instinct of immortality and the consciousness of a spiritual and invisible personality are very strong in all men. And so we can easily believe what we are told, that whatsoever may be the teachings of Buddhist metaphysics, very many Buddhists of to-day look forward to a continuance of life after death. Yet even thus they are still in hopeless contradiction with the teaching of Christ. In the first place, the Christian doctrine as to the future life of every man in heaven or hell, is not the doctrine of Buddha, even as thus represented.

Buddhism has indeed its heavens many, and also its hells many. And it is also true that after death, according to the view we have at present before us, I may find myself in one or the other of these diverse places. But this is very far from certain. The Buddhist teaching is thus given :—

“Some people are born again ; evil people go to hell ; righteous people go to heaven ; those who are free from all worldly desires, enter *Nirvāna*.”¹

“Some people are born again.” That is, instead of going either to heaven or to hell, I may be born again on earth, and go through, no one knows how many stages of existence, before I arrive at the final rest of *Nirvāna*. And even if I go to hell or heaven when I die, what then ? If I go to hell, I may indeed come out again after that, incalculable ages hence, I shall have exhausted the retribution due my sin ; there is some consolation in that. But, unfortunately, the same is true as to life in heaven also. There I may remain ages, but it is nevertheless certain that, sooner or later, I leave heaven either to sink into the annihilation of *Parinibbāna*, or more probably to return to the world and begin again the weary round of birth and death. Of a deathless life, a life of eternal incorruption, Buddhism knows nothing. It tells us indeed, as Mr. Arnold puts it, of “means to live and die no more.”² But these words mean, in Buddhist parlance, an end of *living* as well as of *dying*, to be attained at last, if ever, through the *Parinibbāna*. Of immortal and unending life anywhere, we repeat that Buddhism knows absolutely nothing. The idea is utterly foreign to Buddhist thinking. On nothing do the Buddhist books insist more than on the alleged fact that there is nowhere, in heaven or earth or hell, any permanence in anything. And inasmuch as, according to Buddha, existence anywhere or in any place involves pain sooner or later, existence, therefore, is *per se* an evil, and eternal existence would be eternal evil. So far, therefore, from existence in heaven being regarded as desirable, desire of life even in the highest and most pure and spiritual of the Buddhist heavens is named—under the name of *arūparāga*—as the seventh of “the ten sins,” which must be overcome before a man can attain *Nirvāna*. Herein again we have reason to complain that Mr. Arnold uses language

¹ *Dhammapada*, v. 126.

² *The Light of Asia*, Book vii.

sinfully misleading. He tells us that the Buddha anticipated that as the result of all his self-sacrifice—

“That should be won for which he lost the world,
And death should find him conqueror of death.”¹

The analogy with the teaching of Christ which is suggested in this phraseology is without the least foundation. Death, according to Buddhism, is destroyed indeed, but only because that existence is eternally destroyed which is the condition of death. Plainly, when nothing is left to die, then death is impossible; but is then to conquer death the same thing as to be conquered by death! No less misleading—if we have rightly understood the teaching of the Buddha—is the translation which Professor Max Müller gives of the *Dhammapada*, v. 21: “Reflection is the path of immortality.” Surely not even the Professor will claim that the Christian doctrine of immortality is taught in the Buddhist scriptures! In fact, if we may trust so eminent a Pāli scholar as Mr. Rhys Davids, Professor Müller has been misled by an etymology. Commenting on the same Pāli word *amata*, which is used here, as translated by Professor Beal in his *Romantic Legend*, Mr. Davids uses the following language:—“The expression, ‘to open the gate of immortality to me,’ being quite unbuddhistic, has probably arisen from a misunderstanding of the word *amata*, ‘ambrosia,’ or ‘nectar.’ This word, derived from the Sanskrit *amṛita* (from *amṛi*), is applied to *Nirvāna* as being the heavenly drink of the wise, who are above the gods. It never means “immortality,” and could not grammatically have that sense. So that the striking parallel between the Chinese verses (in the *Romantic Legend*) and 2 Tim. i. 10, falls to the ground.” Of an unending life after death,² then, Buddhism

¹ *The Light of Asia*, Book iv.

² Professor Oldenberg maintains that the position of the Buddhist authorities as regards a hereafter, is simply non-committal. He cites many passages wherein the Buddha is said to have been asked this precise question, whether there were a life after death or not, and to have declined to answer. Granting this, the Buddhist position would rather seem to be described as agnostic regarding this matter. But even in that point of view, it is still essentially true that Buddhism has no doctrine of a life after death. And when we recall the undisputed teachings already noted, as to the non-existence of the soul, and remember that, according to Professor Oldenberg, the Buddha, when pressed with the obvious conclusion as regards a future state, declined to disavow the inference, the statements in our article do not appear to be too strong.—See Oldenberg, *Buddha*, etc., p. 237, ff.

knows nothing. And if it does not even admit the immortality of the soul, much less has it any place for the Christian doctrine of a resurrection.

All this being so, it follows that the Buddhist doctrine of future rewards and retributions has little in common with the doctrine of Christ, except the indissoluble nexus between sin and suffering, and virtue and happiness. That Buddhism should hold fast to this doctrine, and so daringly attempt to reconcile it with its nihilistic metaphysics, is a most impressive and suggestive illustration of the hold which "the fearful looking for of judgment" has upon a sinful man. But even if any insist—as it seems to us, in the face of the clearest evidence—that Buddhism does admit the continuance of the individual after death, to suffer in hell or enjoy in heaven the reward of his works on earth, yet were this not the Christian doctrine. It were not even equivalent to the teachings of Christian restorationists. For if the retributions of the Buddhist hells might seem to be at least less dreadful, that sooner or later the unhappy victim, having exhausted the demerit of his works, will be released from his torments : yet even this is not as restorationists teach, in order that the man may enter then upon unending blessedness in heaven. Again he must begin the almost interminable round of birth and life and death, with all their possibilities of woe. Or if perchance from hell the sinner mount to one of the Buddhist heavens, neither is there permanency there. For the doctrine of future reward with the Buddhist is not a doctrine of eternal reward. No one in the highest of the formless heavens shall stay there for ever. Nowhere is there anything that abides, is the continual and most sad refrain of all Buddhist teaching. The only hope in this life the Buddhist can have, if he do believe in existence for himself hereafter, is that, if he *must* be born again, it may be in a condition more tolerable than this ; one in which he may possibly be able by high resolution and endeavour to break the chain which binds him to the wheel of life and death, and end all conscious being. We may well sum up the case as regards this part of the Buddhist eschatology in the eloquent words of the Rev. Mr. Hardy :—

"The system of Buddha is humiliating, cheerless, man-marring, soul-crushing. It tells me that I am not a reality ; I have no soul. It tells me

that there is no unalloyed happiness, no plenitude of enjoyment, no perfect unbroken peace, in the possession of any being whatever, from the highest to the lowest, in any world. It tells me that I may live myriads of millions of ages, and that not in any of these ages, nor in any portion of an age, can I be free from apprehension as to the future until I attain to a state of unconsciousness ; and that in order to arrive at this consummation I must turn away from all that is pleasant, or lovely, or instructive, or elevating, or sublime. It tells me by voices ever repeated, like the ceaseless sound of the sea wave on the shore, that I shall be subject to sorrow, impermanence, and unreality, so long as I exist, and yet that I cannot now cease to exist, nor for countless ages to come, as I can only attain *Nirvāṇa* in the time of a supreme Buddha. In my distress, I ask for the sympathy of an all-wise and all-powerful friend. . . . But I am mocked instead by the semblance of relief ; and am told to look to Buddha, who has ceased to exist ; to the Dhamma,¹ that never was in existence ; and to the Sangha,² the members of which are real existences, but, like myself, partakers of sorrow and sin."³

When the Christian dies, or when we lay a Christian friend in the grave, we sorrow indeed, but *not* as without hope. When the Christian mother lays her beloved child in the grave, we comfort her with the reminder that the child is not lost, but only gone before, and that though the child shall not return to her, she shall go to the child. But what does Buddhism tell such a stricken parent ? We have it in a discourse which is said to have been spoken by the Buddha himself—the parable of *Kisagotami* :—

"*Kisagotami* was a young mother who had given birth to her first-born, but 'when the boy was able to walk by himself he died,' and the story goes on thus :—The young girl, in her love for it, carried the dead child clasped to her bosom, and went about from house to house asking if any one would give her medicine for it. When the neighbours saw this, they said, 'Is the young girl mad that she carries about on her breast the dead body of her son ?' But a wise man—thinking to himself, 'Alas ! this *Kisagotami* does not understand the law of death, I must comfort her,'—said to her, 'My good girl, I cannot myself give medicine for it, but I know of a doctor who can attend to it.' The young girl said, 'If so, tell me who it is.' The wise man continued, 'Buddha can give medicine ; you must go to him.' *Kisagotami* went to Buddha, and, doing homage to him, said, 'Lord and master, do you know any medicine that will be good for my boy ?' Buddha answered, 'I know of some.' She asked, 'What medicine do you require ?' He said, 'I want a handful of mustard seed.' The girl promised to procure it for him. But Buddha continued,—'I require some mustard seed taken from a house where no son, husband, parent, or slave has ever died.' The girl said, 'Very

¹ Law (of the Buddha).

² The brotherhood of Buddhist monks.

³ *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, pp. 217, 218.

good,' and went to ask for some at the different houses, carrying the dead body of her son. . . . The people said, 'Here is some mustard seed, take it.' Then she asked, 'In my friend's house has there died a son, a husband, a parent, or a slave?' They replied, 'Lady! what is this that you say? *The living are few, but the dead are many.*' Then she went to other houses, but one said, 'I have lost a son;' another, 'I have lost my parents;' another, 'I have lost my slave.' At last, not being able to find a single house where no one had died from which to procure the mustard seed, she began to think, 'This is a heavy task that I am engaged in. I am not the only one whose son is dead. In the whole of the *Sāvatti* country, everywhere, children are dying, parents are dying.' Thinking thus, she acquired the law of fear, and putting away affection for her child, she summoned up resolution, and left the dead body in a forest; then she went to Buddha and paid him homage. He said to her, 'Have you procured the handful of mustard seed?' 'I have not,' she replied; 'the people of the village told me, *The living are few, the dead are many.*' Buddha said to her, 'You thought that you alone had lost a son. The law of death is that among all living creatures there is no permanence.'"¹

And that was all the comfort that he had to give. Could anything be more sad? Could anything more touchingly illustrate the utter helplessness of Buddhism to comfort in the presence of death? How impressive the contrast with the words of Him who once stood near an open grave, and said unto the mourners, "I am the resurrection and the life, he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." And yet Mr. Arnold, in the sober prose of the preface to *The Light of Asia*, extols Buddhism as having in it "the eternity of a universal hope"!! And even Professor Max Müller thinks that he sees in this inexpressibly sad story, with its gospel of helplessness and universal doom, 'a specimen of the true Buddhism,'—wherein no doubt he is right,—"language, intelligible to the poor and the suffering, which has endeared Buddhism to the hearts of millions . . . the beautiful, the tender, the humanly true, which, like pure gold, lies buried in all religions, even in the sand of the Buddhist canon!"²

One could wish to place here, for the benefit of any who may have been unable to see any material difference between the hope of the Buddhist and the hope of the Christian believer, the inspired words of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians:—

"We would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning them that fall asleep; that ye sorrow not, even as the rest, which have no hope. For if

¹ *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, by Prof. Max Müller, pp. 145, 146.

² *Ibid.* p. 147.

we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also that are fallen asleep in Jesus will God bring with him. For this we say unto you by the word of the Lord, that we that are alive, that are left unto the coming of the Lord, shall in nowise precede them that are fallen asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God : and the dead in Christ shall rise first ; then we that are alive, that are left, shall together with them be caught up in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air ; and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore comfort one another with *these words.*"

No brighter prospect does Buddhism hold forth to the world and to the race, than to the individual man. What the Bible promises in this matter we all know. Not only does it hold forth to the individual man the promise of salvation from the guilt and power of sin, and everlasting life in resurrection glory, but also what we might call a social and governmental redemption of the human race on earth. Christ bade us to pray, that the will of God might be done on earth even as it is done in heaven ; and so no doubt it will be. All nations, we are assured, shall serve and obey the Christ of God, and over all the earth "there shall be one Lord and his name one."¹ Holiness shall so universally prevail that it is said, in the glowing language of the prophet, that even "upon the bells of the horses shall be Holiness unto the Lord."² The law of love shall be the law of the world. And although it is true that the Scriptures do point us forward to a coming judgment and visitation of the world that now is by fire, yet those final judgments are said to be only that the Son of man may purge out of His kingdom "all them that do iniquity."³ And the consuming fires, which, according to the Word of God, shall yet enwrap the world, shall not be for the annihilation of the earth, but that, as after the flood, so again, life may bloom on earth anew, but not as now in sin, but in redemption. For "we look, according to his promise, for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." Thus in the closing chapters of the Apocalypse, dark though they be with excess of brightness, yet so much as this is clear. As in the far distance we lose sight of the history of this planet, it disappears in the full glory of a finished and complete redemption, wherein even the very earth itself has been made to share. And among the last words which are borne to our ears are these, "There shall be

¹ Zech. xiv. 9.

² Zech. xiv. 20.

³ Matt. xiii. 41.

no more death, neither sorrow nor crying ; neither shall there be any more pain." ¹

Truly these are wondrous words, and full of hope for those whose hearts are heavy now with the burdens and woes of humanity. The Gospel is as full of hope for the world as for the individual man.

But what says the Buddha ? No such prospect opened to him. He who guessed at so much did not once guess this. He came, we are told, to preach deliverance to the world. At the best, as we have seen, it was but a sorry deliverance. And yet, worse still, such as it was, it was not to last. On the contrary, we are everywhere assured, that however general the moral reform which may be effected by a Buddha, sooner or later the tide of evil will roll back as before, and the whole human race will sink back into the mire of sensuality, from which the Buddha came to free them. Not only morals, but, we are told, at last even civilisation and intelligence will also disappear. This will by and by necessitate the appearing of another Buddha to do the work of his predecessor over again. Yet he will achieve no more permanent success than Gautama Muni. Again will ensue the inevitable moral retrogression, till another Buddha shall appear. And so the dreary history is to go on and on repeating itself, for ever and for ever, till one cannot but feel that if this were indeed the truth, then Buddha *was* right after all, and *not* to be is better than to be, and to exist is verily the sum and source of all evil. All this can be abundantly proved, did space permit, from the Buddhist authorities themselves. The Rev. Mr. Hardy quotes from Mr. Turnour's translation of the Buddhist *Mahavanso*, the statement that in the interval between one Buddha and another, "not only does the religion of the preceding Buddhas become extinct, but the recollection and record of all preceding events are also lost." ²

With reference to the future of the earth itself, the Christian Scriptures plainly teach—as already remarked—that when the Lord Jesus shall return, the earth shall be visited with a general conflagration, issuing in the final destruction of the wicked from off the face of the earth. But this fiery visitation is not to result in the destruction of the planet as such, but is to be followed by the appearance of a new earth which shall

¹ Rev. xxi. 4.

² *Legends and Theories of the Buddhists*, p. 199.

be the abode of righteousness.¹ Nothing could be plainer than these words of the Apostle Peter :—

"The heavens that now are and the earth, by the same word"—which brought about the former destruction of the world by the waters of the deluge—"have been stored up for fire, being reserved against the day of judgment and destruction of ungodly men. . . . The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night ; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat, and the earth and the works that are therein, shall be burned up. . . . But, according to his promise, we look for a new heaven and a new earth wherein dwelleth righteousness."²

And so also Buddhism teaches a future destruction of the world by fire, and the appearance of a new earth after this present earth shall thus have passed away, wherein many have imagined that they have seen another point of coincidence, if not a genetic connection with the Christian doctrine. But like about all the fancied coincidences between the doctrines of the Christian Scriptures and the teachings of Buddhism, the supposed agreement disappears upon examination.

In the first place, while the Scriptures reveal only one such catastrophe in the future, the Buddhist scriptures predict an innumerable series of catastrophes of world-destruction followed by world-renovation. Of these it so happens that the Buddhists say that the next will be by fire ; but others will be by water ; others, again, by wind. The Rev. Mr. Hardy sums up the Buddhist teaching on this subject as follows :—

"The earth inhabited by men, with the various continents, *Lokas* and *Sakvālas* connected with it, is subject alternately to destruction and renovation, in a series of revolutions to which no beginning, no end, can be discovered. Thus it ever was ; thus it will be ever. There are three modes of destruction. The *Sakvālas* are destroyed seven times by fire, and the eighth time by water. Every sixty-fourth destruction is by wind."³

Thus, while the Scriptures teach a single destruction of the earth in the future, to be followed by a new earth which shall abide for ever, Buddhism teaches the very different doctrine of an unending series of destructions and renovations. Moreover, the Scriptures hold forth the prophecy of the new earth as full of hope and glory. As contrasted with the present earth, the new earth will be one wherein dwelleth righteousness. In it "there shall be no more curse."⁴ "The creation itself, also," as well as redeemed humanity, "shall be delivered from the

¹ 2 Pet. iii. 13 ; Rev. xxi. 1 *et seq.*

² *Manual of Buddhism*, 2d ed., p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Rev. xxii. 3.

bondage of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.”¹ As opposed to all this, Buddhism teaches that, both morally and physically, each of the new earths which shall after these great catastrophes succeed to one another will be like unto the earth which now is. As the next destruction of the world shall be produced by the wickedness of men as a moral cause, so shall it always be. In the next earth, men will again be produced and again go through a process of physical and moral degradation, only checked for a season, but not permanently arrested, by the appearance of another Buddha, till again the world shall be destroyed by reason of the wickedness of the men who inhabit it. “As the world is at first produced by the power of the united merit of all the various orders of beings in existence, so its destruction is caused by the power of their demerit.”² “Previous to the destruction by water, cruelty or violence prevails in the world; previous to that by fire, licentiousness; and previous to that by wind, ignorance.”³

So far from any agreement here, we thus find, as in everything previously noted, the most complete and total contrast. The Bible teaches us to look for a social regeneration of man upon the earth, and finally, the redemption of the earth itself from sin and the curse. Buddha saw no such bright prospect. As regards the race, his mission of redemption, so extolled by Buddhists and the apologists of Buddhism in Christian lands, according to the uniform teaching of the Buddhist authorities, was, from the first, certain to end in failure. The decay of morals would only be at the best checked for a little, but not stopped. And when at last, because of the wickedness of men, the world and all upon it would be destroyed by fire, then indeed, we are told that a new earth will appear, but *not* a new earth “wherein dwelleth righteousness.” It will be another earth just like this present, an earth wherein dwelleth sin, violence, and uncleanness. Again a new race of men shall go through the same long course of dreary and inevitable decline, which no Buddha ever to appear shall be able to prevent; and again shall come the awful world-catastrophe, wherein all shall perish. So shall it be, not once or twice,

¹ Rom. viii. 21.

² Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, 2d ed., p. 36.

³ *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 34. See also Pallegoix I., 430 and 475, and *A. Remusat*, 111; cited by Köppen: *Die Religion des Buddha*, p. 287.

but in unending cycles of sin and retribution, for ever and for ever. Where, in all this, is any analogy with the teaching of the Scriptures? And this is all the light which the Buddha had to shed upon the future, either for the individual or the race. The facts are indisputable, and may be verified by any one who will take the trouble to look up the authorities. The truth is, that so far from having in it, as Mr. Arnold ventures to assure us, "the eternity of a universal hope . . . and an indestructible element of faith in final good," these words express the most complete contradiction possible of the actual facts of the case. So far is this from being true, that, to us, it quite passes comprehension, how Mr. Arnold, or any man professing the familiarity that he does with accredited sources of knowledge on the subject, could have so amazingly overlooked or misunderstood the plainest and most matter-of-fact statements. The truth is that Buddhism, judged—not by the words of foreign expositors, intent, at all hazards, on making out an essential agreement between Buddhism and Christianity—but by the repeated and most explicit statements of its own recognised authorities, is one of the most uncompromising and unmitigated systems of pessimism that human intellect, in the deep gloom of its ignorance of Him who is the Light and the Life of men, has ever elaborated. What shall we say then of the many who, in our day, call upon us to recognise Buddhism as the Light of Asia, and thereby challenge a comparison of the doctrine of the Buddha with that of the Christ of God, of Him who is, in truth, the Light, not of Asia only, but of the whole world? To what have we come that in the full blaze of our boasted nineteenth century enlightenment, learned professors in Christian universities, poets and editors, men supposed to represent the intelligence of the age, can find it in them to extol and glorify a heathenism which is stamped with the confession of its own impotence, and condemned still more by an unvarying record of two thousand years of spiritual failure to regenerate a single tribe or people, and subdue the inborn evil of the human heart! Buddhism "the Light of Asia!" Can the Christian help recalling to mind those ancient words of the Holy Spirit of God by the prophet: "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil: that put darkness for light and light for darkness"?

S. H. KELLOGG.

ART. VII.—*Current Literature.*

IT is to be hoped that Mr. Sime's contribution to Jewish History will find the readers and receive the attention it deserves. Histories are of two kinds, descriptive and critical,—romances and essays, as Macaulay would say. *The Kingdom of All-Israel* (1), by the writer of the best *Life of Lessing*, is of the critical class, scientific and authoritative rather than literary and popular. Even readers who desire an interesting record of the days of Saul, David, and Solomon, which may be read half-nodding, will find much in this volume to instruct and please; but the book is for more studious readers, and will be best appreciated by those well read in the great critical questions which are at present agitating the ocean of Old Testament study. Mr. Sime aims to do for the early history of the Jews what Niebuhr did for the early history of the Romans, and, after a careful examination of the many knotty difficulties connected with the historical sources, to build up a narrative, with what interest is possible, upon reasoned data. His task is timely, and it has been well done. The form the book has taken has probably been suggested by the *Lectures on the Old Testament in the Jewish Church*, and *The Prophets of Israel*, for, following the model of these books, Mr. Sime intersperses his critical opinions in the midst of his consecutive narrative. Nor does Mr. Sime fall short when we ask for the picturesque detail, the brilliant local colouring, and the artistic grouping of material, which made the works of Robertson Smith so readable. The principles of method are deserving of notice. Two of them are so commonly acknowledged as to be unproductive. "The rules of historical research on which I have worked are those," says our author, "which have been applied in verifying the literature of Greece and Rome. Two of them were first stated in a book written eighteen hundred years ago to vindicate the truth of the Hebrew records. Josephus, a learned Jewish priest, was the author of that book; and the position he maintained was the necessity of public

(1) *The Kingdom of All-Israel: its History, Literature, and Worship.* By James Sime, M.A., F.R.S.E. London: James Nisbet & Co.

documents for an accurate history of any nation. This involved, first, a knowledge of the art of writing; and, second, the drawing up and the safe keeping of State papers." But that the Jews could write when they came out of Egypt, and that they would preserve their written annals, who would question? It is from the two remaining principles of Mr. Sime's method that he has reaped a rich harvest. Again let these principles be stated in his own language. "Besides these two great principles (just mentioned), science," he continues, "recognises a third, which gives life and coherence to all literature. Every nation has a fountain-head of thought, from which a living stream flows into the darkest corners of its history. Homer's poems are such a fountain-head; Shakespeare is another; the Pentateuch is a third. If, then, the Pentateuch be the chief source of Hebrew literature, living rills will be found running from it throughout the after-history, in words, in quotations, and in ideas." By working this vein of quotation, express and indirect, Mr. Sime has made some discoveries and accentuated many previous replies to the "critical" school. And his fourth rule, as he says, cannot be too strongly insisted on, that is, that "professional words" should be used "in the sense attached to them in the legal or historical books of a nation." In other words, Mr. Sime has endeavoured to trace the Book of Deuteronomy and the legal system of Leviticus in the earlier historical books of the Old Testament, and to trace these Mosaic writings, as he believes them, (1) by hunting for quotations of a more or less exact kind; and (2) by holding with a tenacious grasp to the technicalities of the Law. The result is that Mr. Sime has written what is, in our view, the finest reply yet given to the theory of Kuenen and Robertson Smith. Let any reader carefully go through, at any rate, the chapters on "Law and Legislation among the Hebrews," on the "Literature and Worship of the People," on "Deuteronomy—Antiquity of the Book," and on "Priests and Levites," and he will see several of the strongholds of "criticism" taken by criticism, at the same time that a remarkable defence of the orthodox theory of Jewish history is put forth.

Some of the positions advanced we cannot indorse; some are so new that they require a longer process of verification than we have yet been able to give; but so many of the con-

tentions are fully warranted by the evidence that no writer of the opposite side can ignore the book, and retain his character for a love of unbiassed inquiry into truth.

The Baird Lecture for 1882 (2) discusses a subject of growing interest with full information and rare sympathy. Professor Mitchell has already laid scholars under a debt of gratitude by his publication of *Minutes of the Westminster Assembly*, and the admirable preface whereby he introduced them. He has added largely to that debt by this excellent volume. No one can read it without gaining a remarkably clear insight into the times and circumstances which shaped one of the most remarkable compends of theology the world has ever known. We have long been convinced that a knowledge of the actual facts determining the form and contents of the Westminster Confession would be the best defence and also the best exposition of that much misunderstood document, and a perusal of this volume has done much to deepen that conviction into certainty.

We are not surprised that the historian of the early years of Christianity has been constrained to enter the field of apologetics. The arrogant claims advanced by Materialism have arrested his attention, and he bestirs himself to question the grounds on which they rest. He denies that Science has pronounced a final verdict on the world of mind and conscience, and maintains, what indeed even some eminent scientists who are not indisposed to Materialism have conceded, that "Science is not competent to affirm anything on questions of origin and of first principle." He has published an elaborate study of the problems of knowledge, being, and duty (3), in which he examines, with marked impartiality, the various theories which propose to dispense with the supernatural in human history and destiny. He has evidently taken much pains to acquaint himself with the modern attacks made on the Christian argu-

(2) *The Westminster Assembly: its History and Standards*. The Baird Lecture for 1882. By Alexander F. Mitchell, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews. London: James Nisbet and Co.

(3) *A Study of Origins; or, The Problems of Knowledge, of Being, and of Duty*. By E. de Pressensé, D.D. Translated by Annie Harwood Holmden. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

ment, and he calmly meets them with a confidence which his reasonings prove not to be without warrant. Altogether this volume forms a valuable *apologia*, both scientific and philosophic.

A companion volume has been published by the veteran ex-President of Oberlin College (4). Dissatisfied with ordinary histories of philosophy constructed on chronological lines, he has ventured to classify the various schools of thought as Idealistic, Naturalistic, Sceptical, or Realistic, and to subject them as so related to a close and searching criticism. Dr. Mahan has produced a very valuable because intelligible conspectus of philosophic thought, which, apart altogether from the theory which he himself adopts and advocates, is excellently adapted to the requirements of the student who is anxious to familiarise himself with the various phases in the history of philosophy. In a general introduction (which is also published separately) he states the problems of philosophy and indicates the method of study, and in subsequent sections he examines the Oriental philosophy, the Grecian, the early Christian, and the Modern. The whole of the second volume is devoted to the latter, and deals at considerable length with the modern phases of Materialism and Evolution.

Joseph Cook has returned from his voyage round the world, and has published from the Boston platform a full and interesting account of his observations and experiences. These are now embodied in a volume bearing the significant title, *Advanced Thought* (5). It goes without saying that most of his statements indicate ripeness of thought and acuteness of vision. There is hardly a dull sentence in the whole book, and whether we are inclined to accept or refuse his conclusions, we cannot refuse to acknowledge that the words of one whose width of culture is balanced by the profoundness of his reverence are entitled to the most careful consideration. It may interest our readers in this country to know his opinion on advanced thought in England and Scotland:—

(4) *A Critical History of Philosophy*. By Asa Mahan, D.D., LL.D. London: Elliot Stock.

(5) *Advanced Thought in Europe, Asia, Australia, etc.* By the Rev. Joseph Cook. London: Richard D. Dickinson.

"It is a characteristic of the more cultured circles in England, and especially in Scotland, to ridicule the vagueness, evasiveness, slatternliness, and untenableness of materialistic and diagnostic definitions of matter and life.

"You cannot live in the more cultured circles of Great Britain a month without greatly diminishing your respect for agnosticism and materialism. Yes ; but you say : 'England is the home of agnosticism.' So it is. 'The chief defenders of materialism are in Great Britain.' So they are ; but I am profoundly convinced, after conversations with the leaders of philosophical thought in University centres and elsewhere in the British Islands, that really advanced thinking in England is fundamentally anti-materialistic, anti-agnostic, and so really anti-Spencerian. You are sitting one day in Edinburgh, with a company of learned men, at table at dinner, and one of them says Herbert Spencer cannot read German. You think that must be a mistake, and turn to Professor Calderwood, and say : 'Is it true ? That is a strange assertion.' 'I have always understood it to be the truth.' You ask the views of the whole company, and find that not a man doubts the assertion. Agnosticism, as represented by Spencer, has a very poor following north of the Tweed. You are in the study of Lionel Beale one day in London, Herbert Spencer's home, and he says : 'That man's books contain so much false physiology that they will not be read ten years after his death, except as literary curiosities.' And Lionel Beale is supposed to know something of physiology. You are afterward in Germany, and you find that Herbert Spencer is regarded as a bright man, indeed ; but by no means as a leader of modern philosophical thought. In short, as compared with Herman Lotze, you hear Herbert Spencer called a charlatan. It pains you not a little to find that your own country has large circles that follow him so loyally. It pains you to find that there is a British materialistic school. One day you express this view in company to professors of Edinburgh and Glasgow, and one of them turns upon you somewhat sternly and says : 'There is no British materialistic school. Britain includes Scotland and England. There is no Scotch materialistic school. There is no English materialistic school. If there is any materialistic school in these islands, it is a London and a Cockney materialistic school.' This is Professor Tait, of Edinburgh. You hear the same sentiment expressed by Professor Veitch, of Glasgow, the biographer of Sir William Hamilton. But there is an Alexander Bain in Scotland, who defines matter, in the agnostic Spencerian way, as 'a double-faced somewhat, physical on one side and spiritual on the other.' You ask Lionel Beale what he thinks of this definition, and he says : 'It is obvious nonsense.' You quote that opinion to Professor Veitch or to a dozen others whom I will not have the pedantry to name, and you will find them all repudiating this central keystone of modern materialistic theories. I have been called a charlatan by Mr. Fiske, of Cambridge, for repudiating, in the name of clear ideas, the central tenets of the Spencerian philosophy. I will not call him a charlatan. He is the echo of a charlatan. He may be a man of vigour, but in philosophy he is in a Serbonian bog, and the more he struggles the more deeply he sinks. Give me the recent volume of Professor Bowne, of Boston University, a pupil of Lotze, rather than the work of any pupil of Herbert Spencer, who is not spoken of with profound intellectual

respect in the circles of the most advanced thought with which I have acquaintance in the Old World.

"Do not misunderstand me. This man has immense influence abroad. His scheme of thought is applied to all classes of subjects by a certain arrogant and noisy school of writers. But I am distinguishing between thought advanced enough to be really first class and that which is not more than third or fourth or fifth class.

"The conviction that we must upset natural law, and teach, not that the universe is governed by law, but only that it is governed according to law, is one of the profoundest scientific inspirations which British advanced thought offers to a lofty life.

"You are conversing with Lionel Beale in the manner once common in the days of George Combe, and not yet outgrown. 'Is it not fortunate,' you say, 'that this age knows so much of natural law? Ought we not to congratulate ourselves that humanity is coming to some real knowledge of the natural laws of the universe, and to a certain loyalty to them?' 'Yes,' answers this great physiologist; 'but what we need most is somebody to upset natural law.' What does he mean? Somebody to show that natural law, without God's will behind it, is nothing more in itself than a glove without a hand within it; somebody to prove that God is omnipresent in all natural forces; and that, as matter cannot move itself, all force must originate outside of matter; that is, from an omnipresent, infinite will. This was the doctrine of your own Professor Peires, the greatest American mathematician. Precisely this is what is held by Dr. Carpenter, who lately honoured this city by a course of lectures, and this platform by a magnificent address.

"Advanced thought in England insists on what Carlyle calls natural supernaturalism.

"I was amazed to find so little disturbance in the higher circles by agnosticism and materialism. Carlyle represents really advanced thought in this matter. I admit there is enough of the literature of agnosticism abroad; but, as an editor of a fortnightly review said, not long since, the articles the agnostics publish are more in the style of military ostentation than of earnest battle.

"The agnostics and the materialists keep their forces behind the hill of London journalism, and march them around and around the hill, and you think there is an immense army of them, for you never see the end. Many of our young editors here, a great number of smatterers in philosophy among literary men, hosts of graduates of our Universities, who have not mastered philosophy, think that the chief sign of the times is the marching of this little army around the top of the London height. It is visible to the eyes of the young Bengalees, of the young Japanese, of the young Chinese, of the young Australasian, and they far too often think this marching is the mighty tramp of modern progress.

"You go to London, you enter University circles, you come into contact with men like Clerk Maxwell, whose 'Life' I hold in my hand, and which has just dropped from the press, and you find that this style of philosophy, this agnosticism, this semi-materialistic and often practically atheistic speculation, is really not controlling the most advanced thought of the British

Islands, and especially not the most advanced thought of Germany. You know that Hæckel is one of the most persecuted men in Germany, simply because he is the defender of philosophical materialism. This Clerk Maxwell dies when you are in London. Who is he? Let Helmholtz tell you. Who is Helmholtz? Probably the foremost physicist in Germany. You have a conversation with him, months later, while in Germany, and he expresses his general accord with Lotze's philosophy, and his anxiety that the successor of Lotze should teach the anti-materialistic Lotzian philosophy. Helmholtz goes to London, to deliver a eulogy of Clerk Maxwell. The *élite* of the British scientific world listen to the address. Who is Clerk Maxwell? As devout a Christian as ever lay on a death-bed. A man equipped with a mathematical knowledge, which a Huxley and a Tyndall do not possess; a man discussing the old and the new atomic theory, crystallisation, the origin of life, and other similar topics that lie on the border-land between religion and science, from the point of view of the most exact research, and utterly repudiating agnosticism and accepting the supernatural. He is eulogised by Helmholtz for his scientific knowledge, placed on the pinnacle of scientific fame, and his theism is regarded as one of the greatest claims to scientific respect."

Few books are so well entitled to a place on the shelves of the expositor of Scripture as Dr. Bruce's systematic and critical study of the *Parables of our Lord* (6). When some of the chapters were published in the *Homiletic Magazine* they forcibly arrested our attention by their freshness and vigour. We then pointed out that "to a profound insight into the purpose of each parable there is added a remarkably wide acquaintance with the whole literature of the subject, recent and remote." We ventured also to add, "We know of no discussion of the Parables approaching this in completeness and excellence." Subsequent examination of the completed volume enables us to repeat this opinion with even more emphasis. It is what our American friends would call "a live book." We would not say a word in disparagement of Archbishop Trench's serviceable volume, but we do not hesitate to express our preference for the work produced by the Scotch Professor; and we are confident that those who possess both will at least confess that the latter, so far as practical usefulness is concerned, bears the palm. As an expositor of Scripture Dr. Bruce has already gained a good degree, and this new and singularly successful unfolding of the Parables makes us wish that he would leave the field of apologetics, in which his pain-

(6) *The Parabolic Teaching of Christ*. By A. B. Bruce, D.D. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

fully excessive desire to do the fullest justice to his opponents lays him open to the suspicion of his friends, for this larger and no less productive field in which he has proved himself already such an admirable and unexceptionable worker.

The relations between Science and Faith are not likely to be adjusted for a long time to come. This is not the fault of Faith. It simply results from a fact which many forget, but which few have the hardihood to deny, viz., a *definite* and *final* Science is yet far from being reached. Until scientific conclusions logically and exactly drawn from undeniable and sufficient premises are forthcoming, there need be no attempt at adjustment. On this account we have always steadily opposed any present scheme of reconciliation. We respect Science, and sympathise most earnestly with its cultivators. Only we confess to some impatience at times when students of Science press objections against Revelation, which objections are themselves founded on incomplete observations, and are only entitled at best to a provisional recognition.

The best work in defence of Scripture is to be done by a critical examination of the alleged facts and inferences which are adduced for its discredit. Of late, apologists who have specially dealt with the doubts suggested by Science, have learned this method. An excellent illustration of its serviceableness lies before us in the first volume of the *Theological Library* (7), which deals in detail with the following question: "Does Science aid Faith in regard to Creation?" The author, in the first instance, states the Christian Faith on the subject of Creation; and thereafter fully and satisfactorily examines the scientific aspects of Creation. The volume evidences a thorough acquaintance with the latest speculations of Science, and a clearness of thought competent to assign them their true value.

The second volume of the *Theological Library* proposes to answer the question, *Is Life worth Living?* (8). Many of our

(7) *Does Science aid Faith in regard to Creation?* By the Right Rev. Henry Cotterill, D.D., F.R.S.E. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

(8) *Life: Is it worth living?* By the Rev. John Marshall Lang, D.D., Minister of the Barony Parish, Glasgow. London: Hodder and Stoughton.

readers are aware that a book with the same title has already been published, and that it gave rise to some discussion. It could not be characterised as a strong book; nay, it was even throughout pervaded by a tone of hesitancy and uncertainty. Nevertheless we have reason to believe it has proved, in not a few cases, *unsettling*. Indeed, this *unsettlingment*, determined by various causes, is one of the gravest dangers of the present day, and there can be no better service rendered than a firm and faithful exposure of the unfairness and unjustness of the arguments by which this *unsettlingment* is produced. In the volume before us, Dr. Marshall Lang proves his appreciation of what our time needs, and supplies a valuable contribution to what we may call the *materia medica* of Christian Ethics. Both the style and spirit of the volume entitle it to hearty commendation, and it is specially fitted for our young men, as it is replete with honest thought and earnest purpose.

At His Feet (9) contains short practical and spiritual readings upon the words and life of our Lord.

Messrs. Hodder and Stoughton send us a handsomely got up and illustrated volume (10) by one whose name is a household word in this country and America. It is not, strictly speaking, an autobiography, but rather a *mélange*, containing reminiscences of people and places, and of the incidents the author has met with in his long and varied career. Mr. Gough has succeeded in producing a work of great interest, and one which cannot fail to do real service to the Temperance cause.

Mr. Brown's little book (11) is an interesting and popular explanation of the relation of the Tabernacle and its services to Christ and the Church, copiously illustrated, and well fitted to be useful and suggestive to teachers and preachers.

(9) *At His Feet. Daily Lessons in the Gospels for Devotional Use.* By the Rev. Stringer Rowe. London: Wesleyan Conference Office.

(10) *Sunlight and Shadow; or, Gleanings from my Life-work.* By John B. Gough. Hodder and Stoughton.

(11) *The Tabernacle of Israel, and its Priests and Sacrifices.* By William Brown. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson, and Ferrier.

From the RELIGIOUS TRACT SOCIETY we have received a new edition of *Bogatzky's Treasury*, with an excellent biographical sketch of the author, written by the Rev. John Kelly. Also :—

The Holy Spirit in Man: Some Aspects of His work as dwelling within the Believer. By Rev. A. Douglas M'Millan.

Though simple and unpretending, yet scriptural, devout, and instructive.

Romanism: a Doctrinal and Historical Examination of the Creed of Pope Pius IV. By Rev. Robert Charles Jenkins, M.A.

A serviceable contribution to the Romish controversy by a competent writer.

From ELLIOT STOCK :—

Sermons, Homiletical Expositions, and Leading Thoughts on Texts of Scripture. By Thomas Davies, M.A., Ph.D.

Not equal throughout; but containing many good thoughts well expressed.

Faith: the Life-root of Science, Philosophy, Ethics, and Religion. By H. Griffith, F.G.S.

Evidences wide reading and careful thought.

